Understanding Change in the Deutsche Telekom Group: The Problem of Organisational Learning at Top Management Level by Bungartz, Beate
Open Research Online
The Open University’s repository of research publications
and other research outputs
Understanding Change in the Deutsche Telekom
Group: The Problem of Organisational Learning at Top
Management Level
Thesis
How to cite:
Bungartz, Beate (2009). Understanding Change in the Deutsche Telekom Group: The Problem of Organisational
Learning at Top Management Level. PhD thesis The Open University.
For guidance on citations see FAQs.
c© 2009 The Author
Version: Version of Record
Copyright and Moral Rights for the articles on this site are retained by the individual authors and/or other copyright
owners. For more information on Open Research Online’s data policy on reuse of materials please consult the policies
page.
oro.open.ac.uk
Understanding Change in the Deutsche Telekom Group: 
The Problem of Organisational Learning at 
Top Management Level 
Beate Bungartz 
Submitted in fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of 
Doctor of Philosophy of The Open University 
Milton Keynes / United Kingdom 
The Open University 
_ .ý tßä a September 
2008 
d 
Table of Contents 
Table of Contents ............................................................................................................ 1 
Abstract ............................................................................................................................ 1 
Abbreviations .................................................................................................................. 2 
List of Tables ................................................................................................................... 3 
List of Figures .................................................................................................................. 5 
Chapter One - Setting the Scene .................................................................................... 6 
1.1 Introduction .......................................................................................................... 6 
1.2 Scope of the Thesis and the Need for New Empirical Work ............................. 7 
1.3 Structure of the Thesis ...................................................................................... 10 
Chapter Two - Existing Literature and Theory ............................................................ 12 
2.1 Introduction ........................................................................................................ 12 
2.2 Organisational Learning at Top Management Level - Conceptual Issues..... 13 
2.2.1 Roots of the Literature on Top-Level Organisational Learning (TLOL) ................ 13 
2.2.2 Top-Level Organisational Learning - Conceptual Differentiation ......................... 15 
2.2.2.1 Triggers of Organisational Learning at Top Management Level ................ 17 
2.2.2.2 The Top Management as Subjects of Organisational Learning ................. 19 
2.2.2.3 Individual versus Organisational Learning ................................................ 24 
2.2.2.4 A Dual Approach to Organisational Learning at Top Management Level.. 27 
2.2.3 Definition of the Concept of Top-Level Organisational Learning .......................... 29 
2.3 The Learning Organisation - Definition and Conceptual Differentiation ....... 31 
2.4 Specific Characteristics of Executive Work and Learning .............................. 34 
2.4.1 Introduction ......................................................................................................... 
34 
2.4.2 The Nature of Executive Work ............................................................................ 
35 
1 
-___ -ý 
2.4.3 Specific Features of Executive Learning ............................................................. 
36 
2.5 The Need for Unlearning ................................................................................... 41 
2.6 Methods and Styles of Organisational Learning at Top Management Level . 43 
2.6.1 Introduction 
......................................................................................................... 43 
2.6.2 Organisational Learning Styles at Management Level ........................................ 44 
2.6.3 Controlled Experimentation with Structures and Strategies ................................. 46 
2.6.3.1 Structures and Top-Level Organisational Learning ................................... 46 
2.6.3.2 Strategy and TLOL ................................................................................... 51 
2.6.4 Competency-Acquisition and TLOL ..................................................................... 53 
2.6.4.1 Changing the Composition of the Top Management ................................. 54 
2.6.4.2 Top Management Training ........................................................................ 58 
2.7 Drivers, Barriers and Disturbances of TLOL .................................................... 59 
2.7.1 Introduction ...................................................................................................... 59 
2.7.2 Exogeneous Drivers and Barriers of TLOL ....................................................... 
60 
2.7.3 Factors that Foster or Hinder TLOL at Organisational Level ............................. 
61 
2.7.4 Drivers and Barriers to TLOL at Top Management Level .................................. 
62 
2.7.5 Individual Drivers and Barriers of TLOL ............................................................ 
65 
2.7.6 Overarching Drivers and Barriers of TLOL ....................................................... 
66 
2.8 Conceptual Framework and Research Questions ........................................... 67 
2.8.1 Introduction ...................................................................................................... 
67 
2.8.2 Conceptual Framework .................................................................................... 
68 
2.8.3 Theoretical Gaps and Research Questions ...................................................... 
70 
Chapter Three - Research Methodology ..................................................................... 73 
3.1 Introduction ........................................................................................................ 73 
3.2 Scientific Frame of Reference ........................................................................... 73 
11 
3.3 Philosophical Stance ......................................................................................... 76 
3.4 Quantitative versus Qualitative Research ........................................................ 79 
3.5 Theory Building versus Theory Testing ........................................................... 81 
3.6 Selection of the Research Design ..................................................................... 82 
3.7 Doing Case Study Research ............................................................................. 82 
3.7.1 Introduction ...................................................................................................... 82 
3.7.2 The Aim and Features of Case Study Research .............................................. 
83 
3.7.3 Case Study Selection and Design .................................................................... 84 
3.7.4 Specific Issues Concerning Research on Top-Level Organisational Learning.. 87 
3.7.4.1 Doing Research on Organisational Learning ............................................ 88 
3.7.4.2 Effectiveness of Organisational Learning .................................................. 
90 
3.7.5 Validity, Reliability, Generalisability and the Issue of Triangulation ................... 94 
3.8 Data Collection ................................................................................................... 98 
3.8.1 Introduction ......................................................................................................... 
98 
3.8.2 Selection of Research Methods ........................................................................ 
98 
3.8.3 Timing of Data Collection ............................................................................... 
102 
3.8.4 The Top Management as the Research Cohort .............................................. 105 
3.8.5 Research Methods ......................................................................................... 
108 
3.8.5.1 Interviews ............................................................................................... 
108 
3.8.5.2 Documentation and Archival Sources ..................................................... 117 
3.8.5.3 Observation ............................................................................................ 
119 
3.9 Data Analysis ................................................................................................... 121 
3.10 Doing Research as an Internal ........................................................................ 125 
3.10.1 Introduction .................................................................................................... 
125 
3.10.2 The Researcher as the Research Instrument ................................................. 127 
3.10.3 The Access Problem ...................................................................................... 
128 
111 
3.10.4 Lived Experience of the Organisation ............................................................. 
132 
3.10.5 Organisational and Researcher Roles ............................................................ 134 
3.10.6 Ethical Issues and Insider Research on TLOL ................................................ 136 
3.10.7 Advantages and Disadvantages of Doing Research as an Internal ................ 140 
3.11 Conclusion ....................................................................................................... 141 
Chapter Four - Organisational Learning at Top Level in the Case Organisation .... 145 
4.1 Introduction ...................................................................................................... 145 
4.2 Profile of the DT Group Case Organisation ................................................... 146 
4.2.1 Deutsche Telekom as a Public Authority ....................................................... 146 
4.2.2 Deutsche Telekom's Learning Challenges .................................................... 
147 
4.2.3 Deutsche Telekom's Organisational Structure in 2002 .................................. 148 
4.2.4 The Four Cases at a Glance ......................................................................... 151 
4.2.5 Deutsche Telekom's Financial Performance and Assets Analysis ................. 153 
4.3 Profile of the DT Group's Top Management ................................................... 155 
4.3.1 DT's Top Management at the Start of the Period under Review (1990) .......... 157 
4.3.2 DT's Top Management at the End of the Period under Review (2002) ........... 160 
4.3.2.1 "Lost" Knowledge at Top Level ............................................................... 163 
4.3.2.2 "New" Knowledge at Top Level .............................................................. 166 
4.4 The "Fixed-Network" Case .............................................................................. 168 
4.4.1 Introduction .................................................................................................... 
168 
4.4.2 Background to the "Fixed Network" Case ....................................................... 168 
4.4.2.1 Business Strategy of the "Fixed Network" Business ................................ 169 
4.4.2.2 Top Management and Organisation of the "Fixed Network" Business ... 170 
4.4.3 Approaches to TLOL in the "Fixed Network" Case ......................................... 173 
4.4.3.1 Approaches to TLOL prior to Privatisation (1990-1995) .......................... 174 
4.4.3.2 Approaches to TLOL after Privatisation (Starting from 1995) .................. 178 
iv 
4.4.4 Summary of the "Fixed Network" Case .......................................................... 187 
4.5 The "IUlobile/Online" Case ............................................................................... 190 
4.5.1 Introduction 
.................................................................................................... 190 
4.5.2 Background to the "Mobile/Online" Case ....................................................... 190 
4.5.2.1 Business Strategy of the "Mobile/Online" Business ................................ 190 
4.5.2.2 Top Management and Organisation of the "Mobile/Online" Business ..... 192 
4.5.3 Approaches to TLOL in the "Mobile/Online" Case .......................................... 194 
4.5.4 Summary of the "Mobile/Online" Case ............................................................ 203 
4.6 The "Systems" Case ........................................................................................ 205 
4.6.1 Introduction .................................................................................................... 205 
4.6.2 Background to the "Systems" Case ................................................................ 206 
4.6.2.1 Business Strategy of the "Systems" Business ......................................... 206 
4.6.2.2 Top Management and Organisation of the "Systems" Business ............. 207 
4.6.3 Approaches to TLOL in the "Systems" Case .................................................. 209 
4.6.4 Summary of the "Systems" Case .................................................................... 215 
4.7 The "Headquarters" Case ............................................................................... 216 
4.7.1 Introduction .................................................................................................... 216 
4.7.2 Background to the "Headquarters" Case ........................................................ 217 
4.7.2.1 Corporate Strategy ................................................................................. 217 
4.7.2.2 Top Management and Organisation of DT's Headquarters ..................... 218 
4.7.3 Approaches to TLOL in the "Headquarters" Case ........................................... 220 
4.7.4 Summary of the "Headquarters" Case ............................................................ 232 
4.8 Conclusion ....................................................................................................... 234 
Chapter Five - Case Analysis & Synthesis ................................................................ 239 
5.1 Introduction ...................................................................................................... 
239 
V 
5.2 Exogeneous Factors ........................................................................................ 240 
5.2.1 Market Forces 
................................................................................................ 241 
5.2.2 Legal Constraints 
........................................................................................... 248 
5.2.3 Summary Component Exogeneous Factors 
................................................... 254 
5.3 Strategy ............................................................................................................ 255 
5.3.1 Strategy and Methods of Top-Level Organisational Learning ......................... 257 
5.3.2 Business versus Corporate Strategies ........................................................... 262 
5.3.3 Strategy Development in Divisionalised Firms ................................................ 265 
5.3.4 Summary Component Strategy ...................................................................... 269 
5.4 Organisation ..................................................................................................... 270 
5.4.1 Complexity of the Organisation and Top-Level Organisational Learning ........ 271 
5.4.1.1 The Impact of Size and Age of the Organisation ..................................... 271 
5.4.1.2 Cultural Constraints ................................................................................ 277 
5.4.2 Formal Organisation and Top Level Organisational Learning ......................... 281 
5.4.3 Frequency of Organisational Change ............................................................. 286 
5.4.4 Availability of Financial and Relational Resources .......................................... 290 
5.4.4.1 Financial Resources and Top-Level Organisational Learning ................. 291 
5.4.4.2 Learning Implications of the'T'-Brand ..................................................... 295 
5.4.5 Summary Component Organisation ............................................................... 297 
5.5 Top Management ............................................................................................. 298 
5.5.1 Preconditions for Top-Level Organisational Learning ..................................... 299 
5.5.2 Top Management Resources ......................................................................... 304 
5.5.2.1 Locus and Structure of the Top Management ......................................... 306 
5.5.2.2 Composition of the Top Management ..................................................... 
309 
5.5.2.3 Behavioural Integration of the Top Management .................................... 320 
5.5.3 Summary Component Top Management .......................................................... 328 
vi 
5.6 Summary of Key Findings ............................................................................... 330 
5.7 Dynamic Interrelationships ............................................................................. 332 
Chapter Six - Conclusions and Implications ............................................................ 335 
6.1 Introduction ...................................................................................................... 335 
6.2 Theoretical Contributions and Implications ................................................... 337 
6.2.1 A Resources-Perspective on TLOL ................................................................ 339 
6.2.1.1 Factors in the Top Management's External Learning Context .................... 340 
6.2.1.2 Factors in the Top Management's Organisational Learning Context .......... 344 
6.2.2 An Actors-Perspective on TLOL ....................................................................... 350 
6.2.2.1 TLOL through Experimentation .................................................................. 354 
6.2.2.2 TLOL through Competency-Acquisition ...................................................... 356 
6.2.3 An Integrated Approach to TLOL in Fast-Changing Environments ................. 
361 
6.3 Implications for Practice ................................................................................. 367 
6.3.1 TLOL and Off-The-Job Learning .................................................................... 367 
6.3.2 TLOL and On-The-Job Learning .................................................................... 
368 
6.3.3 Summary of Implications for Practice ............................................................. 
372 
6.4 Methodological Contribution and Implications .............................................. 373 
6.4.1 The Top Management as the Research Cohort .............................................. 374 
6.4.2 Conceptual Framework of TLOL .................................................................... 375 
6.4.3 Doing Academic Research on TLOL as an Insider ......................................... 375 
6.4.4 Research of Organisational Learning ............................................................. 379 
6.5 Limitations and Future Directions of Research ............................................. 381 
6.6 Final Summary ................................................................................................. 386 
References ................................................................................................................... 
388 
vii 
Acknowledgements 
During all the years of work on my PhD as a part-time student, there were not merely 
intellectual challenges, but also those requiring considerable perseverance. The process 
of completing this thesis was by no means smooth, with the many demands of work and 
life presenting themselves along the way. I could not have edged my way towards 
completion without the assistance, support and inspiration of many colleagues, social 
relations and loved ones. I am grateful for all their contributions, although the limitations 
of space enable only a few to be mentioned explicitly. 
My deepest intellectual debt goes to my supervisors, Prof. John Storey and Prof. Paul 
Quintas, both from Open University Business School. They gave me the opportunity to do 
this thesis as an overseas part-time student and inspired much of my thinking during the 
various stages of my PhD. Their open-mindedness and constructive comments have 
influenced my ideas, the design and execution of this study. They have been a wealth of 
continual encouragement, inspiration, patience and help throughout this research. 
I wish to thank Deutsche Telekom who gave me the opportunity to realise my PhD as a 
part-time student and supported me in many ways. I extend enormous thanks to all 
interviewees, who kindly shared their personal experience and knowledge, for the time 
they spent on my questions and interviews, as well as for the abundance of documents 
made available. 
Special thanks go to my (former) superiors Kyra Orth of 'Deutsche Telekom, and Michel 
Dessarthe and Christoph Slabik of the Cegelec Group, who were so understanding about 
my academic research and gave me support for it in many respects. Without them, I 
could not have successfully completed this study. 
Vill 
extend enormous thanks to my parents Christian and Berta Lux, my family and friends 
for understanding that I did not have as much time for them as I would have liked. I 
cannot express enough appreciation to them for their steadfast encouragement and 
understanding through the years of my neglect and preoccupation. 
Finally, I would like to express my deepest thanks to my wonderful husband Thomas for 
his boundless love and support. Many inspiring discussions and his unwavering 
encouragement helped me through this long and lonely endeavour. Without him, I could 
not have successfully completed this thesis. This dissertation is dedicated to him. 
ix 
Declaration 
This thesis represented in accordance with the regulations for the degree of Doctor of 
Philosophy (Ph. D) of The Open University, Milton Keynes. The work described in this 
thesis is entirely original and my own, unless otherwise indicated. None of the material 
contained hereafter has been submitted for a degree at any other university. The 
interpretations in this thesis are the sole responsibility of the author, and do not in any 
way represent the views of the case company or The Open University. 
X 
Abstract 
Performance and sustainability of a company are often viewed as being strongly 
influenced by its top management. And yet, despite a rich literature in the field of 
organisational learning, little is known about how the top management of a company 
acquires and maintains the knowledge of "how to run the business", especially in fast- 
changing environments. This study focuses on Deutsche Telekom as it sought to 
transform itself during a turbulent period from a traditional operator into an international, 
diverse business player. 
This work seeks to extend the theory and understanding of organisational learning to this 
particular group of people at the apex of the organisation and contributes to the debate of 
top-level organisational learning (TLOL) as a dynamic capability. The study, which is 
based upon longitudinal, qualitative research, featuring separate cases embedded within 
a single, large organisation, explores the methods and outcomes of TLOL. Comparative 
cases in different organisational settings and business contexts, at corporate and at 
divisional level, were used in this diversified organisation to empirically investigate the 
deployed initiatives and methods as well as drivers of and barriers to TLOL. 
The research contributes to and expands upon current theory by providing empirical 
evidence that the interplay between exogenous factors, strategy, the characteristics of 
the organisation and of the top management group shapes the methods used for TLOL. It 
provides evidence of the link between learning method and organisational outcomes. The 
study finds that in the turbulent environment described, the deployed methods for TLOL 
in the mature part of the organization differed substantially from the learning methods 
used in the young, fast-growing divisions. The learning methods used did, however, not 
produce exclusively positive results. Finally, by developing a new conceptual framework, 
the study allows researchers and management to systematically examine and shape top- 
level organisational learning within their own organisations. 
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Chapter One - Setting the Scene 
1.1 Introduction 
Although one can read much in these times about companies that are undergoing 
fundamental change, hardly any other market is subjected to such an enormous dynamic 
as the telecommunications industry. 
In Germany, for decades the telecommunications market was dominated by a state- 
owned and -governed monopolist, which operated under the constitutional requirement to 
provide an infrastructural service, and which was run predominantly by technically skilled 
civil servants. The liberalisation of the telecommunications market, globalisation, 
increasing customer expectations, cost competition and privatisation required 
fundamentally altering the overall orientation and alignment of Deutsche Telekom, the 
leading telecommunication company in Europe. This confronted the top management' 
with a series of challenges with particular constraints along the way. 
Firstly, the shift from a domestically-oriented, `stand-alone' traditional operator in a mature 
market to a player in the telecommunications industry of international reach and with 
subsidiaries in fast growing and highly competitive new markets. This presupposed the 
transfer of the company to a private stock-corporation, allowing Deutsche Telekom to 
engage in international joint ventures, from which it had been (partly) withheld by its 
constitutional mandate. 
The second challenge consisted in the radical change of the cumbersome, bureaucratic, 
technical-oriented organisation towards a flexible, efficient and customer-oriented 
company. This raised particular questions, given that a very significant share of 
employees2 remained `Beamte' (civil servants) on `permanent loan' to Deutsche Telekom, 
with their employment conditions still determined by parliamentary legislation, unrestricted 
1 For the definition of the 'top management' it is refered to section 3.8.4. 
2 In 2002 still ca. 50% of all employees in Germany. 
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employment security and their status retained for life3. And finally, it was sought to 
achieve a fundamental cultural change from sovereign to customer- and shareholder- 
oriented behaviour. 
But how to do what a former member of Deutsche Telekom's supervisory board called 
"leading the elephant" ? (Glotz 2001, p. 96) How should the top management tackle the 
problem of transforming Deutsche Telekom during a turbulent period into a private 
competitive, globally acting stock-corporation? And how should the top management 
themselves acquire and maintain the knowledge of `how to run such a business'? 
Inspired by existing theories in the field of top-level organisational learning (TLOL), the 
position advanced in this thesis is that adapting to such radical change, as at Deutsche 
Telekom, requires learning by and facilitated by the top management which is reflected in 
observable actions and changes of behaviour of the top management and its 
organisational environment. 
1.2 Scope of the Thesis and the Need for New Empirical Work 
The vast, partly confusing and little-integrated organisational learning literature consisting 
of a prescriptive and an analytical or descriptive stream shows that the subject of `how to 
deal with strategic change' has been a central research topic for several decades. 
Although, the prescriptive branch of literature on the 'learning organisation' (Senge 1990) 
aims at improving organisational performance by means of showing how organisations 
should learn, no veridical knowledge about organisational learning has been produced so 
In Germany from the day of their appointment, Beamte (civil servants) cannot be dismissed except for very 
serious disciplinary offences. The legal determination of their employment also includes training, the 
structure of career progression, and their (at least theoretically) functional and geographic mobility. 
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far. This can be attributed to the fact that it is based primarily on practical experience and 
knowledge of consultants and practitioners instead of theoretical and empirical research. 
In contrast to that, most of the debates in the analytical stream of organisational learning 
literature centre on the different concepts and opinions concerning the players, 
processes, outcomes and interdependencies between different learning levels of 
organisational learning, but fail to come to a common agreement on the very definition of 
the concept of organisational learning itself (see e. g. Fiol and Lyles 1985, Tsang 1997). 
And although it can be assumed that the concepts of strategic change, organisational 
learning and top managers must be a central part of any explanatory theory, if scholars 
wish to understand why organisations behave and perform the way they do, this area 
remains relatively unexplored. 
Based upon two streams of literature of the elitist approach of organisational learning 
(e. g. Hambrick 1994, Finkelstein and Hambrick 1996, Richter 1999), which fired the 
interest in this research and the search for an integrated approach, this study seeks to 
contribute to fill this salient gap. 
The first of these two streams of literature comprehends the top managers as `actors' or 
agents of learning who undertake actions. It is not surprising that existing theories assign 
a key role and task to top managers with regard to the management of strategic change. 
Richter (1999) finds, however, based upon the research on the nature of executive work 
(Mintzberg 1973), that most learning of top managers was unintended or accidental and a 
by-product of the executives' work. An understanding of the nature of executive work 
been produced (see Barnard 1938, Mintzberg 1973) but apart from the fact ".. that the 
bulk of managers' learning takes place in the work place, as a result of their work and role 
activities" (Antonacopoulou 2002, p. 5), and that the top management and the 
organisation form an inseparable learning community that can mutually support or hinder 
8 
each other (Klimecki 1997), still little is known about the interplay between top 
management and its learning environment and the creative and interactive process of 
top-level organisational learning. Due to that and in the absence of standardised 
responses to strategic change, numerous authors such as Richter (1999)) or Kammel 
(2000, p. 337) express concern about the lack of specific empirical research on methods 
and outcomes of top-level organisational learning. 
In the mentioned second stream of literature that is derived from the upper echelons-/ 
strategic leadership theory (Hambrick and Mason 1984, Finkelstein and Hambrick 1996), 
top managers are rather comprehended as resources and the literature and research 
investigates if executives matter and what effects top executives, including the wide set of 
experiences they bring to their positions, have on organisations, especially those that 
undergo strategic change. Hambrick and Mason (1984), as two of the most influential 
proponents of that literature, come to the conclusion that strategies and effectiveness are 
reflections of the cognitive bases of powerful actors in the organisation. So if the actors 
change, so do the organisational strategies and outcomes. Also academic scholars of 
other disciplines (e. g. dynamic capabilities and absorptive capacity: Eisenhardt and 
Martin 2000, Zollo and Winter 2002, Zahra et at. 2006, Zahra and George 2002) view the 
role of the top management and the influence exercised by top managers to be key in 
understanding the way organisations adapt to their environment. 
However, executive actions-and thus learning-are only reflected in organisational 
outcomes when there is high managerial discretion (Finkelstein and Hambrick 1996), 
which is in turn strongly influenced by the interplay between the top management and its 
external and organisational learning environment. This again is still a less explored area, 
which requires further empirical investigation. 
9 
The objective of this study is to contribute to fill this gap and to render a contribution 
towards a better understanding of methods and outcomes of TLOL. Based upon Berends 
et al. 's' (2003) suggestion to abandon consideration of individuals and the organisation 
as two separate subjects of learning and to replace it by two ways of considering the 
social phenomenon of organisational learning, which differentiates between the agents of 
learning and organisational references for analytic reasons only, this study attempts to 
contribute to the integration of the different streams of literature in this field. 
1.3 Structure of the Thesis 
Before the relevant literature is reviewed, it is necessary to gain an understanding of the 
environment underlying the research. The remainder of this thesis is structured as 
follows: 
Chapter two highlights the current debates in the literature that are relevant to the 
proposed research. Likewise, issues essential to the inquiry of TLOL will be examined. 
Based upon that, a conceptual framework will be derived from the literature review, and 
knowledge gaps in the literature as well as researchable questions to be explored in this 
research will be identified. 
Chapter three systematically derives the research design and methodology utilised to 
explore the research phenomenon. Beyond general methodological debates on the 
philosophical stance, research paradigm, design and corresponding strengths and 
limitations, an attempt is made to tie the methodological concerns and dilemmas related 
to the concrete research questions and the role of the researcher together. Having 
discussed some specific methodological issues resulting from doing research on top-level 
organisational learning, research methods and the strategy and process 
for data analysis 
are considered in order to demonstrate the trail of evidence. 
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Chapter four outlines the four cases of the study consisting of one corporate (i. e. DT 
Headquarters) and three business organisations (i. e. Fixed network, Mobile/Online- and 
Systems businesses). After a short look at each case organisation's history and 
characteristics, the case-specific findings are provided and finally summarised at the end. 
In chapter five, based upon the analysis of data collected from the four case studies, it is 
sought to find explanations for these patterns. Comparisons are drawn with existing 
literature and theories outlined in chapter two. 
Finally, chapter six concludes the thesis. Theoretical, practical and methodological 
contributions and implications are addressed as well as research limitations. Future 
research directions and opportunities for further investigation are elaborated. 
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Chapter Two - Existing Literature and Theory 
2.1 Introduction 
As mentioned in the introductory chapter and as can be taken from Harvey and Denton's 
(1999) empirical study on the emergence of the prescriptive and analytical theories of 
organisational learning, a series of challenges inspired by strategic change and 
fundamental changes in the nature and intensity of competition triggered the broad 
scientific and practical interest in the concept. Although there is relatively little dedicated 
literature on organisational learning at top management level, it will be shown in this 
chapter that there are strong links between the vast and little-integrated different streams 
of literature on organisational learning and the top management. Hence, the concept of 
top-level organisational learning is seen in this study as a valid and logical response to 
the ever more rapid pace of change in the business environment and the increasing 
importance of capabilities and knowledge at top management level as a primary source of 
competitive advantage. 
The objective of the following chapter is to present and discuss the current debates of 
top-level organisational learning (TLOL) in the literature and to show how this study 
relates to other work in the field. It is the thesis writer's version of the literature and is 
directed at summarising, evaluating, clarifying and/or integrating the content of primary 
reports in the fields of organisational learning with a particular view on the top 
management (following Cooper 1988, p. 107). 
The literature review starts after a quick glance at the historical development of the 
concept of organisational learning with a comprehensive consideration of conceptual 
issues and the definition of the concept of top-level organisational learning as it will be 
used in this study. As will be shown, this is a basic precondition for understanding the 
nature of TLOL and so is of particular importance when doing research in this field. It will 
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also contribute to the identification of starting points as well as potential outcomes of 
organisational learning at top management level. The conceptual issues will be followed 
by a critical review and discussion of the writing of relevance on TLOL. This will lead to a 
series of research questions which will be investigated in more detail in the empirical part 
of this study. 
2.2 Organisational Learning at Top Management Level - Conceptual Issues 
2.2.1 Roots of the Literature on Top-Level Organisational Learning (TLOL) 
The concept of TLOL is composed of two basic building blocks, i. e. the `top management' 
and `organisational learning'. Although, as will be shown below, they often do not refer to 
each other in an explicit way, they are characterised by a salient parallel historical 
development which deserves attention. 
The concept of organisational learning thus refers to the notion of organisations as 
learning systems, which can be traced to Taylor (1911), who believed that when 
management `truths' were articulated and measured, this learning could be transferred to 
other employees and thus improve the efficiency of the organisation. The concept of 
organisational learning itself was first mentioned in the early 1950s-against the 
background of this study interestingly in reference to the birth and death of public 
administrations (Simon 1953)-and was further refined by March and Simon in the late 
1950s (March and Simon 1958). Some researchers and theorists became attracted by 
the idea (e. g. Argyris 1957; Argyris 1964; Cyert and March 1963; Cangelosi and Dill 
1965), but it took some time until a regular stream of articles and books became to flow. It 
needed several influential works (e. g. Argyris and Schoen 1978; Hedberg 1981; Fiol and 
Lyles 1985) until the attention of scholars from disparate disciplines, from theorists and 
practitioners was attracted, and a flood of publications, of academic and applied articles 
and books has been released in the past 20 years in the field (e. g. Levitt and March 
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1988; Senge 1990; Epple et al. 1991, Cook and Yanow 1993; Levinthal and March 1993; 
Schein 1993, Nonaka 1994; Pedler 1994; Tsang 1997; Berthoin Antal et al. 2001b; 
Friedman et al. 2001). 
Academic interest in top management, with the most important percentage of literature 
and research concentrating on CEOs and top management teams of a very limited size, 
underwent a similar development. After first remarkable work in the 1950s and 1960s 
(e. g. Barnard 1938; Selznick 1957; Chandler 1962), some of the most inspiring articles 
and studies were published in the 1970s and 1980s (e. g. Child 1972; Mintzberg 1973; 
Kotter 1982; Hambrick and Mason 1984) and brought about a rise in the prominence of 
top management literature (see e. g. Wiersema and Bantel 1992; Hambrick 1994; 
Finkelstein and Hambrick 1996; Miller et al. 1998). 
Although one might find that this historical development happened by happenstance, 
today's organisational learning literature and research rather indicates that the concepts 
of `organisational learning' and the `top management' are somehow interrelated. Although 
this will be considered in greater detail in section 2.2.2.2 it is also confirmed by the 
current organisational learning literature and research which is anchored in an increasing 
number of scientific scholarships and disciplines such as strategy, top management 
learning, strategic leadership, organisation and management development, knowledge 
management, organisation studies and organisational behaviour research that places a 
particular emphasis on the meaning or role of the top management. 
Against that background it might be no surprise that there is no agreement in the 
literature as regards a common definition of the concept of top-level organisational 
learning. Hence, a more in-depth consideration is required, which will now follow in the 
next sections. 
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2.2.2 Top-Level Organisational Learning - Conceptual Differentiation 
There is a particular need for defining the concept of TLOL which will be used for the 
purpose of this study as it is symptomatic of the dynamics of the development of the field 
that the one element on which there is no agreement in the literature is the definition of 
organisational learning itself. The very definition of organisational learning is subject to 
controversy and flux (Berthoin Antal et al. 2001b, p. 921). Tsang even stated: ".... 
definitions are as many as there are writers on the subject. " (Tsang 1997, p. 75) and so 
the conclusion that Fiol and Lyles drew in 1985 is still valid: 
"Although there exists widespread acceptance of the notion of organizational 
learning and its importance to strategic performance, no theory or model of 
organizational learning is widely accepted" (Fiol and Lyles 1985, p. 803). 
The heterogeneous definitions result on the one hand from a fundamental dichotomy 
between prescriptive approaches brought in by practitioners and consultants and the 
descriptive and analytic theories of scientists. On the other hand, this variety of definitions 
is emanating from different concepts and opinions concerning the players in 
organisational learning, relationships and interdependencies between different learning 
levels 4 (i. e. `who learns? '), different opinions concerning processes and learning 
mechanisms (i. e. `how do organisations learn? ') and their efficiency as well as learning 
results (i. e. `when do organisations learn and with what results? '). Hence, it will not be 
possible here to provide a comprehensive review of the different approaches to 
organisational learning. And so the table below can just provide a faint idea of the large 
variety of definitions of the concept of organisational learning. 
Learning levels correspond to individual, team, organisation, environment. 
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Author Definition of organisational learning 
Argyris and Schön "Organizational learning occurs when individuals within an 
(1996) organization experience a problematic situation and inquire into 
it on the organization's behalf. They experience a surprising 
mismatch between expected and actual results of action and 
respond to the mismatch through a process of thought and 
further action that leads them to modify their images of 
organization or their understandings of organizational 
phenomena and to restructure their activities so as to bring 
outcomes and expectations into line, thereby changing 
organizational theory-in-use. In order to become organizational, 
the learning that results from organizational inquiry must become 
embedded in the images of organization held in its members' 
minds and/or in the epistemological artefacts (the maps, 
memories, and programs) embedded in the organizational 
environment" (Argyris and Schön 1996, p. 16). 
Hedberg "Learning takes place when organizations interact with their 
(1981) environment: organizations increase their understanding of 
reality by observing the results of their action" 
(Hedberg 1981, p. 3). 
Fiol and Lyles "Organizational learning means the process of improving actions 
(1985) through better knowledge and understanding" 
(Fiol and Lyles 1985, p. 803). 
Huber "An entity learns if, through its processing of information, the 
(1991) range of its potential behaviours is changed" 
(Huber 1991, p. 89). 
March and Olsen "Organizations ... learn from experience. 
They act, observe, and 
(1976) draw implications for future action" 
(March and Olsen 1976, p. 67). 
Dodgson "Learning .... can be 
described as the ways firms build, 
(1993) supplement and organize knowledge and routines around their 
activities and within their cultures, and adapt and develop 
organizational efficiency by improving the use of the broad skills 
of their workforces" (Dodgson 1993, p. 377). 
Levitt and March " ... Organizations are seen as 
learning by encoding inferences 
(1988) from history into routines that guide behaviour" 
(Levitt and March 1988, p. 320). 
Duncan and Weiss "The dominant coalition represents 
those organizational 
(1979) members who at any point in time have the power to influence 
the strategies, goals, and design of the organization... 
Organizational learning thus becomes that process in the 
organization through which members of the dominant coalition 
develop, over time, the ability to discover, when organizational 
changes are required and what changes can be undertaken 
which they believe will succeed... " 
(Duncan and Weiss 1979, p. 77-78). 
"Organizational learning can be understood as the process 
within the organization by which knowledge about action- 
outcome relationships and he effect of the environment of these 
relationships is developed" (Duncan and Weiss 1979, p. 84). 
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Berends et al. (2003) "... we... define learning as the process of changing the range of 
an entity's (potential) behaviour based on the development of its 
knowledge" (Berends et al. 2003, p. 12). 
Friedman et al. "" .. 
is a process of inquiry (often in response to errors or 
(2001) anomalies) through which members of an organization develop 
shared values and knowledge based on past experience of 
themselves and of others" 
(Friedman et al. 2001, p. 757). 
Tannenbaum "A change in an organization's capacity for doing something 
(1997) new" (Tannenbaum 1997, p. 438). 
Cook and Yanow "... when a group acquires the know-how which enables it to 
(1993) carry out its collective activities" 
(Cook and Yanow 1993, p. 13). 
Table 1: Concepts of Organisational Learning 
For further definitions of the concept of organisational learning, reference is made to 
numerous authors who have attempted to map and cluster the rich organisational 
learning literature in many ways (e. g., Shrivastava 1983; Fiol and Lyles 1985; Levitt and 
March 1988; Huber 1991; Dodgson 1993; Levitt and March 1988; Cohen and Sproull 
1996; Easterby-Smith et al. 1997,2008c; Huysman 1999). But also none of these reviews 
is able provide an exhaustive view on the concept of organisational learning. 
The reasons for that will become clear in the following sections on the concept of TLOL 
where the views held in the literature that shaped the concept of TLOL as it is used for 
the purpose of this study will be considered in greater detail. 
2.2.2.1 Triggers of Organisational Learning at Top Management Level 
As already described in the introductory section of the literature review about the 
historical development of TLOL, the concept of organisational learning is above all viewed 
as a response to the accelerated rate of change and so to exogenous influences. The 
founding fathers of the concept (Cyert and March 1963; March and Olsen 1975; Argyris 
and Schoen 1978) considered organisational learning as an adaptive behaviour of 
organisations over time. Cyert and March (1963) comprehended organisational 
learning 
as the response to changes in the environment of the organisation and described 
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organisational learning as a result of decision making processes in which decision 
makers learn by trial and error what can be done. Argyris and Schön (1978) considered 
organisational learning as a consequence of the detection of organisational errors and 
anomalies and distinguished-according with the way to detect and correct errors-three 
types of organisational learning (i. e. single loop-, double loop- and deutero-learning). 
Those authors claiming that organisational learning was a way to adapt to environmental 
demands (e. g. Cyert and March 1963; Lawrence and Lorsch 1967; Argyris and Schoen 
1978; Duncan and Weiss 1979; Shrivastava 1983; Fiol and Lyles 1985; Levitt and March 
1988) neglect, however, an active approach to organisational learning. They were 
therefore criticised by a another group of contributors in the field for their passive 
approach to organisational learning which makes learning of organisations and their 
members completely dependent upon forces operating in the external world or a defective 
function and the wish to stay aligned with the environment. According to proponents of 
the strategic management literature, the passive approach to organisational learning 
ignores the possibilities of individuals-and above all powerful individuals such as top 
managers-constructing their own environments (Berger and Luckmann 1966; Weick 
1995; Huysman 1996; Finkelstein and Hambrick 1996) and ignores the role that power 
and politics play in organisations (Lawrence et al. 2005). 
Even if Brown and Duguid (1991) did not differentiate between more or less powerful 
individuals, they introduced a social dimension as an internal trigger for learning 
processes. They argued that organisations learn from the stories organisational members 
tell each other. Telling stories would help to diagnose a problem, to construct their own 
account and "to develop a causal map out of their experience to replace the impoverished 
directive route" (Brown and Duguid 1996, p. 65). As well Nonaka and Takeuchi who 
framed organisational learning in terms of knowledge creation which occurs out of an 
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ongoing process of conversion between tacit and explicit knowledge contributed a central 
role to teams and the sharing of their mental models (Nonaka and Takeuchi 1995, p. 25 
and p. 73). And likewise Dodgson (1993) enlarged the list of triggers of organisational 
learning by arguing that organisational learning at all levels of the organisation can be 
triggered by leaders and managers who seek adventure or need to make a difference. He 
criticised that 
"... the role of human agency and individual goals such as the drive for self- 
actualisation are almost completely ignored in many accounts of 
organizational adaptability. Organizational learning is stimulated both by 
environmental changes and internal factors in a complex and iterative 
manner" (Dodgson 1993, p. 387). 
As can be taken from the above discussion, top-level organisational learning can be 
considered as a response to environmental change but can also be evoked by individual 
top managers themselves. This leads directly to a further central discussion in the 
organisational learning literature and research, which follows in the next section. 
2.2.2.2 The Top Management as Subjects of Organisational Learning 
Since the beginning of the concept of organisational learning, there has been a very 
controversial debate about the subjects of organisational learning, i. e. about `can 
organisations learn? ', `who learns? ' and `what is the difference between individual and 
organisational learning? '. Furthermore, when doing research on top-level organisational 
learning it has to be discussed whether there are groups within the organisation which are 
of particular importance with regard to organisational learning. 
The first central question of this debate in the literature is about the capability of 
organisations to learn in general. Many scholars treat organisational learning at the level 
of individuals and teams (micro perspective) and position the members of the 
19 
organisation, and so individuals, as the primary players in the learning process (e. g., 
Cangelosi and Dill 1965; March and Olsen 1976; Argyris and Schoen 1978; Duncan and 
Weiss 1979; Dodgson 1993; Kim 1993; Nonaka and Takeuchi 1995). Only very few 
scholars (e. g. Jones 1995) consider organisational learning as completely independent of 
individuals (macro perspective). Morgan (1986), a cybernetics theorist, conceived 
organisations as self-organising systems, and some proponents from artificial intelligence 
argued that organisations have a sort of collective mind or that the capacity to learn can 
be embedded in expert systems (Huber 1991). Irrespective of this little, less considerable 
group of contributors, there is a wide consensus that individuals are the principle and 
active agents of organisational learning. Although in agreement with the prevailing 
opinion in organisational learning literature, a further differentiation as regards the 
importance of selected groups of individuals is certainly required. 
This is in accordance with some approaches in organisational learning literature- 
particularly in strategic leadership literature-which pursued the notion of the primary 
positioning of learning at individual level even further. They identified certain groups of 
individuals within the organisation which were considered as having particular importance 
with regard to the adaptation of the entire organisation. 
However, there is disagreement in the literature on precisely which groups of people play 
a particular role for organisational learning. Thus Huysman (1999, p. 65) and Levitt and 
March (1988, p. 333) argued that although organisational learning is influenced by 
activities of active agents at all levels of the organisation, it is at the same time above all a 
top-down process. For the same reason, and in order to avoid the trap that organisational 
learning becomes `all things to all people'-Yeung introduced the notion of "organisational 
learning capability" as the word capability would emphasise specific management 
initiatives and practices and by that what managers actually do (Yeung et al. 1999, p. 11). 
Argyris and Schön (1996) proposed a kind of job-sharing by means of the creation of 
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clusters of individual members of the organisation as agents of learning who yield 
learning results for the entire organisation. Others in turn highlighted the importance of 
labour unions (Drinkuth et al. 2001), consultants (Berthoin Antal and Krebsbach-Gnath 
2001), boards (Tainio et al. 2001) or groups of all kinds (Schopler 1987; Brooks 1994) 
who might exert a major influence on decision-making and learning of the entire 
organisation. 
Finally, it is agreed with Kammel who emphasised that it depends on the influence of the 
corresponding groups or clusters of individual members of the organisation if and in how 
far the learning results will spread out in the entire organisation and become of strategic 
relevance (Kammel 2000, p. 336). This elitist approach to organisational learning is also 
supported by Geißler 1991, p. 95), who claimed that for the rise of the controllability of an 
organisation, partially already minimal learning efforts of a few organisational members 
are sufficient if these members of the organisation hold strategically important posts. This 
position is reinforced by an abundant stream of literature and research in the field of 
strategic leadership where scientists examined and found significant associations 
between executive attributes or succession and organisational performance 5 (see for 
instance, Hage and Dewar 1973; Gupta and Govindarajan 1984; Virany and Tushman 
1986; Murray 1989; Haleblian and Finkelstein 1993; Sadler 2001). 
E. g. Hage and Dewar (1973) found that the values held by top management teams affected their 
organisations' subsequent degree of innovation. Gupta and Govindarajan (1984) stated an association 
between different types of general manager expertise and business performance. Virany and Tushman 
(1986) found that senior managers of better-performing microcomputer firms had significant previous 
experience in the industry and tended to include the firm's founder. Murray (1989) identified from a sample 
of twenty-six oil companies, that top management teams composed of members of diverse tenures 
outperformed those with more homogeneous tenures. Haleblian and Finkelstein (1993) found in their study 
of computer and natural gas companies that the size of the top management team was positively associated 
with company performance. 
21 
The limitation on learning efforts of top managers was criticised by another strand in the 
strategic leadership literature' and likewise by proponents of the "involvement discussion" 
(for further references cf. Miller and Monge 1986; Griffin 1988; Cotton et at. 1988). They 
argued that by virtue of the enormous complexity of the environment and the organisation 
and due to limited cognitive capabilities of individuals as well as communication problems 
excessive demands would be more likely with regard to the mastery of difficult strategic 
challenges. And even though top managers were considered to play an important role as 
facilitators of learning processes of the entire organisation, the pure focus on top 
managers as subjects of organisational learning would neglect the fact that they are not 
the only ones who learn within the organisation and that there might be other groups of 
individuals which might be important with regard to the learning of the entire organisation. 
Despite these points of criticism, we agree with Yukl who came to the following sobering 
conclusion concerning participative leadership: 
"In summary, after more than forty years of research on participation, we are 
left with the conclusion that participative leadership sometimes results in 
higher satisfaction, effort, and performance, and at other times it does not" 
(YukI 1994, p. 161). 
And likewise corresponding to Staehle the importance and real spread of participation? in 
practice is "generally overestimated" (Staehle 1994, p. 581). 
When following this argument, in accordance with Klimecki (1997), two general 
comprehensive trends can be identified in organisational learning-and leadership 
literature concerning the role of the (top) management for organisational learning: 
6 Population ecologists particularly have argued that organisations and their top managers - are largely 
inertial, hemmed in by environmental and organisational constraints (Hannan and Freeman 1977). But later 
work by population ecologists also envisioned a more significant role for top executives in influencing 
organisational outcomes (e. g. Carrol 1984; Haveman 1993). The most commonly cited evidence of 
negligible managerial effects is Lieberson and O'Connor's (1972) study of top executives in large 
corporations using a sample of 167 companies over a twenty-year period and Salancik and Pfeffer's study 
of city mayors (1977). However, both studies have been criticised due to several methodological and 
analytic problems (e. g. Hambrick and Mason 1984; Romanelli and Tushman 1988). 
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First, the top management as a facilitator$ (i. e. `controlling and helping function'). In this 
strand of literature, an outstanding role as initiators and facilitators of collective learning 
processes is attributed to the top management. The top management is viewed as 
responsible for the creation of an environment that fosters learning and minimises 
barriers to and constraints on learning. 
Secondly, the top management as a representative of learning (i. e. `bearer function)9. 
From this point of view, the management is considered as a `learning avant-garde' or 
learning agent who yields learning results for the benefit of the entire organisation. 
Thereby the learning of this elite represents or-if possible at all-takes the place of the 
learning of the entire organisation. In doing so, top managers provide an example or 
model that could provide alignment and orientation for (new) collective learning 
processes. 
Although this justifies paying particular attention to top-level organisational learning, there 
is so far very sparse empirical work on both roles and a limited understanding of the 
dynamic interrelationships between the top management as a facilitator and 
representative of organisational learning. This can e. g. be attributed to methodological 
problems such as the problem of researchers getting access to top managers (for further 
details see methodology chapter, e. g. section 3.10.2). Although these roles can 
presumably be separated from each other for analytic reasons only, the exploration of the 
interrelationships would contribute to a better understanding of the kind of things the top 
management does in order to learn and foster learning as well as the outcomes of TLOL. 
However-as will be shown in the Methodology Chapter-such research places particular 
7 Besides there is little consensus in the literature concerning the definition of the concept of participation. 
(see Hollander and Offermann 1990, p. 183). 
8 see also: Berthoin-Antal (2002). 
9 Particularly in the very origins of the organisational learning literature in the US top managers were 
proposed to be the only ones to learn and to manage and control learning within the organisation. 
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demands on the research design and has to put a strong emphasis on the top 
management and its organisational learning context. 
2.2.2.3 Individual versus Organisational Learning 
Even if after the previous discussion it can be stated that individuals-and among those 
particularly top managers-play an important role for organisational learning, the question 
remains what makes the difference between learning of individual top managers and 
TLOL. This discussion is important in order to better understand starting points and 
outcomes of TLOL and how they can be captured. 
Although most inspiration in the theory of organisational learning emanated from theories 
of individual learning and several authors tried to connect organisation theory and 
psychology in order to apply concepts developed for individuals to organisations as well 
as to discuss the learning of individuals in an organisational context it is agreed with 
Berends et al. (2003) that... 
"Theories of individual learning are relevant, for individuals play a role in 
organizational learning, but they are unable to capture the social nature of 
organizational learning. " (p. 7) 
For this reason, theories on individual learning cannot explain the differences between 
individual and organisational learning and so will not be discussed here in further detail'o 
This corresponds to the predominant view in organisational learning literature where 
authors tend to agree that organisational learning is more than a simple aggregation and 
more than simply the sum of individual learning (Argyris and Schoen 1978; Duncan and 
Weiss 1979; Fiol and Lyles 1985; Crossan et al. 1999). The pure focus on the individuals 
of an organisation and herewith the reduction of organisational learning to individual 
10 An overview about the heterogenous learning literature and research is provided by Bower et al. (1983); 
Wippich (1984); Lefrancois (1994); Edelmann (1996). 
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learning risks failing to see or to neglect deterministic forces on learning and by that 
important immanent factors of the organisation which exert a lasting influence on the 
agents of learning, their behaviour and actions. 
Corresponding to Fiol and Lyles (1985), at least an implicit consensus has been reached 
in the literature that organisational learning is distinct from individual learning. Current 
literature provides a large variety of answers to the question how organisational learning 
relates to individual learning even if not specifically for the target group top management. 
So is one position followed in the literature that the results of individual learning have to 
be embodied, embedded or incorporated in the organisational memory (see Argyris and 
Schoen 1978; Hedberg 1981; Kim 1993). Hedberg as a proponent of that view put it this 
way: 
"Although organizational learning occurs through individuals, it would be a 
mistake to conclude that organizational learning is nothing but the cumulative 
result of their members' learning. Organizations do not have brains, but they 
have cognitive systems and memories. As individuals develop their 
personalities, personal habits, and beliefs over time, organizations develop 
world views and ideologies. Members come and go, and leadership changes, 
but organizations' memories preserve certain behaviours, mental maps, 
norms, and values over time. " (Hedberg 1981, p. 6). 
Others argue that an organisation has learned if new knowledge has been acquired and 
is shared (see Duncan and Weiss 1979; Shrivastava 1983; Huber 1991). Levitt and 
March (1988) put a particular emphasis on routines as a result of organisational learning 
processes". They argued that learning by individuals and groups becomes organisational 
when inferences drawn from their experiences are encoded into routines (e. g. rules, 
standard operating procedures, policies, structures). Likewise the March school of 
research (March and Olsen 1976) as well as Kieser et al. (2001) and 
Crossan et al. 
(1999) considered organisational features as vehicles of organisational learning and 
11 In accordance with Blackler (1993) routines are encoded 
knowledge". 
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suggested that individual learning should be institutionalised and embedded in systems, 
structures, strategy, routines and practices of the organisation. Other authors considered 
the decision-making processes (Cangelosi and Dill 1965), organisational theories-in-use12 
(Argyris and Schoen 1978), culture, (Cook and Yanow 1993; Schein 1993), or other 
aspects as important factors which exert a positive or negative influence on the learning 
process of the agents of learning. In that connection, particular importance was attached 
to the notion of interaction-not only with the formal but as well with the informal 
organisation (e. g. "networks" Kaplan (1984), "communities-of-practice" (Lave and Wenger 
1991; Brown and Duguid 1991) and its sphere which makes that organisational learning 
is not restricted to legal bodies or formal structures and processes of the organisation. 
All things considered it can be stated that a large number of authors and researchers 
suggest that one or more extra conditions have to be fulfilled for individual learning to turn 
into organisational learning. Others, such as Antonacopoulou (2006) emphasise that the 
relationship between individual and organisational learning is much more complex and 
not reciprocal. However, the corresponding discussion in the literature leaves the 
researcher with a considerable degree of confusion about the conditions which have to 
be fulfilled as well as about common points and differences between individual and 
organisational learning (see Friedlander 1983; Kim 1993; Antonacopoulou 1998; 
Friedman 2001). Following Richter (1998) as a proponent of the executive learning 
literature, there is little or no in-depth dedicated research in this area; there is also a very 
poor understanding of the characteristics of the inter-relationship between the learning of 
individual top managers and top-level organisational learning. A potential way out of this 
situation is discussed in the following section. 
12 As to Argyris and Schoen (1978) organisational learning takes place when the members of the organisation 
critically reflect and finally change the applied "organisational theories-in-use". This will be done when the 
members of the organisation realise that the results expected and desired will not occur. The revision and 
correction of existing "theories in use" is defined as a "learning loop". 
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2.2.2.4 A Dual Approach to Organisational Learning at Top Management Level 
Meanwhile a very promising suggestion towards a better understanding of the concept of 
TLOL comes from Berends who inspired by Giddens' (1976,1979,1984) structuration 
theory developed a more comprehensive account of the social phenomenon of 
organisational learning. Based on that the dichotomy between individual learning and 
organisational learning and the consideration of individuals and organisations as 
separated subjects of learning is abandoned. It is replaced by a dual point of view which 
differentiates between the agents of learning (i. e. here the top management) and 
organisational references only for analytic reasons. For Berends, individuals and the 
organisation are not two separate concepts or constructs, but are simply two ways of 
considering social action. There is a so-called `duality of structures' so that on one side it 
is composed of powerful actors who undertake actions and interact. At the same time, it is 
composed of resources (Barney 1991), dynamic capabilities (Teece et al. 1997, Wang 
and Ahmed 2005, Prieto and Easterby-Smith 2006, Helfat et al. 2007, Teece 2007) which 
represent an extension of the resource-based view (Easterby-Smith and Prieto 2008), 
rules and social relationships that are produced and reproduced in social interaction. The 
latter comprises learning experiences of the past and provide a starting point for new 
organisational learning. These resources that are embodied in structures which influence 
what Cohen and Levinthal (1989,1990,1994) and Van den Bosch et al. (1999) or Jansen 
et a!. (2005) called `absorptive capacity' could likewise foster or limit learning of the 
learning agents. However, they do not determine organisational learning processes which 
means that certain conditions do not necessarily result in certain learning results (i. e. the 
so-called "caveat actor"). The learning process is rather influenced-as likewise proposed 
by Finkelstein and Hambrick (1996)-by the agents of learning, by their motivation, 
selective perception, their capabilities and herewith by their construed reality (compare 
Berger and Luckmann 1966). This means that the learning agents have a certain 
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discretion to decide which parts of their learning environment and structures they 
consider as important and how they intend to respond to that (Whittington 1990,1992). 
Hence, it can be concluded that following Berends et al. (2003) learning processes are 
triggered by the top management as agents of learning and result in structures. These 
structures in turn have an impact on the agents of organisational learning and their 
learning so that learning processes are never completed and highly interrelated. 
Structures 13 resulting from learning -e. g. organisational structures and routines, 
communities, decision-making processes ... etc., continue to exist-independent of single 
individual learning agents. This is why Kim concludes that organisations can learn 
independent of a specific individual, but not independent of all individuals (Kim 1993, 
p. 37). This means that changes of the structures are possible if-e. g. due to fluctuation or 
personnel turnover-the majority of learning agents have the will and sufficient resources 
to change them. 
This dual perspective on top-level organisational learning is likewise supported by 
Klimecki and Gmür (1997) who introduced the point that the top management and the 
organisation form an inevitable `learning community' which can mutually support or hinder 
each other. Analoguous to Bateson (1972,1983) he considers interactions between 
different learning levels as a fundamental element of organisational learning. However, 
again there is very little or no dedicated research which makes use of a systems 
approach to organisational learning (see Bateson 1972,1983)- even less with regard to 
the top management. So claimed Klimecki and Gmür (1997) that in the organisational 
learning literature and research Bateson's view of a learning unit as an active "unit-in-its- 
environment" (Bateson 1972,1983) has scarcely been applied14. And likewise Hedberg 
13 It has to be noted that this definition of structures is different from Giddens' definition (Giddens 1984). 
14 Already Cangelosi and Dill (Cangelosi and Dill 1965) described organisational learning as a complex, multi- 
dimensional process consisting of a series of interactions between adaptation at the individual, or subgroup 
level and the adaptation at organisational level. 
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confirmed that "the interplay between individual, group and organisational levels has been 
poorly described in the literature, and research into the interactions between learning 
individuals and learning organizations is badly needed" (Hedberg 1981, p. 7). 
Instead, it can be observed that the literature concentrates predominantly on the learning 
unit `organisation' (annotation: it is meant here the organisation as a whole) which is 
mostly described as an open system and-at least implicitly-defined in a formal way or 
in legal terms. In doing so it is neglected-as presented above-that organisational 
learning has rather to be understood as the learning of different social systems15 which 
make part of a larger organisation and who continuously influence each other. 
Furthermore it neglects that some social systems, such as the top management, might be 
of particular importance with regard to the learning of the organisation, of which it is a 
constituent part. Consequently it can be assumed that a contribution to a better 
understanding of organisational learning at top management level could be made by 
applying a methodology for this study (see Methodology Chapter) which puts a strong 
emphasis on both: the top management and its organisational learning context. This 
could be achieved through the simultaneous consideration of the evolution of the 
organisation (here: DT group) and the `sub-system' top management. In that connection 
parallel lines of developments as regards the structuring of the company and the top 
management could potentially be observed which can be seen as an indicator for the 
interactions between different levels of learning. 
2.2.3 Definition of the Concept of Top-Level Organisational Learning 
It was stated at the beginning of this section that the large variety of definitions of the 
concept of organisational learning results from different opinions and assumptions about 
15 These social systems are sub-systems" or sub-organisations" of 
the entire organisation which are located 
at different levels of the organisation. 
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the subjects and the nature of organisational learning. Derived from the reviewed 
literature and research and with reference to Berends et al. (2003, p. 12), the following 
definition of TLOL will be applied for the purpose of this study: 
Top-level organisational learning is the process of changing the range of the top 
management's (potential) behaviour based on the development of its knowledge. 
Figure 1: Definition of Top-Level Organisational Learning (TLOL) for this study 
This definition of TLOL assumes furthermore that: 
- Organisations can be regarded as social systems in which a dominant coalition 
emerges and the learning by this elite rules the organisation. 
- Learning and power are perceived as being closely related which means 
that the 
knowledge of the most powerful actors of the organisation which are above all the top 
managers has the greatest chance of determining organisational decisions and 
changes. Consequently the learning of the social system top management-even if 
they are not viewed as the only ones to learn-is regarded as crucial with regard to 
the adaptation of the entire organisation to change as they have sufficient power to 
impose their will and ideas on the entire organisation. 
- Learning efforts of (top) managers cannot 
be isolated from the learning context and 
the learning of the rest of the organisation. (Klimecki 1997; Kammel 2000, p. 337). 
- Organisational learning 
is different from individual learning although the primary 
agents of organisational learning are individuals. `Structures' composed of actors and 
resources provide starting point and result of organisational learning. 
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If this approach is adapted here several implications concerning the design of this study 
are resulting from this definition of the concept of organisational learning. These will be 
considered and discussed in greater detail within the scope of the methodology chapter. 
2.3 The Learning Organisation - Definition and Conceptual Differentiation 
In using the term top-level organisational learning which is the key concept of this thesis, 
almost by definition that construct is about some kind of collective learning. For the sake 
of completeness a further influential school that deals with collective learning has to be 
mentioned here which has attracted in these times of accelerated change also the 
attention of many top managers: It is the learning organisation discussion (Garrat 1987; 
Senge 1990; Garvin 1993; Pedler 1994). 
Corresponding to Tsang there is a simple relationship between the twin ideas of 
organisational learning and the learning organisation: 
"... a learning organization is one which is good at organizational learning" 
(Tsang 1997, p. 75)16 
This means that a learning organisation can be understood as an outcome of 
organisational learning and so also of TLOL. 
Just as for the of concept organisational learning, there are numerous definitions of the 
concept `learning organisation' in the relevant literature (cf. Garrat 1990; Senge 1990; 
Quinn Mills and Friesen 1992; Pedler 1994; Kilman 1996), which however in general 
focus on companies or firms instead of selected groups of individuals. Probably the most 
cited definitions are those of Pedler et al. and Senge: 
"The learning company is an organization which facilitates the learning of all 
of its members and continuously transforms itself" (Pedler et al. 1991, p. 1). 
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Senge described the learning organisation as an organisation 
"... where people continually expand their capacity to create the results they 
truly desire, where new and expansive patterns of thinking are nurtured, 
where collective aspiration is set free, and where people are continually 
learning how to learn together" (Senge 1990, p. 31). 
Corresponding to Kammel (2000, pp. 382) despite the variety of definitions some further 
common points can be stated in the learning organisation literature as the prescriptive 
branch of the organisational learning literature: 
- Learning organisations represent a practice-related elaborated conceptual framework. 
This is probably due to the fact that the majority of authors in this field are consultants 
and practitioners which might explain the strong practical interest of many top 
managers in the concept (see also Harvey and Denton 1999). 
- All organisations and their sub-organisations learn at different stages of their 
development with different intensity and velocity. This raises the question how 
organisational learning can be aligned in the desired direction and how the success of 
an organisation can be developped continuously. Particular importance is attributed in 
this regard to the structural component of the organisation. 
-A central parameter for the establishment of a learning organisation are formal 
structures" which are considered as a lever and tool for the targeted steering and 
controlling of behaviour as well as learning. The formal organisation determines the 
individual spectrum of behaviour of its members by presetting demands, constraints 
and choices. In doing so it fosters or inhibits learning. Managers and especially those 
16 see also, Lundberg (1995, p. 10). 
17 Formal structures represent a system of rules which arranges activities and processes of the organisation 
as well as rights and duties of its members and so provides a lasting framework for the members of the 
organisation. 
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at the very top play a particular role in this regard and are viewed as facilitators of 
organisational learning (similar: the top management as facilitators; Klimecki 1997). 
They make constitutive organisational decisions which bring about that job -and role 
requirements and herewith requirements concerning the behaviour of the members of 
the organisation are reformulated. Each reconfiguration of the structuring of an 
organisation has implications concerning the learning of the members of the 
organisation. 
- Learning organisations are open systems which are in permanent interaction with its 
environment. Within a learning organisation learning takes place at different levels of 
the organisation (i. e. individuals, teams, organisation). 
- In learning organisations change is the normal case. 
As mentioned earlier, the body of literature on the learning organisation makes part of the 
prescriptive branch of publications in this field which is especially adressed to 
practitioners (e. g., Lewin 1947; de Geus 1988; Stata 1989; Senge 1990; Judson 1991; 
Kim 1993; Kotter 1995; Galpin 1996). This literature---which aims at improving 
organisational performance by means of showing how organisations should learn or 
postulating enablers for the improvement of learning--. is based primarily on practical 
experience and knowledge of consultants instead of theoretical and empirical research. 
Together with the preference of top managers to work with consultants (Richter 1998) this 
might explain the broad interest of top managers in the concept. 
In spite of that, the literature on the learning organisation will not be reviewed here as 
simply referring to what should be done in order to foster organisational learning does not 
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produce veridical knowledge about the learning mechanisms as such. 18 Beyond that point 
the proponents of the learning organisation literature tend too much to simplify, i. e. it is 
assumed that generalisations-even if developed on a very abstract level-could be 
applied to all organisations and learning would always have a positive impact on 
organisational performance (see for instance, Whittington 1993, p. 128)19. 
However, an interesting point in the learning organisation literature is that it puts again an 
emphasis on the meaning of structures for organisational learning to take place. This 
suggests again to link the concept of top-level organisational learning with the structural 
dimension and to apply a corresponding methodology for this study. 
2.4 Specific Characteristics of Executive Work and Learning 
2.4.1 Introduction 
Having clarified the conceptual issues in the previous sections and introduced a dual 
approach to TLOL (see section 2.2.2.4) in order to try to overcome the limited 
understanding of the interrelationships between the learning of individual top managers 
and top-level organisational learning (see section 2.2.2.3), the following section will 
concentrate on TLOL from the perspective of top managers as powerful actors and 
learners. 
One could say that executives might not be significantly different from anyone else in 
terms of their need and capacity to learn. However, due to the positional status, power, 
and authority, the specific features and nature of executive work and learning merit 
particular attention (similar: Richter 1998). Therefore the corresponding literature and 
research will be reviewed in the now following section. 
18 Similar to Argyris and Schön (1996). 
19 For these reasons Grieves (2008) proposes abandoning the concept of the learning organisation. 
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2.4.2 The Nature of Executive Work 
Research into the nature of (top) managers' learning (Burgoyne and Stuart 1976; Stuart 
1984; Burgoyne and Hodgson 1983; Davies and Easterby-Smith 1984; Mumford 1986)- 
in particular whether managers learn "on-the-job" or "off-the-job"-has shown, in 
accordance with Antonacopoulou (Antonacopoulou 2002, p. 5), "... that the bulk of 
managers' learning takes place in the work place, as a result of their work and role 
activities" (similar: Casey 1980; Hague 1979; Rewans 1977). Likewise a series of other 
authors argue that managerial learning cannot be separated from current practical 
experience in the day-to-day business (Kammel 2000; Braddick 1988) and that 
"... managers develop primarily through confrontations with novel situations and problems 
where their existing repertoire of behaviours are inadequate and where they have to 
develop new ways of dealing with these situations" (Davies and Easterby-Smith 1984, p. 
180). This means that the top manager's learning is an integral part of managerial work 
(see also: Kammel 2000, p. 318), which therefore requires a more in-depth discussion. 
There is a large body of literature and research on managerial behaviour and managerial 
activity which consists particularly in the US, France and UK of a variety of studies on 
work habits of managers20. These contribute to a better understanding of under what 
circumstances and which conditions top management's learning has to take place. The 
most influential work done in this field is the studies conducted by Barnard (1938), 
Mintzberg (1973) and Kotter (1982) who described the core executive functions. A 
fundamental finding of Mintzberg's research was that the typical managerial work 
environment has been depicted as consisting of very fragmented activities that occur at 
an unrelenting pace (Mintzberg 1973) and as a stream of disjointed activities and 
interruptions throughout the workday (compare also: Carlson 1951; Stewart 1967; 
20 For a review and critical analysis of the literature and research cf. Hales 1986; Lauvergeon and Delpeuch 
1986; Stewart 1989; Martinko and Gardner 1990; Schirmer 1991. 
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Kammel 2000, p. 318). This was most recently confirmed again by a corresponding 
French study on top managers (Cahen 2008). Senior management jobs would be open- 
ended and top managers would become conditioned by workload. Scheduled meetings, 
business trips, telephone interruptions, drop-in visitors and urgent operative requirements 
would eat up top managerial time, mainly at the expense of time for creativity, reflection 
or in-depth analysis as Cahen (2008) identified in his recent empirical study. Mintzberg 
(1973) drew the conclusion that managers control little of what they do and so are 
somehow guided by their working environment. This leads in turn to the suggestion that 
top managers likewise control little of what they learn, that they even might not always be 
aware of what they are learning and that also their learning is somehow guided by their 
working environment. 
This would also explain why the incremental "learning-by-doing" and "on-the-job" 
approaches are criticised in many ways in the literature. Baldwin and Lawson for instance 
point out that "... simply facing real problems is not sufficient for development to occur. 
Action must be accompanied by reflection on action... ". (Baldwin and Lawson 1995, p. 
513). He therefore claims that in order to be effective `learning-by-doing' presupposes a 
learning intention, a planned learning process as well as some competencies. Schreyögg 
(1984) emphasises that learning-by-doing tends to be too reactive, is too much past- 
oriented and promotes familiar but sometimes obsolete behaviour. For the latter reason 
Ansoff (1991) and Hamel and Prahalad (1996) even reject incremental approaches and 
draw the conclusion that learning-by-doing is no appropriate approach when substantial 
and fast change or adaptation has to occur. 
2.4.3 Specific Features of Executive Learning 
Current literature and research confirms that executive work and executive learning have 
a series of things in common. Richter (1999) found in her study, which involved seven 
executives working at six different companies located in three countries "... that executive 
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learning is accomplished in a solitary, piecemeal way, and that group-based sensemaking 
processes are even more unusual than one-to-one-processes" (Richter 1999). 
Richter's (1999) findings mirror the point that executive learning is strongly influenced by 
the executive's working environment, which leaves little room for reflection on action. The 
findings also suggest that communities-of-practice (see: Brown and Duguid 1991) in the 
classical sense (i. e. informal communities) and also one-to-one informal relationships 
play a secondary role for executive learning. Richter found in her empirical study on 
individual and organisational learning at the executive level that top managers tended to 
be extremely cautious with regard to interactions with others. She identified three 
implicitly held rules why communities-of-practice at top level were poor and why top 
managers rather concentrated on `formal communities-of-practice', such as management 
meetings, task forces etc. 21: 
First, deeply held rules about power and influence would not allow top managers to talk 
about uncertainties or knowledge gaps and make top managers feel that participating in 
anything other than "formal communities-of-practice" carries risks for personal reputation. 
Secondly, it would get increasingly difficult as one gets promoted to a higher hierarchical 
level to maintain long-term trusting relationships. And finally, due to competitive 
boundaries, sharing conversations about challenging situations with colleagues outside 
the organisation-particularly with those within the same industry would be considered as 
a high risk and therefore as taboo. 
Richter's findings flatly contradict the work of Ghoshal et al. (Ghoshal et at. 1994) and 
Kaplan (1984) who did, however, not predominantly focus on top managers, but stated 
that informal management networks would make an important contribution to the 
coordination of the company and help to disseminate information and to create a shared 
21 A series of authors, e. g. Wenger (1998), would not consider task-forces or other formal communities as 
'communities-of-practice'. 
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meaning system. So Richter's work suggests that there might be a difference here 
between top managers and other managers. Despite the small scale of Richter's study, 
that can be criticised but is no rare phenomenon in the field22, Richter's study suggests 
that communities-of-practice in the classical sense-i. e. as informal communities and 
networks emerging from the social context and comprising an explicit as well as implicit 
dimension-are no appropriate method for TLOL. This leads to the point that research on 
TLOL should mainly concentrate on formal communities. 
The lack of `informal' communities-of-practice bears certain risks, but opportunities as 
well (see: Kammel 2000, p. 377). On the one hand, the exploitation of implicit or tacit 
managerial knowledge23 which is, corresponding to Becker (1970), in most cases held by 
managers with a long tenure and professional experience within the organisation, is more 
difficult. 'Newcomers risk not having an overview of the overall situation and interactions; 
they risk getting lost in complexity and re-inventing the wheel. On the other hand, not 
having this in-depth knowledge about the organisation can, according to Sternberg and 
Lubart (1993), also be an advantage when fundamental change has to occur (see also 
section 2.5 on the need for unlearning). 
Apart from that, review of the relevant literature reveals that "little or no in-depth research 
has been dedicated to understanding the day-to-day dimensions of executive learning... " 
(Richter 1998, p. 300). In his reviews of management development literature, Storey 
(1989,1990) came to similar conclusions when stating that the vast bulk of this literature 
is related to the means question, i. e. to the instruments of management development and 
learning such as recruitment, training, coaching, mentoring, teamwork, secondments and 
so on. At the same time he found that surprisingly little is known about under what 
22 Mintzberg's study on managerial work (Mintzberg 1973) based on the direct observation of five CEOs, the 
study of behavior and work of top level managers done by Kotter (1982) comprised 15 top managers. 
23 For the definition of implicit or tacit knowledge it is refered to e. g. Polanyi (1967); Nonaka and Takeuchi 
(1995). 
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individual and organisational circumstances managers acquire the competencies to be 
successful. 
However, some critical success factors were defined in the current literature as regards 
the learning of top managers. Thus, all existing research has established that individuals 
cannot be forced to learn against their will (see Mumford 1971; Honey and Mumford 
1982; Sutcliffe 1988). According to Rosenstiel (1995), this is particularly valid for (top) 
managers, who in the sense of learning do not represent a homogeneous group of 
people. He pointed out that the top manager's formal education, professional socialisation 
as well as the evolution of societal values would bring about that managers think in an 
independent way, critically question objectives and guidelines and actively seek 
information. Rosenstiel continued by stating that managers are therefore not ready from 
the outset to follow or hold a certain organisational ideology or opinion. They would also 
have their own individual convictions and objectives. This is why, according to Humble 
(1973), Lloyd (1990) and Stewart and Stewarf4 (1981), a real learning process can only 
be triggered and the learning process can only be effective when managers themselves 
recognise a learning need and decide to engage in this process. 
This is in accordance with the general tendency in the learning theory and research which 
moved from notions of conditioning and indoctrination towards autonomy and self- 
direction, i. e. the individual is perceived to have the "power" to choose whether or not to 
learn (for further references see: Antonacopoulou 2002). 
24 According to Stewart and Stewart (1981) there are four preconditions for managerial learning to take place: 
Firstly, the learner must see a connection between the learning task and the potential consequences. 
Secondly, there must be a feedback on performance if it is to improve. Thirdly, the opportunity to practice is 
very important, and fourthly the provision of help where people's analytical capabilities are impoverished is 
important. However, Stewart and Stewart did not explain how these preconditions for managerial learning 
could be embedded in the day-to-day dimension of executive learning and how managerial learning could 
be channelled. 
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Hoeksema et al. (1997) gave proof within the framework of their empirical study with 127 
managers working in three different organisations that the pursuit of a `deep learning 
strategy', i. e. the internalisation of the learning need and the understanding of the 
meaning of the learning challenge is key with regard to the effectiveness of the learning 
process25. With regard to this study-and assuming that top managers are somehow 
guided in their learning by their working environment (see above)-this suggests that top 
managers have to explicitly or at least implicitly agree with that guidance if they want to 
learn in an effective way. 
A further interesting point on executive learning is raised by Mumford (1988). He argued 
that once the decision has been made to engage in a strategic process or project learning 
becomes a secondary purpose. He explained: 
"A manager's willingness to learn is most often specific rather than general, 
related to a performance requirement rather than to a detached interest in a 
piece of knowledge. That willingness is increased or diminished by various 
influences, the most identifiable being those centred on the job itself and on 
people important to the manager" (Mumford 1988, p. 192). 
This means, in accordance with Baldwin and Lawson (1995), that from the perspective of 
the manager there are no "learning" problems per se (likewise see: Antonacopoulou 
1999; Richter 1999). The manager's primary concern would be to manage a business 
problem with success. Consequently, once he has agreed to engage in this problem- 
solving process he has likewise agreed to learn and might not even want to be perceived 
as a learner: 
"... managers want to be effective, but they do not necessarily want to be 
learners" (Baldwin and Lawson 1995, p. 513). 
25 He found that this is at the same time a precondition for managerial i. e. career success. 
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For the researcher in the field of executive learning, this means that he/she has to 
investigate learning within the scope of the resolution of business problems which places 
particular demands on the research methodology and highlights again the need to put a 
strong emphasis on the top management's learning context. 
2.5 The Need for Unlearning 
Apart from the manager's agreement with the learning needs and objectives a further 
basic precondition for TLOL to take place that is identified in the literature, is "unlearning" 
(Hedberg 1981; Hamel and Prahalad 1994, p. 65) or organisational forgetting (Blackler et 
al. 1999). Thus argued Hedberg (1981): 
"Knowledge grows, and simultaneously it becomes obsolete as reality 
changes. Understanding involves both learning new knowledge and 
discarding obsolete and misleading knowledge. The discarding activity- 
unlearning-is as important a part of understanding as is adding new 
knowledge. In fact, it seems as if slow unlearning is a crucial weakness of 
many organizations" (Hedberg 1981, p. 3). 
The literature shows that the issue of unlearning is a particularly crucial point for 
organisations with a long history and tradition. It is even more important for organisations 
such as former public authorities in Germany, which employ civil servants that for legal 
reasons cannot not be made redundant or sanctioned. For,... 
"... knowledge can be a double-edged sword. Knowledge can limit one's 
perspective and ability to have fresh ideas.... At a certain point, the costs of 
additional knowledge may outweigh the benefits" (Sternberg and Lubart 
1993, p. 9). 
Top-level organisational learning is therefore not only about new learning, but can also 
require the deployment of corresponding methods to achieve unlearning. 
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Carley found that in general (see: Carley 1996) in turbulent environments, studies have 
revealed that executive turnover is necessary if the organisation is to adapt to the 
changing environment (see also: Pettigrew 1985a). In this particular case, turnover 
enhances competency "... as old executives have often no training on the new task and 
hence may slow the rate of adaptation over hiring new executives trained in that task" 
(Carley 1996, p. 256). Likewise Hedberg suggests that dismissals can be necessary 
when unlearning (Hedberg 1981) does not occur or when strong cohesive structures lead 
to blind spots and distortions of reality. Similarly Whittington (1993, p. 122) and Bleicher 
(1991, p. 762) emphasise that in these situations only the replacement of managers in 
key positions by people coming from outside the organisation permit avoiding the 
strategic persistence that results from dysfunctional, past-oriented internalisations of 
insiders, to initiate strategic change or to achieve turnaround after a crisis. Moreover, 
according to Kammel (2000), lacking organisational socialisation and new configurations 
of power provide the unbiased external recruits-compared to internal candidates-with 
larger room for manoeuvre with regard to necessary changes of organisational structures 
and procedures. Thus, external newcomers with experiences in multiple contexts can 
open new perspectives for the organisation and even break up very cohesive 
organisational structures, which tend to lead to blind spots with regard to reality and the 
challenges the company has to face (Karamel 2000, p. 311). 
However, according to Schein (1993, p. 87) unlearning is difficult. Often emotional 
barriers would stand in the way especially when there is what Cavanaugh and Noe (1999) 
or other authors (Morrison and Robinson 1997; Antonacopoulou 2002; or Storey et al. 
1997) called a `break of the psychological contract'. Furthermore, changing old behaviour 
can be difficult when the way a certain problem was solved previously is properly 
engraved in the mental maps of the members of the organisation. This is why new 
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cognitive perspectives and new ways of thinking can be an advantage when fundamental 
change has to occur. 
2.6 Methods and Styles of Organisational Learning at Top Management Level 
2.6.1 Introduction 
Having reviewed the literature on TLOL from the perspective of top managers as powerful 
actors and learners, the following sections take a resources perspective in order to learn 
more about methods for TLOL, or what Yeung et al. (1999) called organisational learning 
styles, or Shrivastava (1983) `principle learning systems' by which learning of the top 
management is perpetuated and institutionalised26. 
Others have tried to do so before. Shani and Docherty (2003) for instance described in 
their study how e. g. a telecommunications company 27 struggled with its transformation 
from a public utility to a privately owned company and what was done to facilitate learning 
at the individual, team and organisational levels. However, it does not come from his 
study, which puts a strong emphasis on HR-related tools (e. g. coaching, competence 
models, trainings camps etc. ), why certain learning tools or activities were applied in this 
period of massive change, if and if yes, what has been learnt and why it has been finally 
evaluated as a success. The mere description of the deployed learning tools would 
therefore not only go far beyond the scope of this study, but end up again in the 
aforementioned means-discussion (compare: Storey 1989; Storey 1990). Instead of 
detailed tools as such, the interest of this study rather lies on an enhanced understanding 
of the linkages between the top management, their learning environment and the choices 
26 Corresponding to Shrivastava the task of organisational learning systems is to objectify subjective 
knowledge and to integrate it into the organisational knowledge base. Therefore, she considers the 
acquisition, communication and interpretation of decision-relevant knowledge as very relevant 
(Shrivastava 1983). 
27 Shani's study (Shani and Docherty 2003) presents 6 successful companies in different industries and 
national settings. 
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made around methods for TLOL and a better understanding of the deployed methods and 
outcomes of top-level organisational learning. 
In that connection, it must also be mentioned that the intention here is not to investigate 
the organisational learning process as such. As Kammel explains, the concepts that are 
subsumed as learning are simply too complex, the underlying learning theories are partly 
incompatible and only able to explain singular aspects of learning (Karamel 2000, p. 507). 
2.6.2 Organisational Learning Styles at Management Level 
As there is, as elaborated earlier, little dedicated research on executive learning (see 
Richter 1998), it might be no surprise that there is also little empirical work on methods 
and organisational learning styles at top management level. With reference to Hoeksema 
et al. (1997), learning styles are defined as different combinations of methods. 
However, Yeung et al. (1999, p. 34 ff. ) carried out a comprehensive empirical study28 with 
1,500 managers-though most of them were middle managers-in this area. He found 
that just as individuals learn in different ways, there are different styles or types of 
organisational learning (see figure below). Moreover he found that the choice of `the right 
types of learning' depends on contextual considerations. 
exploration 
Learn from 
experience 
of others 
competency - acquisition experimentation 
benchmarkina continuous improvement 
Source: (Yeung et al. 1999, p. 36) exploitation 
Figure 2: Typology of Organisational Learning Styles 
Learn from 
direct 
experience 
28 The study comprised over 1,500 managers from 460 businesses in 411 companies and from more than 40 
countries, mostly middle managers with a tenure > 16 years whereby the majority of them came from larger 
companies in mature businesses. 
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Yeung et al. (1999), whose learning styles go back to two basic sources of learning: direct 
experience and experience of others and-referring to the work of March (1991) to two 
basic purposes of organisational learning: the exploration of new, and/or the exploitation 
of existing capabilities, differentiated between four learning styles (see figure above). 
Yeung et al. identified a certain "ranking" with regard to the effectiveness of these four 
learning styles in certain contexts (Yeung et al. 1999, p. 40) and found that in turbulent 
environments `controlled experimentation' with new strategies, processes, structures etc. 
revealed as being way ahead the most effective learning style with regard to the 
improvement of business performance. Primary sources of learning are the members and 
customers of the organisation. 
As a further, even if slightly less effective way of learning, Yeung et al. (1999) identified 
competency acquisition where organisational learning occurs by buying competency 
through recruitment or acquisitions, training or by borrowing competencies e. g. from 
universities, consulting firms. 
Benchmarking 29 didn't significantly correlate with any performance indicators, and 
continuous improvement 30 proved itself weak in such an environment. So suggests 
Yeung et al's (1999) model that targeted job assignments and job rotation are for instance 
no appropriate method for TLOL as they are based upon learning from direct experience 
and are related to existing resources and capabilities (see continuous improvement). This 
squares well with Dalton (1989) who found that the particular problem in planned `on-the- 
job' assignments lies in the point that it is aligned to stability instead of change. Change 
would bring about that simply other, not controllable and sometimes even `dangerous' 
things would be learned compared to what was planned at the beginning of the job 
rotation. 
29 Learning occurs by "... discovering how others operate and then trying to adopt and adapt this knowledge 
in their own organisation" (Yeung et al. 1999, p. 38). Learning comes from other organisatons who have 
demonstrated excellent performance in the past. 
30 Learning occurs "... by constantly improving on what has been done before" (Yeung et al. 1999, p. 38). 
Often a high degree of involvement is emphasised (such as through quality control circles). 
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This suggests that risk-averse, past-oriented and incremental types of learning (i. e. 
benchmarking plus continuous improvement), that lead only to marginal changes of 
existing practices are not appropriate and sufficient, if fundamental and significant change 
and adaptation of the top management and the organisation has to occur. Or to put it 
another way: Only radical (i. e. experimentation plus competency acquisition) 
organisational learning styles and corresponding methods for TLOL can lead to the 
desired learning results. 
This limits the range of potential styles and methods for TLOL that can be used in rapidly 
changing environments, although it remains to be empirically verified whether the results 
of this promising study can unrestrictedly be applied for top managers. The two potentially 
most relevant organisational learning styles, namely learning by "controlled 
experimentation" (Yeung et al. 1999, p. 37) as well as `competency acquisition' and 
corresponding methods for TLOL will now be further investigated in the following 
sections. 
2.6.3 Controlled Experimentation with Structures and Strategies 
2.6.3.1 Structures and Top-Level Organisational Learning 
In the previous section "controlled experimentation"-among other things with structures 
and processes-was identified as an effective organisational learning style at top 
management level (Yeung et al. 1999). 
The important role of structures and the structuring of the organisation for organisational 
learning is supported by numerous authors (e. g. Dodgson 1993 31; DiBella et al. 1996) in 
the organisational learning literature who argue, like Friedman et al. (2001), that ".. . 
structures represent the relatively tangible `hardware' of organisational learning" 
31 Dodgson defined learning organisations as firms that purposefully adopt structures and strategies to 
encourage learning (Dodgson 1993). 
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(Friedman et al. 2001, p. 760). Likewise Kammel (2000, p. 389) confirmed that structures 
stimulate, control and document TLOL and that executive action and learning were 
directly and inseparably linked with each other. He points out that processes of strategic 
or organisational change and learning are parallel processes that are strongly interrelated 
and continuously influence and control each other (similar: Fischer and Röben 2002). 
In principle, the structure of an organisation which Mabey et al. (2001) describe as the 
pattern of relationships between roles in an organisation and its different parts, consist of 
a hard, formal and a soft, informal component (see: Wang and Ahmed 2002). Whereas 
formal descriptions are abstracted from actual practice, neglect the implicit or tacit 
dimension32 and so inevitably and intentionally omit the details, informal structures such 
as communities-of-practice (Lave and Wenger 1991; Brown and Duguid 1991; Wenger 
1998; Wenger and Snyder 2000) refer to cross-functional, interpersonal, and inter- 
organisational interaction that is often not explicitly demonstrated in the organisational 
chart, formal procedures or job descriptions. But, as already elaborated earlier in section 
2.4.3, Richter's (1999) study found that communities-of-practice, which by definition are 
informal, emerging from the social context and serve as a platform for sharing explicit and 
implicit knowledge inherent in the practice 33, have a limited impact on TLOL. Although 
some methodological concerns have to be raised34, her study, which is one of the rare 
studies on the relationship between executive learning and organisational learning at top 
management level, shows that in times of rapid change managerial work is restricted to 
`functionally or formally established' communities 35 (e. g. management teams, task forces, 
steering committees, project teams, ... etc. 
). 
32 Spender (1996) argues in this connection that managerial work also has a tacit dimension. 
33 Traditionally studies in the field of communities-of-practice focused on well-defined professions (Richter 
1998) and so Richter's empirical study (Richter 1999) was different as it focused on executives. 
34The study involved a small sample of seven executives. Although communities-of-practice are informal and 
so difficult to research, the study was only based upon interviews and so is totally depended on the 
espoused theory of the interviewed top managers. Additional research in that field would be desirable. 
35 Wenger ( 1998) would not consider these groups as communities-of-practice. 
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This raised the question which methods can be derived from controlled experimentation 
with formal structures. Kammel (2000, pp. 382), who highlights the importance of `formal 
communities', emphasises the impact of structures as both, starting point and result of 
TLOL36 
First, top managers learn as part of formal communities37 from each other and through 
the design of new structures. Though their empirical study generally concentrated on 
project groups involved in important corporate initiatives and not only on top managers, 
this is supported by McGrath et al. 's (1995) research. They found that organisations or 
parts of it develop new competitive advantages through the pursuit of new initiatives and 
the corresponding two emerging processes: `Comprehension', which means that a 
common and precise understanding is developed what combinations of resources will 
allow the achievement of the objectives. And `deftness', which captures the extent to 
which a group of people possesses a developed collective mind38. However, they did not 
further specify what initiatives were pursued. On top of that McGrath et al. (1995, p. 253) 
themselves admit that the problem that arises from their approach in fast-changing 
environments is that decisions and actions must be pursued in the face of ambiguity and 
uncertainty. As a result, its returns are uncertain and the team managing a project is likely 
to experience gaps between the initially defined objectives and the actually achieved 
results (similar: March 1991, p. 85). Sometimes the newly-generated competences and 
knowledge would even not be known at the outset. This even raises more questions what 
initiatives for TLOL can be deployed in turbulent environments. 
On the other hand, from a different perspective, structures mark the framework for the top 
management's `structural leadership', as Kammel (2000) called it. This means that formal 
36 A similar approach is applied by Klimecki ( 1997) who described the top management as facilitators and at 
the same time as representatives of learning. 
37 Annotation: Such communities can also comprise e. g. (internal) customers or consultants. 
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structures enlarge or limit top management's repertoire of possible actions and behaviour 
by means of inherent demands, constraints and choices (see also: Stewart 1982). 
Structures so circumscribe the top management's necessities, capacity, willingness and 
opportunities to learn and each restructuring, each reconfiguration and resulting change 
of the job has implications for the learning of the concerned top managers (Kammel 2000, 
p. 382). Hence, the formal structuring and restructuring of an organisation cannot only be 
interpreted as a means of targeted controlling of behaviour (similar: see Schanz 1994), 
but also as a means to `channel' TLOL (Kammel 2000). This raised the question which 
structural elements are important for TLOL and have to be changed in order to trigger or 
foster new learning. 
Although Kammel (2000) neither specified the corresponding methods for TLOL in fast- 
changing environments, nor provided empirical evidence, there are a series of 
suggestions from other academics in the field, even if their work in most cases did not 
concentrate explicitly on top managers. 
Mintzberg's work on the structuring of organisations (Mintzberg 1992, p. 329) thus shows 
that co-ordination can be achieved by establishing a system of common supervision, by 
obliging units to share common resources and knowledge, by establishing assessments 
on common measures of performance or by putting members of an organisation into 
close physical proximity with one another in order to foster communication and mutual 
adjustment. This suggests that organization development initatives that aim to change the 
mentioned components of the structuring of the organisation could serve as a method for 
TLOL. However, there is no empirical evidence for that so far. 
Nearly the same is valid from a knowledge perspective. When considering the firm as a 
knowledge-integrating system (Grant 1996), the internal structure of the firm and the top 
management has implications for the role of the hierarchy and the location of decision- 
38 This means that the team has an effective team organisation and the relationships in the team can be 
characterised by interpersonal trust and predictability. 
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making. Whereas decentralised structures help to integrate tacit or idiosyncratic 
knowledge in decision-making and related learning, a centralised location of decision- 
making is following Grant's suggestion feasible if the knowledge relevant to a particular 
decision can be concentrated at one point in the organisation (Grant 1996). Both 
approaches have strong and weak points. According to Mintzberg (1992), centralisation 
ensures the very tightest form of coordination. In contrast to that, "... decentralization 
allows the organization to respond quickly to local conditions in many different places, 
and it can serve as a stimulus for motivation ... " (Mintzberg 1992, p. 335). However, there 
is a dilemma if decisions and deriving actions require many types of knowledge that is 
resident in many individuals. Then team-based structures are necessary. If, however, 
these individuals are too numerous to be coordinated, their team membership has to be 
made fluid or they have to "occupy multiple organizational roles involving membership of 
multiple teams" (Grant 1996, p. 119). 
What this means for TLOL remains unanswered in the current literature, which is due to 
the fact that, according to Hambrick (1994), despite the great significance to any 
complete theory on top managers, the structure of top management groups has gone 
almost totally without attention in research to date. Hambrick (1994) himself points out 
that depending on the degree of task interdependence, the structure of the top 
management group, as it can often be found in diversified firms, creates a tension 
regarding group identities and can lead to role ambiguities and conflicts. However, little is 
known so far about the impact of the structure of the top management group and its 
change on TLOL, either at divisional or at corporate level. 
All things considered, it can be summed up that despite the prevailing opinion in the 
organisational learning literature that structures play an important role for organisational 
learning, there is still a limited understanding of such methods for TLOL and of the 
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interrelationships between the change of the structuring of the top management and/or 
the organisation and TLOL. For that reason, corresponding empirical research is 
absolutely needed (Kammel 2000, p. 337 and pp. 382,389). After all, the structuring of 
the organisation and the top management is no trivial issue, particularly not in complex 
organisations with different businesses, in fast changing-environments, when 
idiosyncratic or tacit knowledge is concerned and simultaneously new knowledge is 
required, or when it conflicts with other organisational models (e. g. the bureaucratic 
approach; Grant 1996). This available study should attempt to contribute to filling this 
gap. 
2.6.3.2 Strategy and TLOL 
Andrews (1998) considers the formulation and implementation of strategy as an 
organisation process that is in many ways inseparable from structure and other 
organisational aspects and again supports the importance of `formal' communities of 
practice and structures for TLOL. It is widely accepted in the strategic management 
literature that "... strategy reflects a pattern of conscious managerial decisions ... aimed 
at ensuring organizational adaptation" (Thomas and Pruett 1993). Whereas corporate 
strategies usually apply to the whole enterprise and define the businesses in which a 
company will compete, business strategies apply only to an individual business within the 
firm and determine how the company positions itself among its competitors in a given 
business (Andrews 1998). 
According to Mintzberg (1995), learning processes play a key role in the development of 
strategies and new competitive advantages, if not the key role. This leads to the 
assumption that certain methods and initiatives for TLOL are linked to strategy 
development and implementation, and that on the other hand the outcomes of strategy 
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implementation can be seen as an indicator for the quality of strategy development and 
the related learning processes of the top management. 
Following Mintzberg (ibid) the learning implication of strategy development for the top 
management derives not simply from the formalised process by which decisions are 
planned and prepared, different strategic options are developed and evaluated with 
regard to their risks and opportunities and strategic and operative decisions are made 
and co-ordinated39. Organisational learning of the top management is rather perpetuated 
and institutionalised by the fact that the top management is asked to think in a systematic 
and continuous way about the future of the company. 
In contrast to that, Quinn (1980) emphasises the importance of the quality of the strategy 
development process. He argued that learning processes can be triggered and the quality 
of strategic decisions can be improved "... by systematically involving those with most 
specific knowledge, by obtaining the participation of those who must carry out the 
decisions, and by avoiding premature momenta or closure which could lead the decisions 
in improper directions" (Quinn 1980) 40. Hence, according to Quinn (ibid), the formal 
strategy development process is less important than the right compilation of the group of 
top managers who are charged with the development of the strategy. This suggests that, 
depending on the knowledge requirements and the expected effects of strategy 
implementation, this group of top managers should be more or less extensive. In some 
organisations, strategy development will be limited to the CEO and the small group of top 
managers who report directly to him or her, i. e. the top management team. In diversified, 
divisionalised, large companies also business unit heads will probably have to be 
included who do not have the same scope of responsibility than the CEO or a member of 
39 It has been shown that formalised planning does not necessarily correspond to effective planning 
(Armstrong 1982; Rhyne 1986). 
40 Likewise Steiner emphasises that involvement and common reflection are crucial for strategy development 
(see also: Steiner 1969, p. 95). 
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the top management team, but partially oversee very large organisations (Finkelstein and 
Hambrick 1996, p. 8). 
Following Hambrick (1994) and Finkelstein and Hambrick (1996) for these formal 
communities to work effectively on strategy, continuous encouragement by the CEO is 
required. Eisenhardt et a/. (1998, p. 31) pointed out that regular and/or frequent 
interaction between the top managers is needed. Following the findings of Richter's 
(1999) study this interaction should mainly happen as face-to-face talks or meetings 41 
Otherwise top managers would fail to engage in the learning process and fail to have 
sharp views of their own opinions and those of their colleagues. 
However, apart from the quantity of top managers to be involved in the strategy process, 
the literature leaves unanswered whether different kinds or which kinds of top managers 
should be involved in the development of corporate and business strategies from a 
learning perspective. Likewise, the interplay between the development and 
implementation of corporate as well as business strategies and their meaning for TLOL 
remain unclear in the current literature. This, although according to e. g. Campbell et al. 
(1995), a poor co-ordination of corporate and business strategies, can lead to wasteful 
investments. This suggests applying a research design for this study that allows 
considering both, corporate as well as divisional top management groups. 
2.6.4 Competency-Acquisition and TLOL 
As already shown, Yeung et al. (1999) identified competency acquisition as a further 
effective style of organisational learning at management level in fast-changing 
environments. 
41 Richter (1999) found that top managers have despite a challenging travel agenda and means of electronic 
communications a strong preference for face-to-face contact especially if the issue is sensitive in some 
regard. 
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Among other things, it involves, according to Yeung et al. (1999), `borrowing' 
competences from e. g. consultants, external experts or peers. This conflicts, however, 
with Richter's (1999) empirical study on executive learning, which found that due to 
competitive boundaries top managers considered as a taboo, sharing conversations 
about challenging situations with colleagues outside the organisation-particularly with 
those within the same industry. As in Yeung et al. 's (1999) study mainly middle managers 
were involved, this derivation between the two empirical studies can be attributed to the 
specific characteristics of top managers. So can, according to Richter (1999), the high 
preference of top managers to seek advice on a fee-for-service or expert-by-expert basis 
from an "expert" such as a management consultant, coach or an independent expert 
(see: Berthoin Antal and Krebsbach-Gnath, 2001) be attributed to positional solitudes that 
are created by the dynamics related to positional power and status. 
More important for organisational learning than borrowing competences is, however, 
`buying competences' and the use of corresponding (combinations of) methods such as 
external recruiting, acquisitions etc. This confirms Simon, who stated that learning can 
also take place by ".... ingesting new members who have knowledge the organization 
didn't previously have" (Simon 1991, p. 125). It is likewise supported by Virany et al. 
(1996) and Kammel (2000), who highlight the role of executive succession and 
`newcomers' at top level for organisational learning. Hence, TLOL can also be triggered 
by changing not only the size and the structure, but also the composition of the top 
management. 
2.6.4.1 Changing the Composition of the Top Management 
Against that background, Hambrick and Mason (1984), as proponents of the upper- 
echelons theory, further elaborate the previous discussion (see section 2.6.2.2) on 
strategy and the related learning processes. They argue that the quality of strategy is 
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highly affected by the top management and consider strategies and effectiveness "... as 
reflections of the values and cognitive bases of powerful actors in the organisation" 
(Hambrick and Mason 1984, p. 193). Strategic choices are influenced by executive 
experiences, so that organisational outcomes can be partially predicted from managerial 
backgrounds, which in turn result from learning from previous experience. According to 
Hambrick and Mason (1984), it is even possible to control TLOL to a certain extent by 
modifying the composition of the top management. According to Miles and Snow (1978), 
these strategies are self-reinforcing over time, which means that executives with 
competencies in the required areas come to have great power and be more present in the 
organisation (a similar point is made by Cho and Hambrick 2006, p. 456). 
The reflection of managerial backgrounds in strategies and organisational outcomes is 
attributed to a filtering process (see: Finkelstein and Hambrick 1996, p. 42) that top 
executives use to construct their reality of the strategic situation. Hence, the complex 
decisions made within the scope of strategy development and implementation are largely 
the outcome of behavioural factors and top management characteristics. 
However, based on the limited existing42 and partly inconsistent research that has been 
done in this area, only some associations between managerial characteristics and 
organisational strategies/outcomes could be identified (see table 2 below). 
Managerial 
characteristics 
Linkages to organisational strategies/outcomes43 
Age - Low age of top managers seems to 
be associated with volatility of sales 
and earnings as well as growth even though it is not possible to 
disentangle the extent to which growth leads to youth and vice versa 
(Hambrick and Mason 1984; Finkelstein and Hambrick 1996). 
- High conflict top management teams that include large age spreads 
outperform other teams (Eisenhardt et al. 1998; Wagner et al. 1984, 
88). 
42 Hambrick and Mason (1984) highlighted a strong need for further empirical research. 
43 Due to different industry vitality and the important impact of industry characteristics Hambrick and Mason 
(1984) recommended to compare managerial characteristics within an industry. 
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Functional track - The functional orientation that usually has developed from experience in 
some primary functional areas is likely to develop distinctly different 
orientations to the firm and its environment. A positive association is identified between the degree of output-function experience of top 
managers and the extent to which the firm emphasises outputs in its 
strate Hambrick and Mason 1984; Finkelstein and Hambrick 1996). 
per career - 
Chief executives brought in from the outside tend to make more changes 
experiences in structure, procedures, and people than do chief executives promoted from within. Executives who have spent their entire careers in one industry or even one organisation can be assumed to have relatively 
limited perspectives. On the other hand tested working relationships 
might serve the organisation well in periods of stability 
Hambrick and Mason 1984). 
Tenure - Executive tenure is highly positively related to strategic persistence or 
absence of strategic change. Every increase of tenure brings an even 
higher level of strategic persistence. A further positive association has 
been found between executive tenure and performance conformity to 
industry averages, i. e. the longer the tenures of the top executives, the 
more the performance of their companies aligned with the average 
performance of their industries (Hambrick and Mason 1984; Finkelstein 
and Hambrick 1996). 
- Gabarro's research (Gabarro 1987) suggests that all the actions taken by 
new executives occur in the first 2.5 years in office. After that is a period 
of "refinement". 
- Change follows succession. The nature of this change varies depending 
on successor characteristics and contextual factors 
(Kesner and Sebora 1994, p. 357) 
- Top management groups with extensive tenure build specific firm and industry knowledge which is useful when the firm requires efficiency or 
past experiences have to be used to predict future events. It is less useful 
in times of uncertainty and change (Becker 1970). 
Formal - The level of education (not the type) is positively related to receptivity to 
education 
innovation. Furthermore studies suggest that an executive's amount of 
formal education is associated with intellectual dexterity (Hambrick and 
Mason 1984; Finkelstein and Hambrick 1996). 
- Moreover, research revealed that in some countries (e. g. UK) a 
background in a particular socioeconomic group (e. g. Oxford, Cambridge) 
is important for establishing interorganisational ties (Hambrick and Mason 
1984; Finkelstein and Hambrick 1996). 
Group - Routine problem solving is best handled by a homogeneous managerial 
Heterogeneity group, and ill-defined, novel problem solving is best handled by a heterogeneous diverse group of top managers (Hambrick and Mason 
1984; Finkelstein and Hambrick 1996). 
- Heterogeneous top management teams outperform other teams due to a 
more in-depth analysis of available information and the avoidance of blind 
spots, the development of a variety of creative and possible options and a 
stronger commitment of those who are in charge of the implementation 
Jackson 1992, p. 354; Ginsberg 1994, p. 162). 
Combination of - 
"Firms most likely to undergo changes in corporate strategy had top 
managerial 
management teams characterized by lower average age, shorter 
characteristics 
organizational tenure, higher team tenure, higher educational level, 
higher educational specialization heterogeneity, and higher academic 
training in the sciences than other teams" (Wiersema and Bantel 1992, p. 
91). The receptivity to change and the willingness to take risks is affected 
b demographic traits of the top management team. 
Source: depicted by author 
Table 2: Link Managerial Characteristics and Organisational Outcomes/Strategies 
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Hambrick and Mason (1984) and other authors were criticised by Jackson (1992). Based 
on Murray's work44 (1989) she claimed that processes through which the composition of 
the top management team exert an influence on organisational performance are not yet 
understood and that 
"... a priori specification of empirical relationships between top management 
team composition and organizational outcomes is difficult" (Jackson 1992, p. 
348). 
This is reflected in e. g. the inconsistent results of empirical research on the linkages 
between demographic homogeneity, or diversity of the top management team and firm 
performance (e. g. Murray 1989; Wiersema and Bantel 1992; Glick et al. 1993), (O'Reilly 
et al. 1993; West and Schwenk 1996), which can partly be attributed to methodological 
problems. The definition of firm performance thus varied or was reduced to published 
financial data or self-report performance measures (compare also section 3.7.4.2 on the 
effectiveness of organisational learning). A second problem can be seen in the fact that 
researchers have focused on demographic diversity instead of cognitive diversity and that 
demographic diversity is only indirectly linked to organisational outcomes (for further 
details see: Miller et al. 1998). 
Against the background that empirical research on these linkages is still very weak, it 
seems not to be justified to draw simple conclusions. The research design should 
therefore allow considering how the composition of the top management changed in the 
course of time (e. g. as regards age, tenure, knowledge that came in and that got lost etc. ) 
and how it related to strategic and organisational change of the whole enterprise. The 
revised literature furthermore brings up the question what triggered changes in the 
composition of the top management. 
44 Corresponding to Murray (1989) there are a variety of factors that have an impact on financial performance 
indicators. Among those the composition of the top team, the industry studied, the performance measures 
used, the length of time assumed to be necessary for effects to appear and the definition of the top 
management team. 
57 
Apart from that the discussion raises the question why apart from methodological 
problems the `ingestion' of new members at top level leads to inconsistent research 
results. This will be considered in greater detail in section 2.7 on drivers and barriers of 
top-level organisational learning. 
2.6.4.2 Top Management Training 
Learning by competency-acquisition goes beyond external recruiting, external 
acquisitions and a resulting changed composition of the top management group. 
Corresponding to Yeung et al's (1999) model likewise training can be seen as an 
appropriate method to get hold of new competences in fast-changing environments. 
This conflicts with Kammel (2000, p. 659), who confirmed that management development 
incl. training can initiate and support learning processes at top level. But, he came to the 
conclusion that irrespective of if 'off-the-job'-learning is culturally accepted or not (see: 
Antonacopoulou 2002), and despite important investments in training programmes for 
(top) managers, training cannot guarantee strategic change and the alignment of learning 
processes 45. Training could rather only increase the probability and efficiency of strategic 
change and TLOL. And likewise, Beer et al. (1990) claim that the relevance of training for 
organisational learning remains indirect at best. The concern is that... 
... training programs, regardless of 
how personally powerful, do not change 
organizational behaviour ... 
[because] these programs simply do not affect 
enough elements in the system-roles and responsibilities at work, the boss, 
rewards, and structure, for example-to change organizational behaviour" 
(Beer et al. 1990, p. 33). 
45 Apart from the fact that top managers have a certain aversion with regard to "institutionalised" off-the-job 
training, a series of management researchers (Rewans 1977; Hague 1979; Casey 1980) argue that much 
off-the-job learning tends to be far removed from the `real world of managers' and presents the manager 
with major difficulties in transferring knowledge back to the work environment (for further details on transfer 
problems cf. Belling et aL (2004)). 
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For that reason Salaman and Butler (1994) argued that sometimes off-the-job training can 
even be counterproductive or frustrating for the top managers concerned. Particularly 
when organisational structures, organisational culture and micropolitical configurations 
are not changed. So new ways of thinking and acting could not be applied, would not be 
fostered or rewarded and therefore would remain without positive effects (Salaman and 
Butler 1994). 
This suggests that in fast-changing environments, top management training will 
presumably play a subordinate role for TLOL, but rather serve other purposes (see e. g. 
Kammel (2000, p. 72). This will have to be verified within the scope of this study. 
In the following section, the drivers and barriers of top management learning will be 
analysed. 
2.7 Drivers, Barriers and Disturbances of TLOL 
2.7.1 Introduction 
In the previous sections, the literature on TLOL in organisations that undergo massive 
change was reviewed. However, TLOL, like learning in general, does not automatically 
result in performance, organisational efficiency and sustainability, i. e. in positive results 
(Dodgson 1993; Levinthal and March 1993). Besides, not all improvements can be 
attributed to learning but emanate from external or other influences. Depending on the 
absence or presence of such factors the quality of learning processes can turn out 
differently which is why in this section the literature on drivers and barriers of TLOL will be 
reviewed. 
In general it can be stated that there is a very rich, sometimes confusing literature in this 
field, which is why a discussion of all potential factors that foster or inhibit organisational 
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learning would go far beyond the scope of this study46. However, most of the literature on 
drivers and barriers is not related to the organisational learning of that particular group of 
people at the top of the organisation. 
In general, there are different, only partly consistent findings on drivers and barriers of 
TLOL in the current literature and research. As will be shown, these findings suggest that 
some aspects can have, depending on the specific context, both a driving or an inhibiting 
effect, which highlights the need to take a differentiated view on the organisational and 
external environment. As factors that foster or impede TLOL can be observed at different 
levels of the organisation, they will now be considered in greater detail in the following 
separate sections. 
2.7.2 Exogeneous Drivers and Barriers of TLOL 
In the executive learning literature change was identified as an important driver of TLOL. 
Richter (1999) differentiated within the scope of her empirical study on executive learning 
and situated learning at top level between different levels of change. She argued that 
TLOL is fostered e. g. by adjusting to (macro) change that arises from organisation's 
decisions to take strategic courses of action (e. g. a merger decision). Moreover, TLOL is 
triggered by producing or directing change, by responding to micro or local work 
challenges, or by life-cycle change as a result of changing age/stage interests. This is 
similar to the findings of Antonacopoulou's research (1999) on management learning in 
the retailing banking sector, which establishes a close connection between a series of 
external forces such as trends in the world economy, changes in the market, the 
intensification of competition and the need for learning. 
46 Annotation: further references are available from some overviews about the literature on drivers and 
barriers (e. g. Argyris 1980; Levitt and March 1988; Senge 1990; Kim 1993; ILOI 1997; Berthoin Antal et al. 
2001). 
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A series of other authors complement the list of potential exogenous drivers and barriers 
of organisational learning but not with a particular view on the top management47. 
In spite of that, overall the literature does not clearly specify the exogenous factors that 
exert an influence on TLOL. Likewise, no differentiation is made between different top 
management groups (e. g. corporate versus divisional top management groups) on which 
these factors can have a different impact. As, according to Kammei (2000, p. 104), the 
array of potential change forces is wide, a differentiation and additional empirical research 
is absolutely required. This study should contribute to that. 
2.7.3 Factors that Foster or Hinder TLOL at Organisational Level 
At organisational level, Antonacopoulou (2002) identified in her empirical study the 
perceived encouragement by the organisation as an important driver for TLOL. The 
encouragement by the organisation would `authorise' the learners to throw 
institutionalised norms, practices and policies within the organisation into question. She 
furthermore identified a strong relationship between the attitude of the senior 
management, structures and mechanisms in place to support learning, which are in turn 
influenced by the historical approach and the tradition in the sector (e. g. public vs. private 
organisations, Finger and Burgin-Brand 1999, LaPalombara 2001) 
In contrast to that, Tainio (Tainio et al. 2001) particularly emphasises the role of 
(supervisory) boards for TLOL, which can contribute to a turnaround in a performance 
crisis by replacing the current management. Finkelstein and Hambrick (1996) and 
Hannan and Freeman (1984) point out that the organisational size and inertial forces can 
exert an important influence on (top-level) organisational learning. 
47 e. g. ambiguity/ uncertainty (March and Olsen 1975; Klimecki and Gmür 1997; Blutner 1996); influence of 
politics in public sector organisations (Finger and Burgin-Brand 1999) and the normative idea 
(LaPalombara 2001); orientation on short-term results (Senge 1990); time (Weber and Berthoin Antal 2001; 
Bleicher 1985); Speed of environmental change (Bourgeois 1988). 
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Just as for exogenous factors, a series of authors identified further potential drivers of and 
barriers to organisational learning at organisational level, but not with a particular view on 
the top management48. However, as the top management and its organisation form an 
inevitable learning community (Klimec'ki 1997), some of them will briefly be described 
here. Friedman et al. (2001) suggest, for instance (similar cf. Yanow 2000), 
complementing the structural element of the organisation by "... the elements of an 
organisation's culture that facilitate or inhibit learning" (Friedman et al. 2001, p. 760). 
Sennet (1998) and Lounamaa and March (1987) identified too many changes in the 
organisation as a barrier to organisational learning. A high frequency of organisational 
change may produce chaos and instability. The individual and the organisation would not 
be able to stand still and reflect on its past. In other words, changes that are too frequent 
inhibit learning. Likewise March (1991) identified competition among managers for 
internal resources and hierarchical promotion as a barrier to organisational learning which 
should be particularly strong in times of staff reduction etc. 
Altogether, the literature again does not clearly specify the factors that exert an influence 
on TLOL, which is why further research is required. 
2.7.4 Drivers and Barriers to TLOL at Top Management Level 
Numerous further drivers of and barriers to TLOL were identified at top management 
level. One of these factors, which has already been mentioned in connection with the 
composition of the top management, is diversity or heterogeneity of the top management. 
Diversity can foster and inhibit TLOL, which is why Hambrick (1994, p. 200) describes 
diversity as no means and no ends in itself. 
Corresponding to Wiersema and Bantel's (1992, p. 89) empirical study, outsiders are 
more likely to bring new beliefs into the top management. On the other hand, however, 
48 e. g. Psychological contract: Cavanaugh and Noe (1999); Morrison, (1997); Antonacopoulou (2002); Storey, 
(1997), Incentive systems: Ginsberg (1994), slack resources: Dutton and Freedman (1985), History/ Path 
dependency: Fear (2001). 
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external recruits have to invest considerably in the internalisation of the prevailing thinking 
and procedures in the group ("learning the ropes") (Kammel 2000, p. 495) as well as the 
establishment of new contacts and management networking. In spite of that, mental 
maps, values and opinions of the managers on the lower hierarchical levels can turn out 
to be incompatible with the ideas and proceeding of the newcomer at the top and cause 
important resistances and barriers to change. As a result new external hires often bring 
with them collaborators who enjoy their trust and who should help them to establish their 
power in the new organisation. This enhances internal competition among managers, 
causes `domino effects' and a further increase in diversity in the organisation (Forbes and 
Wertheim 1995). 
The literature and research suggests, however, that the significance of diversity for TLOL 
goes back rather to the tension between conflict-as a result of heterogeneity-and 
cohesion-as result of homogeneity or similarity. According to Eisenhardt et al. (1998), a 
constructive conflict ".... reflects a continuously evolving understanding of the world that 
is gained through interaction with others around alternative viewpoints. Moreover, conflict 
is highly emotional in that it requires both the confidence and motivation to engage in a 
process that many executives dislike and avoid" (Eisenhardt et al. 1998, p. 38). 
So conflicts trigger learning processes. Groups without conflict lose their effectiveness. 
This is why "too little conflict can be disastrous" (Eisenhardt et al. 1998, p. 28). Eisenhardt 
et a!. (1998) found that age differences are particularly powerful with regard to conflicts. 
High-conflict top management teams would often include executives with age spreads of 
twenty or more years. This squares well with the findings of Wagner et al. 's (1984) study 
on organisational demography and turnover in top management groups. They identified a 
link between diversity and conflict and found that "People who are most likely to leave are 
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those who are most different in terms of these individual-level values and orientations, 
and these are age-based at the individual level of analysis" (Wagner et al. 1984, p. 88)49 
Apart from the fact that executives find conflict unpleasant because of their emotional 
dimension and of fear that endless debate will lead to slow decision making, constructive 
conflict resolution presupposes a certain degree of cohesion, i. e. that people know each 
other, that they have sufficient trust in each other and the will to solve the conflicts. 
Wagner et al's (1984) study shows that top managers are likely to communicate more 
readily with persons presumed to be similar-similar with regard to beliefs and values 
which change at different stages of life and individual experience. This has in turn a direct 
impact on team cohesion and integration50. This is likewise confirmed by Hambrick 
(1994), who considers behavioural integration as a driver for TLOL and highlights that 
behavioural integration leads to a higher number of team-based and so more effective 
decisions51. Hambrick (1994) furthermore emphasised the role of the CEO for behavioural 
integration. A CEO could either enhance or diminish the behavioural integration of the top 
group and could also alter its configuration. This can be achieved e. g. by means of 
reward systems which emphasise teamwork or through the CEO's own behaviour. The 
latter point corresponds to Richter's (1999) findings, which confirmed that the model of 
the CEO or colleagues fostered TLOL and encouraged top managers to experiment with 
new behaviours52. 
The discussion shows that cohesion or behavioural integration presupposes learning as 
well-even if different knowledge is required. According to Miller et al. (1998), lacking 
as Wagner pointed out that this is not the only factor for turnover to occur. Other factors, such as career 
plateauing are also associated with turnover (Wagner et al. 1984, p. 89). 
50 Further references are available from ((Wagner et al. 1984, p. 77). 
51 Hambrick (1994) argues that in the absence of behavioural integration the CEO would have to make some 
major decisions. 
52 Scherer and Tran (2001, p. 380) point out that prestige and perceived success of the model play an 
important role for "imitation learning". 
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cohesion causes problems with respect to communication, integration and political 
behaviour which overwhelm any positive effects of diversity and conflicts in top 
management groups. This has to be taken into consideration when corresponding 
methods for TLOL such as external recruiting, acquisitions etc. are used. 
Jackson (1992) described the emanating challenge as following: 
"The dilemma arises because cohesiveness and conflict appear to be 
incompatible, yet the evidence indicates that both can be beneficial" 
(Jackson 1992, p. 367). 
This means that a balance has to be found between "useful conflict53 potential"-as a 
result of heterogeneity and corresponding diverse and alternative viewpoints with regard 
to organisational goals, values, and beliefs about the connections between actions and 
outcomes-and "necessary cohesion" of the team-as a result of a homogeneous team 
that underwent socialisation and group processes which led to confidence and a common 
language among the team. The current literature and research in the field of 
organisational learning however leaves unanswered when more or less diversity is 
required and appropriate. 
2.7.5 Individual Drivers and Barriers of TLOL 
A final set of factors that drive or hinder TLOL are identified in the literature that result 
from specific characteristics of top managers. 
Following Culley (1989) and Senge (1990) top managers are action-oriented and lack 
self-reflective competence, which can impede TLOL. Beyond that Richter (1999) 
identified deeply held norms about power and influence as an important barrier to TLOL. 
53 For further details and references see Eisenhardt et al. (1998). 
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These would, as elaborated earlier, impede top managers engaging in anything else than 
formal forms of communities-of-practice. 
She identified within the scope of her fieldwork a lack of personal trust and confidence in 
former colleagues as another barrier to TLOL as well as competitive boundaries with 
colleagues outside organisational boundaries. Richter (1999) emphasised that top 
managers themselves are reluctant with regard to one-to-one discussions with other 
executives. Frank conversations are only viewed as possible when the top manager 
worked enough with the person, e. g. within the scope of shared working experiences, 
and/or when he knows that that he will give good advice. Apart from the trust issue, top 
managers are according to Richter (ibid), also concerned whether the person worked 
enough on this issue in or for this company to know how things are going on in this 
particular organisational context. As a result, top managers often deal largely on their own 
with their own problems which supports Antonacopoulou (2002) who identified the 
personal motivation of managers in her empirical study on top management learning as a 
crucial point for TLOL. 
As there is still little known about the relevance of individual drivers and barriers for 
learning on TLOL this study might contribute to fill this gap. 
2.7.6 Overarching Drivers and Barriers of TLOL 
Finally, factors that foster or hinder learning can obviously be located at different levels of 
the organisation. 
In this regard, Finkelstein and Hambrick's (1996) model of managerial discretion refers to 
three main forces affecting executive/managerial discretion: 
- task environment 
(i. e. the product differentiability, market growth, industry 
structure, demand instability, quasi-legal constraints, powerful outside forces, 
capital intensity), 
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- internal organisation (i. e. inertial forces [size, age, culture, capital intensity], 
resource availability, powerful inside forces), and 
- managerial characteristics (e. g. aspiration level, commitment, tolerance for 
ambiguity, cognitive complexity, internal locus of control, power base, political 
acumen). 
It thus sums up factors at different levels of the organisation as well as of the external 
environment. According to Finkelstein and Hambrick (1996) but also Whittington (1990; 
1992), the top managers as learning agents have a certain discretion to decide which 
parts of their learning environment they consider as important and how they intend to 
respond to that. 
Following Finkelstein and Hambrick's (1996) suggestion, managerial discretion is derived 
from these three sets of factors that greatly affect how much influence top managers have 
on organisational outcomes. Only when high discretion exists and top managers are 
aware of and have multiple possible courses of action are executive actions and learning 
reflected in organisational outcomes. Finkelstein and Hambrick's (1996) work and model 
of managerial discretion considers executive actions in general. As executive learning is 
however an integral part of managerial work (see sections 2.4.2 and 2.4.3) it is suggested 
by this research that Finkelstein and Hambrick's model can likewise be applied for TLOL. 
It will have to be investigated in this study whether this promising attempt contributes to a 
better understanding of the concept of TLOL and the interrelationships between the top 
management and its organisational and external learning context. 
2.8 Conceptual Framework and Research Questions 
2.8.1 Introduction 
The above review has scrutinised the literature on top-level organisational learning. A 
large amount of contributing literature has also been touched on but is not the main focus 
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of this research. In this section, the key issues identified in the literature review are 
summarised and synthesised in a conceptual framework that specifies the analytic 
strategy of the research. Furthermore the research questions that will be explored in this 
study will be derived from the literature. 
Due to the strong theoretical fragmentation of the concept of organisational learning, it 
has to be stressed here that not all theoretical gaps can be covered in this single study. In 
addition, it is found that not all the theoretical gaps identified can be researched. This 
study accordingly chooses to select researchable questions that are of broad significance 
for a better understanding of the problem of organisational learning at top management 
level in an environment of change. 
2.8.2 Conceptual Framework 
The objective of the conceptual framework, which is based upon the conceptual building 
blocks of the literature on TLOL, is to specify the analytic strategy of the research. The 
purpose of this strategy is to contribute to making the researcher's map of the territory 
under investigation and the researcher's understanding of how s/he is construing theory 
explicit. This is important because it-consciously or not-inevitably exerts an influence 
on the approach to data analysis (Miles and Huberman 1994, p. 434). The analytic 
strategy or conceptual framework, which interacts with and is operationalised by the 
research questions that were derived from the literature review, will provide the reader 
with a clear understanding of the central theme under investigation and its boundaries5a 
and will explain the structure around which the analysis chapter is organised. For further 
details on the approach to data analysis of this study, reference is made to section 3.9 on 
data analysis in the methodology chapter. 
54 i. e. of what was and of what was not studied. 
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The present framework for examining top-level organisational learning in fast changing 
environments is composed of four key components that are highly interrelated. Each of 
these key components will now be briefly outlined. 
The first constituent part, exogenous factors, is derived from the discussion of 
organisational learning as a response to environmental change (Cyert and March 1963), 
which was further elaborated with regard to TLOL by Richter (1999) and Antonacopoulou 
(1999). It comprises all factors of the external environment that generate or impede a 
pressing need for action and that expand or narrow the top management's options to 
learn. 
The strategy component describes the objectives of the organisation and the strategic 
choices that are made by the top management, in order to orient the organisation 
accordingly over all hierarchical levels. These choices and the development and 
implementation of strategies for which learning processes of the top management play a 
key role (Mintzberg and Quinn 1991) are influenced by exogenous factors, the firm's 
resources and capabilities as well as the top management itself. Depending on the top 
management's field of activity, one must differentiate between corporate and business 
strategies (compare: Andrews 1998). 
The parameter organisation is synonymous with the organisational learning environment 
of the top management. Specific characteristics of the organisation of which the top 
management is a constituent part influence the development and implementation of 
strategies and related learning processes. 
The organisation and the last constituent, the top management, i. e. a defined group of top 
managers at the hierarchical pinnacle of the organisation 55, form an inseparable learning 
55 The focus of appraisal in this context is not on the individual top managers themselves but rather on the top 
management as a whole. 
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community (Klimecki 1997). The top management is derived from the notion of the 
`duality of structures' (see Berends et al. 2003; Kammei 2000), not only composed of 
"actors" who undertake actions and interact. Top management and its organisational 
environment are likewise comprehended as "resources" that mark the framework for top- 
level organisational learning by shaping top managerial roles and by defining the 
capacity, willingness, opportunities or necessities to learn. 
2.8.3 Theoretical Gaps and Research Questions 
Having briefly outlined the conceptual framework, the theoretical gaps that were identified 
in the literature review will now be summed up. The research questions that will 
operationalise the conceptual framework will be derived from that. 
Overall, the review of the existing literature and research revealed that empirical research 
on organisational learning styles at top management level or methods for TLOL is still 
very sparse, and it remains to be empirically verified whether the results of Yeung et al's 
(1999) promising study on organisational learning styles, which was carried out with 
mainly middle managers, can unrestrictedly be applied for top managers. 
Irrespective of that, it is little understood what determines the methods for TLOL. They 
also need to be specified and require further empirical evidence. It could, for instance, 
thus be found that, despite the prevailing opinion in the organisational learning literature 
that structures play an important role for organisational learning (e. g. Friedman et al. 
2001; Kammel 2000), there is still a limited understanding of such methods for TLOL and 
of the interrelationships between the change of the structuring of the top management 
and/or the organisation and TLOL (Kammel 2000, p. 337 and pp. 382,389). 
The same is valid for other methods for TLOL. Although, according to Simon (1991), 
TLOL can take place by ingesting new members with knowledge the top management did 
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not previously have (similar: Hambrick and Mason 1984; Virany et al. 1996), there is also 
limited existing and partly inconsistent research on the associations between managerial 
characteristics and organisational strategies/outcomes. This leads to the first fundamental 
research question: 
  What initiatives and methods for top-level organisational learning were deployed? 
And why? 
The review of the literature likewise showed that most existing research on top managers 
concentrated on CEOs and a very small group of top managers that directly reports to 
him. As a result no differentiation is made between corporate and business top 
management groups as they can be found in diversified firms. Little is known about the 
interplay between the development and implementation of corporate as well as business 
strategies and their meaning for TLOL. This although it is known that learning processes 
play a key role for strategy development (see Mintzberg and Quinn 1991) and that the 
involvement of the right people in the strategy process is a crucial aspect for learning (see 
Quinn 1980; Grant 1996). A second research question is derived from that: 
  How and why does top-level organisational learning differ at corporate and 
divisional level? 
Just like organisational learning (Cyert and March 1963), top-level organisational learning 
(Richter 1999; Antonacopoulou 1999) is above all viewed in the literature as a response 
to change. Although reference is made to a series of external forces (Antonacopoulou 
1999), and the literature suggests that exogenous factors influence the choices made 
around top-level organisational learning styles and methods (Yeung et al. 1999), and the 
extent to which TLOL is reflected in organisational outcomes (see Finkelstein and 
Hambrick 1996), the current literature and research still provides an indeterminate idea 
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and understanding of the elements of the external environment that exert an influence on 
TLOL. 
Apart from that it could be found that, despite a vast literature on drivers of and barriers to 
organisational learning, there is little corresponding literature and research that is related 
to top management (e. g. Richter 1999; Finkelstein and Hambrick 1996). The findings of 
the literature suggest, that some aspects such as diversity (Hambrick 1994; Wiersema 
and Bantel 1992) can have depending on the specific context both, a driving or an 
inhibiting effect on TLOL. The literature likewise suggests that managerial discretion 
(Finkelstein and Hambrick 1996) plays a crucial role for TLOL, which highlights the need 
to take a differentiated view on the organisational and external environment. 
This leads to the following third research question that will be explored in this study: 
  What factors foster or hinder top-level organisational learning, and why? 
Overall, it can be stated that TLOL is not yet well understood (Richter 1999). The pursuit 
of a dual approach to TLOL (Berends et al. 2003) (see section 2.2.2.4), which regards top 
managers as actors and the organization and the top management as resources, aims at 
contributing to an enhanced understanding of the concept of TLOL and the 
interrelationships between the top management and its learning context. 
Before moving on to the methodology chapter the table below finally sums up the 
research questions and relates them to the components of the conceptual framework. 
Components of 
Conceptual Framework Exogenous Strategy Organisation Top Research Factors Management 
Questions (RQ) 
RQ 1: What initiatives and methods for TLOL x x x 
were deployed? And why? 
RQ 2: How and why does top-level organisational 
learning differ at corporate and divisional x X 
level? 
RQ 3: What factors foster or hinder TLOL , 
and why? 
x x X X 
Table 3: Correlation Map - Research Questions and Conceptual Framework 
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Chapter Three - Research Methodology 
3.1 Introduction 
The literature review revealed a series of research questions in the field of top-level 
organisational learning that deserved further investigation. This raised the question, how 
to research it. And more precisely what this means for the design of the study and the 
applied research methods, and which limitations of the study will result from that. 
The main purpose of this chapter is to present and discuss the choices made around the 
methodological approach of this study. 
The identification and definition of an appropriate research design that addresses the 
aims of the research presupposed the consideration of some fundamental issues 
influencing the research design. The following sections will highlight some of them. Above 
all the philosophical stance, different research approaches, and strategies. Likewise the 
selection of an appropriate research design and methodology will be derived in a 
systematic way, and it will be explained how the data were collected. In addition the 
boundaries of research design and methods as well as some specific issues with regard 
to research in the field of organisational learning will be considered. One section is 
dedicated to data analysis. On top of that one section will critically examine the role of the 
researcher as an internal, the strong and weak points, potential biases and ethical issues. 
3.2 Scientific Frame of Reference 
Science is composed of different disciplines. In principle formal and real or behavioral 
sciences are differentiated (cf. Raffee 1993; Staehle 1994). Whereas formal sciences 
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such as mathematics or philosophy deal with the construction of languages and an 
adequate set of rules and regulations for their application, real sciences examine and 
design `perceptible realities' (Ulrich 1982). Thus, real or behavioral sciences represent a 
part of the social sciences and comprise in the widest sense all disciplines that deal 
preferably with the human dimension. Real sciences can again be differentiated in pure 
and applied research (Ulrich 1982). 
The key feature of pure research is that it aims at leading to theoretical developments. A 
practical orientation is not mandatorily necessary. The discussion and setting up of 
hypotheses and theories are rather of decisive importance (Easterby-Smith et al. 1997, 
2008c). In contrast to that, the objective of applied research is pragmatic and should lead 
to the solution of specific problems. Starting point are problems that occur in practice or 
refer to a practical problem. Therefore the results of applied research have an essential 
connection with the practical application of constructs and rules in practice. 
Based on this understanding of sciences and against the background of the objectives of 
this study this research project can principally be assigned to applied sciences. This is 
also underlined by the interest of Deutsche Telekom in the results-and the sponsorship 
of this study. Nonetheless this assignment is not unequivocally for every aspect of the 
objectives of the research. Particularly with regard to some sub-objectives this study 
contains some elements of pure research as well. This is especially founded in the 
intention of this research project to gain a more in-depth understanding of organisational 
learning at top management level in a context of change. 
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However, it has to be pointed out that organisational learning is, just the same as 
organisational behavior56, not a scientific discipline in itself but rather an interdisciplinary 
approach. As shown in the literature review there is a complex literature and research on 
organisational learning anchored in an increasing number of disparate scientific 
scholarships, such as e. g. social, (strategic) management or organisational sciences, so 
that it is nearly impossible to reduce organisational learning either to pure economics, 
pure sociology, or pure psychology, etc. 
As a result the researcher in the field of organisational learning was confronted with a 
dilemma: He could either try to undertake this study within one discipline-which would 
help to gain respectability from academic peers but which could be very limiting, or could 
adopt a multi- or cross-disciplinary, pluralistic approach to research. The latter "... is more 
likely to produce results that are of use to practicing managers" (Easterby-Smith et al. 
1997, p. 5), expands the models of collective action (Hatchuel 2005), but risks to be 
criticised as eclectic. Chmielewicz (1979) even views a risk of `dilettantism' when 
completely dropping the separation of disciplines. The primary disciplines which are 
involved would be many and varied: thus it would probably not be possible for any person 
to be thoroughly versed in theory building and construction in more than one of the 
primary disciplines. It was decided to agree with Egner (1984), who argues that the 
advantages of overcoming the isolation of separate disciplines clearly prevail and that the 
risk of dilettantism should not be overestimated because even if an interdisciplinary 
research approach were formulated, it would not be necessary to deal with the entire 
psychology, sociology, ... etc. 
in order to deal with this research question. Rather only 
very limited parts of these sciences would be needed. This view is likewise supported by 
Organisational 
behavior is concerned with the study of the organization's and group's effects on the 
workers perceptions, feelings, and actions, the environment's effects on the organization and its human 
resources and goals, and the effect of the workers on the organization and its effectiveness" (Szilagyi and 
Wallace 1987, p. 3). 
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Giddens (1995) who reported that he deliberately referred to ideas and concepts of 
diverse sources when he formulated the theory of structuration. He argues that the claim 
for a focus on just one discipline could also serve as a mantle for intellectual 
sluggishness57. Following and encouraged by Giddens and due to the cross-disciplinary 
nature of the literature and research on organisational learning it was decided to try to 
turn the resulting eclectic use of theories and concepts in this study into a virtue in order 
to gain new insights into the learning of this influential group of managers at the apex of 
the organisation. 
3.3 Philosophical Stance 
Before entering into the details about the research design and methods a further section 
of this chapter is dedicated to the discussion of the main philosophical choices underlying 
this study. 
According to Easterby-Smith (Easterby-Smith et al. 1997, p. 21), an understanding of 
philosophical issues is useful for at least three reasons. Firstly, it can help to clarify 
research designs. Secondly, it aids to recognise which research designs will-or will 
not-work and thirdly, it helps to identify or create new or improved research designs that 
go beyond past experience. 
There are a number of philosophical issues that guided the debate about approaches to 
research in the past. These included such questions as how to define science, what is 
good science or bad science, what is truth and can absolute truth claims be made, what 
5' "When formulating my presentation of the theory of structuration, I hesitated to refer to concepts from 
widely different sources. Some may consider this unacceptable eclecticism, but I myself did not see the 
force of this objection. Certainly, working within a clearly defined tradition of thinking offers some 
conveniences-and perhaps even more if you consider the large range of approaches you are confronted 
with today that belong to no tradition. Nevertheless, the conveniences of established views can easily 
become a mantle for intellectual sluggishness. "(Giddens 1995, p. 35). 
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is useful research as well as a series of epistemological58, ontological59, ethical, and other 
issues (for further references cf. Miles and Huberman 1994; Baldwin and Lawson 1995; 
Zucker 1996; Easterby-Smith et al. 1997; Denzin and Lincoln 1998; Denzin and Lincoln 
2004). 
A central debate concerns the most appropriate philosophical positioning from which 
research designs and methods should be derived (see. table below): 
- the positivist-and 
the phenomenological paradigm. 
Positivist paradigm Phenomenological 
paradigm 
Basic beliefs: The world is external and The world is socially 
objective. constructed and subjective 
Observer is independent. Observer is part of what 
observed 
Science is value-free. Science is driven by human 
interests 
Researcher should: focus on facts focus on meanings 
look for causality and try to understand what is 
fundamental laws happening 
reduce phenomena to look at the totality of each 
simplest elements situation 
formulate hypotheses and develop ideas through 
then test them induction from data 
Preferred methods operationalising concepts using multiple methods to 
include: so that they can be establish different views of 
measured phenoma 
taking large samples small samples investigated 
in depth or over time. 
Source: (Easterby-Smith et al. 1997, p. 27) 
Table 4: Key Features of Positivist and Phenomenological Paradigms 
58 Epistemology is the theory or science of the method or grounds of knowledge (Blaikie 1993). 
59 Ontology is the science or study of being (Blaikie 1993). 
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The positivist paradigm is associated with quantitative methods whereas the 
phenomonological paradigm is associated with qualitative methods (Easterby-Smith et al. 
1997,2008c). 
The triumph of Newton's mechanics in the 18th and 19th century strengthened the role of 
positivism-and the associated quantitative methodology-and physics as a prototype 
and benchmark of "hard" or "good" science. The more scientists of other disciplines 
succeeded in imitating or emulating the methodology of physics, the more they 
corresponded to the requirements of that discipline, the higher was their reputation in the 
scientific or academic community (Capra 1989)60 
However, in the course of time this tendency became a real handicap particularly in social 
sciences and economics, which deal with "living systems" of human beings, which are in 
continuous interaction with each other and their environment. Increasing occurrences of 
anomalies caused scientists to question the established logical positivism that seeks the 
causes of social phenomena with little regard for the subjectivity of individuals (Kuhn 
1962). Changes in the philosophy of science occurred as a result of Kuhn's (1962) 
presentation and discussion of paradigm (woridview) shifts. This gave way from a 
Cartesian reductionist thinking toward a more holistic model that was more complex but 
necessary in order to better understand and explain the pecularities of human or social 
sciences (Miles and Huberman 1994). 
60 Also Secretan (1997) notes in his discussion of organizations, how some organizations are mechanistic" 
and traces this model to Newton. 
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Derived from a phenomenological stance, this thesis has been influenced by the work of 
the social constructionists (Berger and Luckmann 1966) 61 . From this perspective, 
meanings emerge through the verbal and social interaction of actors (Berger and 
Luckmann 1966), which lead to the main epistemological concern of the social 
constructionist approach, i. e. to analyse and understand such meanings. As this study 
focusses on a detailed understanding of certain situations, on explanations rather than 
predictions the phenomenological paradigm and the notion of reality as socially 
constructed shaped the underlying logic of the research design and research 
methodology. This implied to pursue a qualitative research approach (see Easterby-Smith 
et al. 1997,2008c). 
3.4 Quantitative versus Qualitative Research 
Resulting from the "scientific revolution" (Kuhn 1962) (see previous section) a 
considerable growth of interest in a qualitative research approach could be stated in the 
early 70s. In spite of the increasing interest in qualitative research and the claims about 
its potential influence, however, Bryman (Bryman 2004; Bryman 1995) observed that 
overall qualitative research is still not as pervasive in journals and elsewhere. 
Qualitative approaches differ from quantitative approaches in that they put-based on a 
social constructivist approach to reality-a strong emphasis on the perspectives of those 
being studied and on the interpretation of observations in accordance with the subjects' 
own understandings62. On top of that, qualitative research gives a strong sense of context 
and process, i. e. on the unfolding of events in time. Further common features of 
qualitative research are the proximity of the researcher to the phenomenon observed, 
61 Reality is seen to be a social construct rather than objectively constructed. 
62 In contrast to that and based on the ontological assumption that social reality is independent of human 
minds, the role of the quantitative researcher is to obtain scientific knowledge through observing and 
measuring objective reality (Philipps 1987). 
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flexibility and the use of different sources of data (Bryman 1995). So the aim of qualitative 
research, such as this study, is not to measure the studied phenomenon, but to interpret 
the social actor's perception of the meanings embedded within social settings. 
In any case, the quantitative as well as the qualitative approach have both, strong and 
weak points. Corresponding to Easterby et al. (1997,2008c) the main strengths of the 
quantitative methods and positivist approach are that: 
"... they can provide wide coverage of the range of situations; they can be 
fast and economical; and, particularly when statistics are aggregated from 
large samples, they may be of considerable relevance to policy decisions. On 
the debit side, these methods tend to be rather inflexible and artificial; they 
are not very effective in understanding processes or the significance that 
people attach to actions; they are not very helpful in generating theories; and 
because they focus on what is or what has been recently, they make it hard 
for the policy-maker to infer what changes and actions should take place in 
the future 63. 
..... The strengths and weaknesses of the phenomenological 
paradigm and associated qualitative methods are fairly complementary' 
(Easterby-Smith et at. 1997, p. 32). 
Qualitative approaches can thus tell us a lot about the dynamics of organisations and 
change processes over time, on subjects' perspective on certain issues and so contribute 
to the evolution of new theories. They can likewise provide deeper insights what causes 
the outcome of interest, and not just what is correlated with it (Carlile and Christensen 
2005). Even though qualitative studies can also be quite consuming in terms of time and 
resources, and the analysis and interpretation of data may be difficult (Bryman 1995; 
Easterby-Smith et al. 1997,2008c) a qualitative research approach seemed in the view of 
the formulated objectives and research questions of this study justified and the most 
appropriate and promising. 
63 In orginal highlighted in italics. 
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3.5 Theory Building versus Theory Testing 
As in any research design, a further choice to to be made was whether data or theory 
should come first (Philipps and Pugh 1987; Easterby-Smith et al. 1997,2008c). Theory 64 
must come before data, if the purpose of the research is to test or expand an existing 
theory. The data must come first if the researcher seeks to build theory that is particularly 
reflected in the concept of grounded theory (Glaser and Strauss 1967). A theory-building 
approach is more advisable if the problem is not well researched or understood and 
especially if the phenomena under investigation cannot be understood apart from their 
social context. The orientation towards theory is again linked to corresponding research 
logic, i. e. theory testing to a deductive approach (= a generalisation is applied to new 
specific cases). or theory-building to an inductive approach (= specific case leads to 
generalisation). Whereas theory-testing relies mainly on questionnaires, surveys, or 
simulations (Snow and Thomas 1994), the case study is in accordance with Eisenhardt 
(1989) the main research tool for building theories. 
It has already been stated as a result of the literature review that very little is known about 
the organisational learning of the top management. Reference has also been made to 
lacking theories, gaps in the literature and lacking empirical evidence capable of depicting 
the methods, outcomes, drivers and barriers or other aspects of the organisational 
learning of the top management. Accordingly, for the purpose of this research the aim 
was to make an effort to generate a theory capable of filling a gap in the literature. 
64Theory building and theory testing correspond to an inductive or deductive research approach. 
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3.6 Selection of the Research Design 
The next decision that had to be made was the selection of an appropriate research 
design. The discussion in the previous section on theory-building versus theory-testing 
suggested applying a case study approach. 
This is likewise supported by Yin (1994). According to Yin (1994) the selection of an 
appropriate research strategy or design depends in principle on three basic conditions: 
The type of research questions, the extent of control the researcher has over behavioral 
events, and the degree of focus on contemporary as opposed to historical events. 
As formulated and derived from the literature review, this study addresses "what", "how" 
and "why"-questions whereas the most important research questions are "what" and 
"why"-questions. Corresponding to Yin (1994) these questions are likely to favour the use 
of case studies, experiments or histories. Histories, however, were not applicable as this 
study focuses on contemporary events. And finally experiments were not an option, as 
the researcher had no control over behavioral events. Hence, for this study a case study 
approach was applied. 
3.7 Doing Case Study Research 
3.7.1 Introduction 
Having decided to apply a case study approach it was important to make further choices 
around the design of the case study. This required being aware of strong and weak 
points, the opportunities and threats of doing case study research in order to maximise 
the quality of the study. 
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In this section on doing case study research, the aim and features of case study research 
will be discussed in a first step. This will be followed by a discussion of the selection and 
design of a case study, and a consideration of the issues of valididy, reliability and 
general isabiIity for qualitative case studies. 
3.7.2 The Aim and Features of Case Study Research 
The case study research design entails the detailed examination of either a single or 
multiple cases on numerous levels of analysis (e. g. industry and firm) (Yin 1994). The 
objectives of case study research are varied (cf. Eisenhardt 1989; Eisenhardt and 
Graebner 2007; Yin 1994; Bryman 1995): Case studies can be of descriptive, explanatory 
or exploratory nature. They can be used to explore new research areas and to provide an 
understanding of areas of organisational functioning that are not yet well-documented 
and not easy to access. They can likewise be used for theory testing or to allow findings 
from other studies to be confirmed. And finally case studies can be used to generate new 
insights that are useful for building theory. However, according to Bryman it is not the 
objective of case studies"... to infer the findings from the sample to a population, but to 
engender patterns and linkages of theoretical importance" (Bryman 1995, p. 173). 
In general, an organisation or a department within an organisation is considered as 
constituting a case (Bryman 1995). A strong emphasis is put on context and process (-* 
time), which provides a frame of reference for the researcher and reader to interpret 
events. Whereas most qualitative research is in fact a form of case study65, not all case 
studies consist in qualitative research. They can also comprise quantitative elements. 
65 In certain respects action research which is most frequently adopted in organisational development can 
likewise be understood as a special kind of single case study. In action research (annotation: approach 
developed by Lewin (1946) in order to respond to problems in social action and in order to bridge the lack 
of co-operation between practitioners and researchers) the researcher is seen as part of the change 
process itself. It is assumed that the best way to learn about the organisation is to try to change it. The role 
of the researcher contrasts with the usual client - consultant relationship in that those should be involved in 
the change initiative who will most likely be affected by it. For further references cf. Dickens and Watkins 
(1999). 
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Thus case studies can be based on either of two distinctive philosophical stances- 
positivism and phenomenology. 
In this study, the use of a case study stems from a phenomenological, and more 
specifically a social constructionist perspective, linked to the goal of theory building. 
Analoguous to the categorisation by Snow and Thomas (1994, p. 466) the main purpose 
of this thesis lies on the explanatory aspect by establishing relationships among 
constructs (such as top-level organisational learning and the structuring of the 
organisation) and providing theoretical rationales for observed relationships. 
Further choices made around the selection and design of the case study will be 
presented and discussed in the following section. 
3.7.3 Case Study Selection and Design 
Having decided to follow a case study approach a series of new questions were raised 
such as: How many cases to select?, How many levels of analysis?, Should a longitudinal 
study be carried out or should it focus on a short period of time? Which cases to select?, 
Why choosing a particular case? etc. 
According to Yin (1994), a primary decision to be made with regard to the design of the 
case study was whether a single case or multiple cases should be used. A second 
decision concerned the unit of analysis. 
With regard to the first question, there is a controversial and partly even emotional 
discussion in the literature (see Eisenhardt 1989; Dyer and Wilkins 1991; Eisenhardt 
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1991). In recent years the number of multi-case studies66 has increased, which partly 
goes back to the criticism of a limited generalisability (see also section 3.7.5) of the 
results of studies of a single or small number of cases (Bryman and Bell 2003; Bryman 
1995). Eisenhardt (1989) argues, for instance, that with fewer than four cases, it is often 
difficult to generate strong theory, and its empirical grounding would more likely to be 
unconvincing, unless the case has several mini-cases within it. 
In contrast to that Pettigrew (1985b), argues that these disadvantages can be overcome 
by longitudinal studies of change processes with single or a small number of cases such 
as he did with his study on organisational change in ICI (Pettigrew 1985a)67. Dyer and 
Wilkins (1991) even consider single-case studies superior to multiple cases for creating 
high-quality theory and underline the strong points of the so-called `classic studies' that 
are single case studies68. They argue that classical single-case studies lead researchers 
to see new theoretical relationships and to question old ones. Multi case studies would 
tend to neglect the more tacit and less obvious aspects of the setting under investigation. 
As a result they would more likely provide a distorted description of the underlying case 
and its dynamics. Within the scope of the selection of the case study design they consider 
the most critical trade-off for the researcher between the deep single case study with 
strong contextual insights in a particular social setting and surface, multi-case studies and 
their benefits of comparative insights. 
Likewise, Yin (1994) considers a single-case study as an appropriate and justified design, 
if ... 
66it has to be noted that multi case studies can require extensive resources and time beyond the means of a 
single researcher (Yin 1994). 
67 This is why Easterby-Smith et al. (1997) points out that this is essentially the choice between cross- 
sectional and longitudinal design. 
68 They argue that the classic case study approach has been extremely powerful because these authors have 
described general phenomena so well that others have little difficulty seeing the same phenomena in their 
own experience and research. 
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- the case represents a critical case in testing, i. e. confirming, challenging, or extending 
a well-formulated theory, 
- the case represents an extreme or unique case69. 
the case is the revelatory case. This is the case when a researcher gets the 
opportunity to investigate a phenomenon that was previously inaccessible to scientific 
research. 
A second choice with regard to the design of the case study is whether one or more than 
one unit of analysis should be involved, i. e. whether the case study should follow a 
holistic or embedded approach (Yin 1994). Holistic means that only the global nature of 
an organisation will be examined; embedded means that within a single case also sub- 
units or different levels of the organisation will be considered. The latter approach can 
frequently observed in classic case studies. 
Again, there are advantages and disadvantages to both approaches (Yin 1994). The 
strong points of the holistic case studies are the weak points of the embedded ones and 
the other way round. A holistic case study is then favourable when the theory underlying 
the case study is itself holistic in nature or simply when no reasonable sub-units can be 
defined. An holistic approach risks, however, being conducted at an abstract level and 
overlooking unsuspected slippages that lead to changes, which cause the original 
research design to be no longer appropriate for the research questions. Embedded 
studies can also be unfavourable when the study focuses only on the sub-unit level and 
fails to return to the larger unit of analysis. 
On top of this general discussion on case study design there were some particular issues 
in organisational learning research that had to be taken into account with regard to the 
69 Just the same Pettigrew (1998). 
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selection of an appropriate case study design. These will now be presented and 
discussed in more detail. 
3.7.4 Specific Issues Concerning Research on Top-Level Organisational Learning 
Antonacopoulou already highlighted within the scope of her work in the field of 
managerial learning that there are-considering that learning is as much conscious as it 
is unconscious-a number of epistemological and ontological challenges to overcome 
(Antonacopoulou 2002). A comparable challenge was observed in the field of strategic 
management, which represents a further important source of research in the field of 
organisational learning. One recent development in the field of strategic management is 
the integration of the resource-based view of the firm (Wernerfelt 1984; Barney 1991), 
which is a difficult theory to research and test empirically. Just as learning is a conscious 
and unconscious process, it is difficult to measure resources that are unique, 
idiosyncratic, and sometimes even intangible or tacit. However, these intangible 
resources such as e. g. the firm's unique resource of strategic leaders (Hoskisson et al. 
1999), management capabilities or certain knowledge of how to run a business are the 
primary source of sustainable competitive advantage (Hitt et al. 1998). This raised some 
methodological issues and questions, which will be dealt with successively in this section: 
How-if at all-can organisational learning at top management level be observed or 
demonstrated? How can intangible capabilities/tacit knowledge be observed? And 
what are potential implications for the research design? 
- How can the quality and effectiveness of 
learning be evaluated? And which 
consequences for the design of research in this field go along with that? 
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3.7.4.1 Doing Research on Organisational Learning 
The first question addresses a fundamental problem of doing research in the field of 
organisational learning. It derives from the fact that the learning process70 itself cannot be 
observed and that it is impossible to see cognition taking place in the actions of the 
organisations. On top of that the results of organisational learning are not always explicit 
but often implicit and embedded in the organisation. Baumard (1999) tried to tackle the 
problem how the `non-expressed' could be investigated. He came to the conclusion that it 
is not possible and useful to force tacit knowledge into destructive explicitations and that 
every methodology will remain imperfect (Baumard 1999, p. 229). Giddens (1984) and 
Layder (1994) propose focussing on observable human action and to come back from 
that to agent and structure-related aspects. Spender (1989), however, contended that 
industries are idiosyncratic because the tacit knowledge they convey is not accessible 
from without, and that there is a danger in wanting to transpose to all industry what one 
has been able to observe in one. Morin (1986, p. 205) put it another way when arguing 
that the knowledge of physical things presupposes belonging to the physical world; 
knowledge of living phenomena presupposes belonging to the biological; knowledge of 
cultural phenomena presupposes belonging to a culture. When having to deal with 
intangible resources or tacit knowledge Hitt et al. (1998) therefore pleaded for a small 
sample study": 
"[T]the idiosyncratic nature of management capabilities makes multi-industry 
studies difficult, because operationalization of resources must be specific to 
the industry or even the firm" (Hitt et al. 1998, p. 13). 
70 Processes can also be considered as encoded 
knowledge"(Nelson and Winter 1982; Blackler 1995). 
71 Empirical testing of the resource-based view within the scope of large sample studies as they were often 
used in the field of strategic management before would therefore not be appropriate. For the same reasons 
also other disciplines in the field of organisational learning such as management research cannot put 
forward an universal repertoire of models of collective action (Hatchuel 2005). 
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On the basis of this discussion, despite the less encouraging view of Baumard (see 
above) and taking into account that it would not be possible to completely escape 
imperfection some methodological assumptions/decisions were made which should help 
to partly overcome the problem and which had an important impact on the design of the 
case study: 
Following Morin (1986), it is necessary to belong to the world that should be observed. 
And Spender (1989) argued that the tacit dimension would not be accessible from 
without. Likewise Dyer and Wilkins (1991) underlined the strength of Dalton's approach in 
his classic case study who `went native' to gather his data: 
"The aim [of the researcher] is to get as close as possible to the world of 
managers [the focus of Dalton's study] and to interpret this world and its 
problems from the inside....... we wish to describe both unique and typical 
experiences and events as bases for theory that is developed and related to 
other studies (Dalton 1959)". (Dyer and Wilkins 1991, pp. 614-615) 
This led to the conclusion that a strong involvement of the researcher in the phenomena 
being observed, both in terms of of an active work role in the organisation as well as 
tenure in the organisation, would be indispensable. 
It could be assumed that the proximity to the observed research subjects-either as a 
covert or full participant observer (Bryman 1995, p. 143)-, would be a definite advantage 
with regard to the unconscious or tacit dimension of learning and knowledge. At that time, 
the researcher had already worked for several years for Deutsche Telekom and it 
seemed promising that this long term involvement-based on her own `socialisation' in 
the organisation-would be useful to better deal with the singularity of the industry, and 
with the `non-expressed' (Baumard 1999) e. g. by a better understanding or by means of 
targeted questioning, confrontation, etc.. On the other hand, however, the required strong 
personal involvement in the organisation meant to remain modest with regard to the 
sampling of this study. This meant that under these conditions only one case company, 
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Deutsche Telekom, could be studied. At the same time it corresponded to Spender and 
Hitt et al. (see above) in being necessary to focus on the industry or even the firm due to 
and depending on the idiosyncratic nature of management capabilities. On top of that, the 
researcher considered that Deutsche Telekom is a unique, revelatory case in that it is the 
only telecommunications company in Germany that had to manage the transition from a 
former state-owned public authority managed by civil servants to a private competitive 
company72. Hence, it seemed not only an obligation but also a necessity to focus on a 
single case company, which is DT group and its preceeding organisations. 
Furthermore, the decision was made to cope with this tacit dimension of the learning 
process and results by adopting a common assertion in the literature that organisational 
learning has taken place when actions by organisationally key individuals such as top 
managers that are understood to entail learning are followed by observable changes in 
the organisation's patterns of behavior (Miles and Randolph 1981; Giddens 1984; 
Kammel 2000)73. Corresponding to the discussion in the literature review, these 
observable changes imply above all changes of the formal structuring of the organization 
or the top management. Consequently this single case study had to include different 
levels of analysis: the top management and its composition and observable changes of 
the structuring of the group. 
3.7.4.2 Effectiveness of Organisational Learning 
The second important methodological question that was raised above concerns the 
evaluation of the quality and effectiveness of organisational learning. This question lies in 
72 In addition it has to be beared in mind that Germany was in comparison with e. g. other European countries 
or the United States relatively late with regard to the deregulation and liberalisation of the 
telecommunications market. 
73 Miles and Randolph (1981, p. 50) defines organisational learning as individuals' insights reflected "in the 
structural elements and outcomes of the organization itself'. 
90 
the tradition of the studies of organisational effectiveness. Namely despite the tendency 
for organisational effectiveness (OE) to be one of the most central concepts in the field of 
organisation studies Bryman states "... an irritation with the fruits of decades of research 
which has led to calls for the abandonment of OE studies" (Bryman 1995, p. 233). Some 
of the chief sources of disillusionment with this research go back to the questions: Who 
evaluates? And what are the criteria of effectiveness? Or to put it in another way : there 
are obviously no objective but only social constructed measures for quality and 
effectiveness. Bryman (1995) argues that different stakeholders in the organisation, such 
as shareholders, top managers, customers, etc. may have different conceptions or 
models of an organisation's goals and criteria for its effectiveness. What is considered 
effective by the top management, does not necessarily apply to shareholders, employees 
or another group. 
On top of that these goals might be idiosyncratic for a specific industry or firm and 
therefore of limited generalisabiltiy. This means that there is in general no objective 
measure for effectiveness, but that it is socially constructed. This means in turn that the 
evaluation of the quality and effectiveness of organisational learning differs depending on 
the individual perspectives on-and subjective goals and criteria for effectiveness. So a 
series of general, industry- or firm-specific, group/team-specific and individual factors 
exert an influence on this evaluation process. 
One observable special factor in the organisational learning literature is a widespread 
optimistic view on the results of organisational learning. Organisational learning is 
considered as positive, linked to improvement (Huysman 1999), as something that 
creates "useful" knowledge (Prange 1999)74. So it was sometimes neglected or even 
74 The learning curve theory (Thurstone 1919; Wright 1936; Ascher 1965; Epple, Argote et al. 1991) as one of 
the first contributions to organisational learning, already assumed that learning results in improvement. 
Data on production costs or working hours are plotted against the cumulative output/performance and a 
decrease in costs was attributed to learning that takes place every time the worker repeats the task. 
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ignored that organisational learning does not produce necessarily positive outcomes 
(Dodgson 1993; Levinthal and March 1993) and that not all improvements are resulting 
from learning processes75. As to March (1990) organisational learning should therefore 
not be seen as ,,... following a path of greater and greater elaboration, beauty, civility or fit 
with the environment. The essential element is not that development leads to higher and 
higher states but that it inexorably leads somewhere" (March 1990, p. 40). 
Likewise learning through experience does not produce exclusively positive results. 
Experiences are a positive thing, if and when they contribute to the resolution of 
problems. However, there is also a risk of permanently repeating the same mistakes. The 
quantity or time of specific experiences does not mandatorily positively correlate with the 
quality of these experiences. In a strategic context experience is, according to Levinthal 
and March, ,,... often a poor teacher, being typically quite meager relative to the complex 
and changing nature of the world in which learning is taking place. Many of the same 
cognitive limits that constrain rationality also constrain learning" (Levinthal and March 
1993, p. 96). 
Against this background Locke and Jain (1995) claim that researchers need to move 
away from a conception of organisational learning as an `efficient' instrument of 
organisational change to an appreciation of its possible `inefficiencies'. And Huysman 
(1999) recommends to the contributors in the field of organisational learning to treat the 
phenomenon to a greater extent than at present as a process of which the outcomes can 
be either positive or equally negative76. 
75 They can as well be attributed to e. g. external influences. On top of that not in all organisations a high 
learning capability, problem resolution skills, or the use of diverse sources of learning and knowledge 
bases can be assumed and taken for granted. 
76 The negative aspects and limits of learning can be observed in many ways. Shaw and Perkins (1994) give 
some examples: a general incompetence with regard to the critical reflection and analysis of cause-effects 
relationships, the transfer and dissemination of knowledge in the organisation, effective actions (i. e. lacking 
experimentation, unsuccessful establishment of projects). Often complexity and the dynamics of the 
ambiguous environment are made responsible for these problems of organisational learning. 
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Beyond that point it has to be taken into account-as already mentioned above-that the 
evaluation of learning results has to differ depending on different perspectives and 
interests. Managers for instance often ".., seem to be able to reinterpret their objectives 
or the outcomes in such a way as to make themselves successful even when the shortfall 
seems quite large (Staw and Ross 1978)" (Levitt and March 1988, p. 522). Virany et al. 
(1996) identified the same phenomenon of self-serving attributions. Executives tend to 
take credit for favourable outcomes and blame external forces for unfavourable outcomes 
(Finkelstein and Hambrick 1996, p. 35). New organisational leaders often define previous 
outcomes more negatively than are leaders who preceeded them (Hedberg 1981). This 
means that there is a risk in relying just on the espoused theory of managers. 
A final important aspect in this regard is that there are in general two outcomes of 
organisational learning which can be differentiated but which are closely interrelated with 
each other. The first outcome concerns the organisation's performance which is in 
general described by economic key performance indicators such as net revenue, net 
income, market share, ... etc.. A second outcome concerns the 
human resources and the 
development of crucial capabilities and competencies. Corresponding to Porras and 
Robertson these two outcomes affect each other and "... over the long run one cannot 
improve without the other, and that if an organization has placed great emphasis on one 
and virtually ignored the other, neither will occur" (Porras and Robertson 1992 p. 740). 
With regard to the research design and methodology of the study this discussion 
illustrates again the need for a qualitative approach in order to grasp the subjects' point of 
view. This led to the conclusion that the single case study had to comprise different levels 
of analysis-especially e. g. the entire top management vs. the top management of certain 
divisions of DT group-when it comes to the evaluation of the effectiveness of the 
learning of different groups of top managers (-* embedded single case-study). Here 
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again, in order to prompt questions or to compare or contrast views on certain issues it 
was assumed that it could be useful that the researcher worked during his professional 
career-either as a manager or a consultant-in different parts of DT group, i. e. in all 
divisions as well as at the headquarters. This permitted the researcher to develop at least 
a `feeling' for the different `sub-cultures' of the respective divisions. The discussion above 
illustrates likewise some potential traps, potential criticisms and concerns, which mainly 
concern the role of the researcher. He has to carry out the case study rigorously (Yin 
1994) and to be aware of his own potential biases or the biases of some of the research 
subjects in order to avoid their exerting an influence on the direction of the research 
project. The strong involvement of the researcher in the organisation might on top of that 
raise some ethical issues, which will be discussed in a separate section. 
Further concerns about case study research resulting from the quality of case study 
research will now be discussed in the following section. 
3.7.5 Validity, Reliability, Generalisability and the Issue of Triangulation 
Having made a decision on the case study design it was important to identify potential 
risks with regard to the quality of the case study design and to possibly develop targeted 
strategies for this study to cope with them. 
Potential risks could lie in the validity, reliability and/or general isabiIity of the case study. 
First, it has to be pointed out that the use of reliability and validity is common in 
quantitative research, which goes back to the positivist research paradigm. In general, 
quantitative research "... leads us to regard the world as made up of observable, 
measurable facts" (Glesne and Peshkin 1992, p. 6). This raises the question of validity 
and reliabilty, i. e. the question if the measuring instrument measures what it is supposed 
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to measure (--> accuracy) and if the results can be reproduced under similar 
methodology" (- replicability, repeatability). 
However, due to the different nature of qualitative research (see table 5) qualitative 
researchers claim to reconsider the concepts of validity and reliability with regard to 
qualitative research (Golafshani 2003). 
Quantitative Research Qualitative Research 
Philosophical nature Positivism: Phenomenology: 
of the paradigm 
"... leads us to regard the Seeks to understand 
world as made up of phenomena in context- 
observable, measurable specific settings 
facts" 
(Glesne and Peshkin 1992, p. 6). 
Researchers seek... Causal determination, Illumination, understanding, 
prediction and generalisation and extrapolation to similar 
of findings situations. 
Research methods supplementary dominant 
like interviews and 
observations are... 
Role of the researcher distant involved 
Source: following Golafshani (2003) 
Table 5: Differentiation Qualitative versus Quantitative Research 
In agreement with Golafshani (2003), both, quantitative and qualitative researchers need 
to demonstrate that their studies are credible. While in quantitative research credibility 
depends on the instrument construction, in qualitative research "... the researcher is the 
instrument" (Patton 2001). Hence, validity and reliability cannot be viewed separately in 
qualitative research. They are rather "... conceptualised as trustworthiness, rigor and 
quality in qualitative paradigm " (Golafshani 2003, p. 604). There is strong linkage 
between trustworthiness, rigour and quality and general isabiIity. If trustworthiness, rigour 
77 This means that the research design or instrument ensures replicability or repeatability of 
the results. 
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and quality can be maximised it may lead to `high quality qualitative research' and so to 
generalisability (Stenbacka 2001). General isabiIity can be described-corresponding to 
Miles and Huberman (1994, p. 279)-as transferability to other contexts or according to 
Easterby-Smith et al. (1997,2008c), generalisability describes how likely it is that theories 
generated in one setting will also apply in another setting. 
It was already mentioned before that limited generalisability represents one of the most 
important criticisms of single case studies (Eisenhardt 1989). A strategy that aims at 
overcoming the weakness of the problems that come from single method, single- 
observer, single-theory studies and intrinsic biases in theory-building research is 
triangulation. Corresponding to Denzin and Lincoln (1998) four basic types of 
triangulation can be differentiated. They can again be combined to multiple triangulation 78 
(Patton 2001): 
- Triangulation by data source, involving time, space, places and persons, 
- Investigator triangulation, which consist of the use of multiple, rather than single 
researchers, 
- Theory triangulation, which consists of using more than one theoretical scheme in the 
interpretation of the phenomenon, 
- Methodological triangulation, which involves using more than one method and may 
consist of within-method or between-method strategies 
Often the purpose of triangulation in specific contexts is to obtain confirmation of findings 
through convergence of different perspectives (Creswell and Miller 2000). The point at 
which the perspectives converge is seen to represent reality79. As far as research on 
78 This means that the researcher combines in one investigation multiple observers, theoretical perspectives, 
sources of data, or methodologies. 
79 Miles and Huberman (1994) compare triangulation with the modus operandi approach used by detectives 
who amass different exhibits such as fingerprints, eyewitness accounts, ... etc. 
in order to find sombody 
guilty. 
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TLOL is concerned, this is particularly relevant. As the top managers themselves could be 
part of the problem and e. g. not be aware of learning needs etc., it would be dangerous to 
merely rely on the espoused theory of top managers (e. g. interviews). According to Miles 
and Huberman (1994), triangulation is most powerful when triangulation sources are 
picked that complement each other due to different biases and strong points. These 
different sources for instance of data-should lead to the replication of the finding. In a 
constructivist approach triangulation, e. g. by the use of multiple methods, will lead to 
more valid and reliable multiple and diverse constructed realities (Johnson 1997). 
However, contradictory results can not only produce multiple context-related explanations 
but also bring up important problems e. g. question design, as well as fundamental issues 
surrounding researcher understanding of a topic. 
A further way to increase the researcher's trustfulness of a proposition about some social 
phenomenon and to eliminate bias is by `respondent validation'. In the latter case 
researchers ask research subjects for feedback on some of their findings (Bryman 1995; 
Bryman and Bell 2003) which can help to minimise the interpretation problem. This 
presupposes again the researcher is aware that the case study method is concerned 
basically with his interpretation of the management's signification of events. 
With regard to this single case study this discussion had several implications: First, based 
on the argument that `the researcher is the instrument' (Patton 2001), it was decided to 
include a separate section in the methodology chapter on doing research as an internal 
which comprises some information about the professional background of the researcher 
in and outside of DT. The objective is to provide the reader at least with an idea about the 
role of the researcher in the organisation and how the researcher tried to avoid or at least 
minimise bias and the risks when doing research as an internal. As mentioned before, 
understanding organisational reality means seeing through the eyes of one's subjects (i. e. 
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members of the organisation). However, it must be avoided-e. g. by means of 
respondent validation or verbatim quotations (Bryman 1995)-that this is-as argued by 
Bryman-".. ironically a phrase frequently used by qualitative researchers to describe their 
point of orientation" (Bryman 1995, p. 140). Secondly, this discussion had an important 
impact on the selection and use of concrete research methods. In the view of the single 
case study design the choice was made to use multiple triangulation-i. e. different 
sources of data and different research methods-as an appropriate and indispensable 
means to obtain `credibility' and to deal with the problem of general isabiIity. 
3.8 Data Collection 
3.8.1 Introduction 
In this section data collection will be considered in more detail. The selection of research 
methods, the timing of data collection as well as the research methods will be outlined. 
Likewise the research cohort will be defined in this section. 
3.8.2 Selection of Research Methods 
As stated above, case studies can be based on either of two distinctive philosophical 
stances-positivism and phenomenology. So they can comprise qualitative as well 
quantitative elements and use the whole array of research methods such as 
questionnaires, surveys, unstructured and structured interwiews, participant observation, 
simulation, documentation, archival sources of data, etc. Ultimately, however, the 
selection of the methods for data collection depends on the research focus and the 
defined research questions (Eisenhardt 1989; Yin 1994; Easterby-Smith et al. 1997, 
2008c). 
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With regard to this qualitative study, a research method could then be considered as 
appropriate when it permitted coping with the still diffuse and complex concepts of 
managerial work and learning and its strong reference to context. The objective of data 
collection was to gather information about a series of different issues such as about the 
top managers themselves-about who is considered a top manager, their professional 
and demographic backgrounds, etc. Furthermore it was important to gain an 
understanding of the personal views of top managers on top-level organisational learning 
and their potentially different conceptions about, e. g. the deployed methods for TLOL, the 
outcomes or the effectiveness of TLOL. In doing so it had to be taken into 
consideration-as described in the literature review (see section 2.4.2)-that for top 
managers there are no learning problems per se but only business problems, that top 
managers do often not want to be considered as learners and prefer to talk about 
business problems which need to be solved (Baldwin and Lawson 1995). Hence, not all 
top managers will want to talk about their own learning or learning will be `hidden' in 
stories they tell about business problems. 
Derived from the research questions the research method had to approach organisational 
learning at top level as a phenomenon situated in executive actions and the resulting 
structuring of the organisation. So details about how the structuring or formal organisation 
of the group evolved including data on all large OD-initiatives were necessary. 
When applying these qualitative research methods the researcher had in turn to be 
sensitive and skilled enough not only to understand how top managers construct the 
meaning and significance of certain situations or issues with regard to TLOL but also to 
help them to reflect upon or question their own practices and explore their own beliefs 
(Antonacopoulou 2002). So social interaction between the researcher and the research 
subjects was required. 
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Based on that it is not surprising that interviews and observation revealed as the 
prevalent research methods of qualitative studies on managerial or executive learning 
respectively (Richter 1999; Antonacopoulou 2002) or managerial work (Stewart 1982; 
Kotter 1982). Whereas the very early studies (Carlson 1951; Stewart 1967) mainly 
focused on "what" questions, the later studies concentrated more and more on "how" and 
"why" questions concerning executive work and learning and so made use of more 
flexible research methods (see table below) such as interviews and observation. 
Depending on the research questions-these studies were sometimes complemented by 
another research method. 
Author, year Methods 
Carlson Diaries80 
(1951) 
Stewart Diaries 
(1967) 
Mintzberg Observation, Interviews 
(1973) 
Stewart Observation, Interviews 
(1982) 
Kotter Questionnaires, observations, 
(1982) documentation (diaries), 
interviews 
Richter Interviews 
(1999) 
Antonacopoulou Interviews, observation, questionnaires, 
(2002) documentation 
Cahen Interviews 
(2008) 
Table 6: Qualitative Studies: Research Methods on "Managerial Work and Learning" 
This suggested again using interviews for the purpose of this study as the core element of 
the research methodology. However, it seemed indispensable not to focus only on 
interviews. As described in the previous section, theory-building researchers typically 
80 Managers observed their own behaviour over a longer period of time and wrote down details about their 
activities (content, location, duration, participants) 
in standardised forms (diaries). 
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have to combine and apply multiple research methodologies in the study of the same 
phenomenon in order to overcome the weakness, intrinsic biases and the problems that 
come from single case studies and to deal with potential problems of interpretation (-> 
triangulation). So, in order to further validate the data of the interviews and compensate 
for potential weak points of interviews as a research method (see table below) and to 
gather more information about DT's evolution it was decided to use documentation or 
archival sources and observation as further research methods. It was assumed that this 
would simultaneously contribute to a better understanding of the impact of the learning 
context on TLOL and vice versa. So those research methods were identified and used for 
this study that are, according to Bryman (1995)-typically associated with qualitative 
research. 
Source of Evidence Strengths Weaknesses 
Documentation " stable-can be " retrievability-can be 
reviewed repeatedly low 
" unobstrusive-not " biased selectivity, if 
created as a result of collection is incomplete 
the case study " reporting bias-reflects 
" exact-contains exact (unknown) bias of 
names, references, and author 
details of an event " access-may be 
" broad coverage-long deliberately blocked 
span of time, many 
events, and many 
settings 
Archival Records " (Same as above for " (Same as above for 
documentation) documentation) 
" precise and quantitative " accessibility due to 
privacy reasons 
Interviews " targeted-focuses " bias due to poorly 
directly on case study constructed questions 
topic " response bias 
" insightful-provides " inaccuracies due to poor 
perceived causal recall inferences 
" reflexivity-interviewee 
gives what interviewer 
wants to hear 
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Direct Observations " reality-covers events in " time-consuming 
real time 
Participant " (Same as above for " (Same as above for 
Observation direct observations) direct observations) 
" insightful into " bias due to 
interpersonal behavior investigator's 
and motives manipulation of events 
Physical Artifacts " insightful into cultural " selectivity 
features 
" availability 
" insightful into technical 
operations 
Source: (Yin 1994, p. 80) 
Table 7: Six Sources of Evidence: Strengths and Weaknesses 
Following Yin's recommendation (1994), in preparation of the data collection and with a 
view to data analysis, a computer database was implemented. 
Each method of data collection of this study as well as the precise application of the 
research method will be described in more detail in the following sections. It will be 
complemented by a section on the boundaries and limitations of the research 
methodology. 
3.8.3 Timing of Data Collection 
Having defined the research methods it wirf now be described in more detail how data 
were collected. Data were collected in four main phases over the entire duration of this 
study (1998 - 2003). 
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The first phase of data collection comprised of an analysis of the organisation using 
mainly documentation and archival sources. This review provided valuable insights into 
how DT was organised and managed before and after the privatisation of the group and 
liberalisation of the telecommunications market in Germany. 
The second phase of data collection (1998 - 2000) consisted mainly of observation. The 
researcher was involved as a consultant in a series of group-wide OD-initiatives (here 
mainly the new alignment of customer divisions as well as sub-projects within the scope 
of the establishment of the 4-pillar strategy) which included a partly close co-operation 
with the top management and the participation in numerous management and steering 
committee meetings which consisted mainly of top managers. In this phase deeper 
insights could be gained into how strategies were developed and implemented and into 
how a new structuring of the organisation was developed and established by DT's top 
management. 
In a third phase of data collection (from 2001 - 2002) the researcher undertook an 
analysis of DT group's top management development as well as DT's training and 
development offerings for the group's top managers using mainly documentation (incl. 
CVs of the top management), observation and a few interviews with HR managers and 
experts. At that time the researcher headed the top management development 
department of DT group, which was initially part of DT's corporate university (i. e. 
"Telekom Business Academy", cf. Storey and Bungartz 2005) and after a restructuring, of 
the Top Management Human Resources department. Based on this review, valuable 
insights could be gained into the "institutionalised" part of TLOL and particularly into the 
significance and meanings that were attributed, e. g. top management training, 
development tools, career management and succession planning, grading as well as 
individual learning offerings such as coaching. This phase of data collection was 
103 
complemented by a first series of interviews with 35 top managers, which were done 
between May and August 2002 within the scope of a top management development 
initiative which was managed by the researcher. 
In the fourth and final phase of the data collection, 37 interviews with top managers were 
conducted between January and March 2003. These interviews provided important data 
about the significance and meanings DT's top managers attributed to the development 
and implementation of strategies and DT's organisation and how it evolved over time in 
relation to the learning of the top management. 
These primary data that were collected in four phases were complemented by secondary 
data that resulted from semi structured interviews. A study on the effectiveness of the 
group's organisation development initiatives, which was based on 25 interviews with 
senior managers and members of the corporate board of management and 150 
interviews with employees, was carried out by DT group's auditing unit between July and 
September 2002. This study, which aimed at the evaluation of the effectiveness of past 
organisation development initiatives and the identification of critical success factors, was 
carried out completely independent of the researcher's study. Nevertheless the auditing 
department's study dealt with some issues that were relevant to this research such as co- 
operation at top level, communication, strategy and decision-making processes, potential 
conflicts between individual and group objectives at top level, etc. This study of the 
group's auditing proved very useful with regard to the research project as it permitted to 
cross-check and validate some of the findings. 
More details about data collection and the related research methods will be provided in 
the following sections on the different research methods. In accordance with the 
importance of the research method the first section will be dedicated to interviews 
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followed by documentation and archival sources as well as observation. Prior to that, 
however, the research cohort will be defined in the next section. 
3.8.4 The Top Management as the Research Cohort 
Before the start of data collection it was indispensable to clearly define the research 
cohort and clearly state the assumptions and criteria that were applied for that purpose. 
Research on top managers as it is intended for the subject of organisational learning 
within this study can namely be conducted at multiple levels of analysis: 
  Governance bodies such as supervisory boards. They are in charge of reviewing 
major policy choices such as acquisitions, diversification, executive spending or CEO 
dismissal (for further references see (Finkelstein and Hambrick 1996, p. 9). 
  The Chief Executive Officer who is the executive who has overall responsibility for the 
conduct and performance of an entire organisation (Finkelstein and Hambrick 
1996, p. 7). 
  Top Management Teams which refer in general to the top three to ten executives at 
the top of an organisation. 
  Business Unit Heads holding posts that do not have the scope of responsibility of CEO 
positions. However they often oversee very large organisations, have considerable 
autonomy and sometimes are even bestowed such titles as managing director, senior 
executive vice presidents, CFO, COO, CMO, CIO or CEO of their respective business 
units. 
This study will not focus on governance bodies as part of the top management, as 
supervisory boards do not belong to the `inner circle' of the organisation. In Germany, the 
composition of these governance bodies is defined by law. Furthermore, politics have a 
sustainable impact on the composition of these boards-in particular in large companies. 
Within the framework of this study effects of these organs wil be considered as 
exogenous factors. 
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Even if an important percentage of top management research concentrates on CEOs and 
top management teams of a very limited size, and even if there is no doubt that these two 
target groups play an important role, this study is based upon a more complex definition 
of the top management. Within the framework of the emergence of diversified firms with a 
corresponding divisionalised, decentralised organisation, numerous general management 
positions had been created in large companies such as Deutsche Telekom (Chandler 
1962). Although these management positions do not correspond to the responsibility of a 
CEO position, the holders of these positions in divisionalised large organisations, 
following the suggestion from Finkelstein and Hambrick (1996), very often have important 
room for manoeuvre in making a decision. They make strategic decisions with far- 
reaching consequences and launch strategic projects and initiatives. Consequently, the 
focus on a few single individuals such as the CEO or the top management team in the 
classical sense, do not do justice to the complexity of very large organisations such as 
Deutsche Telekom. For the same reasons Kammel (2000, p. 217) advocates seeing this 
classical approach (i. e. focus on CEO and a small top management team) in relative 
terms. Otherwise there would be a risk not to mirror reality but to expect too much from 
top managers by viewing them as omniscient and omnipotent. Rather, it is necessary to 
integrate the first and-even in parts the second-level below the management board, in 
particular if their units are particularly affected by the decisions that have to be made. 
This procedure also corresponds to the approach in the field of strategic leadership where 
some of the most important contributors to the field have carried out their research on the 
level of Business Unit Heads (Gupta and Govindarajan 1984). "However, such research 
has so far been very sparse, probably due to the difficulty of obtaining data as compared 
to data on CEO's and others at the corporate level" (Finkelstein and Hambrick 1996, p. 8). 
Thus, for the purposes of this study a definition of the top management will be applied 
that goes beyond the classical, very limited definition. Apart from members of the board of 
management, core-functions on corporate level and business unit heads on divisional 
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level of DT group made part of the target group of this study. This raised the question as 
to the basis on which top managers were or were not assigned to this group of people at 
the apex of the group's organisation. Corresponding documentation (Benner 1994) 
showed that in 1994, a grading system (see table 8 below) was implemented for DT's top 
management that, among other things, served as a basis for the board decision as to 
whether or not a specific position was assigned to DT's top management. 
Criterion Measures 
... 
... the scale of the function on the basis of key 
performance indicators (e. g. EBITDA, EVA, sales, Key performance indicators and etc. ), as well as the impact of this function on impact on business activity business results (e. g. sales: categories starting from 
< EUR 10 million up to the highest category > EUR 4 
billion) 
... the width, depth and complexity as regards the Scope of business activity responsibility of the function, as well as the decision- 
making competence 
... the influence on the development and Strategic integration establishment of initiatives that have a significant 
impact on the long-term alignment of the company. 
... what is communicated to whom and how. In this 
Interaction/Management of interfaces respect, 
it has to be taken into account that an 
environment has to be created that fosters the 
achievement of company objectives. 
... the required width and depth of the topical 
Complexity of expert and 
knowledge and the use of this knowledge for 
management knowledge 
innovation problem solving. Different complexities of 
knowledge are differentiated (indicators: nat. /internat. 
professional and management experience in years) 
Source: Resources (2002), translation by author 
Table 8: Grading System of DT's Top Management (2002) 
While according to representatives of the HR department for the top management staff, 
the criteria apparently did not change since its implementation with the exception of 
marginal modifications, the weighting of the different criteria varied and depended on the 
importance that was attached to them by the members of the corporate board of 
management. In spite of that, there were a series of functions that were part of DT's top 
management throughout the entire period of the study. The holders of these functions 
that represent the research cohort of this study are entitled member of the Board of 
107 
Management (--> Corporate or divisional level such as CFO, COO, Chief Brand Officer, 
CMO, CTO, 
... etc. ), Managing Director (- important subsidiaries), Chairman of the 
Board of Management on divisional level (- CEO), Senior Executive Vice President, 
Executive Vice President were in the particular focus of this study. 
Case Case Case Case 
"Head- 
" 
"Fixed "Mobile / Online" "Systems" 
"DT Group" 
quarters Network" 
Definition Top management 
Represents X% 100 
of DT's top mgt. 27 20 27 6 20 (corresponds staff to 121 top 
(as at 08/2002) managers) 
Corresponding 
functions/titles Members of the board of management, 
of managers senior executive vice president, 
assigned to Managing director 
DT's top mgt. 
Corresponding 
functions/titles See above See above 
of managers plus plus 
assigned to Executive vice Executive vice president, 
top mgt. of the president partly: vice president 
business 
Table 9: Top-Management - Key Figures of the Research Cohort in Case Organisation 
In this study these different functions are designated as top managers, top executive 
managers, senior managers, top executives or senior executives. The terms are used 
interchangeably. 
Having defined the research cohort, the following sections will now, as mentioned earlier, 
concentrate on the research methods. 
3.8.5 Research Methods 
3.8.5.1 Interviews 
Interviews are one of the most important sources of data for case studies (Yin 1994). It is 
recommended to apply interviews when the primary purpose of a research is to develop 
an understanding of the meanings interviewees attach to certain situations or matters and 
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so on the constructs that the interviewee uses in order to explain and interpret certain 
phenomena. However, some choices had to be made concerning the use of interviews. 
Based on the definition of the top management as the research cohort (see previous 
section) the interviewees had to be selected and it had to be decided how many 
interviews had to be made in total. Concerning the latter point it could be found that in 
existing research a partly very small number of top managers were interviewed or 
observed (see table below). 
Author, year Sample Methods 
Mintzberg 5 top managers of 5 american 
(1973) companies 
Observation 
Stewart 98 managers of different levels 
(1982) and functions 
Observation, Interviews 
Kotter 15 general managers from 9 
Questionnaires, observations, 
(1982) different companies 
documentation (diaries), 
interviews 
Richter 7 executives working at 6 
different companies located in one-to-one interviews (1999) three countries 
6-8 HR managers of each of the 
three retail banks 
Antonacopoulou 
(2002) 
plus Interviews, observation, 
26 individual managers in each questionnaires, documentation 
of the three retail banks (in total 
78). 
Cahen 
11 CEOs of CAC 40 companies* one-to-one interviews 
(2008) 
* CAC 40 = French stock market index, The index represents a capitalization-weighted measure of the 40 most significant 
values among the 100 highest market caps on the Paris Bourse (now Euronext Paris). 
Table 10: Studies on `Managerial Work and Learning' - Samples and Methods 
When a larger number of managers were involved in these studies then also other 
management levels were considered. A further crucial point of the first four studies is that 
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in most cases individual top managers coming from different companies were involved. 
Bearing in mind that TLOL is affected by the learning context (see literature review), the 
researcher concentrated following Antonacopoulou's approach on a larger number of top 
managers in the study. 
In total, 72 interviews with 68 top managers (incl. members of the corporate board of 
management) were made. The top managers interviewed reflected all businesses and 
functions of DT group. Getting access represented in general no major problem. 
However, due to time constraints particularly interviews with members of the corporate 
board of management DT group were postponed several times. One planned interview 
could ultimately not take place. 
Furthermore, secondary data (i. e. a study of the auditing department) based on 25 
interviews with senior managers) could be used in order validate the results. 
Interview Design and Conducting Interviews 
A further important choice to be made concerned the design and more precisely the 
degree of structure of the interviews. In general, one can differentiate between 
unstructured, semi-structured and structured interviews. Truly unstructured or depth 
interviews (Berent 1966) are not guided by a pre-existing interview schedule. The main 
objective is to get the interviewee "... talking freely and at length, without interruption. The 
function of the interviewer is to be an interested and sympathetic listener: She never 
interrupts, and intervenes only to keep her informant talking" (Berent 1966, p. 33). The 
strong point about unstructured or depth-interviews is that a lot can be learned about 
what motivations, attitudes, views, etc. exist and that researcher bias is eliminated. On 
the other hand, however, the analysis of the interviews is difficult and it is not sure that 
the desired information can really be obtained (Bryman 1995; Easterby-Smith et al. 1997, 
2008c). Therefore it was decided to use semi-structured interviews, whereby the 
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researcher used an interview schedule but provided time and space for issues that might 
be raised by the interviewee. In order to get the interviewees' versions of things mostly 
open question were used. 
Within the scope of this study two series of interviews were carried out. A first series of 
interviews with 35 senior managers of Deutsche Telekom incl. 5 members of the 
corporate board of management DT group took place between May and August 2002. 
Although a series of questions could be added to the interview schedule that were directly 
derived from this study, and although all interviewees were informed that the collected 
data will also be used for research purposes, this first series of interviews was primarily 
conducted for professional reasons within the framework of a top management 
development project of the top management HR development department of Deutsche 
Telekom Group which the researcher managed at that time. A short description of the 
objectives of the interviews and the interview schedule had to be sent to the interviewees 
prior to the interviews. 
All 35 interviews, which lasted between 60 and 90 minutes, were carried out by two 
interviewers, i. e. the researcher was accompanied by a member of her team. Tape- 
recording of the interviews was not possible because the interviewees did for 
confidentiality reasons-without exception-not want to (further references concerning 
disadvantages of tape recording see (Berent 1966; Easterby-Smith et al. 1997,2008c). 
So it was decided that the two interviewers tried to note down as much as possible during 
the interviews and make a detailed debriefing of each interview just after the interview in 
order to bring out the most important issues, quotations, observations, etc. 
A second series of interviews with 37 top executives of Deutsche Telekom Group (incl. 
one member of the corporate board of management DT group) was made some time later 
between January and March 2003 for the purposes of this research only. In contrast to 
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the first series of interviews, all questions of the interview schedule (see table below) 
could be covered. 
Contributes to* 
# Qualitative Question Ob ti jec ve 
RQ 1 RQ 2 RQ 3 
General Information 
Could you please correct Learn about the interviewee's 
or complete the available professional background and 
personal data and experience in DT group. 
information on your X X X 
personal professional Complement missing statistic data 
development (CV ... etc. )? 
(e. g. demographic data, formal 
education, ... etc. ) 
Learning needs and approaches to TLOL 
What were the most Get deeper insights into the 
important things to be "content" of the top management's 
2 learned by the top learning and what triggered X X 
management during DT's learning. 
transformation since 
1990? 
How did DT's top Pursuit of off-the-job and/or on- 
management get hold of the job learning strategies. 
required new 
competencies/knowledge? Learn about concrete learning 
3 Which actions did you actions/deployed 
learning 
X X X 
and/or were taken by the methods. 
board or your peers 
precisely? Get to know the rationale for the 
With what results? launch of an initiative. 
Please specify. 
Which DT-internal training Pursuit of off-the-job and/or on- 
offerings for top managers the job learning strategies. 
do you know? 
Which external or internal 
training offerings did you Learn about how the effectiveness 
4 attend in the last years? of top management training is X X 
How do you evaluate the seen by the top management. 
outcome of such 
measures with regard to 
the mentioned learning Identify barriers and constraints 
challenges? 
A large number of key Pursuit of off-the-job and/or on- 
initiatives (see list) were the -job learning strategies. 
initiated by DT's top 
management since 1990 
5 in order to drive change. 
Get to know the rationale for the X X X 
launch of an initiative. 
Which ones were the most 
challenging initiatives for Learn about the impact of key DT's top management? initiatives on TLOL and why they Why? 
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What were the lessons differ from each other. 
learned of these projects 
for DT's top management? 
How would you evaluate 
today DT's top mgt. 
regarding a shared 
understanding of the 
strategic alignment of DT 
group and of appropriate 
means for achieving 
defined targets? Why? 
Composition and behavioural integration of the top management 
6 
7 
8 
9 
(Scale between 0= very 
poor and 10 = very good). 
Please specify. 
How did this evolve over 
time? 
Identify barriers and constraints of 
TLOL. 
Common approach of the entire 
top management versus isolated 
approach of individual top 
managers 
Pursuit of deliberate or emergent 
strategies. 
How can this be observed Involvement of top management in 
in the daily business? strategy development and 
Please give examples. implementation 
How would you evaluate 
today DT's top mgt. 
regarding cohesion, 
mutual support and co- 
operation? (Scale between 
0= very poor and 10 = 
very good). How did this 
evolve over time? How 
often do you meet with 
your peers? 
Please specify your 
evaluation. 
What do you think, how 
did the composition of 
DT's top management 
evolve in the last decade? 
With what effects? 
Which new knowledge 
came in? Which 
knowledge got lost? Are 
there differences between 
different parts of DT 
group? 
Common approach of the entire 
top management versus isolated 
approach of individual top 
managers 
X 
Get deeper insights on the quality 
of the relationships between top x 
managers (cohesion versus 
conflict). 
Triangulation with corresponding 
documentation 
Draw conclusions on intensity of 
external recruitment and 
acquisitions as well as dismissals 
and their effects. 
Triangulation with corresponding 
documentation 
Draw conclusions on intensity of 
external recruitment and 
acquisitions as well as dismissals 
and their effects. 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
K 
X 
X 
X 
X 
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Factors that fostered or hindered top-level organisational learning 
What helped or hindered Identify barriers and constraints of DT's top management TLOL. 
10 respectively to adapt to X X X 
change? Please give 
examples. 
Effectiveness of organisational learning at top management level 
How is your evaluation of Get to know how the top 
how well DT's top managers construed their own 
management overall has reality. 
been in adapting DT to the 
11 new market conditions and X X environment? (Scale from 
very poor to very good). Identify barriers and constraints of 
Please precise. TLOL and criteria for effectiveness 
of learning. 
How well did the top Get to know how the top 
management manage its managers construed their own 
own change? reality. 
12 X 
Identify barriers and constraints of 
TLOL and criteria for effectiveness 
of learning. 
Which parts of the top Learn more about the specific 
management do you think characteristics of the different 
have been better or faster learning contexts. 
in adapting to change? 
13 Why and what made the X X X 
difference? 
Identify differences in the learning 
behaviour of different parts of DT's 
top management. 
In a nutshell what was Learn more about how a top 
your recipe for success in manager can adapt himself 
order to master the successfully in an environment of 
personal and professional change. 
14 challenges you were X X X 
confronted with? What 
could other top managers 
have made to be more Identify barriers and constraints of 
successful? What made TLOL and criteria for effectiveness 
top managers fail? of learning. 
Final statement 
Suppose you met the CEO Identify lessons learned of DT's 
of DT group in the elevator top managers with regard to 
by chance. With a view to appropriate actions aiming at 
15 tomorrow's challenges of fostering TLOL. X X X 
DT's top management he 
asks you for your 
recommendations to foster 
the top managements 
Verify the role of the CEO for 
114 
competence and TLOL. 
performance. He promises 
to realise the first of your 
suggestions immediately. 
What would you propose? 
Do you have any last Provide time and space for the 
thoughts to add to this interviewee to raise issues which 
16 interview? were not mentioned before but (X) (X) (X) 
should be considered in further 
interviews. 
Methodology 
What are from your Identify opportunities and 
perspective advantages or ' limitations in doing research as an 
17 disadvantages internal. 
respectively being 
interviewed by a DT 
insider? 
*Legend: RQ (Research Question) 
RQ 1: What initiatives and methods for top-level organisational learning were deployed? 
And why? 
RQ 2: How and why does top-level organisational learning differ 
at corporate and divisional level? 
RQ 3: What factors foster or hinder top-level organisational learning, and why? 
Table 11: Interview Schedule - Data Contribution Matrix 
Four top executives were interviewed twice i. e. participated in both the first and the 
second series of interviews. Again, all interviews were conducted by two interviewers and 
again tape-recording was not possible so that the same approach was taken to deal with 
this constraint. However, access to the target group was perceptibly easier now. The top 
managers were interested in the study-also due to the parallel project in the field of 
management development. The fact that a series of other top managers including 
members of the corporate board had already been interviewed brought about additional 
management attention. On average, the interviews of this second series lasted a bit 
longer-ca. 90 minutes on average, some even longer. Three of the interviewees even 
called or spoke to the researcher again some time after the interviews because they 
wanted to add some further details they had forgotten to mention. In order to sharpen up 
the interviewee's responses, probes as proposed by Easterby-Smith et al. (1997, p. 80) 
were extremely useful. 
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The interviews of the first and the second series emphasised different aspects of the 
study. Some of the issues raised in the first series of interviews were discussed again in 
order to validate these findings of the first interviews and eliminate problems of 
interpretation. When conducting the interviews, the researcher had to ensure that 
questions about learning were adressed in a different way, i. e. it was necessary to talk 
about concrete projects or business problems instead of learning (Baldwin and Lawson 
1995). 
These primary data were complemented by secondary data that also resulted from semi 
structured interviews. A particular study on the effectiveness of the group's organisation 
development initiatives, which was based on 25 interviews with senior managers and 
members of the corporate board of management and 150 interviews with employees, was 
carried out by DT group's auditing unit between July and September 2002. The 
researcher learned about the existence of this study by the auditing department more or 
less by chance within the scope of an interview with the senior executive vice president of 
the group's auditing department. He directed his team members who were charged with 
this study to make a detailed debriefing of this study with the researcher and to provide 
her with all further information and results of the study that she might need but which 
were not included in the management summary of this study. In this connection, a former 
colleague who accompanied this study as a consultant and who was one of the two 
interviewers provided the researcher with some more in-depth information about the 
objectives, data collection and analysis as well as the minutes of every interview. 
Although the study of the auditing department which aimed at the evaluation of the 
effectiveness of past organisation development initiatives and the identification of critical 
success factors was carried out completely independent of this research there were a 
series of overlaps. The study thus revealed, for instance, not only differences in the 
evaluation of the adaptation of the group between employees and managers but also 
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between senior managers and members of the board. Likewise, issues concerning co- 
operation/teamwork at top level, communication, management and remuneration 
systems, potential conflicts between individual and group objectives at top level were 
considered and evaluated. These interviews of the group's auditing proved very useful 
with regard to the research project as it permitted cross-checking and further validation of 
some of the findings. 
3.8.5.2 Documentation and Archival Sources 
Documentation and archival sources were relevant with regard to every research 
question of this case study. It corroborated and augmented the evidence from other data 
sources (analoguous to Yin 1994, p. 81)-here in particular the interviews. Thus, 
documentation was mainly used in the first phase of data collection-above all in order to 
gain a better understanding of the historical development and the evolution of the 
group-but likewise until the end of the data collection process. 
Documentation and archival sources were easily accessible by virtue of the internal work 
role of the researcher. However, due to confidentiality reasons and corresponding to a 
confidentiality agreement between the researcher and DT, not all data were exploited 
(such as turnover or remuneration of the top management staff). In agreement with 
Bryman (1995), it was very important to have a structured approach to data collection and 
to exclude certain issues at a premature stage as was attempted in this study. Some 
researchers, particularly many qualitative researchers, face the problem that so much of 
the field being observed is potential data that there is a problem of knowing what to 
record (Bryman 1995). Some even feel overwhelmed by data and face masses of data 
that cannot be handled. The problem is even more complex if a longitudinal study or a 
complex organisation was chosen for the case study. So having good access to data is 
not only positive but implies certain risks. 
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In the face of the rich bases of documentation the most important challenge for the 
researcher was to differentiate between relevant and non-relevant documentation and to 
systematise data collection. Therefore a data collection plan was made which mainly 
differentiated between two different streams of documentation. 
Firstly, documentation about DT group (incl. preceding organisations) and important OD 
initiatives. This documentation comprised above all draft resolutions for the board of 
management, kick-off and final project presentations to the project steering committee, 
minutes of management and steering committee meetings, organisation charts, studies, 
internal newsletters, intranet, etc. Furthermore, elements of the external communication 
such as articles in newspapers and journals or books edited or published by top 
managers or consultants of DT. 
A second stream of documentation concerned the top management staff. Here in 
particular the CVs as well as extracts from personal files, lists of names of the members 
of the top management staff, and the personnel information system and archives of the 
Top Management Human Resources department could be used. Some data on top 
managers who left the company (e. g. tenure in the organisation and in the position, 
functional background) could be extracted from the personnel information system or 
archives of the Top Management HR department. Further documentation in this stream 
dealt with established or planned top management development tools, management-by- 
objectives, ranking, grading and remuneration systems, or training offerings etc.. 
Concerning documentation on the top management staff, it was-in the face of the rich 
basis of statistics on DT's staff-surprising that no statistics were available. Furthermore, 
data concerning the demography of DT group's top management were not available 
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before 1995 (i. e. privatisation of DT group) and could also not be reconstructed. This 
suggests that these data obviously had neither been requested before by the CEO or 
other members of the board of management-in particular HR-nor by the top 
management human resources department and used as a basis for, for example, 
systematic top management recruiting, succession or development policy. Therefore 
statistics (e. g. concerning age, tenure, etc. of the top management staff) had to be 
developed arduously based on CVs and other sources of information. 
3.8.5.3 Observation 
A further complementary source of data for this study was observation, which was 
mainly-but not exclusively-used in the second phase of data collection. In principle, 
one can differentiate between direct observation and participant-observation. Participant- 
observation (see table below), which has been most frequently used in anthropological or 
ethnographic studies ((Yin 1994), (Easterby-Smith et al. 1997,2008c)), is a special form 
of observation in which the researcher assumes his/her own active role and not only a 
passive role in the case study situation (Yin 1994). 
Type of participant 
observation 
Characteristics Issues 
Covert participant The researcher gains No need to negotiate 
observation entry to the organisation access to the organisation. 
and observes others 
without anyone knowing Removes the problem of 
that he or she is a "reactivity". 
researcher. 
Requires the researcher to 
assume a work role in the 
organisation. 
Raises ethical problems. 
No ability to use other 
research methods. 
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Full participant The researcher is known Requires the researcher to 
observation as a researcher when assume a work role in the 
negotiating entry and organisation. 
when undertaking 
research.. 
Indirect observation The researcher is 
constantly in and around 
the organisation but does 
not possess a formal work 
role in it. 
Source: analoguous to: (Bryman 1995), p. 142-146) 
Table 12: Types of Participant Observation 
The distinction between covert observation and the other two roles can be a matter of 
degree in this study. Therefore, and even though DT sponsored the research project, it 
was assumed that most people were not aware that the consultants' was at the same 
time a researcher. So the researcher assumed a role that is close to a covert participant 
observer. 
The main criticism of covert observation is, however, the "ethically dubious practice" 
(Bulmer 1982). Ethical issues will therefore be discussed in a separate section (see 
section 3.10.6). Potential further problems that can arise from an active role in the 
organisation are-in contrast to the external observer who remains independent- 
potential conflicts of interests (Bryman 1995). This might be reflected by a too strong 
identification of the researcher with the organisation being studied so that the researcher 
becomes a supporter of the organisation. Conflict of interests can also occur due to 
81 Annotation: The researcher assumed a role as consultant in phase 2 of data collection. 
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`professional' objectives of the researcher and sometimes simply for the reason that there 
is not enough time to raise all questions in a meeting. 
In order to minimise ethical problems, and potential biases of the researcher it was 
therefore decided to use observation only as a method to provide complementary 
information about a certain topic. 
3.9 Data Analysis 
This section looks around at some principle issues around the analysis of qualitative case 
studies. It explains how the data were reduced, displayed, analysed, and reported. 
According to Yin (1994) and Eisenhardt (1989), data analysis is the most important but at 
the same time most difficult part of the case study research process. Patton and 
Appelbaum (2003) and Yin (1994) therefore recommend starting every investigation with 
a defined analytic strategy. The purpose of this strategy is to contribute to make the 
researchers understanding of how he is construing theory explicit. This is important 
because as analysis proceeds "... that construction will-consciously or not-inevitably 
influence and constrain data collection, data reduction, data display, and the drawing and 
verification of conclusions" (Miles and Huberman 1994, p. 434). In the absence of 
corresponding theoretical propositions or rival explanations-as it is the case for this 
study-and based upon Yin's (2003) suggestion, a descriptive framework for organising 
the case study was developed. It was derived from the literature and introduced at the 
end of the literature review (see section 2.8). 
The analytic strategy or conceptual framework exerted an important influence on the data 
analysing process and methods. Based on the positivist and phenomenological approach 
two main approaches to data analysis can be differentiated: Content analysis and 
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grounded theory. The most important differences between the two approaches are 
described in the table below: 
Content analysis Grounded theory 
Bitty Holistic 
Go by frequency Go by feel 
Objectivity Closer to the data, open much longer 
Deductive Inductive 
Testing hypotheses Testing out themes, developing patterns 
Source: Easterby-Smith et al. 1997, p. 106. 
Table 13: Differences between `Content Analysis' and `Grounded Theory' 
This study rather conforms with the more open approach to data analysis of grounded 
theory (Glaser and Strauss 1967). For this reason, an iterative, cyclical process of data 
analysis was applied to this study. 
Miles and Huberman (1994, p. 10) proposed qualitative data analysis as consisting of the 
following three activities that form such an interactive cyclical process (see figure below): 
- Data Reduction: 
This activity refers to the reduction, simplification and transformation of qualitative 
data through e. g. the selection, summary or paraphrase or the subsumption to a 
larger pattern. 
- Data Display: 
Data are processed into organised, clearly-structured and compressed displays of 
information that permit the draw of conclusions. In the case of this study, data were 
mainly displayed as narrative text, tables and graphs. 
- Conclusion Drawing and 
Verification: 
The researcher draws inferences what things mean, identifies regularities, patterns, 
explanations, ... etc. 
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In this view qualitative data analysis is in contrast to quantitative analysis82 a continuous 
process. 
Data 
collection """"""" 
""""""""" Data 
display 
Data 
reduction ........................ 
" "" .............. """ ""ý'"ý Conclusions "'"". drawing/ 
verifying 
Source: Miles and Huberman (1994, p. 12) 
Figure 3: Components of Data Analysis: Interactive Model 
A similar but more elaborated strategy for management research is proposed by 
Easterby-Smith et al. (1997, p. 108-112), which was therefore applied in this thesis (see 
table 14 below): 
Phase of data analysis Activity 
Familiarisation Transcripts, filed notes and minutes were re-read 
again 
Reflection Data were evaluated the in the light of existing 
research 
A set of concepts, which seemed to be important 
Conceptualisation for understanding what is going on, were 
formulated. 
A catalogue of identified concepts was 
Cataloguing concepts 
developed. A computer database was 
established. Concepts were linked to the source 
of data. 
82 Quantitative data analysis is corresponding to Miles & Huberman (1994) usually more sequential. 
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With the help of this linkages to data sources 
Recoding went back to the data again. Concepts were 
redefined and recoded. 
Empirical data were linked in an iterative process 
Linkage to the literature; others were asked for 
comments. 
Re-evaluation In the light of the comments re-evaluate, revise 
and complete the analysis. 
Source: Following Easterby-Smith et al. 1997, p. 108-112. 
Table 14: Qualitative Data Analysis 
A further choice that had to be made concerned data analysing techniques. Yin (2003) 
proposes five dominant and three lesser modes of analysis that can be used after data 
collection-for either single-or multiple case studies: 
Modes of analysis Description 
... compares an empirically based pattern with a 
Pattern-Matching predicted theoretical hypotheses. If the patterns coincide 
a causal relationship between theory and empirical 
knowledge can be assumed. 
... 
is a special type of pattern matching but more difficult 
Explanation-Building and a result of a series of iterations. The objective of this 
technique is to identify causalities 
Within the scope of a time-series analysis several 
Time-Series Analysis83 incidents are considered in temporal cohesion. 
The 
analysis is not limited to chronicles but is focused on, 
identifies and explains causalities. 
... corresponds to a combination of pattern-matching and 
Program Logic Models time-series analysis. 
Incidents are presented in cause- 
effect chains. The empirically observable incidents are 
matched with the theoretically predicted effects. 
... 
is applicable when at least two, better more cases are 
Cross-case synthesis available for analysis. These cases are compared and 
contrasted based on a defined objective of analysis. 
Table 15: Modes of Data Analysis 
The lesser modes of analysis "analyzing embedded units", "making repeated 
observations" and "Doing a case survey: Secondary Analysis Across Cases" can only be 
applied in conjunction with a dominant mode of analysis. 
83 Compare Miles & Huberman 1994, p. 434. 
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For the available study the following dominant techniques were used: Pattern-Matching, 
Explanation-Building, Time-Series Analysis. They were complemented by "analyzing 
embedded units". As this present study is an embedded cases study within a single 
organisation, findings were first analysed individually-which helped to establish 
familiarity with each individual case-and after that across all cases. The cases on the 
different top management groups were compared in order to search for cross-case 
patterns. Classes of cases were made, such as centralised versus decentralised top 
management groups, in order to look for similarities and differences within each and 
between the different classes of cases. Based upon that, the analysis was re-evaluated, 
revised and finally completed. 
A conceptual framework for data analysis was presented as a result of the literature 
review in section 2.8. It specifies what was and what was not studied within the scope of 
this study, when the corresponding analysing techniques were used and will provide 
guidance through the analysis chapter. 
3.10 Doing Research as an Internal 
3.10.1 Introduction 
It was shown in the previous sections of the methodology chapter that this study's 
underlying research design and methodology is shaped by the phenomenological 
paradigm. Reality is seen as socially constructed, and so a strong sense of context and 
process as well as proximity of the researcher to the phenomenon observed are required 
in order to interpret the social actor's perception of the meanings embedded within social 
settings. Especially with reference to some specific issues concerning research on TLOL 
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(compare e. g. section 3.7.4) it was decided to undertake this study as an internal 
researcher, i. e. as a full member of the organisation. 
Although there are research approaches (e. g. phenomenology or the constructivist 
approach) which consider the researcher as an integral part of the research process and 
although there are research constructs (such as e. g. learning or resources) which have a 
tacit dimension and/or are socially constructed (such as e. g. effectiveness), relatively little 
attention has been paid so far to the subject of insider academic research (Brannick and 
Coghlan 2007, p. 59). This despite the enormous potential and strong points of insider 
research in research areas where subjective interpretation and preunderstanding, i. e. 
insights from the lived experience, are key to the research process. 
This might be explained by that fact that one stream of the existing literature tends to take 
a rather sceptical view on doing research as an internal, claiming that insider researchers 
would be blind, too close to the research phenomenon to attain the necessary objectivity 
and independence for valid research (Morse 1998, Alvesson 2003). In contrast to that it is 
agreed with proponents of insider academic research (e. g. Brannick and Coghlan, 2007) 
who come to the conclusion that "... there is no inherent reason why being native is an 
issue and that the value of insider research is worth reaffirming" (Brannick and Coghlan 
2007, p. 59). Doing insider academic research rather has to conform-as does traditional 
research-to the standards of (good) qualitative research, i. e. among other things it is 
important to critically reflect on the researcher's identity, experience and values and their 
impact on the research (Easterby-Smith et al. 2008, p. 420) as well as on the specific 
dynamics of doing research as an internal. For that reason having acquired an overview 
of the different roles the researcher held in the case organisation in section 3.10.2, the 
specific methodological and ethical issues arising from the particular role of an insider 
researcher and the advantages and disadvantages, opportunities and risks of doing 
research as an internal will be considered in greater detail in the following sections. 
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3.10.2 The Researcher as the Research Instrument 
The discussion about validity, reliability and general isabiIity (see section 3.7.5) revealed 
that the quality of this type of studies depends much on the researcher. In order to 
contribute to the credibility of the researcher a short description of the researcher's roles 
within and beyond the case organisation of this study is given as well as a brief 
description of its contribution to the quality of the research (see table 16 below). 
Phase of Period of time Role of the Contribution to the quality 
data researcher of the research 
collection 
Dec. 1993 - Commissioner HR Got to know a different 
Feb. 1995 Development in the company and management 
food industry culture. 
Phase l Mar. 1995 - Commissioner Gained deep insights into 
Oct. 1998 HR & Organisation the business and culture of 
Development, the mobile division of DT 
(starting T-Mobile group. Got to know group- from 1998) wide OD-initiatives and a 
series of top managers. 
Phase 11 Nov. 1998 - Managing Consultant Carried out a series of 
Feb. 2001 in the "Change consulting projects-among 
Management" those some which made 
consulting area, In- part of large OD initiatives at 
house Consulting, group level. Got deeper 
Deutsche Telekom insights into DT's divisions 
(except T-Mobile) and 
headquarters. Got to know a 
larger number of top 
managers from the different 
businesses and 
headquarters. 
Phase III Mar. 2001 - Head of Gained in-depth insights 
+ Mar. 2003 Top Management 
into DT's top management 
Development, development. Gained 
Phase IV Deutsche Teiekom access to top managers and 
the top management HR 
department. 
Attended at that time a 
training in systemic 
coaching that comprised an 
intensive training of 
interviewing skills. 
Apr. 2003 - Director Corporate Part of data analysis was 
present HR Development of a made in this phase. The 
French company work in a different company 
(construction) and in a different cultural context 
managing director HR contributed to the reduction 
of one of her of blind spots. 
subsidiaries 
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Since Jan. 2007: Vice Took over a top 
President Human management position and 
Resources and gained new insights into the 
member of role of a top manager 
management board of 
the German-speaking 
business division 
Legend: Active work role within case organisation 
Table 16: The Role of the Researcher 
As can be taken from table 16 (see above), the researcher held very different work roles 
until the completion and final writing-up of this study - mainly in the case organisation, but 
also after the completion of the empirical part of the study, outside the Deutsche Telekom 
group. In that connection, it has to be pointed out that the researcher not only held work 
roles with different proximity to the top management, but mainly such work-roles that are 
held by the kind of people with whom following Richter's (1999, p. 6) suggestion top 
managers like to be in contact84. These work-roles in turn were characterised by differing 
degrees of independence of the researcher from the case organisation, while enabling 
the researcher at the same time to take different perspectives on the phenomenon under 
investigation 85. 
3.10.3 The Access Problem 
Many researches have to face the problem of getting into organisations (Bryman 1995; 
Bryman and Bell 2003). Low response rates or lack of general interest in research are 
difficulties reported by qualitative researchers. 
84Following Richter's (1999, p. 6) suggestion top managers have in sensitive situations a definite preference 
for advice from an `expert' - either internal (e. g. HR expert), or external (e. g. management consultants). 85 In this connection, it should be remembered that this study did not pursue an action research approach. In 
action research (Lewin 1946, Dickens and Watkins 1999, Reason and Bradbury 2001) theory development 
requires the researcher to have full control over the research project through deliberately planning, taking 
action and evaluating the actions leading to further planning etc.. This was not the case in this study on 
TLOL. 
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In general, primary and secondary access can be differentiated (Brannick and Coghlan 
2007). Whereas primary access implies the permission to undertake research and to 
have access to the organisation, secondary access refers to the ability to get access to 
specific parts of the organisation (e. g. functional or hierarchical areas) that are relevant to 
the research. Particular access problems were viewed in management research 
(Easterby-Smith et al. 1997,2008c). Busy, fairly tightly structured and controlled, powerful 
managers at the top of the organisation tend to allow research access only when they 
see practical-personal or commercial-added value of the research project. And when 
they allow access, the researcher has to deal with time constraints (e. g. with regard to the 
duration of interviews). 
There are particular advantages and disadvantages to doing qualitative research as an 
internal. Concerning the access problem, gaining primary access is much easier for an 
internal research fellow. Having received permission to do research, he/ she can use- 
depending on the status of the researcher (see Brannick and Coghlan 2007)-all 
possibilities as a full member of the organisation to gain access to people and material. 
However, gaining secondary access is a real issue for insider researchers. 
In the case of this study-starting at the end of 1998 until the completion of the study- 
this permission had to be negotiated eight times, thereof seven times within DT group, 
which also contributed to the long duration of the research project. This was in particular 
due to major restructurings and a high turnover in the management. Hence, for the 
internal researcher it might represent an important barrier-in particular in the case of 
long-term studies and dynamic or short-term oriented organisations. Permanent 
restructuring, organisational change and personnel turnover might lead to a loss of the 
sponsorship and the need to find new sources of support. As in this case, it might require 
an important time investment in order to ensure that the researcher is authorised to 
undertake the research. Sometimes, it can even be necessary to change jobs if a new 
superior will neither support nor tolerate the endeavour under any circumstances-as 
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was the case in one instance during the example at hand. Brannick and Coghlan (2007, 
p. 68) put it this way: "Negotiating access with superiors is a tricky business... " 
Official permission, however, is a necessary but not sufficient condition. Gaining access 
rather depends on the research topic and on the importance that is attached to it by the 
organisation and those people that are relevant to the research. Gaining access to data 
means being convincing, i. e. having a clear picture in mind of the objectives of the study 
and its benefits for the sponsoring organisation and the research subjects and being able 
to `sell' these advantages of the research86. In the particular case of this study, the 
researcher, in her capacity as the head of DT group's top management development 
department, started an initiative in the field of top management development in order to 
gain top management attention and support. This project and its short-term and mid-term 
benefits for the organisation and the top managers, as well as the previous work as a 
consultant, served later on as a door-opener for more far-reaching interviews with top 
management staff. However, when doing so, the researcher has to remain aware of the 
resulting (potential) ethical issues and has to deal with them in a professional way (cf. 
section 3.10.6). 
How important it was to clearly explain the contribution of the research to the personal or 
organisational objectives of top managers can be illustrated by the following quote of a 
senior executive of DT who participated this study: 
"I let go of a manager who undertook a PhD in the times of the merging of the 
technical branch offices87. Firstly, I was not well informed, and secondly, 
asked myself what could be my added value of this research? He was not 
able to explain that to me and so I didn't take him for one of the new 
management positions. Three months later he came across with a doctorate 
86 Within the framework of this empirical study it could also be experienced that it is an important driver with 
regard to gaining access to data if the study not only sounds interesting and promising for the sponsor 
but 
also for all members of the organisation who participate in the empirical study. 
87 Within the framework of this project 39 technical branch offices had been transferred to 13 technical branch 
offices which brought about a substantial reduction of top management positions. 
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in his pocket. / asked myself. Did / make a mistake? With regard to me, he 
was personally disappointed. Thus he got a much better job than the job 
could have offered to him. Nevertheless, I think it was the right decision. / 
mean, it takes a lot of time when you are undertaking a research project and 
am expecting my collaborators in management to invest all their time for the 
company. " 
Despite these constraints, getting access to data is a real strength of internal researchers. 
One senior manager of DT group put it in a nutshell: 
"You will speak with a large number of top executives within our group. I 
suppose that studies with such a large basis of interviews with real top 
executives are quite rare. Hence, this research must be of particular interest 
for every university. It is very positive what you are doing and I hope you will 
share the results of your work with us. " 
This view was supported by a large number of top managers who had been interviewed 
during the empirical part of the study. And an important number of the interviewees told 
the researcher that they would not talk to an external researcher. One of these executives 
stated for instance: 
"l would simply not talk to an external researcher. And I assume you would 
never have the chance to talk to such a large number of top executives. " 
And another one explained: 
"If you were an external researcher I would have asked you immediately how 
you can assure data security and confidentiality. I would have never been so 
open and would not have told you so much about my personal views and 
experiences. In this case, however, I am not worried. " 
Confidentiality, trust and data privacy represented real issues in this research project. Top 
managers were particularly sensitive with regard to the confidentiality of 
information (see 
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also Easterby-Smith et al. 1997)-either internally or with regard to external bodies- 
which required particular attention to the collection, recording, use and publishing of 
obtained data. The sponsorship agreement with the employer (incl. an agreement with 
the public relations department concerning publications, etc. ), which the researcher 
explained in detail at the beginning of every interview, helped to overcome this barrier88. 
3.10.4 Lived Experience of the Organisation 
The interpretation of data is also a particular strength of the internal researcher because 
he/ she forms part of the organisation. Insider researchers can draw on particular 
knowledge of and experiences within the organisation and so provide important 
knowledge about what organisations are really like (Brannick and Coghlan 2007). 
Traditional approaches cannot do this. On the other hand insider researchers are native 
to the setting and so risk being too close to the research phenomenon, not attaining the 
necessary objectivity or being blind to certain aspects and so not conforming to the 
standards of rigorous academic research. This is why there is a stringent necessity for 
what Brannick and Coghlan (2007, p. 60) call a process of reflexive awareness. For the 
same reason, Morin (1986, p. 205) claimed that due to the potential idiosyncracies, the 
subject who wants to know must, in some way, distance him-/ herself to become his/ her 
own object of study. Otherwise some things might be taken for granted and considered 
self-evident. The researcher cannot remain independent89 from the phenomena being 
observed and this might have an important impact on the selection (cf. Brannick and 
Coghlan 2007) and interpretation of data. 
88 Consequently for an external researcher, it would probably be an advantage to have an internal sponsor 
even some constraints might remain as one senior manager explains: 
"As an external researcher you need a sponsor if you want to get access to an organisation. But even with 
a sponsor it might be difficult. I remember that I once sponsored a research team of the London Business 
School - it was not easy. " 
89 The traditional assumption in science is that the researcher must be complete independent (Easterby-Smith 
et al. 1997, p. 23). 
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This lack of independence that is harder to sustain in social science is simultaneously a 
problem and a virtue: 
 A problem where the researcher does not succeed in dissociating him-/ herself from 
the system and implying theoretical concerns. In addition, there is a risk that 
insider researchers concentrate on events with which they are already familiar and 
seek out informants because they know them and their viewpoints on certain 
issues. They might assume too much and not probe as much as if they were 
outsiders (Brannick and Coghlan 2007). In order to integrate an external 
perspective it might therefore be helpful to ask for external supervision, as was 
done in this study. 
 A virtue because the internal researcher speaks and understands the language of 
his/ her respondents. He/ she knows background stories and is more likely able to 
assess whether success stories are embellished or not. He/ she is involved in 
personal networks, knows the structure and routines of the organisation, can 
attend meetings etc. without drawing too much attention to him-/ herself. He/ she 
knows more about the informal organisation, unwritten rules and the culture of the 
organisation. 
The latter argument was emphasised in the case of this study by the overwhelming 
number of senior executives who have been involved in the empirical work. One senior 
manager stated for instance: 
`lt is a real advantage that you know our organisation well. I do not have to 
explain everything, i. e. our organisation, our projects, etc. in detail. And 
although / do not explain everything you understand and have a clear idea 
about what I am talking about. Deutsche Telekom is a very complex 
organisation and external people have difficulties finding their bearings. 
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Beyond that point, you know very well the characteristics of our company so 
that you can question what has been stated. " 
A potential further limitation of doing research as an internal results from the case study 
approach. There is a particular risk, when doing case study research as an internal, of 
becoming too involved in the organisation, particularly in one case or one organisation. It 
might be difficult straying from subjects' perspectives and adopting a sufficiently broad 
perspective that explores all possible angles (Bryman 1995, p. 165). So generalising from 
a single case or a very small number of cases is probably easier in the case of an 
external researcher. In the case of this study, it proved to be beneficial in this connection 
that the researcher took a new position in a different organisation, a French group in the 
construction industry, after the data collection process. This served to enhance the critical 
analysis of the findings and enabled taking new perspectives on the phenomenon under 
investigation. 
There is no doubt about the risks of doing research as an internal and the need for a 
continuous process of reflective awareness. The quality of data and findings, however, 
depends on the fieldworker's understanding of the organisation. It will never be precisely 
the same understanding that those who live in the organisation have, but the internal 
researcher is more likely close to it and more likely able to at least partially capture the 
implicit dimension of knowledge. This is a particular strength and value of insider 
research. 
3.10.5 Organisational and Researcher Roles 
A research project with top managers presupposes that the researcher as an employee of 
the organisation is accepted as an appropriate person to talk to, i. e. the researcher has to 
be viewed as competent and independent in order to avoid being refused by the top 
managers. It is key for doing research as an insider to be aware of organisational politics 
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and to assess the power and interests of the corresponding top managers in relation to 
the research project. Furthermore, derived from the experiences made in this study and 
as suggested by Brannick and Coghlan (2007) a certain hierarchical positioning of the 
work role of the researcher in the organisation seemed favourable. A senior manager 
stated in an interview: 
"From my point of view, I admit that it is important to me that I know you 
personally. This comprises that you are neutral and that I know you in your 
professional capacity in the top management human resources department. " 
Insider researchers are likely to encounter role conflict "... and find themselves caught 
between loyalty tugs, behavioral claims, and identification dilemmas" (Brannick and 
Coghlan 2007, p. 70). Enacting two roles-the role of an insider researcher and an active 
work-role-affects the researcher's relationships with fellow organisational members and 
raises ethical issues. Some of them were already addressed within the scope of 
participant observation (see section 3.8.5.3) and will be considered in greater detail in 
section 3.10.4. 
A further negative point of that role duality results from the fact that the research could 
only be done as a part-time student. This represented the most important constraint for 
the researcher who held a management position in the case organisation. Due to the dual 
burden of working and researching, the time that could be spent for research purposes 
depended to a large extent on the professional workload. As the employer 
understandably set the number one priority as professional issues, this significantly 
slowed down the completion of the research project. 
Finally, the proximity of the internal researcher can also be a problem, especially for top 
managers (see Richter 1998). Due to, e. g. positional solitudes, top managers might 
hesitate to entrust something to an internal because they are afraid that it could be 
misapplied or be viewed as not loyal. 
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3.10.6 Ethical Issues and Insider Research on TLOL 
Ethics are most frequently discussed in relation to the responsibilities of more powerful 
people against less powerful people and arise frequently from a clash between personal 
and professional interest (Easterby-Smith et al. 1997, p. 64). In other words, there is a 
risk that the researcher-instead of taking responsibility for the research subjects-will 
disregard personal privacy or confidentiality, in order to obtain good data and promote 
his/ her own career. Ethical issues are discussed most in qualitative research because 
the researcher has far more control about what data are collected, how they are recorded 
and interpreted. 
Although according to Miles and Huberman (1994), ethical questions can concern a long 
list of issues, there is little guidance on ethical issues in the business and organisational 
research literature (Lindorf 2007). As they cannot all be discussed here in detail90, this 
section will concentrate from an insider researcher perspective on the three fundamental 
principles identified by Lindorff (2007) that have to be respected when undertaking 
business and organisation research. 
For a brief summary of the following discussion and the practical implications of ethical 
issues for this study reference is made to table 17 below where the main strategies of the 
researcher to deal with (potential) ethical issues are briefly described. 
Ethical issue Ethical issue/questions How the researcher dealt with potential ethical issues-Examples : 
Worthiness of For the researcher: If he is not 
Strong professional and personal interest of the 
res archer in the issue the project convinced of the worthiness of . 
e 
Sponsorship agreement with DT group was made. 
the project there is a risk that Regular progress controlling by supervisors and OU 
the study is pursued in a staff. 
shallow way. 
Competence Does the researcher have the Regular meetings and support with the 
boundaries expertise and capacity to carry researcher's supervisors Prof. J. Storey and 
out a study of good quality? Prof. P. Quintas. 
Ready to study, be 
supervised, trained, ask a Regular exchange and reflection with other 
friend/colleague for help? research students or academic staff 
90 For a further discussion of ethical issues it is referred to the corresponding literature (e. g. Miles and 
Huberman 1994, Bryman 1995 and Easterby-Smith et al. 2008, Lindorff 2007). 
136 
Targeted training on e. g. interviewing skills 
Concerning language skills: Ask somebody for 
help to polish the researcher's English for the 
final version. 
Informed Participants in the study are Yes, except in phase 2 of the data collection 
consent fully informed about what the process. Here in most cases the research 
study will involve. Did they subjects were not informed about the research 
agree with that voluntarily? project (-) covert participant observation, see 
section 3.8.5.3). Collected data are therefore 
just used as complementary data or as an aid to 
interpret primary data. If a top manager was 
quoted in the study he was asked for his 
approval and informed belated about the 
research project. 
Benefits, What will each party of the Some aspects are covered by the sponsorship 
costs and study gain from having taken agreement with DT group. A copy of the thesis 
reciprocity part? What will they have to will be handed over to DT group. 
invest in terms of time and 
other resources? Cf. scientific and practical contribution of the 
Deceptiveness of broken thesis. 
promises. 
Harm and What might this study do to Sponsorship agreement and a specific 
risk hurt the people involved? agreement with the public relations department 
were made. 
Verbatim critical quotes could cause trouble for 
the quoted managers. Therefore all top 
managers were asked for their agreement to 
exploit the collected data. Names of individual 
top managers are in general not given. 
(exception: CEO or the researcher was 
authorised to do so). 
Honest and What is my relationship with The researcher had an active work role in the 
trust the people I am studying? Am organisation that was perceived as independent 
I telling the truth and do we and neutral with regard to this study. Trustful 
trust each other? relationship with top managers. Top managers 
were informed about the research project. 
Privacy, How identifiable are the It was tried to make identification of individuals 
confidentiality individuals and organisations impossible. The case company and the CEOs 
and studied? are identifiable even if names would not be 
anonymity Explicitly confidentiality given. 
agreements Certain information (e. g. turnover at top level 
etc. ) was not given. 
A specific agreement with the public relations 
department of DT group is made. A non- 
disclosure agreement of the thesis intended. 
Research Is the researcher's study being Methodological approach is systematically 
integrity and conducted carefully, derived and described in detail in the 
quality thoughtfully, and correctly in methodology chapter. 
terms of reasonable set of 
standards? 
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Ownership of 
data and 
conclusions 
Who owns the field notes and 
analyses of the researcher ? 
Field notes and analyses are in the hand of the 
researcher. Will be destroyed after the 
completion of the research project. 
Conflicts, There is often a conflict See above. 
dilemmas, between different interests. 
and trade-offs 
As an internal researcher: potential loyalty 
conflict, i. e. conflict between role as a 
researcher and the internal work role. The 
researcher hold different work roles through-out 
the research process and works now for another 
company. 
Source: analoguous to Miles and Huberman (1994, p. 289 ff. ) 
Table 17: The Thesis and Ethical Issues when Doing Research 
The three ethical core principles that are particularly relevant for the ethics of insider 
research on TLOL are justice, beneficence and respect for persons, whereby the practical 
arrangement depends significantly on researcher values and attitudes (Lindorff 2007). 
Although it might be difficult to achieve, this study was driven by the desire to meet goals 
of the sponsoring organisation, to meet academic interests and standards, and to provide 
benefits to participants in equal measures, because this longitudinal study could not have 
been possible without the long-term support of the case organisation and their top 
managers. 
The principle of justice requires the benefits and burdens of the research to be equally 
and fairly distributed between the research subjects, the sponsoring organisation and the 
researcher. Thus, e. g. top managers should not be required to bear the burdens of 
research in terms of time, energy, or disclosure of personal information while other 
groups, such as the researcher and the case organisation, reap the fruits of the research 
project 91. 
91 Thus parts of the results of the data collection process were, for example, also incorporated on short notice 
into top management development programmes. 
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Likewise, the right balance has to be found between the researchers' academic interests 
and the desire of the sponsoring organisation not to have negative findings published. On 
the other hand it is imaginable that pressure might be placed upon the researcher to 
interpret the findings in a particular way or to release information on individual top 
managers that might be of particular relevance when doing research as an internal. 
However, this was not the case in this study and part of the mutual agreement with the 
sponsoring organisation. 
The second important fundamental ethical principle is beneficence. It requires that the 
researcher makes efforts to secure the well-being of participants and does not cause 
harm. It also comprises that the research creates benefits for the sponsoring 
organisation, the top managers as the research subjects and the researcher. This might 
be tricky but is a basic precondition for negotiating primary and secondary access (see 
section 3.10.3). 
The third core ethical principle is `respect for persons' which is-given the crucial role of 
trust and confidentiality (Richter 1998)-of particular relevance when doing research on 
TLOL. It involved the researcher explaining to the top managers as research participants, 
the purposes and nature of the research so that they could freely choose whether or not 
to participate. Here it is also necessary to simultaneously meet the different goals and 
objectives of the individual top managers, the sponsoring organisation and the academic 
interests of the researcher. 
In a nutshell, it is agreed with Lindorff (2007) that there is a strong need for researchers to 
continuously reflect upon their own values and the way they deal with ethical issues 
throughout their research projects. 
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3.10.7 Advantages and Disadvantages of Doing Research as an Internal 
It was shown in the previous sections that there are a series of specific challenges and 
dynamics that distinguish insider research from an external researcher approach. As this 
research project requires-as was shown before--a strong involvement of the 
researcher, it is important to be aware of the inherent opportunities and risks and the 
imminent potential ethical problems. Therefore the table below finally sums up the strong 
and weak points of insider academic research on TLOL. 
Doing Research on TLOL as an Internal 
Strong Points Weak Points 
Access -Gaining the permission to ®Insider researchers who undertake 
undertake the research and to have research that involves top 
access to the organisation managers as research participants 
(= primary access) is much easier might need to hold a neutral' 
for an internal research fellow function in the organisation and 
 As a full member of the might require a certain hierarchical 
organisation the internal researcher positioning/ status to be accepted 
has full access to the organisation as an appropriate person to talk to 
(--> rich data base) and to entrust. 
Possibility to involve a large   Negotiating access to specific parts 
number of different top managers of the organisation that are relevant 
of the same organisation in the to the research (= secondary 
study which work, act and learn access) can be a `tricky business', 
under comparable conditions especially in longitudinal studies 
(- comparisons between and/ or in fast-changing 
managers) organisations. Study cannot only be 
conducted `pro bono publico'. 
Research also has to be of benefit 
for the sponsoring organisation and 
the participating top managers. 
  Risk of being overwhelmed with 
data 
Lived -Speaks and understands the same   Insider academic researchers risk 
Understanding language as the research being too close to the research 
of the participants; knows the internal phenomenon, being blind to certain 
Organisation jargon and culture aspects or not attaining the 
In contrast to traditional necessary objectivity 
approaches insider researchers -Risk of bias. Insider researchers 
have stronger contextual insights. might tend to concentrate on 
They are thus more likely to provide events with which they are already 
knowledge about what familiar or to seek out informants 
organisations are really like. because they know them and their 
  Can contribute to a better viewpoints on certain issues. 
understanding how top managers -Insider researchers might risk 
are constructing their reality. assuming too much and not probe 
  Insider researchers can make use as much as if they were outsiders, 
of their preunderstanding of the 
organisation for the interpretation of 
data and are more likely able to 
critically assess statements, 
decisions and actions of top 
managers. 
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 Tacit/ implicit dimension of 
knowledge is more likely accessible 
from within. Is more likely able to 
provide insights what causes the 
outcome of interest and to identify 
causalities. 
Organisational   Researcher is able to consider the ® Enacting two roles - the role of an 
and phenomenon under investigation insider researcher and an active 
Researcher from an inside and and an outside work-role - might raise ethical Roles perspective and to gain in-depth issues, cause conflicts of interest 
contextual insights. and affects the researcher's 
  Insider researchers can attend relationships with fellow 
meetings etc. without drawing too organisational members. 
much attention on themselves.   Dual burden of working and 
  Insider academic researcher can researching. In general it might only 
make a distinctive contribution to be feasible to carry-out a single 
the debate on the transfer of case-study. 
knowledge between academics and   Potential negative effects on the 
practitioners. researcher's career prospects in his 
active work-role 
  Proximity of the internal researcher 
might be viewed as a problem by 
top managers. Due to e. g. 
positional solitudes top managers 
might hesitate to entrust something 
to an internal because they are 
afraid to be viewed as not loyal or 
that it could be misapplied. 
Table 18: Advantages and Disadvantages of Doing Research as an Internal 
In order to deal effectively with the specific challenges of doing research as an internal 
and potential ethical issues a series of practical measures were taken which were 
described in the previous sections (see also table 17). However, the most important 
measure was the regular reflection of the research process in which the supervisors and 
peer students and other external people (e. g. a former professor of the researcher) were 
involved. 
3.11 Conclusion 
The above methodological chapter was to present and discuss the choices made around 
the methodological approach of this study. It also dealt with particular research problems 
in the field of TLOL. 
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Hereafter, some key issues related to how the proposed research questions can be 
answered from the empirical evidence will be summarised and synthesised. Likewise, 
strong points and the limitations of research design and methodology will be summed up: 
0 In the face of the formulated objectives (-* theory-building) and research questions of 
this study and given the strong points of such a research design it was decided to 
carry out a qualitative case study. 
In order to better explore the less obvious or idiosyncratic aspects of TLOL and to 
provide strong contextual insights, the decision was made to carry out a single case 
study. 
0 In order to minimise the limitations and constraints that result from a single case 
design, the study was carried out as an embedded single case study. In addition, a 
long-term approach to the study and the triangulation of data sources and data 
collection methods was employed in order to increase general isabiIity. An embedded 
research design enabled comparisons-particularly when it came to the evaluation of 
the effectiveness of learning-between different parts of DT's top management. 
0 It could be derived from the discussion in this chapter that research on TLOL 
requires-as learning cannot be observed directly-a strong focus on the learning 
context or environment and a strong involvement of the researcher. However, there 
are opportunities and risks in doing research as an internal. In order to comply with 
the standards of intellectual rigour and `good' qualitative research it was shown that 
an in-depth consideration of the strong and weak points, of the specific dynamics and 
limitations of insider academic research is required. Through a critical process of 
reflexive awareness and by taking the necessary precautions to e. g. overcome 
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access problems or to avoid bias and the emergence of ethical issues, the internal 
researcher can take advantage of the strengths of being "native" and can undertake 
research in areas which traditional researchers are unable to uncover. 
M It was furthermore shown in this chapter that research had to be based on observable 
changes in the organisation's patterns of behaviour. Following Richters (1999) 
findings and as informal structures are difficult to observe particular attention was paid 
to formal structures. 
0 The results of TLOL can be positive or negative, and can, due to selective perception 
and constructivism (Berger and Luckmann 1966), be evaluated in many ways by 
different stakeholders (e. g. corporate versus divisional top management). They 
comprise two different types of results: economic key performance indicators and 
human resources/capabilities, such as knowledge, trust, cohesion. 
" Concerning research methods apart from semi-structured interviews-a flexible 
research tool which provided the opportunity to learn more about the personal views 
of top managers on TLOL, organisational learning and adaptation-documentation or 
archival sources, and observation were used. In order to minimise potential ethical 
issues, observation was only used as a method to provide complementary information 
about a certain topic. Primary data were supplemented with secondary data (i. e. a 
study of the auditing department). 
0 Due to the complexity, size and decentralised organisation of 
the case company, the 
definition of top management was expanded-in contrast to the classical studies on 
CEOs and very small top management teams-to business unit heads who have 
great responsibility in large, decentralised organisations. 
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" There are a series of ethical issues when doing research as an internal. Especially 
the principles of justice, beneficence and respect for persons are relevant for the ethic 
of insider research on TLOL. There is a strong need for researchers to continuously 
reflect upon their own values and the way they deal with ethical issues throughout 
their research projects. 
Having discussed how the identified research questions could be researched from a 
methodological point of view, the next chapter will now present the results obtained with 
those methods. 
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Chapter Four - organisational Learning at Top Level in 
the Case Organisation 
4.1 Introduction 
Having derived the research questions and the conceptual framework for data analysis 
from the literature and having investigated and shown how the identified research 
questions could be and were researched, this chapter will now describe the DT Group 
case organisation and the following four embedded cases in greater detail: 
  The top management of the fixed network business (divisional sample) 
  The top management of the mobile and online business (divisional sample) 
  The top management of the systems business (divisional sample) 
  The top management of DT's headquarters (corporate sample) 
As an embedded case study approach is applied and TLOL will be considered both from 
a group as well as a divisional perspective, it is important to gain a better understanding 
of the setting of the study and how the individual cases and the learning of the 
corresponding top management should be appraised within the overall context. Section 
4.2 will therefore introduce into the case organisation Deutsche Telekom as the top 
management's organisational learning environment, briefly outline the challenges the top 
management had to face in the period under review and provide some key figures on the 
DT Group's organisation and financial performance92. Likewise and based upon the 
definition of the concept `top management' applied to this study (see Methodology 
Chapter, section 3.8.4), section 4.3 will then sum up the main characteristics of the DT 
92 As shown in the methodology chapter, the performance of an organisation alone is not an adequate 
condition for evaluating the effectiveness and quality of top management learning. Instead, the starting 
point and case-specific criteria must also be taken into account in order to provide valuable corresponding 
indicators, or to refer to potential opportunities and constraints. 
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Group's top management at the beginning and at the end of the time period considered in 
this study. This adheres to Finkelstein and Hambrick's suggestion (1996), according to 
which conclusions can be drawn from this for the input and outcome of TLOL. 
While the start and end points represent the comprehension of the case as a whole, and 
just a short map of the different approaches to TLOL will be given in section 4.3 (compare 
table 19), the reader will learn more on the case-specific context and approaches to TLOL 
in the following individual cases. 
In order to make these case studies comparable with one another, each case starts with 
a general introduction of the case and the case background. This is followed by a 
comprehensive account of the approaches to TLOL. The emerging themes and main 
findings are briefly summarised at the end of each case. 
Finally, section 4.8 presents an overview of the main findings of all cases. These findings 
provide the basis for the subsequent in-depth analysis and literature discussion in 
Chapter Five. 
4.2 Profile of the DT Group Case Organisation 
The top management investigated in this study heads the Deutsche Telekom group, 
which is today a major player in the highly dynamic telecommunications industry and has 
its headquarters in Bonn, Germany. 
4.2.1 Deutsche Telekom as a Public Authority 
The case organisation was formerly an administrative section of the Federal Ministry of 
Posts and Telecommunications in Germany and operated as such under the 
constitutional requirement to provide an infrastructural service and in an environment with 
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substantial political interference on central strategic and operational decisions. As a state 
owned and governed public sector company that had an almost entirely German 
orientation, Deutsche Telekom held a monopolistic market position, and was run-up to 
the very top of the organisation-by civil servants who were protected by the laws and 
regulations governing such state employees. However, as a result of the postal reforms in 
Germany 1989 and 1995, Deutsche Telekom was subsequently confronted with 
fundamental change and DT's top management had to face the challenge of aligning the 
company accordingly. 
4.2.2 Deutsche Telekom's Learning Challenges 
Just like other companies in the telecommunications sector, Deutsche Telekom now had 
to cope with the fast pace of technological progress and ever shorter product life cycles. 
The political decision was made to privatise Deutsche Telekom, to float the shares on the 
stock market and to transform the company into a private-equity corporation with 
international reach. Furthermore, due to the complete liberalisation of the 
telecommunications market in Germany, ways had to be found to keep up with the keen 
competition in existing and emerging new markets (e. g. mobile communications, internet, 
etc. ) and to compensate for the loss of its monopolist position in the German market. To 
put it in a nutshell: The "rules of the game" changed completely for Deutsche Telekom: 
new technologies, and above all new shareholders and new market conditions, had to be 
managed. 
The first management board of Deutsche Bundespost Telekom93 - established in 1990 as 
a result of the first postal reform - consolidated these challenges for Deutsche Telekom 
into the three pillars of the group's strategic realignment and declared these to be of the 
93 = Official name of DT at that time. 
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absolute highest priority and the supreme maxims for the actions of the top management: 
  "A fundamental cultural change, i. e.: 
-from sovereign to customer-oriented behaviour 
- from technical orientation and satisfaction of public needs to efficiency and economic 
efficiency... 
  the strategic realignment of the group, i. e. 
-from telecommunication services to value added services and multimedia 
-from a national-oriented, "stand-alone" company to a global player with international 
partnerships and joint ventures 
 a fundamental re-organisation of the group, i. e. 
-from a cumbersome bureaucratic and technical-oriented organisation to a customer- 
oriented, flexible organisation 
-the foundation of subsidiaries in fast growing and highly competitive markets. " 
Source: Blank (1996) 
4.2.3 Deutsche Telekom's Organisational Structure in 2002 
12 years after the establishment of the first management board, 7 years after privatisation 
and 4 years after the complete liberalisation of the telecommunications market in 
Germany, the former "monolith" Deutsche Telekom was organised as a strategic 
management holding (see figure below). 
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New structure of the Deutsche Telekor Group 
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Business operations were controlled by the following four "lines of business" that had full 
entrepreneurial responsibility for developing their markets in keeping with their business 
orientations: 
  First, fixed network business T-Com94, which is one of the largest fixed-network 
providers in Europe. T-Com's numerous services and products are based upon 
one of the world's most advanced network infrastructures. T-Com is the sales and 
financial stronghold of the DT Group and served at that time more than 40 million 
residential customers and some 350,000 business customers from the SME 
segment (small and medium enterprises). 
  T-Systems (i. e. systems business) offers worldwide systems solutions and 
IT/telecommunication solutions to global customers from a single source. The 
94 incl. T-Networks 
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service portfolio of the second-largest systems house in Europe that emerged 
from the merger with debis Systemhaus-formerly part of the Daimler-Chrysler 
group-ranges from telecommunications products and services for international 
carriers, all the way to the implementation and operation of desktop systems, data 
centers, consulting, eBusiness system solutions and classic IT and 
telecommunications services. 
  T-Mobile (i. e. mobile business) integrates the Deutsche Telekom Group's major 
mobile communications operations and has positioned itself as one of the largest 
international mobile communications carriers. About 54 million customers in five 
European countries and the United States use an array of voice and data mobile 
communications services and products. 
  T-Online (i. e. Internet/online business) is DT's mainstay on the Internet market 
and Europe's biggest online service. With about 12.5 million subscribers, including 
more than 10 million in Germany alone, T-Online has the greatest reach of all 
portals in the German-language Internet. In addition to Internet access, the 
product portfolio also comprises value-added services, such as Web hosting, e- 
mail services, online banking and international roaming access. With effect from 
January 1,2000, T-Online was transformed into a stock-corporation, T-Online 
International AG. T-Online was the only business line to undergo such a 
transformation. 
With its strategic focus on these four central lines of business, DT's top management 
sought to position Deutsche Telekom as a leading T. I. M. E. S provider in the global arena. 
These four lines of business with growth-oriented business models were meant to focus 
on the corresponding international markets, while at the same time collaborating closely 
in order to develop convergent products and services. 
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4.2.4 The Four Cases at a Glance 
A more in-depth consideration of further key data on the DT Group and its different parts 
(see table 18 below) illustrates that the top management groups of DT's headquarters 
and the different businesses found themselves in a very different learning environment. 
Case Case Case Case "DT 
"Head- "Fixed "Mobile / Online" "Systems" Group" 
quarters" Network" in total 
ey figures 
Considered 1990 1990 1993 1996 1994 1990 period of 2002 - -2002 
(foundation) (foundation) (foundation) 
- 2002 time -2002 -2002 -2002 
Sales 2002 
(in billion ¬) 
/ 25.4 19.7 1.8 11.3 53.7 
Annual result 
before tax 
(in billion ¬) 
2001: J. 4.6 -6.4 -0.2 -0.4 -3.5 
2002: I 3.5 -23.7A 0.0 -2.0 -24.6A 
Nb of DecreasingC+Q Decreasing Fast growing Growing Fast Growing 
employees growing 
1998: 17,241 166,0978 6,000 560 5,978 195,876 
2002: 19,266D 148,900 41,597 2,814 43,292 255,969E 
Size of Medium Large Medium Small Medium Large 
or anis. 
Case characteristics 
Stage of See 
Development 
. 1. 
Mature Fast Growing Growing business 
of the Market lines 
Market Monopolist Competitive 
characteris- position until 
Market deregulated since ext. market, See 
tics / liberalisation 1993; highly competitive but strong 
business 
in 1998 markets DT-internal lines business 
Age of the Long 
organisation: Long history and tradition New founded organisations history and 
tradition 
Specific "Heritage" of the public Very limited. Strong 
constraints: authority (e. g. civil servants influence of 
[still 50% of total staff in (Could develop relatively untouched from 
German 
2002], cameralism) the rest of the organisation and the government 
heritage of the past) 
(partly 
Due to legal constraints state- owned limited access to ext. labour company) 
market until privatisation in 
1995 
Source: annual reports UT group i yyts ana zuuz 
A record loss, due to important investments and depreciation 
B figure ascertained by author based upon annual reports; > 16,700 people were made redundant since 1995; > 60,000 
people were made redundant between 1998 and 2002 
Figure comprises DT headquarters (= approx. 5,400 employees) plus assigned units; 
D 
(Source: information provided by HR Strategy department) 
corresponds to DT headquarters (= 1,039 employees) plus assigned units; (Sources: annual report DT group 2002; draft 
resolution "strategic management holding" for the board of management, dec. 17,2002) 
thereof ca. 78,000 were located outside of Germany. 
Table 19: Key Figures on Case Organisations and their Top Management 
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The corresponding cases thus differed significantly with regard to the scope of business 
activities, financial performance, the maturity, deregulation and development of their 
markets and organisational characteristics, such as their age and size of the organisation 
or their specific constraints. 
The question must now be raised as to what this learning environment of the respective 
case organisation actually meant for TLOL. Whereas the mature fixed-network business 
and the headquarters evolved from the former public authority structures directly in the 
wake of the postal reform, Mobile/Online and Systems were established as autonomous 
companies to be able to operate independently from the `ballast of the legacy of the 
organisation' in new, extremely dynamic and fast growing markets. As will be shown later, 
this legacy entailed a series of constraints on TLOL and the transformation of the wider 
organisation as a whole. Consequently, very different cultures-ranging from `start-up 
companies' to the successor organisation of a public authority-were able to emerge in 
these different parts of the DT Group. 
This was particularly striking for newcomers. A newly appointed financial top manager at 
DT's headquarters who had the opportunity to gain deeper insights into all parts of the 
group described DT's company culture as follows: 
"The culture of Deutsche Telekom is as a matter of fact not a monoculture as 
it is the case in many other companies. The individual group elements have a 
very different character you have to deal with. This is why the group has a 
great degree of variety. That's a positive factor, but sometimes a difficult one, 
too. 'I 
Several other-above all externally hired-top managers, such as the following top 
manager who headed a consulting subsidiary of DT Group (annotation: part of T- 
Systems) that carried out consulting projects with external customers as well as in-house 
DT projects, shared this view: 
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"I have projects everywhere in the group. Everywhere handles everything 
differently. The most lively part of the top management is in T-Mobile. It is 
hard in T-Com and the most old-fashioned behaviours can be found there, but 
the culturally most difficult ones are T-Systems. T-Online seems to run rather 
smoothly-sometimes you have the impression that you are working for 
completely different companies. " 
Consequently, the top management was in each case confronted with a different starting 
position, different challenges and different dynamics and constraints on target markets 
and the organisation. Due to these different learning environments, different strategic 
approaches had to be pursued and different demands were thus placed on the 
organisational learning of the corresponding parts of DT's top management. This will 
have to be taken into consideration in the corresponding individual case descriptions and 
the evaluation of TLOL. 
4.2.5 Deutsche Telekom's Financial Performance and Assets Analysis 
However, in light of the poor financial performance of the DT Group (see table 18 above), 
one might become doubtful and question if DT's top management learned how to run the 
business. DT group thus realised a record loss of EUR 24.6 billion (annotation: 
corresponds to approx. GBP 16.2 billion! ) in 2002. 
However, a closer appraisal of the longitudinal evolution of the most important financial 
indicators since the privatisation of the DT Group in 1995 revealed a principal financial 
strength of the DT Group with a stable development of EBITDA and a continuous 
increase in sales. 
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In billion ¬ 
70 
50 
ý. -ý--" 
_ý 
i ._ ýý "- 
JV 
10 
10 - 
30 - 
1995 1996 19971 1998 1 1999,1 2000 2001 ; 
} 
2002 1 2003 1 2004 
--t-- Sales 30,4 32,2 34,5 35,1 35,5 40,9 48,3 53,7 55,8 57,9 
-ý-- EB ITDA 17 17,3 14,5 12,9 15,1 16,3 18,3 19,4 
Net profit 2,7 0,9 1,7 2,2 1,3 5,9 -3,5 -24,6 1,3 4,6 
- -f - Net financial 
liabilities 
38,3 32,9 37,9 57,4 62,8 61,1 45,6 35,2 
Source: Annual financial statements of the DT Group; annotation concerning EBITDA and net financial liabilities: 
corresponding figures were only available starting from 1997. 
Figure 5: Financial Performance DT Group 
And this against the background that some 60 billion German marks (annotation: 
corresponds to approx. EUR 30.68 billion) had to be invested in infrastructure in former 
East Germany (Buchner 1999, p. 13) in the early 90s in connection with the German 
reunification in 1989. 
On the other hand, the figures reflect very substantial investments. According to the 
group's assets analysis (see 2002 DT Group annual report), EUR 43.1 billion were 
invested in 2000 and EUR 37.7 billion in 2001 (compared to EUR 7.5 billion in 1998)-in 
both cases mainly for acquisitions (including the U. S. wireless group VoiceStream for 
over thirty billion Euros) and licences (e. g. the UMTS licence for 16.6 billion German 
Marks95). These investments were a burden on the results of the business activities and 
led in the most extreme manifestation to a maximum value of the group's net financial 
liabilities of EUR 62.8 billion. 
95 This corresponds to approx. EUR 8.36 billion. 
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The substantial investments in infrastructure, licences and acquisitions could be seen as 
an indicator for the high capital intensity of the business and the availability of financial 
resources. However, the high losses raise the question as to whether the right quality and 
quantity of investments were made in the periods under review, and who or what 
elements of the top management respectively have to take responsibility for the 
corresponding investment decisions. The evaluation of the large majority of the top 
managers interviewed who regarded the top management of T-Mobile (the division with 
the highest losses) as the part of DT's top management which was the most effective as 
regards TLOL, confirms Bryman's (1995) point, that there is no objective but a socially- 
constructed measure for effectiveness (compare Methodology Chapter, section 3.7.4.2). 
This will be considered in greater detail in the individual cases. 
4.3 Profile of the DT Group's Top Management 
Having taken an initial glance at the top management's learning context and realising that 
the top management of the corresponding cases acted due to differing market conditions 
and characteristics of the corresponding case organisations in very different learning 
environments, this section will now concentrate on the subjects of TLOL. 
The following overview imparts an impression of the internal structure of the top 
management in the case organisation at the start and end of the period under review in 
this study and of the corresponding approaches to TLOL. The table illustrates that a 
heterogeneous top management developed from the originally homogenous top 
management, with its own characteristics for each business and the headquarters: 
Deutsche Telekom in 1990: 
Characteristics of DT's Top ManagementA 
Status of top managers Top management consists of civil servants. 
Age Older, i. e. on average > 50 years (promotion principle: seniority) 
Tenure Very long tenure, many years of experience in DT (promotion principle: seniority); 
No job experience outside DT. 
Cognitive complexity° Strong technical orientation; specific graduation and career track for civil servants 
that goes along with intense training. 
Geographic origin From Germany only. 
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.. ": 7` Y°. ß.! 4A 4r i... A: _ 
-_ -. 
A roaches to Top Level Organisational Learnin 
Case Case Case Case In total for 
"Head- "Fixed "Mobile / Online" "Systems" "DT Group" 
quarters" Network" 
Spin-off of the 
business in.. J 1993 1996 1994 . /. 
Mergers &B 
acquisitions 
None Medium High Very high High 
Frequency of 
restructurings/ 
key projects of 
Medium High Low Very high High 
the businessB 
Rate of Very High Low - High- 
external hires6 Moderate High Very high High 
Internal top 
management 
Several common top No business-internal training offerings 
None until 
Training B management training courses . 2001 
Formal top At least At least At least At least 
At least 
annual mee- 
management annual mee- annual top annual mee- annual mee- tings of DT 
networks None 
tings of the mgt. mee- tings of the tings of the Group's top 
(divisional & top 100 and tings plus top 30 mgrs. top 70 mgrs management 
group level) 
300 mgrs. of further events of the of the (last called the business (teambuilding) business business ` ' TOP 100 ) 
Deutsche Telekom (as of August 2002): 
Characteristics of DT's Top Management (corresponds to 121 Top Managers) 
Case Case Case Case In total for 
"Head- "Fixed "Mobile / Online" "Systems" "DT Group" 
quarters" Network" C 
No. of top mgrs 33 24 33 7 24 121 
assigned to 
DT's top mgt. 
(27%) (20%) (27%) (6%) (20%) (100%) 
Nb. of top 
mgrs. from 0 6 16 0 8 30 
outside (25%) 
German 
Nb. of civil 3 7 3 2 2 
17 
servants (14%) 
Age Below 
(compared to below above Much below Much below below average age 
average age of in 1990 
47.3 years) 
Tenure (com- Below 
pared to aver- 
age tenure of 
below above below below Much below 
average 
tenure in 
7.5 years) 1990 
Cognitive 
° High Low High High Very high High com lexi 
(Depicted by author based upon interview results and the analysis of corresponding documentation) 
A Results of interviews; no precise figures available 
B Compared to other parts of the top management 
C Compared to 1990 (see above) 
D Diversity of formal education, external job experience, etc. 
Table 20: The Case Organisation's Top Management - Short Overview 
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As is briefly outlined in table 19, it was also found that the internal configuration of DT's 
top management as a whole underwent a radical change in the time period under 
appraisal in this study, but the top management in the different case organisations 
evolved in different ways. The following section involves a closer appraisal of the top 
management at the start and the end of the period under review. The detailed appraisal 
of the approaches to TLOL will be made in the respective cases. 
4.3.1 DT's Top Management at the Start of the Period under Review (1990) 
As described in table 19 above, DT's top management consisted in 1990 of civil servants. 
Due to the fact that DT was an infrastructure service provider in Germany and service 
functions such as finance, purchasing, etc. were common functions of 
telecommunications and posts prior to 1990, most top managers had a technical 
background and acted in an exclusively national context. 
It was apparently a relatively uniform group of people at the apex of that single company 
who followed the specific career track of civil servants. Top managers who had the status 
of a civil servant expressed in the interviews that due to the associated, in part commonly 
experienced and time-intensive training for civil servants, the top managers at that time 
often knew each other often quite well, even since the start of their career in Deutsche 
Telekom. In the interviews, it was reported that this often gave rise to "lifelong" close ties, 
as well as friendships and loyalty, on which one could have built. Furthermore, good 
cooperation was also partially attributed to the career development of civil servants 
displaying a tendency to pursue a stronger generalistic orientation in comparison with 
those colleagues recruited from the private sector. Thus, civil servants were apparently 
used to having job assignments in different departments, ranging from central tasks, all 
the way to technological functions. It obviously did not matter whether or not one had a 
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corresponding formal education or the specific knowledge required for the respective job. 
In this context, one of the senior managers interviewed-a former permanent secretary in 
the ministry-remarked dryly that civil servants had a saying: "Knowledge comes with the 
position. " 
Regardless of a possible lack of specialist expertise, numerous advantages were seen in 
this approach, particularly by civil servants who, according to their own statements and in 
line with the assessment of their CVs, actually made this experience. For instance, one 
interviewee--a top manager at the board level of the chairman of the board for many 
years and himself a civil servant who had previously held very different functions within 
the enterprise, including network planning, network operation and human resources- 
reported the following: 
"It's easier to adopt the perspective of a colleague on the other side when 
you've already held similar responsibility, or perhaps expect that one day 
you'll have to realise such a function yourself " 
A number of the interviewed top managers-all of them civil servants-admitted rather 
self-critically that the management culture at that time was obviously more oriented 
towards political aspects than performance and economic efficiency. 
For example, one top manager who headed a central department at the board level of the 
chairman, reported: 
"In earlier days-also as a top manager-you did your job from eight to four. 
And then you put your pen down and knocked off. Today, there is a 
completely different willingness to perform. As a counter-move to that we 
have lost between us this enormous solidarity we had as the `Telekom 
family' " 
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Another top manager-a civil servant and in charge of an operational sales role- 
obviously shared this view: 
"Cost-oriented thinking-we didn't understand that at all back then. For 
instance, / passed my driving test here. I was given three weeks leave to do 
so. And we had managers who built their houses during working hours. 
Thankfully, we've departed from that old world. " 
Apart from the management culture, the top management in 1990 differed from the later 
top management as regards their age and tenure in the organisation. It was reported by 
the interviewed top managers and an HR manager that, in line with the fact that seniority 
generally played an important role for promotion, most top managers at that time were 
apparently older than 50 years, with long years of service in the group as a result of the 
civil service system. Although neither figures on the precise number of top managers96 
nor reliable statistics97 were available on DT's top management in 1990, the analysis of 
some available CV's confirmed these interview findings just as the previously identified 
strong emphasis on a mainly technical formal education. 
It appears that little has changed at the top level in the first years after the postal reform in 
1990, which marked the first step towards privatisation in 1995 and split the former 
"Deutsche Bundespost" into its three constituent parts (telecommunications, postal 
services and banking) and established each as an independent operational unit 
administratively separate from the ministry of Posts and Telecommunications. Also, the 
mobile and systems business/subsidiaries were still very small. In this context, the former 
96 The CTO of T-Mobile-who started his career when DT was still a public authority-and the former 
responsible head of top management HR reported independently from one another that with the spin-off of 
`Deutsche Bundespost Telekom' in 1990, it was stipulated that a maximum of 790 management posts 
could be transferred. "That was a tough requirement" [CTO, T-Mobile]. Initiated by the first Management 
Board, this later gave rise to the Top 60 and Top 300 managers (with the latter containing the Top 60). 
97 Personnel lists were not accessible for the period from 1990 to 1995 as responsibility for management of 
the top managers was not assumed by Telekom until privatisation. 
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responsible head of Human Resources Department for the top management staff 
explained in the interview: 
"Between 1990 and 1995, we had a stable management at top level as the 
employments were under public law. Everything had to be decided by the 
federal cabinet. Just as before, changes at top management level happened 
only when the government changed, but this never concerned the technical 
part. This is also why there were nearly no changes in the organisation. There 
were only two people at that time who joined the top management from 
outside Telekom, and one senior manager changed as CTO to our mobile 
business. At that time, we had a stable management that consisted of 
managers who had the specific qualifications of high level civil servants. A lot 
of them left Deutsche Telekom shortly after privatisation in 1995. " 
Evidently, nothing changed in the structure of the top management in terms of age and 
technical orientation, as was reported by one of the newly hired two top managers 
mentioned: 
'When i joined the group in 1993, / was 39 years old and a `yuppie' within the 
top management. In those days, I was viewed as very younger-too young. 
And a businessman at that! It took at least 2 years for me to be accepted by 
the others! Today, seniority is not so important. " 
After DT's privatisation in 1995 and the resultant removal of legal constraints, things 
changed rapidly at the top level (annotation: This will be considered in more detail in the 
corresponding cases) and resulted in a different configuration of DT's top management. 
4.3.2 DT's Top Management at the End of the Period under Review (2002) 
As can be seen from table 19, DT's top management in 2002 differed significantly from 
what it was 12 years before. 
The original relatively homogenous group of top managers obviously gave way to a 
different top management structure that was involved in various businesses and which 
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was characterised by different scopes of their business activities, market and 
organisational characteristics, as described in section 4.2.3. Based upon corresponding 
documentation and the analysis of the top management's CVs, it was found that the new 
businesses that had not yet existed in 1990 now provided the majority of the top 
managers. 
The decision of the corporate board to attribute greater importance-and with it power- 
to the management functions of the newer businesses was apparently a source of serious 
conflict and was, according to the interviews, one of the most controversial issues 
discussed at top level, mainly between the fixed network business on the one hand, and 
the new businesses, on the other hand. Two statements might illustrate this. The first is 
by a senior manager from fixed network business; the second is by a manager in the 
fixed network business who was refused a position amongst the group's TOP 100 
Managers: 
"When the importance of the role for the Group is concerned, then I regard it very 
critically. In my estimate, the most important people should have the most important 
influence on the presentation of the Group result. When / see who was present at the last 
TOP 100 Meeting (annotation of the author. - This is the DT Group's top management 
convention), I have to wonder whether some representatives of small units that only 
produce costs, or so many from smaller divisions of the Group really belong there? " 
"lt is sometimes really frustrating. I am responsible for 60,000 people and an investment 
budget of EUR 3 billion. Yet much more attention is paid to the other pillars. An equal 
status between T-Online and T-Com is, from my point of view, difficult as 
they are not 
equal. " 
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These conflicts arising from the decision on the composition of DT group's top 
management were seen in the interviews as one of the core causes for the poor 
assessment of cohesion at the top level, which was rated by 50% of the interviewees as 
worse than satisfactory. This contrasted the thoroughly "good" assessment by the civil 
servants interviewed of cooperation at the top level at the start of the period under review. 
As already mentioned, all parts and businesses of the DT Group were represented- 
albeit in varying degrees-in DT group's top management. However, it could be observed 
that the top management of the different businesses differed substantially from one 
another, which indicates a strong linkage between the top management and its learning 
environment. A top manager of DT's headquarters described the group's top 
management as follows: 
"I remember the last TOP 100 meeting98 we had in Potsdam. The Mobilers 
presented themselves as the young savages with their own culture and spirit. 
One had the impression that they were fresh, full of energy and wanted to 
achieve something together. The Onliners were a little bit more moderate. T- 
Systems had no real cohesion and seemed to be somewhat befuddled. And 
T-Com ... 
They are the dinosaurs of the fixed network. They are bad at self- 
marketing and bringing themselves to market. There is nearly no interaction 
between these different groups of top managers and due to the divisional 
structure interaction is decreasing even further. " 
That which the above-mentioned manager's observation reflects, can also be seen in the 
development of a number of demographic traits. So what actually happened to the top 
management that originally consisted of civil servants with the aforementioned typical 
characteristics (> 50 years, long tenure, mainly technical formal education)? 
98 Annotation: that is the annual meeting of the group's top management. 
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A closer inspection of the composition of the top management revealed that only a 
minority of top managers (in total: 14%) were still civil servants. One of the three left in 
DT's headquarters in 2002 claimed: 
"I sometimes feel like the last Mohican. Who is left? Mr. X (annotation of the 
author: name not disclosed for confidentiality reasons) has now gone and 
none of the old guard are left on the corporate board of management 
anymore... ". 
In this context, the number of civil servants in the "new" mobile, online and systems 
businesses was particularly low, with the largest number still being found in the large 
organisation of the fixed network business99, as can be derived from documentation. 
The overall massive decrease of civil servants in the top management raised the question 
as to precisely what knowledge was lost and what new knowledge was introduced at top 
level in the period under review. 
4.3.2.1 "Lost" Knowledge at Top Level 
lt was primarily the remaining civil servants themselves who pointed out in the interviews 
that they regretted the loss of technological competence and in-depth knowledge 
regarding the functioning of the group. They also claimed that the former powerful 
management networks would become full of holes and the strong identification with the 
"Teiekom Family" would decline. In contrast, numerous externally hired top managers 
from the new businesses claimed in the interviews that no knowledge at all was lost 
during the transformation. Indeed, they stated that contrary was true. 
99 This is not surprising given that according to an internal HR strategy paper (2002), 50% of the fixed 
network's business staff were still civil servants. It should be reiterated that for legal reasons, civil servants 
could not be made redundant, even after the privatisation of DT. 
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Having confronted a senior manager who played an important role in the group's OD- 
department for many years and now headed the fixed network's organisation department 
with these differing statements, he explained: 
"Our company's production is not comparable to other firms. This is a 
peculiarity of our business in fixed networks and a lot of externally recruited 
top managers are not aware of that. We sell something, and then it is 
produced in the net. A lot of externally recruited senior managers come from 
producing industries-1 mean from the world of objects. Sometimes even from 
a company of a completely different size. Some of them underestimate the 
differences, and a considerable number of top managers have already failed 
due to this. Young managers who immediately enter the top level of our 
company do not have this company-specific knowledge and/or are unaware 
of the factors that can cause problems, especially within the framework of 
change processes. They simply do not perceive hurdles as they do not know 
the company and how it works. And it works on account of experience. " 
This could be seen as a plea for preserving this experience-based knowledge, even it 
remains unknown precisely how much of this knowledge has to be provided. However, 
there is evidence that large parts of this experience-based knowledge were lost. This can 
be derived from the development of the top management's age structure and tenure in 
the group. The top managers interviewed stated themselves that one of the most striking 
trends involved a rejuvenation of DT's top managers and a decrease in tenure in the 
group in the period under review. This was confirmed by analysing the corresponding 
documentation (for further details it is referred to section 5.5.2.2). While a large majority 
of top managers was older than 50 years in 1990, the figure in 1995 was just 49% and in 
2002 a mere 30%. At the same time, a significant rise in the number of younger 
managers was observed: In 2002,23% of the group's top management were younger 
than 40, and in total 47% were younger than 45. These young top managers became 
particularly prominent in the mobile and online/Internet business. 
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Simultaneously, a significant decrease in tenure in the group was observed (for further 
details it is referred to section 5.5.2.2). In 2002,47% of the group's top management had 
a maximum tenure in the group of 4 years. Although turnover rates could not be given for 
confidentiality reasons, the evolution of age and tenure already strongly indicates a lot of 
"coming and going" amongst DT's top management, naturally also accompanied by a 
loss of experience-based knowledge. 
As shown above, the top managers interviewed also claimed a loss of technical expertise 
at the top level. According to the top managers interviewed, outstanding technical 
competence was no longer regarded as being very important. And as is evident from the 
structure of the group's management board, there was a lack of promoters for this. The 
analysis of the structure of the DT Group's management board over time (see table 
below) illustrates that the technological roles in this respect clearly lost importance. 
Where there were still 4 board members for technology in 1990, the last technology 
management board function was "dispensed with" in 2002. 
CEO Technology Marketing, Sales, 
Service, 
Product Mgt. 
Customer Segments 
Strategy, Finance, 
Human Resources 
International Specific issues in total 
1990 1 4 1 3 0 1 10 
1996 1 2 3 2 1 1 10 
1998 1 2 2 2 1 0 8 
2001 1 1 2 3 1 0 8 
2003 1 0 4 2 0 0 7 
Table 21: The Corporate Management Board of the DT Group 
Furthermore, the analysis of the top management's formal education (for further details it 
is referred again to section 5.5.2.2) confirmed a steadily declining share of engineers and 
natural scientists (annotation: between 1995 and 2002 alone by 20%) in the top 
management and with it a loss of technical expertise. 
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4.3.2.2 "New" Knowledge at Top Level 
The loss of technical knowledge during DT's transformation between 1990 and 2002 was 
evidently accompanied by a simultaneous acquisition of new types of knowledge. As 
table 19 illustrates (annotation: the table is based upon the analysis of demographic data 
of the top management), the share of international top managers represented in the top 
management of this formerly only Germany-oriented company reached a new peak in 
2002 at approx. 25%. 
Furthermore, the top managers interviewed emphasised in particular improved 
knowledge on the part of the top management in the fields of marketing, sales and 
finance (for further details it is referred to section 5.5.2.2). Some individuals also made 
explicit mention of the corporate communications function. The analysis of the top 
management's CVs revealed that an increasing number not only complied with 
corresponding studies but also brought vocational experience in management positions at 
other companies. It could also be found-in line with the trend in the industry-that an 
increasing number of top managers had no academic degree, but rather pertinent 
experience as good businessmen in the "new economy", thereof three members of the 
corporate board of management and other managers. This would certainly have been 
inconceivable at the start of the period under review in this study. 
lt could be seen that the spectrum of companies and segments (e. g. technology, media, 
IT, food industry, plant construction and engineering, business consulting, etc. ) was very 
broad. If one ignores acquisitions for a moment, clusters can be identified as regards 
individual companies, such as Philips, Siemens-Nixdorf, McKinsey and Sony, for 
instance. In the interviews, this approach was strongly criticised in some cases. It was 
viewed that certain top managers clustered their cronies around them so that a change in 
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a top management position was very often accompanied by further changes. One top 
manager from human resources commented on this practice as follows: 
"Very often, candidates are recruited for top management positions because 
they are well-known, because they worked together in another company. 
They are not employed because they know something about something, have 
a specific capacity, knowledge or skills. They are rather employed because 
they understand and get on with each other. But where is the balance 
between personal interests, i. e. getting along well with one another) and 
company interests, i. e. skills? " 
It has already been mentioned that a lot of young top managers joined the group, which 
imperatively means that a lot of them only had a few years of job experience. This was 
viewed as a double-edged sword. One of those top managers said in the interview that 
took place a few days before he left the company: 
"At Deutsche Telekom, they are not afraid to give very responsible jobs to 
very young people, which is very positive. Some of them, however, shot up 
too high, too quickly. In one or two years they set fire to themselves. " 
Overall, it can be summed up that the diversity of DT's top management as regards age, 
formal education, previous job experience, etc. increased significantly in comparison with 
the start of the period under review. In this context, the extent to which individual 
characteristics were pronounced within the different businesses differed greatly in part. 
This suggests that apart from the influence of the learning environment on TLOL, different 
methods for TLOL were deployed. This was already indicated in table 19 as "approaches 
to TLOL" and will now be considered in more detail in the following individual cases. 
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4.4 The "Fixed-Network" Case 
4.4.1 Introduction 
The following case outlines the organisational learning of the top management of the 
fixed network telecommunication business. This case is unique-also compared to the 
other cases of this study-as it deals with the top management of that part of Deutsche 
Telekom that faced the most radical shift from a public authority to a private corporation 
acting in the highly competitive and dynamic telecommunications market. 
The case will show how the top management of the large and mature fixed-network 
business tried to respond to the loss of its monopolistic position and steadily increasing 
market pressure. It will also show how it dealt with a series of specific constraints and 
restrictions, such as temporary limited access to the labour market or the impossibility to 
make civil servants redundant, which further restricted the fixed network's top 
management repertoire of options, forcing it instead to adopt approaches to TLOL such 
as training or the regrouping of existing resources that subsequently proved to be only of 
limited suitability. 
4.4.2 Background to the "Fixed Network" Case 
As mentioned in the profile of the case organisation (see 4.2), the top management of the 
fixed network business headed an organisation that formerly held a monopolistic market 
position and acted in a mature, purely national-oriented market. Deregulation of the 
telecommunications market was then initiated by the German government 100, with 
deregulation of the fixed network telecommunications market being 5 or more years later 
when compared to other future fields of activity of the group. However, the market itself is 
100 The European Commission decided in November 1994 that the European telecommunications markets 
had to be liberalised by 1 January, 1998 at the latest. 
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very closely regulated. One top manager and former civil servant who was interviewed 
and now heads the department for regulatory affairs at DT's headquarters described the 
impact of market deregulation on the former top management as follows: 
"We knew that when a real market had to be created, then the government 
had to put us in a corset. Before, we made a lot of money for the government. 
We financed the postal service in Germany and even earned more money for 
other government projects. Yet, the same government caused us so many 
problems. For many of my peers, this was difficult to accept. " 
4.4.2.1 Business Strategy of the "Fixed Network" Business 
As a countermove to the deregulation of the telecommunications market, the newly 
established top management of DT Group defined the most important objective of the 
fixed network business to be to minimise the loss of market share intentionally aimed at 
by the federal government and the regulatory authority (Blank 1996, Blutner 1996). With 
reference to high internal cost structures, competencies and the degree of familiarity of 
Telekom, it was evidently a simultaneous goal in this context to not become embroiled in 
a ruinous price battle with the competition. To this end, efforts were made to offer the 
customer more value for the same price (e. g. higher bandwidth, more or additional 
functionalities, greater customer proximity through more shops, brand image, etc. ). The 
guideline of the business strategy in fixed network business was thus to pursue a quality 
leadership strategy in the premium segment. 
In this situation, the DT Group was faced with the new competition, which pursued a clear 
cost leadership strategy to which an excessively large gap could not be allowed to arise, 
as well as the regulatory authority, whose pricing requirements for invigorating 
competition had to be complied with by Telekom. As the drop in prices in Germany in the 
wake of the liberalisation of the fixed network telecommunications market in 1998 was 
significantly sharper in comparison with other countries (see: Frühbrodt 2002), this was 
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also a decisive factor for the new strategic alignment, together with the knowledge of 
where one stood in terms of costs. 
So what was the result of these developments for the top management of the fixed 
network business? As DT corresponded in its early phase to fixed network business and 
its headquarters (the newer businesses did not yet exist at that time), the strategic 
challenges the fixed network's top management had to face largely corresponded to what 
was already described in section 4.4.2 as cultural change, strategic realignment and 
fundamental re-organisation towards an economical, profit-oriented, efficient and more 
internationally aligned organisation. The love of technology that extended all the way to 
the top level consequently had to make way for more committed customer orientation and 
goal-oriented market management. The establishment of a sales structure, customer 
segment management and marketing and the associated know-how was absolutely 
imperative to this end. And, last but not least, the top management had to find ways to 
achieve greater market proximity, flexibility and adaptability for the fixed network business 
(Blank 1996). 
4.4.2.2 Top Management and Organisation of the "Fixed Network" Business 
This was a real challenge for the top management who-as elaborated earlier-headed 
an organisation that primarily distinguished by its size (in 2002: 25.4 billion Euro sales 
and 148,900 employees), its strong local presence, its pronounced division of labour, the 
complexity of its routines and structures and languid administrative processes. 
At the same time, the fixed network business was the "principal heir" of the legacy of the 
former "public authority", which became more than evident from the assignment of the 
technical platforms and the bulk of the civil servants (in 2002, these still represented 50% 
of the workforce), who enjoyed state-guaranteed employment 
for life. Consequently, the 
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company culture in the fixed network business remained strongly influenced by the old 
structures of the civil service, which not only permeated the fixed network organisation, 
but also its top management. After all, virtually all top managers were civil servants, at 
least up until the group's privatisation. Therefore, the top management also largely 
displayed the characteristics described earlier (see section 4.3.1, i. e. age > 50 years, 
usually technical training, higher tenures, generalist orientation through job rotation within 
the group). 
Consequently, there was very little know-how or experience in sales, product 
management, marketing, finance and the international market. 
Likewise, the factors of efficiency and cost orientation that were now necessary (see 
section 4.4.2.1 on business strategy) were evidently not strongly anchored at first in the 
fixed network business's top management that was initially hallmarked by a very strong 
technological orientation. One member of the board of the fixed network business 
attributed this to the different control mechanisms of a public authority in comparison with 
those of a private sector company. He explained: 
"When / came to the `Bundespost' there were civil servants in the important 
management positions, the entire system was oriented towards stability and 
the company was aligned with personnel and human resources. In those days, 
this was the real controlling and not business administration. The 
management simply delegated budget planning to any old clerk. Nobody was 
interested in it. Even today, cost centres are not completely managed via 
budgets. Nevertheless, today the times have changed. At the end of the 
business year, you have to show to your boss value you have added to the 
company down to the last penny. That is the benchmark today, not like in the 
past when it only mattered how many people were under your management. " 
An externally hired top manager in sales apparently had similar experiences and reported 
in the interview as follows: 
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"/ was astonished to see at the beginning of my career here that there was 
nobody of my peers who was really interested in the planning of budgets. 
Often this was handled by a clerk and often funny things happened in your 
planning. For instance, I had a rise in my personnel costs of 16% without 
having increased my headcount. None of my colleagues was able to explain 
that phenomenon to me, or why my budget was charged with so many 
overhead costs. Apparently it was rare for a manager to raise a question or 
critical discussion about these issues. And then we wonder why we have 
problems with our cost situation? " 
A top manager heading a technical department of the business put it in a different way 
and attributed it to the image and pronounced technology orientation of the earlier public 
authority Telekom and its civil servants: 
"Earlier, most of the staff at Telekom were engineers. They made telephones 
that could drop from 10m but never broke. The chief aspect back then was 
quality. Telekom always acted according to the principle of "good and 
expensive", and we sought the best possible solution together, even if it 
wasn't always feasible for price reasons. When it came to quality, we had an 
excellent reputation. We were well known for our quality. And even the 
management regarded the costs as less important than the quality. " 
This suggests that top managers at that time were not used to assuming entrepreneurial 
responsibility. Or to put it another way like a member of the board of the fixed network 
business: 
"Accepting responsibility and not having the security net in place at all times. 
This was the major change for our former top civil servants. 11 
However, despite all mentioned obsolete patterns of the former civil service culture, the 
fixed network organisation obviously also disposed over not only the aforementioned 
quality but also the mastery of complex telecommunications systems and technical 
platforms, as well as in the serving of a mass market and the associated handling of 
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complex processes. This was described by an externally hired senior manager in sales 
(fixed network) as follows: 
"What fixed network business, Le. the "old Telekom"; is really good at is the 
organisational handling of mass telephony. However, that doesn't mean that 
they had a handle on the processes. That functions on account of experience. 
It works because everybody up to the very top of the organisation builds a 
network. Normal, production companies have a clean structure, but not us in 
the fixed network business. A lot of money could be saved. " 
However, this suggests that, in view of the necessary organisational changes, the utmost 
challenge for the newly hired top managers was initially to understand the process flows 
themselves before they could be designed to be more efficient without taking incalculable 
risks 
As shown, the top management of the fixed network business was urgently in need of an 
entrepreneurial mindset and the competencies mentioned above, in order to transform 
the old, fixed network organisation-characterised as it was by public authority structures 
-into a customer-centric and profitable private enterprise operating according to 
economic standards. 
4.4.3 Approaches to TLOL in the "Fixed Network" Case 
The approaches to TLOL in the fixed network business will be considered in two different 
periods of time-the first before, and the second after DT's privatisation in 1995. 
The reason for this is that the fixed network business was under a legal constraint that 
prevented external growth as well as recruitments from the external labour market until 
privatisation and lacked any options to dismiss or detach individual top managers from 
the rest of the top management. Due to their status as civil servants, they were protected 
and privileged by corresponding laws and regulations. 
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Therefore, with no access to external resources, the fixed network's top management 
was not only obliged to make do with existing knowledge and resources in the first phase 
prior to privatisation, but also had to make use of all appointed managers at top level. The 
latter meant that in the absence of sanctioning options, those top managers also 
remained at the top of the organisation who were not ready or able to unlearn inadequate 
practices and/or learn new things. 
So DT's privatisation and by it the removal of the corresponding legal constraints invoked 
a whole new dynamism, which is why the top management's approaches to learning are 
now appraised in the two different time periods mentioned. 
4.4.3.1 Approaches to TLOL prior to Privatisation (1990-1995) 
As mentioned above, the top management of the fixed network business was obliged in 
the early phase of its development to make use of existing resources and knowledge. In 
this context, the top management pursued both off-the-job and on-the-job approaches to 
learning, as will be shown. 
Top Management Training 
As the fixed-network business had a long tradition in terms of off-the-job training 
(compare section 4.3.1) as the "principal heir" of the legacy of the former public authority, 
the decision was made to invest in a corresponding training offering for the top 
management. In 1991, a specific training course called "Nach-Diplom in 
Unternehmensführung (NDU)" (continuing studies in business management) that was 
comparable to a part-time executive MBA programme was initiated by the main 
department for human resources development. At the same time, this course was offered 
to top managers at DT's headquarters. The course curriculum was discussed in depth 
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with the members of the management board and the implementation of the programme 
was approved. The curriculum discussions were preceded by extensive scans of the 
individual top managers. Presumably to nobody's surprise, the assessment centres that 
lasted up to two weeks had revealed particularly strong learning needs on the part of the 
fixed network's top management in virtually all business management fields, especially 
finance and all market- and customer-related areas. 
With a duration of several years and week-long attendance phases for the participating 
top managers, the NDU programme lasted until 1993 and was developed and 
implemented in cooperation with the University of St. Gallen, Switzerland. However, only 
one group of top managers attended the training before it was stopped a few months 
after the start of the first training course by a board decision. In the face of rapid 
environmental changes, the management board apparently came to the conclusion101 
that it was simply too time consuming, too difficult to integrate in the day-to-day working 
routine of a top manager and inappropriate for acquiring the necessary competencies at 
top management level in a timely fashion. As a result, absolutely all training activities for 
the top management were frozen, even training sessions lasting just one or a few days. 
From then on, training was restricted to very few individual measures for individual 
managers. 
Regrouping around Required Competencies 
Apart from off-the-job top management training which concentrated on the top 
management alone, the top management of the fixed network business initiated a series 
of change initiatives in order to learn and adjust to the wider organisation, and with it the 
top management accordingly. The top managers themselves expressed unanimously in 
101 This could be derived from corresponding interview statements of attendees of this training course and 
representatives of the top management of the HR department. 
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the interviews that the most important one in the period under review was the Telekom 
KONTAKTproject'o2 
Based upon the described axes for strategic re-alignment103 and the needs for adaptation, 
as well as the results of a benchmarking study of large international carriers such as 
AT&T, British Telecom and Nymex, (Telekom, 1995) the new management board of 
Deutsche Bundespost Telekom104 made the decision in September 1992 (Telekom, 1992) 
to implement a new structure for the management board that was based on customer 
segments and to simultaneously launch the complex KONTAKT initiative. 
Organisation DT Group: 
Before Telekom KONTAKT 
Marketing/ Sales/ Telekonº Service - Customer Divisions - 
Technology 
Networks, Broadband, Fixed network/ Value Added 
Satellites, Switchboards Broadcasting, Services -Technology Divisions - 
Logistics Mobile 
Reconstruction Eastern Germany - Divisions with 
specific missions - 
Controlling/Finance, 
HR/ Legal Organisation Purchasing, - Functional Divisions - 
1 
/IT Real Estate Management, 
Structural En in in g 
After Telekom KONTAKT 
Residential Business Systems 
Customers Customers Customers 
Technology Networks Technology Services 
Finance/ Controlling/ 
HR(Legal Purchasing! International 
Structural Engineering 
CEO CEO 
Figure 6: Organisation of the DT Group Before and After Telekom KONTAKT 
The key feature of the "Telekom KONTAKT" initiative (1992-1996) was the regrouping of 
tasks, responsibilities and available resources around these customer segments, a 
decentralisation of responsibility and a resulting change in the allocation of power and 
resources (see figure 6). This was meant to be achieved through the implementation of 
committed customer-oriented company divisions, the introduction of result responsibility 
and the promotion of entrepreneurship. In this context, the introduction of additional 
102 KONTAKT is an abbreviation for: "Kompetenz und neueste Technologien als Angebot an die Kunden der 
Telekom", (in english: competence and the newest technologies as an offering to Te{ekom's customers) 
103 As DT was made up at that time of the headquarters and the fixed network business only, this largely 
corresponds to what was described in section 4.2.2. 
104 = Official name of DT at that time. 
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performance-related pay at the top level (-* management by objectives) was intended to 
contribute decisively to the latter two goals. 
The top managers themselves considered the Telekom KONTAKT initiative to be one of 
the projects that were particularly challenging for TLOL. One top manager-today 
heading a corporate function in DT's headquarters-who made part of the Telekom 
KONTAKT project reported about the laborious project work: 
"... However, to build up a sales force.... There were those "old" Telekom 
managers and a very small external part, i. e. consultants, who had to make a 
shift from acceptance of an order to the market. We needed at least 4 to 5 
years to do that! Also, the old mindset of responding to the constitutional 
requirement to provide infrastructural service had to be replaced with 
profitability and financial transparency. It was necessary to create pressure at 
that point and to oblige top managers to overcome this old way of thinking. 
Financial incentives alone were not enough to achieve this. It 
It seems, however, that this was not just a question of expert knowledge, but rather of the 
readiness for change. The responsible manager of the OD department recalled the 
following: 
"Before 1995, there were a lot of top managers or high-ranking civil servants 
with a high level of expert knowledge but with an enormous amount of inertia. 
This resulted in long-lasting, long-winded fights. Drastic measures were 
necessary to bring these fights to an end. Some of them simply didn't want to 
understand what it means to trust others and to work in a team. They had to 
leave. " 
In addition to the challenges regarding content and the personal readiness for change, 
the shift of power from the minister to the management of the board also left its traces. 
This brought about a change in the decision-making process so that decisions from now 
on were team decisions. The latter was obviously a completely new experience 
for DT's 
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top managers, who were apparently not used to such complex decision-making 
processes. A former top manager of a technical department explained: 
"When you compare how decisions were made in former times and today, 
you can see that decision making became much more complex. Now we have 
draft resolutions for the board of management where everybody has to make 
a statement-real orgies of written consents. In former times decisions were 
made quicker. In the end, the minister decided, even very important things. 
Now we have board and team decisions. " 
The statements of the interviewees above, as well as the duration of the KONTAKT 
initiative (5 years! ), suggest that this approach to TLOL led in the right direction but was 
very time consuming, just like top management training. On the one hand, this can be 
attributed to a lack of fundamental expert competencies, which could only be 
compensated for to a limited degree through consulting and making decisions on a 
broader basis (i. e. team decisions), as illustrated in the example of establishing a sales 
force. On the other hand, change and decision making processes were evidently 
seriously impeded and delayed by the lack of options for sanctioning those top managers 
who resisted the change and stuck to their old behavioural patterns with supreme 
stubbornness. 
4.4.3.2 Approaches to TLOL after Privatisation (Starting from 1995) 
As mentioned in the introduction of this section, the top management's repertoire of 
potential methods for TLOL increased significantly with DT's privatisation. 
External Recruiting 
After privatisation, the abolition of the legal limitations now provided the possibility of 
recruiting external staff and to fill identified positions with external candidates. 
Although compared to the other businesses, external recruiting remained at a much lower 
level in the fixed network business, it was obviously indispensable in order to acquire new 
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professional knowledge at top level. A senior manager heading a technical department in 
the fixed network business made the following statement in the interview: 
"External recruitment on a senior level has enabled us to quickly enlist new 
competencies. Many external appointees have better credentials in terms of 
management and profit orientation. They tend to be more hesitant about 
exhausting budgets, meticulously calculating the additional added value 
which the resources applied are likely to generate. In the old "T-Com° 
however, very little understanding thereof has remained. It took a Mr. X to 
come along and say: If you up the rating of these jobs, the cost will be x 
million. 11 
The analysis of the CVs of the top managers who joined the fixed network business 
showed that mainly top managers with a background in business administration, finance, 
marketing and sales were hired. As could be seen from the interviews, these external 
hires clearly contributed to creating new impetus, but did not raise major integration 
problems. The age and experience of these managers possibly contributed to this effect, 
as the external hires in the fixed network business were generally not younger than 40 
years, compared to the external hires of the new businesses. One interviewee--a long- 
standing executive and himself a former civil servant-recalled the situation in the fixed 
network business as follows: 
"There are two basic types of people. There are those in their early 40s to 
mid-50s with industry experience. A number of these possess a strong 
pioneering spirit and have done and still do many unconventional things. And 
then there are the civil servants, who want to achieve things, but still regard 
many things as totally strange and are not always particularly professional. 
However, some of these dispose over outstanding technical expertise and an 
unbelievable knowledge of how our company functions. Both complemented 
one another excellently, but there were still very few from outside. " 
It was reported by interviewees (annotation: top managers as well as representatives of 
the HR department for the top management staff) that external recruiting at that time 
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served above all the replacement of those top managers who were not ready to learn and 
the dismantling of encrusted structures. An externally hired top manager heading the 
fixed network's legal department explained the underlying difficulties for the former civil 
servants as follows: 
"I think there is one particular point in this case. The contract the employer 
and the manager had agreed upon before all that change had been broken by 
the company, Those managers who once decided to work for Deutsche 
Telekom and its preceding organisations often made a decision for their entire 
professional life. They had a certain idea in mind when they started working 
for the company. They had an idea about the company's values and culture 
and the `rules of the game'. Suddenly everything changed.. Their status, the 
rules for the evaluation of performance or career development, etc.. But those 
who insisted on their peacock feathers failed. " 
However, after many years of partially wretched experiences, particularly within the scope 
of the Telekom KONTAKT Project (compare previous section), the top management's 
receptiveness for new developments as well as the availability of specialised expert 
knowledge at top level was highly needed and now given a high priority. The positions at 
which personnel changes had to be made to this end became exceedingly clear in the 
wake of the long duration of the Telekom KONTAKT Project. 
It could be observed that the trend towards external recruiting in the face of the 
liberalisation of the fixed network telecommunications market and increasing change 
intensified somewhat up to 1998. 
The top managers of the fixed network business themselves explained the phenomenon 
in the interviews with the fact that external hires started allocating their cronies around 
them at the expense of internal top manager's career prospects. This could, however, 
only be partially confirmed by interviews and the analysis of CVs. 
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DT's top managers outside the fixed network business, such as a top manager of DT's 
headquarters (formerly in the fixed network business) provided a different explanation for 
the further increase of external hires: 
"One does not go elsewhere or resort to people outside of one's own 
department boundaries for fear of taking an unacceptable risk. As a result, 
valuable opportunities to become familiar with other areas of the business 
and other perspectives are missed. " 
Six other interviewed top managers attributed the increasing external recruiting to the 
permanent restructuring of the fixed network business and simultaneous continuous staff 
reduction-also at top level-which resulted in rivalry and competition between top 
managers. Just as will be shown in the systems case (see section 4.6), in the absence of 
a clear internal successor or candidate, external top managers were often the tertius 
gaudens. A top manager in HR commented as follows: 
" Concerning internal candidates for top management positions, only their 
weak points and not their strong points are perceived. This is simply due to 
the fact that they are well-known. In comparison with external applicants, an 
excessively strict standard is applied to our internal people. Top managers 
also worry when in doubt that people below them could be promoted and be 
on an equal footing with them. An external recruit is preferable in such a 
case. " 
Despite the problems raised, external recruiting was viewed by all interviewed top 
managers of the DT Group to be an appropriate and very important strategy to secure the 
requisite competencies at the fixed network business's top level at short notice. 
OD Projects 
It could be seen from the presentation of the responsible HR manager on the occasion of 
an internal group HR conference beginning in 2003 that 13 major restructurings were 
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initiated and realised in the fixed networks business between 1995 and the beginning of 
2003 atone 105. In this context, an increasing frequency of such measures could be 
observed in the wake of the liberalisation of the fixed network market. Some of these 
restructurings were seen as a logical consequence of, or an attempt at correcting or 
improving, the Telekom KONTAKT project. For instance, the separation of private and 
business customer branches (KNL) was completed within the framework of KONTAKT in 
1995, only to be reversed again in 1999 as a result of the "PK/GK KNL" project. A further 
group of initiatives and projects aimed at cost-cutting and staff reduction followed. Indeed, 
virtually everybody interviewed expressed surprise at the long list of projects. Some top 
managers-even those with a long affiliation with the group-evidently had difficulty 
explaining the goal and sense of individual projects. One top manager from HR 
commented on this rather self-critically as follows: 
"Some of the projects launched made no real sense. Sometimes you got the 
impression that somebody just wanted to mark his territory. " 
A representative of DT's organisation development department explained it in a different 
way: 
"Telekom never gave itself and its managers and employees the necessary 
time to let something sink in. Nobody knew if something would have really 
yielded results. It had immediately been changed again. " 
This is also confirmed by a comprehensive auditing report (DT internal audit report, Nov. 
27,2002, page 71) on restructurings in the fixed network business that were initiated on 
account of increasing deficits in motivation and identification on the part of the workforce. 
It is stated in the report that: 
105 No less than 13 large restructuring projects could be identified in the fixed network business in the period 
from 1995 to 2003. In detail, these involved the following projects: Te'lekom KONTAKT, 1995: KNL; 
1996/97: ZAT, 1999: PKIGK KNL; 2000: WENN, ZNI; 2001/02: T-Com classic, T-Networks, SLIM, T-Com 
Plus; 2002/03: NICE, PRISMA, Ergo. 
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"... However, the success of these projects was not appraised and in no 
instance was a business case developed in advance for any of the measures 
reviewed. The further planning of measures was not based on any kind of 
analysis of previous measures. " 
Those measures that were initiated by the top management obviously developed a 
certain momentum of their own. It is probably for this reason that only one of the listed 
projects was viewed as really important by the interviewed fixed network business's top 
managers with regards to TLOL. It involves the most comprehensive one, "T-Com 
classic", which was imposed on the fixed network business as a result of the DT Group's 
corporate strategy (i. e. the implementation of the "four pillar strategy" (2000-2001)). 
Although this group reorganisation was originally based on capital market considerations, 
as shown in the headquarters case (see section 4.7), and was intended not to change the 
functioning of the group, it ultimately led to a number of lessons being learned at the top 
level that the group management had probably not intended in this form. 
In the wake of the `T-Com classic' initiative (annotation: part of the implementation of the 
DT Group's `four-pillar-strategy'), tasks, responsibilities, decision-making and the 
management-by-objectives system were rendered more decentralised. Earlier projects 
had also resulted in a greater decentralisation of responsibility, albeit to a more limited 
extent. Within the framework of this project, the fixed network business was now 
transformed into a separate "line of business" called "'T-Com". In this connection, a 
dedicated divisional management board was implemented for the fixed networks 
business, as well as new systems of supervision and a new organisational structure. This 
resulted in an overall further reduction of the number of top management positions within 
the fixed network pillar. The responsible top manager of the fixed network's OD 
department described the resultant situation as follows: 
"The four pillar strategy brought about a significant decrease in top 
management functions for us. Only 6 to 8 posts were left at the 
board level of 
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the respective pillars..... Former top managers dropped off from top level and 
found themselves in a--subjectively perceived-inferior position, i. e. at the 2nd 
hierarchical level, or as a project manager. Top managers realised very 
strong competition and those who still held a top management position 
developed a kind of opportunism, i. e. they tried to avoid everything to create 
friction or to do the wrong things. " 
Simultaneously, the introduction of the divisional corporate structure meant that the most 
intense investments, such as acquisitions (e. g. Voicestream) or licenses (e. g. UMTS), 
were made in other divisions, whose primary task was to achieve growth and develop 
new markets, whereas the fixed network business as a mature business was more or less 
assigned the role of being the Group's "cash cow". 
This new division of tasks within the Group was evidently equated by the fixed network 
business's top managers with a very difficult to accept downgrading of their earlier 
positions, contrasting severely with their perspective of T-Com's actual in-house and 
external significance. Their displeasure and frustration regarding this situation were 
expressed according to statements made by the organisers at one of the regular 
meetings of the so-called "(Top) Leadership Programme" on February 5,2003. This 
meeting involves a regular meeting of a formally defined group of T-Com's top managers 
and, according to a board member, has the purpose of working on current and strategic 
issues and achieving a stronger level of involvement, commitment and accountability for 
the fixed network's top management. One interviewed top manager from the commercial 
division of the fixed network business referred to that meeting as follows: 
"In T-Com we try to demonstrate that we have a future, that we are not only 
the cow which has to be milked. Sometimes we feel like the group's grubby 
urchin-we have the image of a company in liquidation. We have already 
made so many staff redundant. l would like to see the other divisions do that. 
We have to try to get away from this image-with new services and products. 
Yesterday during the Top Leadership Forum, we discussed the attentiveness 
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of our corporate management board. We have the impression that everybody 
else is more important than T-Com. In the view of our contribution to the 
business results and our external image this is not justified. Here, T-Com is 
still the heart of Telekom. " 
The frustration expressed in the statement might also be partly attributable to new forms 
of intra-Group cooperation, which places the four business lines of the Group on an equal 
footing despite considerable size differences in the businesses (see section 4.2.4), be it in 
terms of the business volume or the number of employees. This again is frequently 
regarded by the respective top management as a downgrading of the importance of the 
fixed network business and a source of conflict with the other businesses. One senior 
manager of T-Com who was personally affected by a downgrading explained this in the 
following words: 
" The weighting of the pillars compared to the central units has changed. ... It 
is-from my point of view-extremely difficult to consider T-Com and T-Online 
as equally matched [very excited]. We are not equally matched! " 
Regardless of this, the fixed network business pillar-as the largest line of business and 
the owner of the technical platform in fixed network business-continued to maintain 
numerous technical and process-oriented interfaces to the other divisions, with whom 
partly severe conflicts now arose at the top level. These might be attributed in part to the 
aforementioned aspects. They were reinforced by conflicts of interest between the 
corresponding divisional top management groups which were triggered by the divisional 
group organisation and cultural differences. Thus, the implementation of 'T-Com classic' 
and the entire four pillar strategy contributed to a worsening cooperation of the DT 
group's top management. 
External Acquisitions 
An additional attempt to develop the corresponding competencies at the top management 
level and the organisational level involved external acquisitions. Since 1996, Deutsche 
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Tele'kom has made a series of acquisitions in the field of fixed network 
telecommunications, e. g. in central and eastern Europe. Although numerous acquisitions 
were made, it could be seen that "internationalisation had only a limited impact on the top 
management" (quote of the top manager heading the strategy department) and was not 
really considered as an important step in the evolution of the top management. Among 
other things, this was made apparent in fixed network business by the fact that many top 
managers already lacked sufficient English language skills. And even when English was 
declared to be the official corporate language, day-to-day business was obviously 
conducted in a different language. It seems, however, that the most critical point about 
the internationalisation was that the acquisition strategy remained unclear and only very 
few top managers were involved in the corresponding activities. One senior manager 
explained this as follows: 
"As far as our acquisition strategy is concerned, we have to define clear fields 
of expansion, i. e. where we wish to commit ourselves, technically, spatially, 
etc. That should have already been communicated a long time ago. Today, 
we have to manage our shareholdings in central and eastern Europe without 
such a strategy. If the decision is made to become a European carrier, then 
we should work towards achieving synergistic effects between the 
shareholdings. But if our focus is only on mobile communications, for 
instance, then we would consequently also have to sell our holding in fixed 
network business. Yet these companies have to remain independent to this 
end. And those are totally different approaches. " 
On top of that, it could be seen that most top management positions of subsidiaries were 
held by local managers who obviously had very few opportunities and necessities to meet 
with their peers in Germany, and vice versa. Those top managers who decided despite all 
adversity to go abroad very often found themselves in a one-way street, which resulted in 
the long term in the best managers often not going abroad, which in turn reduced the 
fundamental attractiveness of overseas operations. An international executive therefore 
made the following recommendation: 
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"Do not leave this ebony tower and work abroad. Your career will immediately 
come to an end. Despite the experience you might make in an international 
context you MY not be taken into account when an interesting post is 
available ... " 
This suggests that the full potential of these activities for TLOL and "... the knowledge 
about how to work in an international context ... was not really exploited.. " (statement of 
an interviewed top manager heading a central services function of the fixed network 
business) despite a steadily increasing volume of business that was realised outside of 
Germany. 
4.4.4 Summary of the "Fixed Network" Case 
On the basis of this case, where the top management of the large, mature fixed network 
business tried to respond to the loss of its monopolistic position and steadily increasing 
market pressure, it was possible to show that TLOL is strongly influenced by the top 
management's external and organisational environment and its accessibility to external 
resources. The case showed how the top management dealt with a series of specific 
constraints and restrictions, such as the temporary limited access to the labour market, or 
the impossibility of making civil servants redundant. In detail, the top management did the 
following things in the period under review in order to learn: 
1991-"Nachdiplom in Unternehmensführung, NDU (continuing studies in 
company management)": 
This intense in-house training course, which was similar to an MBA programme, 
was stopped shortly after its launch. It proved to be too time consuming, too 
difficult to integrate in the day-to-day working routine of a top manager and 
inappropriate for acquiring the necessary competencies at top management level 
on time. 
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- Sept. 1992--Telekom KONTAKT: 
A new structure of the management board arranged around customer segments 
was implemented. Simultaneously, the complex KONTAKT restructuring was 
launched, which aimed at regrouping tasks, responsibilities and available 
resources around these customer segments, decentralisation of responsibility and 
a different allocation of power and resources. 
Due to the mandatory and exclusive use of existing resources, this approach 
proved to be very time consuming, too. This can be partly attributed to a lack of 
expert competencies, which could only be compensated for to a limited degree 
through consulting and making decisions on a broader basis (i. e. team decisions), 
as illustrated in the example of establishing a sales force. On the other hand, it 
can be attributed to the lack of options for sanctioning those top managers who 
resisted change and stubbornly stuck to their old behavioural patterns. 
After privatisation in 1995 and the partial removal of legal constraints: 
- Moderate external recruiting: 
Replacement of those top managers who were not ready to learn by external 
hires. Dismantling of encrusted structures and increased input of specialised 
expert knowledge at top level. External recruiting reached its peak in 1998 due to 
increasing rivalry between top managers and due to people starting to allocate 
positions around them to their cronies. 
- Since 1996-external acquisitions: 
Deutsche Telekom made a series of acquisitions in the field of fixed network 
telecommunications. However, this had a limited effect on TLOL as the acquisition 
strategy remained unclear and there has only been a low mix of national and 
international top managers. 
- Organisation development 
initiatives/restructuring: 
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High frequency of restructurings mainly aiming at cost and staff reductions, 
especially directly before and after the liberalisation of the telecommunications 
market in 1998. Furthermore, the group strategy imposed implementation of the 
fixed network business as a separate line of business, which as a result of 
differences in corporate culture or conflicts of interest finally contributed-although 
not originally intended to do so-to a worsening cooperation between the DT 
Group's top managers. No appraisal of the success of the OD projects and 
restructurings, which obviously developed a certain momentum of their own. 
Result: considerable losses in motivation and identification. 
The case showed that access to external resources in a learning environment 
characterised by strong change is necessary, but is not sufficient to ensure goal-oriented 
learning on the part of top management. Far more, the findings suggest that deliberate, 
clearly formulated strategic approaches are required that are transparent for the top 
managers. Otherwise, the increasing pressure of change gives rise to the danger of 
action for the sake of action, as evidenced by the example of the OD projects and 
external acquisitions. However, the number of measures implemented and the 
assessment thereof suggest that top managers in turbulent environments have relatively 
little control over what they learn. 
The case also illustrates the controlling effect of organisational structures on TLOL. This 
results on the one hand from the design of structures, e. g. the implementation of a sales 
structure within the framework of the Telekom KONTAKT project. On the other hand, 
structures evidently also establish the framework for learning processes and control 
these. As was evident from the "Four-pillar strategy" example (specifically: T-Com 
Classic), it is apparently of little significance whether the effects that result from these 
structures are intended or not. 
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4.5 The "Mobile/Online" Case 
4.5.1 Introduction 
The following case outlines the organisational learning of the top management in the 
mobile and Internet business. Compared to the fixed network business, the mobile and 
Internet business was highly competitive right from the start and adhered to a different set 
of rules. Initially, the business was a small, albeit rapidly growing business in the period 
under review. This is reflected in the rapid growth in the size and importance of the 
mobile/online organisation and its top management. 
The case is particularly interesting as the mobile and Internet activities were outsourced 
at a very early stage of their development to dedicated subsidiaries (e. g. mobile business 
in 1993), allowing them to develop relatively untouched from the rest of the organisation 
and its public authority legacy. Against that background, this case will show how the top 
management of the mobile and Internet business tried to cope with the particular 
challenges that resulted from the establishment of a new business in a highly competitive 
and simultaneously fast-growing market in the mobile communications and Internet 
sector. As both businesses experienced a very similar development in many regards, 
which is also reflected in the intermittent consolidation of both businesses within the 
Deutsche Telekom Group at the group management board level, they are appraised 
together in this section. 
4.5.2 Background to the "Mobile/Online" Case 
4.5.2.1 Business Strategy of the "Mobile/Online" Business 
Parts of the German telecommunication market-specifically mobile communication and 
telecommunications services, excluding voice-were liberalised within the framework of 
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the first postal reform (1990). As the following statements in DT's 1995 annual report 
show, it was a market with a strong growth potential: 
" Deutsche Telekom was also able to considerably expand its business in 
online services in 1995. The ... T-Online service ... recorded growth of approx. 
257,000 customers in the period under review. In comparison with the 
previous year, the number of customers of T-Online increased by more than 
36 percent to over 965,000. The number of monthly T-Online connections 
rose in 1995 to roughly 14.5 million, equating to growth of almost 35 percent 
over 1994" (DT annual report 1995, p. 32). 
"The mobile communications market will continue to develop very 
dynamically. Technical progress will allow price reductions and new services, 
both of which will stimulate the market. In Germany, the number of mobile 
phone customers is likely to increase over the next ten years from the current 
figure of roughly four million users to as many as 20 million. For the paging 
market, growth is forecast from today's figure of almost one million customers 
to several million in the year 2000. " (DT annual report 1995, p. 37) 
The top management's strategic intent was to open up these rapidly growing markets, to 
constantly develop them and remain the mobile market leader in Germany. The mobile 
communications market was targeted as the only "one stop shop" with a comprehensive 
service for mobile communications. The focus of the online business was on developing 
the new business on the basis of strategic partnerships in the field of online services. In 
contrast, the competition mostly pursued a cost-leadership strategy in this field, which 
had to be countered. 
So what requirements resulted from that for the top management of the mobile and online 
businesses? The top management of these two businesses had to play a pioneering role 
insofar as it had to cope with a completely liberalised and highly competitive, dynamic 
and young market. In addition to know-how regarding new technologies, standards and 
business fields, new marketing and sales concepts were primarily intended to assist in 
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securing market leadership, despite the ever fiercer competition (see DT annual report 
1995, p. 36). Another challenge with regards to developing the business involved the 
establishment and management of a high-growth organisation adapted to the market 
requirements and equipped with corresponding resources. 
4.5.2.2 Top Management and Organisation of the "Mobile/Online" Business 
As elaborated earlier (see section 4.2.2, Blank 1996), the top management of the mobile 
and online business headed dedicated 100% subsidiary companies. Both subsidiaries 
were created-mobile in 1993 and online in 1996106-in order to bypass the highly 
centralised, bureaucratic and formal organisation of Deutsche Telekom, which was 
geared towards the completion of "sovereign tasks" rather than customer service and 
which was constrained by public sector employment regulations. As dedicated and 
flexible subsidiaries, these two businesses could develop independently from the rest of 
the Deutsche Telekom organisation. Both subsidiary companies grew rapidly, the mobile 
business growing much faster. So achieved the mobile business in 2002-9 years after 
the spin-off-19.7 billion Euro sales with its 42,000 employees 107; the online business 
and its 2,814 employees 108 --6 years after its creation-sales of EUR 1.8 billion (source: 
annual reports DT Group). Most of the staff in these businesses was hired externally, and 
as can be taken from the group's age structure (see table below) a strong emphasis was 
put on the recruitment of young employees and managers. 
106 "In order to continue this success in the dynamic market for interactive online services, Deutsche Telekom 
resolved in the year under review to spin-off T-Online to form a dedicated subsidiary, Online Pro Dienste 
GmbH & Co. KG. " (Deutsche Telekom, Annual Report 1995, p. 32). 
107 In 1995 the mobile business had approx. 6,000 employees. 
108 In 1998 the online business had 560 employees. 
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Business Unit Average Age of the Employees 
T-Online 32.8 years 
T-Mobile 35.0 years 
DTAG 40.7 years 
%JUUI . C. %LJ UI. l ie I eitre uiii LVUU) 
Table 22: Age Structure of the DT Group 
In contrast to the top management of the fixed network business, the top management of 
the mobile/online business was, just like their organisations, built from scratch. CEOs for 
the mobile and online business were externally appointed and charged with the mission 
to develop that new business with a corresponding organisation and management team. 
The result was a completely different company culture, which can be illustrated by two 
quotations. The first is taken from one of the first top managers in the mobile business: 
"We were simply different to Telekom and wanted to show those sad duffers 
on the other side of the Rhine (annotation of the author: The Telekom Group's 
headquarters and the headquarters of T-Mobile are both located in Bonn, but 
on opposite sides of the river Rhine. ). This pioneer spirit and the feeling of 
being different was noticeable everywhere-even at the top level, and also 
from outside. " 
The second quotation from a former top manager in charge of the online business's HR 
department-herself a civil servant: 
"There was a real sense of starting something new. It was the shared wish of 
everyone at all levels to develop this business with a huge amount of 
pioneering spirit, creativity and a truly impressive degree of commitment,, 
What the top management of these two subsidiary companies-which could nearly 
pursue a Greenfield approach-did, however, in order to get hold of the required 
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competencies at the top level (see section 4.5.2.1 on the mobile/online business strategy) 
will be considered in the next section. 
4.5.3 Approaches to TLOL in the "Mobile/Online" Case 
As elaborated earlier, the main challenges for the top management of the mobile and 
online business was to open up these dynamic markets and ensure their constant further 
development. As mentioned, the top management of these new businesses did not have 
to deal with existing structures and resources. That explains why the top managers 
interviewed evidently had only a little idea of what to do with group-wide OD initiatives 
and regarded these as being of little importance for TLOL. For instance, the CTO- 
himself one of the few former civil servants in the mobile business-commented on the 
list of the DT Group's most important OD initiatives as follows: 
"It is striking that most of these initiatives are relatively unknown from our 
[mobile business] perspective. The least important project was TEMPO'09. 
This was an empty cover, a top heavy bureaucracy which had been produced 
here. " 
And he continued with a smile on his face: 
"Imagine, it took one year until I had learned that I had an active part in this 
project. 11 
As both businesses involved very young and initially very small organisations whose 
structure was subject to frequent change on account of the rapid growth, the above- 
mentioned group OD initiatives and restructurings were not relevant. On top of that there 
was a limited number of interfaces between the mobile business and the other parts of 
109TEMPO stands for "Telekom Erfolg durch Maßnahmen zur Prozeßorganisation" 
[Telekom success through 
process organisation measures]. The project (1996-1998) aimed at 
the establishment of a process- 
oriented organisation and a greater transparency of 
how the work is done (Telekom, 1999). Due to process 
based costing methods and the definition of clear responsibilities 
this initiative was meant to contribute to 
the improvement of efficiency and quality (Telekom, 1998). 
194 
the group, and the mobile business realised compared to the other businesses only 20% 
and so a limited share of its sales within the group (see section 5.2.1). 
Furthermore, the top levels of mobile and online businesses felt that they had a large 
degree of discretion, especially in the initial years after the spin-offs as dedicated 
companies. This is supported by the fact that corresponding to the interviewed top 
managers from DT's headquarters (here: group organisation and strategy), the top 
management groups of the mobile and online business were only managed by financial 
objectives. As a result, the mobile and online top management groups were autonomous 
when it came to designing routines and the structuring of the organisation. Indeed, at the 
start the corresponding top management groups even implemented their own brands and 
their own corporate identity on the market, which occasionally led to outside observers 
needing a second glance to actually realise that these were subsidiaries of Deutsche 
Telekom. To quote the top manager heading the group's OD department in DT's 
headquarters: 
"Mobile was spun off and was therefore not hassled. In the fixed network 
business, every organisational change had to be approved by the group 
organisation, I. e. the holding, even up to one year ago. But mobile and also 
online were always managed as if it were a financial holding and developed 
fully autonomously. " 
As there were no restrictions with regard to access to the external labour market due to 
the spinning off into separate private companies, in contrast to the other parts of the 
group, the mobile/online top management could pursue a real Greenfield approach. 
External Recruiting 
In the interviews DT group's top managers themselves unanimously identified external 
recruiting as the most powerful method for TLOL in the mobile and online business as it 
enabled them to enlist new competencies at top level. These it needed in order to 
195 
successfully develop and implement marketing and sales concepts, for example. The two 
subsidiaries benefited from the fact that the external labour market was accessible to the 
mobile/online businesses, but also from the fact that the mobile and online business had 
a positive image as an employer, and HR policies and terms and conditions of a private 
company could be applied from the start. Representatives of DT group's human 
resources department for the top management staff reported that after the spin-off of the 
mobile and online business all corresponding top positions at the top level were filled 
almost exclusively and intentionally with external hires. According to corresponding 
documentation, for instance, only the CTOs and associated subordinate technical roles 
were recruited from the parent company. All other positions, including that of the CEO, 
were filled with external hires. It could be seen that these external hires had a formal 
education and job experience that was more geared towards business management and 
international business. The analysis of the top managers' CVs revealed that only the very 
first externally hired top managers in the mobile and online business were recruited from 
diverse industries and companies (e. g. media and technology companies, the food 
industry, the chemical industry, etc. ). Later an increasing specialisation on the 
telecommunications industry and corresponding suppliers as well as the new economy 
could be observed. 
Due to that, the composition of the top management of the mobile/online business very 
soon differed fundamentally from that of the top management of the fixed network 
business. A novel situation in DT's history in this respect involved the recruitment of 
managers without an academic background to the top level of the business. It could be 
seen from an analysis of corresponding documentation and CVs that both businesses 
had CEOs and/or members of the board without university degrees"' but with experience 
in a start-up company in these new emerging businesses. Apart from the technical 
110 Annotation: A sales manager and later CEO had an apprenticeship as an industrial clerk, while another 
CEO had discontinued his psychology studies after 4 semesters. 
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component of the top management and at times due to legal requirements"' in human 
resources, there were no civil servants in the mobile and online business. Just like the 
organisation they were heading, most mobile and online top managers were young, 
between 30 and 45 years old, and so in most cases significantly below the average age 
for the top management of the group of 47.3 years. On top of that, top managers, with 
just a few select exceptions, had a much shorter tenure in the organisation compared to 
the fixed network business, which has to be attributed to the creation of subsidiary 
companies for these businesses and subsequent almost exclusively external recruitment. 
An analysis of the formal education of mobile's and online's top management also 
revealed a clearly greater frequency of qualifications and job experience in sales, 
marketing and finance in comparison with the fixed network business. 
It could be found in interviews with top managers from mobile and online that integrating 
the new hires at top management level was obviously going well. Due to the new creation 
of subsidiary companies and the initial clear size of the organisations, a lot of contact was 
apparently held between the executives and a lot of activities were done together, in the 
early phases of the two businesses. The task to build something new together also 
seemed to bond, and new colleagues were welcomed very openly. Further, independent 
of the affiliated groups activities, it was found that from the beginning, the CEOs of the 
corresponding businesses invited their executives at least twice a year-often more 
frequently-to joint meetings-sometimes combined with visiting customers (or similar). 
Also, workshops concerning team structure and outdoor sessions were held, where 
executives were given the chance to get to know each other better (source: DT internal 
documentation on the T-success project, 2002). 
il' Annotation: Due to legal requirements, the labour representatives (trade unions and works councils) 
exerted an important influence on the appointment of the member of the board for human resources. 
197 
It could be observed that executives communicating amongst each other-possibly due 
to the more or less same range of age-were using a kind of informal phraseology. Many 
of the top executives were on informal terms (using the familiar, not the formal, German 
forms of address), and there were also some friendly relations involved. 
The strictly external recruiting for the top positions in these two businesses did not 
change until the takeover of the affiliate group leadership by the DT Group through a new 
CEO in 1995. And thus, "due to insurmountable differences" phrased by the manager 
responsible for the top management HR department (similar, see: Glotz 2001)-the 
CEOs of the mobile and Internet businesses stepped down and were replaced by 
external hires again. Single key functions within the management board of the mobile as 
well as the online division, especially HR, were now definitely filled with "Telekom" 
managers (i. e. managers from the fixed network business or headquarters). External 
recruiting was still very distinctive, even while many internal applicants had only been 
employed with the organisation for a few years. 
The member of the board for HR of the online business stated the following: 
"Very often when I hire someone, l do it externally. Externals are meant to 
bring a fresh breeze and fresh ideas. One assumes that after being with 
Telekom for 2 years, a lot isn't being questioned anymore. Admittedly, with 
internals, one only sees the weaknesses, and not the strength, due to 
knowing them that well. The bar is set too high compared to the externals. " 
On the other hand the interviewed top managers from the mobile and online businesses 
reported that the internal practice used to fill vacancies at top level in their businesses 
with so many external hires made some managers at top level started thinking about 
other options outside DT Group. Furthermore, as will be shown below, after the IPO of 
Deutsche Telekom, top managers from the mobile/online sector (incl. board level) for the 
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first time switched into other parts of DT group (particularly headquarters and fixed- 
network business). 
The "T"-Brand 
The interviewed top managers from the mobile and online business reported unanimously 
that the implementation of the "T"-brand was important for TLOL. This although this 
initiative was not driven by their initiative but imposed by DT's corporate organisation. 
Driven by financial constraints12 Deutsche Telekom was transferred within the framework 
of the 2 "d postal reform as an "Aktiengesellschaft" to private sector status on 1 January 
1995 (Darbishire 1997, p. 195). A costly privatisation campaign with its key figures the 
CEO of DT Group in those days-later known as "Mr. Telekom" in the public, the CFO DT 
Group and the Executive Vice President Corporate Communication was launched in 
march 1996 and was obviously a 100% success'13. It went along with the group-wide 
implementation of the new "T"-brand" which subsumed all products and services, all units 
and subsidiaries-so also the mobile and online subsidiaries-under one common 
umbrella brand. 
The corporate board of management insisted on the strict implementation of the new 
brand and resulting communications policy and it could be observed that those top 
managers who did not respect the brand-strategy had to face the consequences. In the 
case of the mobile and Internet business who acted up to that time in a relative 
112 Resulting from the German reunification in 1989 there were enormous financial requirements. About 60 
billion German marks were needed to be invested into infrastructure in former east Germany (Buchner 
1999, p. 13). Because of the overstretched financial situation of the German government and increasing 
international competition the Basic Law was changed in order to allow Telekom to raise capital outside 
tight federal budgets and to engage in international joint ventures from which it had been partly 
constrained by its constitutional mandate. 
113 Due to the strong demand there was a rise of the volume of shares of 100 Million shares. Deutsche 
Telekom collected 20 billion Deutsche Marks (instead of 15). 156,051 employees (= 64% of the total staff 
at that time) became shareholders. After the first IPO the federal government owned only 71.95 
% of the 
total shares. 
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autonomous way-also when it came to external communications-this resulted 
obviously in a clash. This can be illustrated by a quotation of a senior manager of DT's 
headquarters: 
"When the mobile business was outsourced14 it moved away from the parent 
company very fast. In an early phase the mobile business developed its own 
brand and refused to use the T-brand. This ended up in severe conflicts and 
after that in some changes at the very top of the mobile subsidiary. " 
The new "T" brand was meant to become a cultic symbol of the entire Deutsche Telekom 
group, and apparently no exceptions were tolerated by the group's CEO. A top manager, 
heading the group organisation of DT's headquarters reported in the interview: 
"In 1996 there was a big fight. Due to discussions about the brands, Telly15, 
... etc... Mobile's CEO had to leave. The prices also didn't match anymore. 
That's when the pricing was established, and that's also when total freedom 
for Mobile's top management vanished. " 
In the interviews some of the top executives remembered that day in October 1996 in 
great detail, when DT group's CEO explained the immediate departure of the then CEO 
of the mobile division-from the perspective of the employees and executives, a leading 
figure, who was of great meaning during the establishment of the company from the start. 
Several interviewees even used the term "October Revolution". Obviously this incident left 
a large dent in the development that had taken place up to that point in the mobile 
business16 A mobile senior manager put it in a nutshell: 
"We were clearly confronted with the fact that., we are part of the Telekom, 
and are seen as such from the outside looking in. We can not isolate 
ourselves from that 
114 Due to the earlier liberalisation of the mobile communications market the mobile business was outsourced 
in 1993. It developed relatively independent from the rest of the group. 
115 'Telly' was brand used by the mobile business at that time. 116 Annotation: It has been reported that the entire management of the mobile department fell into a state of 
lethargy. After DT group's CEO had explained to the mobile's executives who were used to an enormous 
workload, that "another wind would be blowing around here" (statement of a mobile business top 
manager) it was actually showing all the way up to the top management, that motivation decreased and 
working hours were from now on strictly adhered. 
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A similar development could also be seen in the online division, even if due to the later 
creation of the online subsidiary, not till a later point in time. T-Online's route to the stock 
market in early 2000 and the establishing of an incorporated company with its own brand 
was apparently the last triggering moment. In this connection also, more conflict arose 
due to the appearance and the arrogated freedom of the management. These conflicts 
led to the change of the top management of T-Online. Glotz (2001) a contemporary 
witness and former member of the supervisory board of Telekom, described the fights 
over power between the top management of T-Online and the management of the parent 
company in his book "Der Weg der Telekom" (The Path of Telekom), and quotes the 
CEO of Telekom as follows: 
"I also fire managers if arrogance suddenly makes them start believing in 
themselves so much that they think that the feeling for the future will come by 
itself. " (Glotz 2001, p. 113). 
After the first shock and grief over the loss of the high autonomy had abated slightly, 
chances for the top managers arose from the mobile as well as the online business of 
these very successful group-brands. In the interviews, some online and mobile top 
managers explained that even if there was still a certain "administrative authority" sticking 
to the image of the parent company, the introduction of the new T-brand had helped to 
install this brand, which from an external as well as internal perspective-was 
associated with "... a new, powerful vision and a new attractive image of DT's future" 
(quotation of one interviewed senior manager of the fixed network business). This 
combined with the financial strength of the large Deutsche Telekom group, whose core 
competence still was seen in technology and quality. Through this, the mobile/online 
businesses' top management could obviously increasingly identify itself. The T-brand 
therefore stood for the mobile/online top management for visible integration in and 
affiliation into one large group, that stood for new chances and financial reserve. 
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Especially from the perspective of non-mobile and non-online top managers, the 
introduction of the "T-brand" and the resulting development had strongly nourished 
ambition and will to change and added to building a bridge between the "old" and the 
"new" generation of top managers, and so towards a new quality of executive work that 
made use of competencies of both "worlds". This is supported by an increasing number of 
staff fluctuations on the top management level' 17 of mobile/online in other parts of the 
group and vice versa that could be stated at that time. 
External Acquisitions 
At the end of the 90s, Deutsche Telekom entered a very active period of purchasing in 
order to steadily expand its international reach. New subsidiaries in the Internet sector 
were bought in France and in Spain. In the mobile communications sector, acquisitions 
were mainly made in Central and Eastern Europe but also, for instance, in the 
Netherlands, with the acquisition of One-to-One in the UK or the acquisition of Voice 
stream/Powertel for an astonishing 60 billion deutschmarks in the United States. 
However, as far as TLOL is concerned, acquisitions remained obviously of limited 
significance. It could be thus found that the most crucial point about external acquisitions 
was that the underlying strategy remained unclear for most of the concerned top 
managers in the mobile and Internet businesses. Decisions on the partly costly 
acquisitions were rather viewed as isolated decisions of the CEO. As a consequence of 
their lacking involvement in the corresponding decisions, it seems that it was very easy 
for mobile's and online's top management to withdraw responsibility from them for the 
difficult financial situation that resulted from the costly investment as well as the 
integration of the corresponding acquisitions. 
117 This includes some board members. Source: Corresponding documentation of the top management HR 
department. 
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Their sceptical view became evident in the fact that these acquisitions were first of all, i. e. 
until a change of the group's CEO in 2002, led like financial investments. As a result, 
there were no common activities or meetings between the top management in Germany 
and the international acquisitions so that the top managers did not even know each other. 
The top managers' scepticism can also be illustrated by the following quotations of the 
financial top managers of the mobile and online businesses: 
" 
... As it was the group's CEO who decided to do it although it was a 
mistake, it was very easy for the divisions to deny responsibility. They didn't 
make the decision.... " 
"Internationalisation was not clearly defined and so was more likely 
detrimental to Deutsche Telekom. It was the zeitgeist of that time. Maybe if 
the divisions had been in charge of internationalisation, the world would have 
been different now. But by virtue of the centralisation of these activities in the 
headquarters... On top of that the pursued strategy could obviously not be 
financed. " 
4.5.4 Summary of the "Mobile/Online" Case 
On the basis of this case it was possible to show how the top management of the 
mobile/online businesses took up the challenge in the environment of a major corporation 
to expand and to develop in the dynamic market. A main precondition was set by the 
spin-off of the mobile business in 1993 and online business in 1996 into autonomous 
incorporations, which could develop relatively untouched from constraints of the rest of 
the group's organisation and its legacy as a public corporation. 
To sum up, the following methods for TLOL were deployed: 
- From the start (i. e. mobile in 1993, online in 1996): 
Strong external recruiting in order to enlist required new competencies at top level. Strong 
specialisation on telecommunications industry, suppliers and new economy and a strong 
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emphasis on specific expert knowledge in marketing, sales and finance. Obviously 
successful integration of the newly hired top managers and the establishment of an 
overall team spirit supported by common meetings, teambuilding... etc. and a certain 
homogeneity of the team (in terms of, for example, age). 
- 1996: Group-wide implementation of the new "T-brand". 
Firstly symbolises the re-integration within the group and the circumcision of former 
stages of freedom. In retrospect, it also stands for an increasing identification with the 
Deutsche Telekom group and the developmental possibilities within and through the 
group. In the aftermath it comes to early movement among the staff on the top level 
between the mobile/online business and the other parts of the group. 
- 1999: Increasing acquisition activities. Very high investments were made. 
However, top management of the mobile/online business was not sufficiently involved in 
decision-making. Isolated decisions of the CEO led to the mobile/online business not or 
only partially feeling responsible for the aftermath of the acquisition and integration. 
Limited effect on TLOL. 
The case showed, that not only planned methods for TLOL were important. More so it 
highlighted the meaning of structure (i. e. the spin-off) and symbols for learning. So led the 
`T'-brand-even if not necessarily by choice, to a larger identification with Deutsche 
Telekom, which in time also showed through being open for job offers within other parts 
of the group. 
Through the strategy of acquisition the case shows, how important the integration of the 
top-management in the development of the strategy and the decision process is. Without 
a clear structure and co-operation towards the decision, important opportunities of 
learning might be passed up on. 
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4.6 The "Systems" Case 
4.6.1 Introduction 
The third case outlines the organisational learning of the top management of an 
organisation in the global systems solutions segment of Deutsche Telekom. Just as the 
mobile and online business the systems case organisation with its focus on the 
management of corporate accounts was outsourced at an early stage of its development 
and so could develop relatively untouched from the rest of DT group. The systems 
business differentiated from the mobile and online business in so far that it had high 
internal sales (end Sept. 2002: 37.2%, source: DT internal paper, PF 2002) and had tight 
interfaces to other parts of the DT group (Source: "Organisation for the future-the project 
Telekom Kontakt", Deutsche Telekom, March 1995, p. 19). Therefore it also profited from 
a certain subsidy of the business and was exposed to lower market pressure compared to 
e. g. the mobile and online businesses. 
The systems case is, however, of particular interest due to an important merger of the 
systems business with a large IT company, the debis Systemhaus, which led overnight to 
a high level of diversity at top level. In the absence of a shared integration strategy, the 
systems case will show that a high level of diversity and lacking behavioural integration at 
top level can be detrimental for TLOL and even develop a certain momentum on its own. 
It is also for that reason and owing to the complexity of the permanently changing 
systems organisation as well as significant turnover at top management level that in 
comparison with the other cases the collection of data was more difficult. 
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4.6.2 Background to the "Systems" Case 
4.6.2.1 Business Strategy of the "Systems" Business 
By virtue of the success of this model for the mobile business (Blank 1996) and, to live up 
to the high expectations of key account customers, a subsidiary company called 
`DeTeSystem' was created in 1994 for DT's systems business (see annual report DT 
group 1995). The systems mission was to offer tailor-made telecommunications solutions 
and corresponding services to national and international key accounts from a single 
source. The systems business portfolio is based upon products and services of DT group 
which are complemented by additional services and components available on the market 
into complete individual solutions. Due to the groups high internal cost structure, 
competence and reputation, differentiation on the market resulted primarily through the 
quality of the solution as well as comprehensive service, instead of a ruinous price 
challenge. 
The mission to offer worldwide systems solutions from a single source, i. e. to create 
integrated, complete solutions extending from consultancy ("plan") to development and 
implementation ("build") right down to operation ("run") for global customers in various 
sectors challenged the systems top management in many ways. Due to their 
decentralised organisation, many systems customers and key account customers 
required constant availability of highly efficient national and international 
telecommunication networks and services. As a result, the systems business's top 
management had to build up a company of international reach that provides a universal 
and uniform portfolio of high quality products and services beyond national boundaries. 
Furthermore, the top management had to create an organisation, which corresponded to 
the specific needs of systems clients and which required in-depth knowledge about target 
markets and specific sectors also at top level. 
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4.6.2.2 Top Management and Organisation of the "Systems" Business 
At the very beginning the top management of the systems business headed a subsidiary 
company with ca. 600 employees. Its sales reached ca. 1.1 billion deutschmarks in 1994. 
In 1995, there were already ca. 850 employees and more than 18% higher sales 
(compare annual report DT group, 1995). The growth of the systems business continued, 
even if organic growth compared to the mobile/online business was significantly lower. 
Similar to the top management of the mobile/online business, the top management of the 
systems business was built up nearly from scratch and hired from the external labour 
market. However, due to the nature of the systems business and its high rate of internal 
sales, there were much stronger interfaces-above all with the fixed network business. It 
is for that reason and the required technological competence that from the very start of 
the systems business numerous technological top management functions were filled with 
"Telekom" managers. 
As elaborated in previous section, the top management of the new created systems 
subsidiary had to face a series of challenges which one of the systems business top 
managers summed up in the interview as follows: 
"lt was clear. We needed a highly professional, international team with the 
corresponding knowledge of our business at a global level, with a good 
international network and experience of overseas markets. But international 
top managers were missing. And an international strategy? ... We 
had to 
follow the customers! " 
Years later in 2002 after numerous mergers and acquisitions-the most important one 
was debis Systemhaus in 2000 with 20,830 employees (Source: DT internal presentation; 
Vorstandsklausur HR of 18 Sept. 2001)-the systems business realised with its ca. 
43,000 employees more than 11.3 billion euros sales and was present 
in 23 countries. 
The systems business thus occupied the second position 
in Europe as 
telecommunications and IT service provider. 
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However, resulting from the merger with debis Systemhaus, Systems' top management 
implemented a complex, permanently changing matrix organisation (source: Organisation 
Chart T-Systems, Organisation data and information management DT group, July 2001) 
consisting, first of service lines "$, secondly of a regional organisation 119 and thirdly of 
business lines 120 which were oriented towards customers and sectors and stood for 
universal account management at the systems business 121 
However, the poor performance of the systems business (e. g. in 2002 annual result 
before tax: -2 billion euros; source: annual report DT group 2002) and the complexity of 
the Systems organisation apparently only reflected the situation that happened at top 
management level, and what a senior manager who joined DeTeSystem in 1994 
described in the interview as follows: 
"When I first came to DeTeSystem, I was slightly prejudiced: civil servants... 
etc.. That was not approved. The motivation and the dedication of the people 
at the top didn't stick back-quite the opposite was the case. One wanted to 
accomplish something together, to make a move, and to push sophisticated 
products and concepts. This wish grew stronger in the first years of the 
DeTeSystem... At the latest after the merger with debis Systemhaus a lot had 
changed. The company grew rapidly-too rapidly. It became culturally 
extremely difficult, severe conflicts arose between top managers and the 
organisation changed constantly. So often, that the top managers had no time 
anymore to look after their markets and customers... 11 
Although the systems business at its beginning was relatively similar to the mobile and 
online business, the interviewed top managers-regardless of their position in DT group's 
118 e. g. consulting, systems integration, desktop, computing and network services 
119 i. e. North Europe, South Europe, Central & East Europe, Americas, Asia & Pacific. 
120 e. g. manufacturing industries, telecommunications/ carriers & service providers, Banking, Public & Health 
Care Sector, Retail & Distribution, Travel & Transport, Insurance, Media Broadcast. 
121 Whereas the service lines reflected the products and services and were responsible for a universal and 
uniform portfolio of products and services - extending beyond national boundaries, the business lines 
were responsible for the development of solutions from the entire product and service portfolio on behalf 
of specific sectors. 
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organisation-designated the company and management culture of the systems business 
as "difficult" or even "chaotic". What led to that difference and dramatic change will be 
looked into closer in the next section. 
4.6.3 Approaches to TLOL in the "Systems" Case 
The main challenge for the Systems top management was to get hold of the 
corresponding competencies which were required to build up and run a sales 
organisation and key account management (KAM) for national as well as international 
business accounts. On top of that, and as the systems business was a provider of 
systems solutions with a significant share of internal sales (74%, source: DT internal 
presentation: "Regeln der Wertschöpfung" [Rules of Value Creation], Jan. 23,2003), the 
interface between management and other parts of the group was a critical success factor. 
External Recruiting 
Right from the foundation of the DeTeSystem subsidiary in 1994 the corresponding top 
management made use of external recruiting, with a particular view to sales and KAM 
competencies which were apparently not available in the DT group but necessary to 
implement what one systems top manager called "a new culture of sales and leadership". 
External recruiting was further used to get a few international top managers into the boat, 
while the top positions, that held strong interfaces within the group, were, according to the 
former manager of the HR department for the top management staff, filled mainly with 
group-internal candidates. 
The level of external recruiting at top level remained relatively moderate and stable until 
the start of the phase of intense external acquisitions and the merger with 
debis 
Systemhaus (2000). Paradoxically, after the merger with debis Systemhaus the rate of 
external hires at Systems' top management level 
increased enormously despite the 
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realisation of synergies and a decreasing number of top management positions. Nearly 
every hire was made externally. The top managers themselves, but also OD and HR 
managers attributed that development in the interviews mainly to power struggles, severe 
competition and rivalry that followed continuous further restructuring and reduction of 
management positions. Due to mistrust and to "maintain the political balance" [quotation 
of a systems top manager in charge of a business line] one rather took up the option of 
external preference than either debis-or Telekom-top managers. Externals were the 
"smiling third party" in this situation. 
As a result at the end of the period under review the typical systems business top 
manager had a technical background in electrical or communications engineering or IT, 
was around 40 to 45 years of age, and had relevant working experience in the field. This 
might be attributed to the fact that the systems business dealt with complex systems 
solutions for key account customers in various industries, which required a certain level of 
technical expertise and knowledge about customers and markets. 
Resulting from external recruiting, mergers and acquisitions as well as a permanently 
changing organisation, a large number of top managers had a very short tenure in the 
organisation as well as a short tenure in the position. A senior manager who joined 
DeTeSystem in 1994 and now holds a new position in the fixed-network business 
described the result after the merger as follows: 
, The people at 
Systems? They are a real chaotic bunch. Everyone is running 
around, and everybody is doing different things. It is quite visible at the 
occasion of top management meetings. There is no togetherness and no 
cooperation. Too much politics and too many power struggles, and the staff 
merry-go-round keeps turning and turning. " 
The same phenomenon could be observed within the scope of regular 
biannual meetings 
of a group of top managers, which were organised by the researcher 
in his active work- 
210 
role. On that occasion the top managers of the systems business, without exception, 
always reported on their new managers, of heavy conflicts at the top level, organisational 
change and different definition of teams or grading of top management positions. They 
often complained about the enormous investment of time that was necessary just to 
secure their own positions and that of their teams in the organisation. The expressed 
unrest amongst the top management and the entire organisation of the systems business 
as a cultural melting pot of very different company cultures was also reflected in the high 
personnel turnover at the top level122. 
International External Acquisitions 
In order to adapt to the increasing globalisation of business customers, to get hold of 
established business contacts and by that gain access to new target markets and 
customers, a series of acquisitions were made starting in 1996. However, the acquisitions 
were triggered by DT's headquarters, and the underlying integration strategy for these 
acquisitions remained obviously unclear for the systems business top management. What 
also remained unclear, was if and if yes, how the top management of the new 
acquisitions should be integrated into the systems businesstop management. A systems 
top manager described the consequences as follows: 
"What failed is the globalization in the business customer sector. The results 
are rather moderate, if not to say poor. Real chances were given away here. 
For example Company A* or Company B*. Here, the question of integration is 
still unclear. We don't have a competitive product-portfolio and the particular 
subsidiaries are not really led. With company A* for example, I can remember 
an astonished remark of the CEO, while speaking of a synergetic approach. 
In the process of acquisition, one had spoken of a financial investment. This 
explained the wonderment of the CEO about our attempt to intervene actively 
into the subsidiary and to shorten their rope. " 
(*annotation of the author: names of the companies not given for confidentiality reasons) 
122Annotation: precise figures could not be given for confidentiality reasons. 
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As a consequence and as neither the corporate nor the systems board did apparently 
intervene, most of the top managers of those acquisitions continued working more or less 
in their old way with relatively little connections to the rest of the systems business top 
management and vice versa. This suggests that in the case of the systems business it 
was not made use of the full potential that lies in external growth for TLOL. 
The Merger with Debis Systemhaus 
Particular dramatic consequences of that lacking involvement of the systems top 
management in M&A activities resulted from the merger of the systems business with 
debis Systemhaus. A poor integration management and an uncontrolled knowledge 
drain-also at top management level-were the consequences. 
Triggered by a group-wide initiative, the "four pillar-strategy" (2000-2001), which aimed at 
implementing a decentralised group organisation, the systems business-now called "T- 
Systems"--was established as the "prototype of a network-based provider of e-business 
solutions in the IT/telecoms convergence sector' (source: Management Report DT group, 
2000, p. 49) and the second largest system house in Europe. In doing so, efforts to 
extend T-Systems international reach were intended to be stepped up significantly. 
So much rhetoric; reality painted an obviously different picture. Problems had already 
begun with that fact that the motivation for this merger and the underlying acquisition 
strategy was not known or shared by Systems' top management. This can be illustrated 
by the quotation of a senior manager of the systems business: 
"The merger with debis? We knew nothing. We didn't even know what the 
CEO (of DT group) wanted with debis. Then, suddenly they launched an 
integration project... ". 
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Another systems top manager who joined the systems business in 1995 described the 
consequences as follows: 
"The integration of the debis systemhaus was poorly managed and ended up 
in too many changes of a much too complex organisation, too much 
micropolitics and a lacking common identity" 
Right after the merger evidence could also be found for a substantial rise of the turnover 
rate of top managers and key personnel. Against that background the wording of DT 
group's HR strategy of September 2000 (source: DT internal strategy paper) seemed 
quite cynical. It was stated in the document which was titled: "Only approx. 30% of all 
mergers are successful`; that integrated human resources due diligence is absolutely 
required. Furthermore, the following five typical core-reasons for failure of a merger were 
identified: 
- "Mismatching company cultures" 
- "Top management does not pursue common interests". 
- "Post-merger integration process fails" 
- "New formal organisation is too complex". 
- "Key people leave the company" 
(Source: DT internal strategy paper). 
Corresponding to the interviewed top managers themselves, the mentioned factors were 
given without an exception. With the merger of parts of the Deutsche Telekom Group with 
the debis Systemhaus (annotation: made part of the Daimler Chrysler group), two strong 
company cultures clashed. Heavy conflicts, competition over resources, budgets and 
positions as well as power struggles at top level between both camps became evident. 
Many key people up to the very top of the organisation left the company and attempts 
were made, as shown earlier in this section, to replace them with external hires. 
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DT internal documentation (HR strategy paper, Sept. 2001) showed that the post-merger 
project was obviously insufficiently prepared, the new formal organisation-as a result of 
the very difficult negotiations-was a complex, difficult to guide structure formed of 
service lines, business lines with regional organisation. It was questioned whether this 
organisation responded to the requirements as they were derived from the systems 
business strategy. 
Against that background it might not be surprising that top managers throughout the 
group came as regards the merger with debis Systemhaus to the following conclusions: 
"T-Systems, starting with its top management, is in a disastrous situation. " 
or 
T-Systems has to sort things out with itself. A clean internal structuring is 
necessary here. " 
Although the legal integration was formally accomplished in March 2002, attempts to 
foster cohesion and identification at top management level through common meetings, 
seminars etc. were, according to the responsible HR manager of the systems business, 
not made before end of 2002. 
Restructuring 
External recruiting of top managers, acquisitions and the merger with debis had an 
important side effect. Numerous change projects aimed at the optimisation of the 
organisation were initiated by the Systems top management-above all by newly 
appointed members of the Systems board of management, but also at lower levels. 
However, in the eyes of most interviewed top managers from outside the systems 
organisation, these initiatives either served individual purposes or objectives (e. g. drive 
for self realisation) or had-because they were only pursued with semi-interest and led to 
little, none or marginal change-rather detrimental effects on TLOL of Systems' top 
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management. And also an interviewed systems top manager who joined the systems 
business in 1996 admitted self-critical in an interview: 
"What we expected of the people in terms of change was certainly a cheek, 
as loyalty had repeatedly been demanded of managers and employees. But 
when the individual top managers have to continuously fight for their survival 
in the organisation ... What can one expect here? ... All reorganisations are 
crazy. The bosses were already thinking about a new reorganisation while the 
current one was still being implemented. And that on a scale that had never 
been seen in any comparable company, not at Siemens, not at Volkswagen, 
etc. It should come as no surprise when the people including direct reports of 
the board no longer take everything quite so seriously afterwards. " 
4.6.4 Summary of the "Systems" Case 
At its very start, the top management of the systems business developed relatively similar 
to the top management of the mobile and online business. On the basis of this case it 
was, however, possible to show that the imposed acquisition of new competencies from 
outside the organisation is not enough for TLOL to occur. In order to avoid the 
emergence of undesired learning results or not effective TLOL, the objective and strategy 
of learning rather needs to be understood and shared. 
On top of that it could be shown that high levels of diversity at top management level can 
be problematic and bear the risk, that the top management is increasingly dealing with 
itself. 
The following approaches to TLOL were pursued by the top management of the systems 
business. A key determining factor was-similar to the mobile and online business-that 
the systems business was spun-off in 1994 so that it could develop relatively untouched 
from the constraints resulting from DT's legacy as a public authority: 
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- From the start in 1994: 
External recruiting to enlist competencies at top level mainly in the area of sales 
and key account management, particularly with a focus on international markets. 
At the beginning moderate, during and after the merger with debis high level of 
external recruiting. 
- Starting from 1996: 
A series of international acquisitions were made in the Systems business initiated 
by DT's headquarters. The acquisition and integration strategy remained unclear 
for the Systems top management, so that the full potential of these acquisitions 
could not be used for TLOL. 
- 2000: 
In the absence of a clear integration strategy the merger of the systems business 
with the debis Systemhaus overtaxed the organisation. Top management 
increasingly lost sight of the formulated business strategy and dealt more and 
more with itself and constant restructuring of the complex organisation resulting 
from the merger. 
4.7 The "Headquarters" Case 
4.7.1 Introduction 
The following case outlines the organisational learning of the top management of DT's 
headquarters. The case of the HQ top management differs from the other cases of this 
study as the top management of DT's headquarters concentrated-per definition-on the 
development and implementation of corporate strategies. So in contrast to the top 
management of the corresponding business divisions which concentrated on the pursuit 
of adapted business strategies the top management of the headquarters aimed at the 
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harmonisation and the optimisation of business results from a group perspective. 
The case will show that the CEO as the central figure with formal power over the 
individual business units exerts an important influence on TLOL by imposing decisions on 
the divisional top management groups. This case furthermore illustrates the importance of 
formal organisation for TLOL. 
4.7.2 Background to the "Headquarters" Case 
4.7.2.1 Corporate Strategy 
The change from state institution to private corporation was formally completed within the 
scope of the first postal reform (1989). While the previous state institution had followed 
the main goal of providing infrastructure and telephones as well as general public interest, 
Deutsche Telekom's guiding principles post 1990 were customer and result orientation 
and entrepreneurship (Telekom 1996, p. 4) . 
As DT corresponded in its early phase to the fixed network and headquarters, the 
strategic challenges the headquarters' top management had to face corresponded to 
what was previously described in section 4.2.2. This means that the main challenge 
consisted of the establishment of a market-oriented, competitive organisation that had to 
live up to the following criteria: 
- "The business is ruled by the market, not 
by internal routines. 
- Different clients are treated differently. 
- Only positive results guarantee surviving against 
the competition. 
- Success = financial result + satisfied clients. 
- Decentralise responsibility as 
far as possible. 
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- Create entities that are responsible for their own actions and results. It 
((Telekom 1996), p. 6) 
After DT's privatisation, which was finally triggered by the enormous financial 
requirements (ca. 60 billion deutschmarks) for investments in the telecommunications 
infrastructure in former East Germany, (Buchner 1999, p. 13) capital market forces played 
an increasingly important role. And furthermore, the major point for the top management 
was to align the group to the requirements of the shareholders and the financial and 
capital markets. 
This placed new demands on the competencies of the top management, particularly with 
respect to their financial and presentation skills. Thus, the privatisation of DT and the 
deregulation of the telecommunications market thrust consistent work on optimising key 
financial figures and the stock price as well as the representation of political interests and 
investor relations into the foreground. Increasing the value of the company became an 
important goal for the HQ top management. A strong brand and appropriate external 
communication were also meant to contribute to this. The unavoidable loss of domestic 
market share resulting from the loss of the monopoly would be countered by external 
growth and acquisitions both domestically and abroad (in contrast to the individual 
businesses, which aimed for organic growth). 
4.7.2.2 Top Management and Organisation of DT's Headquarters 
In keeping with its origins as a bureaucratically-structured ministry, the Deutsche Telekom 
Group initially set up its headquarters under a parent-company concept. This meant that 
the headquarters' top management centrally controlled all strategy and operations and 
centrally managed and monitored all operational implementation. The composition of 
the 
top management at HQ followed virtually the same rules as for the 
fixed network business 
due to Telekom's past as a public authority and the tight organisational enmeshment 
(see 
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(Darbishire 1997, pp. 191-2) As a result, the headquarters' top management was 
characteristic of the civil service, leading to a large number of managers over 50 with a 
long average service, a high level of technical qualifications and typical civil service 
career paths. Due to political interference, there were also some former state secretaries 
and politicians in HQ top management. There was little financial know-how in the 
operational and financial areas. 
After privatisation in 1995, DT increasingly reoriented itself to market demands and 
intensified its orientation to customers. As a result, more and more operational tasks and 
therefore power and responsibility were transferred to the divisions and the divisional top 
management groups. Consequently, the demands on HQ top management changed 
fundamentally. The altered competition in the telecommunications market, shareholder 
and capital-market orientation, the effort to increase the company's value, regulatory 
politics etc. represented entirely new challenges for the top management, primarily in 
terms of strategy, finance, representation of political interests and in communication. 
These changing requirements were also mirrored in the first fundamental change of its 
formal organisation, which DT's headquarters experienced in 1998. The group 
headquarters was defined as an instrument of the board whose task it was to support the 
board in its management tasks. To these ends, subsequently headquarters should only 
have functions that "... , are oriented towards overall 
determination, control, monitoring 
and coordination of the group units. " (source: DT-internal paper, group organisation, May 
21,1999). All other functions were relocated outside headquarters either to so-called 
central operations or the business divisions. The headquarters shrunk to ca. 5,400 
employees. 
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Figure 7: Organisation of the DT Headquarters 
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In early 2002, the Group's headquarters was reoriented as a strategic management 
holding (SMH), and this holding, along with the Group's Board of Management, began 
further concentrating primarily on strategic and overarching management tasks. The 
divisions now controlled business operations, and they had full entrepreneurial 
responsibility for developing their markets in keeping with their business orientations. As 
a result, DT Group headquarters had been significantly downsized to ca. 1,000 
employees end 2002 [further reductions down to 900 was planned in 2003]). 
Which methods for TLOL the top management of DT's headquarters deployed to get hold 
of the required competences and with what results will be considered in more detail in the 
next section. 
4.7.3 Approaches to TLOL in the "Headquarters" Case 
Just as in the case of the top management of the fixed network business and for the 
same reasons (compare section 4.4.3), the HQ top management's approaches to 
learning have to be considered due to different legal constraints in two differentiated 
periods-before and after DT's privatisation in 1995. 
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Since the top management in the fixed line sector and the headquarters were part of the 
same organisation until privatisation, the described deployed methods and outcomes of 
TLOL of the fixed network case (see section 4.4.3) match the approaches to TLOL of the 
headquarters. Without access to external top management resources, they were limited 
to regrouping of existing competencies and top management training. In addition to the 
excessive time requirements for building new competencies at the top level, a lack of 
desire to learn was also shown to have been a factor. And those who were not ready or 
able to learn were replaced by mainly external hires after privatisation. 
External Recruiting 
The recruiting issue became particularly prominent for the headquarters' top management 
with DT's privatisation and the appointment of the youngest CEO in DT's history in May 
1995123. As could be taken from an interview with the former manager responsible for the 
HR department of the top management staff, he launched a large number of executive 
searches for DT's headquarters in the group shortly after his arrival and made the filling of 
these top positions a "matter for the boss". 
It could be taken from interviews with representatives of the top management HR 
department as well as documentation that from now on mainly young top executives 
between the ages of 32 and 45, most of them with a formal education in finance or 
business administration with corresponding relatively short professional experience-in 
general outside the telecommunications industry or in the consulting-were hired. 
The strong external recruitment was viewed by the interviewed top managers as a 
deliberate attempt to turn Deutsche Telekom away from its negative employer brand and 
123 He was born in 1949, held a doctor's degree in mathematics and had before several including international 
- particularly sales-oriented management positions 
in Nixdorf group and Sony. 
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image as a public authority which was incompatible with the new CEO's vision124 of an 
innovative, customer-oriented, high-performing, private-owned international group. This 
can be illustrated by a quotation from a long-standing senior manager of the fixed network 
business: 
"With the new CEO, the notion of quality and service came into the 
company-also with regard to corporate design and external communication. 
Communication was extremely important, which also had an important impact 
on the top management. The appearance had to be better than what was 
behind it. These were the times where numerous young top managers and 
above all consultants were recruited who produced all these nice consultant 
concepts with the Deutsche Telekom Logo on it, " 
The preference for the recruiting of management consultants might-apart from their 
presentation and conceptional skills-also be associated with the fact that management 
consultants played, according to relevant documentation (e. g. draft resolutions for the 
board, presentations, ... etc. ), an important role in major organisation development 
projects of DT group since 1990. 
It seems, however, doubtful whether these external hires and the strong external 
recruiting policy led only to desired results. Certainly, comprehensive expert know-how 
was won at the top level very quickly, as was essential, for example for privatisation and 
managing investor relations, or market management. The integration of this new 
expertise and its implementation within a Telekom context appears to have only had 
limited success. A newly acquired top manager for example, reports the following: 
"From my point of view, there is very strong competition on the first 
hierarchical level, in particular between the former civil servants and newly 
recruited top managers. You just have to observe who has lunch together and 
124 'We will make Deutsche Telekom the most customer-friendly, best-liked and most successful company in 
our industry and continue to set new standards around the world in the information society" (Telekom, 
2001). 
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who not. There are two camps that rarely interact. Everyone works in their 
own peace and quiet for their personal goals. I'm really disappointed about 
that. " 
This obviously led, as the following statements show, to frustration in the business 
divisions: 
"A lot of those young external hires did not listen to the advice of their more 
senior and experienced peers. They did simply not understand how our 
company ticks. These then disappeared, were replaced by someone new, 
and everything was done over. " 
(Source: a senior manager in the fixed network business-a former civil servant-who worked 
previously in DT's headquarters. ) 
"Some external hires were so decoupled and disconnected from Telekom. We 
need people who have a feeling for what works and what does not work. Look 
for instance at all those consultants in the headquarters. Some of them 
haven't the faintest idea, but produce nice PowerPoint slides. It needed some 
time until it was realised that these were not the men of action who translate 
these slides into practice. " 
(Source: a middle-aged externally hired top manager in the fixed network business coming 
from the industry. ) 
"In our external presentation and many internal presentations and draft 
resolutions for the board, they talked about a modern company-even if the 
quality didn't change at the same pace. Rhetoric and reality were often far 
from each other. Personally, / found that the discrepancy between what was 
presented and reality was too large. As a result, a lot of managers-mainly 
the elder ones with a long tenure in the business-thought we could continue 
responding to the new requirements with old behaviours. This was an 
illusion. " 
(Source: a middle-aged externally hired top manager in DT's headquarters. ) 
The missing integration of the partially very young, inexperienced external hires and their 
short stay at DT (annotation: According to the top management HR department two out of 
every three left the group before the second year of service) was explained as 
follows: 
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"lt had been an attempt to buy stars with a lot of money-but nobody took 
care how these people would work together. " 
The affected newly-recruited top managers pointed less at the lacking team skills of the 
new hires and more at existing insider relationships among the "old" managers. One 
senior manager who joined DT's headquarters a year ago stated: 
"There is a small group of top managers who really guide the company. You 
cannot pass these people. If you're innovative, you have a tough time of it 
with those people. " 
Top managers with a longer tenure in the organisation had a different explanation for that 
phenomenon. A senior manager (annotation: a direct report of the CEO) of DT's 
headquarters reported: 
"Our CEO was always devious125. I have worked for long years with him, but 
never knew what he took me for. As far as I can say, there is in general an 
absence of common meetings or of no-risk, non-tactical, one-to-one talks 
among members of the board and their staff, i. e. the kind of dialogue that 
doesn't leave the impression that all thoughts expressed are automatically 
being subjected to positive or negative ratings under the table... We do not 
have a culture of such exchange in the headquarters. People are fearful of 
stating demands openly. Rivalry...., bullying... People are afraid to express a 
view for fear of being wrong or perceived as being wrong. That's difficult, 
above all for new hires. " 
This was reflected-as was further experienced in the interviews-by the prevailing 
management culture in the headquarters. One of the interviewees-only with the 
company for 9 months at the time of the interview, explained this as follows: 
"... This hierarchical mindset and the distance to authority is evident 
everywhere. Our members of the board are not available, they are shielded. 
There is simply no place, no opportunity for contact and meeting. By the way, 
the architect of this building should be arrested. Our directors are as distant 
125 This corresponds to the observations of Glotz (2001, p. 37) or the Business Week, 
Oct. 1995 who 
characterised Sommer as following: "He was not the kind of guy, you'd have a 
beer with. " 
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as possible from each other and every member of the board sits in his own 
tower. This building is a certain symbol, lt is strange but obviously normal 
here that the manager of a unit has his office here, his peers their offices on 
other floors and his team is situated somewhere else. It is this distance that 
causes nobody to ask questions or take a step towards the other. It is not 
because you are afraid-it is simply because you feel the distance. " 
It is presumably also for that reason that-in the divisions' top managers assessment- 
there was little teamwork and team spirit among the top management at DT headquarters 
after privatisation. This is confirmed by the fact that DT's headquarters was the only part 
of DT's top management that did not establish regular management meetings. Before, the 
cohesion was very different, just like in the fixed network sector. 
The IPO and the "T"-Brand 
The second largest IPO in history at that time after NT&T in Japan was a costly but 
successful privatisation and brand campaign (see Glotz 2001) which was launched in 
march 1996 by the CEO-called "Mister Telekom" by the external press. As could be 
taken from the interviews with senior managers, the IPO and the implementation of the 
Telekom brand was seen as very important with regard to TLOL. This in several respects: 
firstly, IPO and the T-brand made clear that DT's time as a public authority was definitely 
over and that DT had to keep up with its competitors in the telecommunications market. 
The senior manager heading the OD department-himself a civil servant-put it in a 
nutshell: 
"Then we knew that we didn't work for the government anymore. This brought 
about massive changes, in particular with regard to the top and middle 
management's code of conduct and philosophy. Today there 
is a completely 
different willingness to perform. " 
And another senior manager-now in the strategy department--who worked 
for DT group 
at that time as a consultant complemented: 
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"Suddenly DT's employees had a new concept of the enemy. It was not any 
longer the client, now it was the competitor. " 
The second important effect of the Telekom brand was its integrative effect. Even if this 
did not always happen voluntarily-as was shown in the mobile/online case and will not 
be discussed in more detail here for that reason-the strict introduction of the "T" brand 
strategy, under which all products and areas were collected under a common, successful 
umbrella brand, did lead to all parts of top management to identify more strongly with the 
company. The borders between the businesses in the heads of the top managers 
became more open, leading for the first time to personnel movements at the top level 
between the businesses (for further details see section 4.5.3). This made new 
competencies accessible to the group's top management in different places. 
Thirdly, the Telekom brand had an important impact on DT's image as an employer of top 
managers. A senior manager in HR in DT's headquarters put it in a nutshell: 
"The `T' brand has an enormous value. The new brand and the upbeat 
external communication caused a fundamental change of Telekom's image 
and helped us win personnel, that we could have never attracted before. " 
This in turn had an important impact on external recruiting activities, which were already 
considered at an earlier stage of this section. 
External Acquisitions 
Whereas the top management of the business divisions concentrated on organic growth 
of their business, it was part of the headquarters' top management's mission to get 
access to and to develop these target markets by means of external growth. The CEO 
himself set a high priority on these issues, and as a complement a member of the board 
for international affairs was appointed. 
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The partly sobering results of DT's acquisition activities for TLOL were already described 
earlier in this chapter in the corresponding cases with the most dramatic results for the 
systems business (see fixed-network case: section 4.4.3.2; the mobile/online case: 
section 4.5.3; and the systems case: section 4.6.3). It seems that the core problem went 
back to the lacking involvement in the corresponding strategy development and decision- 
making process which might explain why more than one third of DT's top managers 
considered M&A and internationalisation as having had a very limited effect on TLOL. 
The acquisition strategy was obviously not known, or at least not understood, which had 
very detrimental effects on the integration of these acquisitions, caused high turnover 
rates at top level and a corresponding knowledge drain. Furthermore high investments 
(compare section 4.2.5) burdened the business results lastingly. 
Implementation of the "Four-Pillar Strategy" 
Considerations for increasing the value of the company, unlocking international markets 
and consistently aligning the company with the requirements of financial and capital 
markets also shaped the formal organisation of the DT group. As can be seen below, this 
initiative by corporate top management also had unintended effects on TLOL. 
The merger with Telekom Italia having failed, the group's board decided in 2000 to 
implement a four-pillar strategy and with that a divisionalised group structure that was 
meant to smooth the way to new international markets126. Within the framework of this 
project, DT has been transformed into a strategic management holding with four "lines of 
business" consisting of the fixed network business, the mobile business, the online 
business, and the systems business. 
126 A top manager of the strategy department explained 
in the interview: « The previous structure never would 
have been permitted to become an international company. « 
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However, the official communication to the employees127 cannot hide the fact that the real 
motivation could be traced back to other considerations. Many company-internal conflicts 
and statements from the interviews with top management support the theory that these 
changes resulted from capital market considerations and not from operational reasons. 
One manager from the systems business reported: 
"At the very beginning the reasoning of the four pillar strategy was the capital 
market. I remember when the four-pillar strategy was presented by our CEO. 
He said in the top management meeting: Who will make use of this structure 
for his own good... I will slay this person and then kick him out. The intention, 
however, was very different from the real-life. " 
This quote hints-as was already discussed in 4.4.3.2 that unintended changes resulted 
from this restructuring. In the wake of the implementation of the four-pillar-strategy and 
the corresponding organisation restructuring, power and decision-making as well as the 
management-by-objectives system were rendered more decentralised-albeit with a 
strong focus on short-term divisional objectives which contributed to short-termism and 
the neglect of long-term objectives (e. g. innovation) 128. 
Each business division was given its own management. The internal definition of the 
group's top management was modified and the total number of assigned top managers 
decreased by ca. 2/3. The business units now put a stronger focus on their own target 
markets, acting in divisional instead of group terms. They partly even competed with other 
business units instead of working together to develop convergent products and services. 
Competition further existed as regards resources such as investment budgets or 
manpower. The weak points of the new organisation became evident shortly after 
127 "From top to bottom, the Deutsche Telekom is now geared to the objective of making optimal use of the 
prospects and potentials of our growth markets in the interest of a future-oriented corporate development 
that benefits our customers, shareholders and employees" (vision international 2001, Vol. 3-4, p. 2). 
128 A significant decrease of patent applications can be stated: 2002: 547; year 2004: 374 (source: activity 
report Deutsche Telekom 2004). 
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implementation in severe conflicts, which could mainly be observed between divisions 
with close supply and service relations and a high proportion of internal cost allocation: 
"There are cultural problems that we urgently need to work on. If the T-Online 
division can announce a revenue warning in May, claiming that the T-Com 
division is at fault, we have a problem on our hands. " 
(Source: interview with a top manager heading a technical department in the fixed network 
business) 
"Networked products are our strength, but all our departmental thinking gets 
squarely in the way of it. " 
(Source: interview with a top manager in charge of a business line in the systems business) 
"The question that arises is: who burdens whom with what? The issue is not 
that some party or other is not coping or is not capable enough and that this is 
their problem to deal with, but rather to identify one's own contribution. As far 
as / can see, there are too few decent people in the responsible positions and 
too many tricksters. We need to be more open and thus unblock the view of 
the real problems. " 
(Source: interview with a top manager in charge of regulatory affairs in DT's headquarters) 
Other parts of top management with production that was relatively independent of the rest 
of the group, such as Mobile, conversely welcomed the greater independence. A top 
manager in finance in the mobile business stated for instance: 
"Too many-often less important-decisions were made by the corporate 
board of management in the past. This contradicted the principle that there 
were other responsible and competent people at divisional level who were 
ready to take on responsibility when they are involved in the decisions. " 
Apart from the mutual internal and external competition, severe group-internal conflicts, 
which were partly caused by the equal ranking of the businesses (compare section 
4.4.3.2), and changed decision processes, this new structure also resulted in the divisions 
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developing their own corporate thinking 129 as well as a continuously worsening 
cooperation of the group's top management. According to most top managers, this was 
reinforced, as top managers no longer had any point of contact anymore with top 
managers from other businesses outside their own field of activity. 
On top of that, in the face of the cessation of common meetings at group level for all 
former `TOP 300' top managers, each business division apart from the systems 
business-which was trapped in high personnel turnover and permanent restructuring- 
established its own divisional top management meetings. The results can be illustrated by 
a quotation of a top manager of DT's headquarters: 
"We are not capable of working together in a cross-divisional way-and 
include the management bodies in my judgement. " 
This was increasingly reflected in key financial indicators (see section 4.2.5), the first 
structural changes were instigated after the conclusion of this study13o 
Top Management Training 
Apparently little importance was attributed to training to foster TLOL. This corresponds 
well with the low number and very irregular frequency of relevant actions, as well as the 
limited involvement of the corporate board of management in the development of training 
programmes for the top management that could be observed through-out the entire 
period of this study. Despite a long tradition in the DT group in terms of training which 
resulted from the civil service system (compare section 4.4.3), it could be seen that, in 
129 One interviewee (senior manager heading the OD department of DT group in DT's headquarters) 
described the effects of that for instance as follows: "Another factor is that all divisions are developing a 
corporate thinking approach - e. g. with regard to decisions of the corporate board of management. 
The 
divisional representative comments that, "I'm not interested in proposals. Until I receive information to the 
contrary from my management, they have no relevance for me. " It is important to impress upon 
the 
individual management bodies that they need to implement and monitor the application of Board 
decisions within their own divisions. " 
130 It was thus for instance finally decided to reintegrate the T-Online division, which became a stock- 
corporation in 2000, into the fixed network business. This was accomplished 
in 2006. Only the brand "T- 
Online" was upheld. 
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contrast to all other parts of DT's management, there was no unit or contact person who 
systematically dealt with training for this target group. 
The situation changed apparently within the scope of the implementation of the four-pillar 
strategy and the establishment of a corporate university for DT group (the so-called 
Telekom Business Academy131). That it took so long (until 2000) might only partly be 
attributed to disputes over responsibilities between the top management HR department 
that reported directly to the CEO and the member of the board for HR and his staff who 
were responsible for all HR matters for the entire staff except the top management. It 
might rather indicate the relatively low importance that was attached to top management 
training by the CEO and the corporate board of management. One of them summed it up: 
"You are a born leader or not, and the best way to learn is to learn on-the- 
job-most notably in change management. / do take a sceptical view of these 
academies and business schools which lecture on change. Leading change, 
setting concrete things in motion, is important. You have to force people to 
change. " 
In spite of that, costly training offerings such as the "Advanced Management Programme" 
(AMP) were offered to the group's top management but were apparently rather seen as 
incentives or means to retain managers in the organization. Hoping that a strong brand 
would be able to attract the attention of DT's top management, the Harvard and Stanford 
Business School were put in charge of the development and realisation of a training 
course for DT's top management. It could be found that those senior managers who 
expected more than an incentive came to a sobering conclusion as regards the outcomes 
of top management training. The following quotation of a senior manager of 
DT's 
headquarters might illustrate this: 
I had the impression that our members of the corporate board did not know 
what was trained. They were not aware of their own weak points and 
deficits. 
131 In 2005 it was decided to close DT's corporate university. 
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Instead of that, they sent their direct reports to training courses and did not 
realise that the people were trained in a direction which was aligned against 
our management board. " 
Another top manager from HR reported that after the first top management training 
course in Harvard and Stanford, there had been a push to change things. A consortium of 
top managers wanted the then CEO, to say something about the grievances. It was 
hoped that the board would signal that change was desired in this direction. It never 
came to this, however, due to the resignation of the CEO in summer 2002. 
After the take-over by his successor and due to extensive cost cuttings, a further session 
of the AMP that had already been scheduled was postponed. The realisation of that 
second session of the programme was linked to the development of the debt situation of 
DT group, which further underscored the incentive nature of the measure. 
4.7.4 Summary of the "Headquarters" Case 
On the basis of this corporate case of DT's headquarters' top management, it was 
possible to show that the mere external hiring of holders of specific expert knowledge or 
the acquisition of companies is not enough for TLOL to occur. The integration of these 
new resources is rather crucial. This presupposes above all that the corresponding 
strategies are understood and shared. The findings of this study suggest that the CEO 
can play an important role in that respect. 
The case also showed that too high levels of diversity at top level risk to overburden 
the 
organisation and that lacking knowledge at corporate top management 
level about the 
functioning of the organisation is crucial in group-wide change processes. 
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In detail, the following methods for TLOL were deployed in the period under review: 
- Before 1995: 
Top Management Training and regrouping of existing resources around required 
competencies, i. e. Telekom KONTAKT (for further details it is discussed in the 
summary of the fixed network business). 
After privatisation in 1995 and the partial remove of legal constraints: 
- Strong external recruiting: 
Replacement of those top managers who were not ready or able to learn and 
filling of newly-created positions with external hires with a formal education in 
finance or business administration but relatively short professional experience-in 
general outside the telecommunications industry or in consulting. 
- 1996: IPO and implementation of the T-brand strategy. 
The T-brand symbolised the final shift from public authority to a private company. 
It also contributed to stronger identification of all parts of DT's top management 
with the group, had a strong integrative effect and improved DT's employer brand 
(target group: top managers) 
- 1996: Mergers & acquisitions: 
Strong phase of acquisitions. However, limited effect on TLOL as the acquisition 
strategy remained unclear and divisional top managers were not involved in 
decision-making. Resulting from that, partly poor management of integration 
projects. High financial investments with strong impact on company results. 
- Implementation of 4-pillar strategy: 
Triggered by the capital market, a decentralised group-organisation was 
implemented. Although not intended to do so, the new structure fostered the top 
management's acting in divisional rather than group terms and the development of 
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own corporate thinking at divisional level. Severe conflicts and competition 
between top managers of the different divisions arose. Co-operation between DT 
group's top management worsened significantly; synergies between divisions 
could not be exploited. 
- Advanced Management Training Programme: 
The costly training programme which was developed and carried out in co- 
operation with well-known business schools was, due to the lacking involvement 
of the corporate board of management, obviously rather an incentive than a 
means to foster TLOL. 
By means of the four-pillar strategy it became clear, that TLOL does not necessarily lead 
to positive results. The findings of this corporate study showed, however, that formal 
organisation structures (see Telekom KONTAKT, Four-pillar-strategy) can have strong 
behaviour-guiding effects. 
4.8 Conclusion 
Having given an account of the situation of DT's top management at the beginning and at 
the end of the period under review in section 4.3 and considered the different approaches 
to TLOL of the corresponding cases (see sections 4.4,4.5,4.6,4.7), this section will now 
sum up the case-specific characteristics and presents an overview of the main 
findings. 
First, some insights will be given into how the top managers themselves evaluated 
the 
outcomes of TLOL from an overall perspective. 
In contrast to some financial key indicators (see section 4.2.5), the 
interviewed top 
managers of all businesses and DT's headquarters, with only 
2 exceptions, considered 
the top management of the mobile business as that part of DT's 
top management that 
has learned the fastest and best in the period under review. It was followed 
by the fixed 
network business that should have come in 
first place in sole evaluation of financial 
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performance. The top management of the online business was evaluated average as 
regards the outcomes of TLOL, and the top management groups of the systems business 
and headquarters were evaluated as very bad by all top executives. 
It could be found in the interviews, that the differences, in particular specific 
characteristics of the Top Management itself (composition, cohesion... etc. ), and the 
organisational and external learning environment became entrenched, which will have to 
be analysed in greater detail in the Analysis Chapter. In both of the most highly-rated top 
management groups (i. e. mobile and fixed network business), it was the cooperation 
between themselves, which had always been good, that was primarily emphasised. 
Concerning external aspects, the top managers themselves, like the following top 
manager heading a sales department of the mobile business, viewed closeness to the 
marketplace and customers as well as early deregulation of the corresponding markets 
as an important factor that fostered T'LOL: 
"The parts of the group with stronger market pressure were simply better. The 
fixed network has hung in for the longest, since it's been moving in a 
regulated market for the longest. Everyone who had to stick their head out 
early had to learn the meaning of customers and prices the hard way. " 
This evaluation of the interviewed top managers is supported by the fact that the first and 
most significant OD initiatives (e. g. Telekom KONTAKT) which were launched to foster 
learning and TLOL were market-oriented projects. It also squares well with the lower 
evaluation of top management in areas far from the market (e. g. headquarters or support 
functions such as finance, human resources etc. ), or also of top management of those 
parts of the group with high internal sales (here above all the systems business and, even 
if to a lower extent, the online business). A top manager of the fixed network 
business put 
it this way with view to the systems business: 
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"Systems' internal sales are still relatively high. That makes it tempting to 
become uncompetitive. At least the board member is no longer also 
responsible for Systems, and now Systems won't be subsidised any more. " 
Likewise, top managers identified the need for unlearning as a decisive factor for TLOL 
and a reason why TLOL differed between the different parts of DT's top management. 
This can be illustrated by the quotation of an interviewed Systems top manager who 
described his perception of the Mobile top management as follows: 
"The top management of T-Mobile was the best and fastest with regard to 
learning. . -There is a completely different attitude among the managers. An 
atmosphere of departure. They had not that ballast of instructions and the civil 
service. They did those things which had to be done and not because they 
were there and had to be changed. It is simply a different life in this company. 
They can follow changes much easier and without hectic diversions like in the 
rest of Telekom ... It was quieter than other parts of the group. Of course this 
is also a size issue, but above all, it is a matter of the people who are working 
there. Mobile's top managers take a risk, are fresh and have an appreciation 
for new ventures. " 
However, fixed-network top managers in particular seriously questioned whether Mobile's 
top management could have also managed the large and complex fixed-network 
business just as successfully. Some voices from headquarters also argued that Mobile 
had "had an easier job. " (senior manager in the legal department). Against the 
background of those external hires in the fixed network business (see section 4.4.3.2) 
who underestimated the complexity and inertia of that large fixed network organisation 
and finally failed, this seems to be at least a justified objection. 
Before moving on to the analysis chapter the following table now sums up the identified 
case-specific characteristics: 
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"Fixed Network" "Mobile I Online" "Systems" Case "Head uarter" 
Case Case 
q 
Case 
Exogenous - 
Relatively late - Early deregulation -Early deregulation - Strong political 
Factors: 
deregulation in of the very fast of the fast growing interference 
- Market 
1998 is followed by growing, highly market, but high 
- Deregulation of 
Forces 
strong competition competitive and share of group- tele- 
- Other 
and price dropping dynamic markets internal sales and communications 
powerful - Mature, formerly 
so less market markets 
outside monopolist market 
pressure 
- Due to reunification sources - Civil servants of western and 
remain protected by eastern Germany 
public labour necessity to raise 
regulations capital outside tight 
- No access to the 
federal budgets 
external labour - Globalisation of the 
market until business 
privatisation and no 
external - Increasing 
acquisitions influence of capital 
market and 
shareholders 
- From a provider of - Develop rapidly - Quality leadership - From the civil Strategy: infrastructural growing markets as for individual service to a market 
- Business service to quality the `one-stop-shop' telecommunications orientated, Strategy leadership in the with a comprehen- solutions for competitive private 
- Corporate premium segment sive service for national and company Strategy 
- Minimizing of the 
mobile communica- international 
- Consequent 
unavoidable loss of 
tions and strategic business customers orientation towards 
market share partnerships 
in the the financial and online services. capital market 
- Complex (size, - Very fast growing -New founded, - Emerged from a Organisation: routines, companies which growing company bureaucratically 
- Specific structuring) but were build up from but with strong structured ministry 
charac- shrinking the scratch interfaces with other 
-Increasing teristics organisation 
-Start-up company 
businesses decentralisation 
- Cultural legacy of culture -After `00: complex, and alignment of 
the former public fast changing matrix organisation 
authority organisation with corresponding to 
different sub- requirements of the 
cultures capital market 
- Many civil servants - On average - High 
diversity of the - High diversity of 
Top Mgt: 
- On average older 
younger, strong top management the headquarters 
- Specific 
charac- 
, 
mainly technically- emphasis 
on formal 
education and job 
average tenure - 
top management; 
preference for 
teristics qualified top mgt. experience in sales, 
n the organisation in consultants. 
staff with long 
tenure in the marketing, 
finance, - No or very limited - On average lower 
organisation 
shorter tenure in cohesion at top 
l l age and tenure 
in 
the organisation eve the organisation. 
- Strong 
also due 
cohesion- 
- Strong cohesion 
" - 
"Stars" at top level 
years of shared 
start- based upon 
" 
with no cohesion 
working experience -spirit, 
common up 
objectives and 
and regular regular meetings/ 
management events 
meetings 
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Approaches 
Before privatisation: - Creation of a - Creation of a Before privatisation: 
to TLOL - Regrouping of 
subsidiary company 
for the business 
subsidiary company 
for the business -see fixed network organisation and 
top mgt. around 
increased flexibility increased flexibility case 
required - Strong ext. - Imposed integration 
competencies but recruiting at top of international After privatisation: 
problem of level but good acquisitions but with 
- Strong external unlearning integration of new limited results recruiting led to 
- Top mgt. training, 
hires 
- Strong external very high levels of but revealed as not - Strict recruiting diversity 
appropriate in fast- implementation of 
` ' - Imposed merger - 
"T"-brand had a changing context T -brand brought with very negative strong integrative about stronger 
identification with results 
(i. e. serious effect on top mgt. 
After privatisation: the group; dismissal conflicts, 
high 
- Numerous mergers 
- Moderate external 
of those who were 
turnover rates, very 
complex & fast 
& acquisitions but 
recruiting to enlist not ready to change changing matrix 
acquisition strategy 
new competencies. - Imposed integration organisation, high 
was not understood 
by divisional top 
- Dismissal of those 
of ext. acquisitions levels of diversity at management. 
who weren't willing/ 
but due to lacking top mgt. level) 
- Although not able to learn 
involvement in 
decision-making -restructuring intended, led the 
- Imposed external with limited results 
certain developed a implementation of a 
acquisitions but momentum on 
its capital-market - 
limited integration of - 
Imposed own. oriented group 
new top mgrs. 
implementation as organisation to top 
a separate line of mgt's acting in 
- High frequency of business fostered divisional rather OD and cost-cutting accountability and than group terms initiatives increased development of an 
rivalry at top level own corporate - Top management 
- Imposed 
thinking, but training but lacking 
attention of mgt implementation as a worsened co- 
operation at group 
. the corporate board 
separate line of 
business had level 
negative effects on 
group-wide co- 
operation 
Overall ++ (mobile) 
evaluation of + +/- (online) TLOL* 
* self-evaluation of DT's top management; Legend: -- = very poor; ++ = very good 
Table 23: Case-Specific Characteristics Related to TLOL 
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Chapter Five - Case Analysis & Synthesis 
5.1 Introduction 
As already shown (see Chapter Two), the concept of organisational learning is often 
considered in literature and research as a valid and logical response to a series of 
challenges inspired by strategic change. In that connection, particular importance is 
attributed to top management and the organisational learning of that particular group of 
people at the apex of the organisation. Given the research objective of exploring 
corresponding methods of top-level organisational learning, the data collected from the 
research site will now be analysed in greater detail in this chapter. In doing so, the 
analysis not only aims to contribute to a better understanding of the kind of initiatives and 
methods for top-level organisational learning and the rationales for their implementation, 
but also to seek to explain differences between corporate and divisional top-level 
organisational learning, and to broaden the knowledge of factors that foster or hinder 
organisational learning at top management level. 
Although a qualitative, long-term case study of the top management of just a single- 
albeit very large-organisation acting in a turbulent environment was carried out, 
considerable differences as regards the use and effectiveness of methods of top-level 
organisational learning between different constituent parts of the group's top 
management could be found. These differences could be traced to various factors 
outside and inside the given parts of the top management, such as market forces or legal 
constraints, strategies, powerful inside forces, and specific characteristics of 
the 
corresponding given parts of the organisation and the top management group. 
Additionally, dynamics between these factors as well as the parts of the top management 
could be identified-above all between the corporate and 
divisional top management- 
239 
which either had a positive or negative effect on learning of the relevant top management 
group. 
As previously mentioned, this chapter now aims to contribute to the understanding of 
these patterns and is dedicated to in-depth analysis of the findings. Based upon the 
strategy for data analysis (see methodology chapter), the findings of this thesis are 
arranged around the conceptual framework which was derived from the literature and 
which was introduced at the end of the literature review. 
In the following sections, the findings relating to each component of the conceptual 
framework are analysed and are simultaneously discussed and linked with the literature 
within this one common chapter. As organisational learning of the unit `top management' 
cannot be understood without its learning environment, the first sections are dedicated to 
the in-depth analysis of the context. Section 5.2 will start with exogenous factors, followed 
by strategy (section 5.3), and the component organisation (section 5.4). This prior focus 
on context is indispensable in order to clarify the organisational setting and to better 
understand what will follow in section 5.5 on the top management. Each section 
concludes with a short summary discussion. In section 5.6, the key findings and their 
sources of evidence are briefly summarised. As the four constituent parts of the 
framework are analytically separate, but in fact highly interconnected, the dynamic 
interrelationships between them are highlighted in the final section of the analysis chapter 
(cf. section 5.7). 
5.2 Exogeneous Factors 
As mentioned earlier exogenous factors comprise all external factors that generate or 
impede a pressing need for top-level organisational learning or that expand or narrow 
down options to respond to a learning need. Dealing with these factors is 
important in 
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order to better understand what triggered organisational learning at corporate as well as 
divisional top management level, to learn more about the rationales for the choices made 
around initiatives and methods for top-level organisational learning and to assess the 
extent to which top-level organisational learning is reinforced or hindered by its external 
environment. On top of that, corporate and business strategies are derived from 
exogenous factors, in whose development, Mintzberg (1995) suggests, learning 
processes play a key role. 
The need for in-depth consideration of exogenous factors can also be derived from the 
literature and research in this field. The founding fathers of organisational learning 
literature, Cyert and March (1963), and many other authors of the organisational learning 
literature (see Lawrence and Lorsch 1967; Argyris and Schoen 1978; Duncan and Weiss 
1979; Shrivastava 1983; Fiol and Lyles 1985; Levitt and March 1988) considered 
organisational learning as a means to adapt to environmental demands. Similarly, 
proponents of the executive or management learning literature (e. g. Antonacopoulou 
1999; Richter 1999) identified adjustment to change as a driver of learning. However, as 
Kammel (2000, p. 104) underlined, the array of potential change forces is wide, and 
following Whittington's (1990; 1992) suggestion, learning agents have a certain discretion 
to decide which parts of their learning environment they consider as important and how 
they intend to respond to that. Due to that, the exogenous factors that encourage or 
impede top-level organisational learning are analysed in greater detail in the following 
sections. 
5.2.1 Market Forces 
As will be shown hereafter, it could be found in this study that 
the need for learning at top 
level, and the pace and quality of top-level organisational 
learning were strongly 
influenced by market forces. The study thus confirms in principle 
Harvey and Denton 
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(1999), who identified in his empirical study on the emergence of the twin ideas of 
organisational learning and the learning organisation a series of market-related factors 
such as an ever more rapid pace of change in business environment or the intensely 
competitive nature of global business, from which the need for organisational learning 
was derived (Harvey and Denton 1999, p. 897). In the same way, the study supports the 
findings of Antonacopoulou's research (1999) on management learning in the retailing 
banking sector which establishes a close connection between a series of external forces 
such as trends in the world economy, changes in the market, the intensification of 
competition and the need for learning. Although overall not a lot is mentioned in the 
literature about which meaning "market forces" indeed have for top-level organisational 
learning and although authors such as Harvey and Denton (1999) or Antonacopoulou 
(Antonacopoulou 1999) do not differentiate between different target groups or between 
corporate or divisional top managers, the findings of this research strongly indicate-as 
will be shown below-that organisational learning at corporate and divisional top 
management level is triggered and/or influenced in different ways by market-related 
factors. 
This conclusion can be drawn on the one hand from the proximate connection that the 
interviewed top managers themselves created between competitive pressure, and the 
pace and quality of top-level organisational learning in the corresponding top 
management group. Thus, for instance, according to a very large majority of the 
interviewed top executives132, top-level organisational learning was worse amongst those 
parts of DT's top management that operated (longer) in regulated markets (e. g. fixed 
network business) or had, like the Systems business, strong DT-internal business and 
sales compared to other parts of DT's top management. In contrast to that, in comparison 
with other parts of DT's top management, learning was perceived as better or faster 
132 Annotation: Only two senior managers from the fixed network business (In total 37 top managers were 
interviewed in that series of interviews. ) took a different view. They argued that the different parts of DT's 
top management had different starting points and so could not be compared. 
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amongst those top management groups that, like the mobile business, had to keep up 
from the start with keen competition in deregulated markets, that acted in fast-developing, 
growing markets with shrinking product life-cycles and whose success depended to a 
high extent on the external market. 
As can be taken from the table below, these views expressed by the interviewed top 
managers about the impact of market forces on organisational learning at divisional top 
management level square well with some hard evidence, such as at the time of market 
deregulation and consequent intensifying of competition, the actual dependency of the 
corresponding business division from the external market, as well as the dynamic of 
growth of the particular partial markets (see table below). 
Mobile/Online Fixed network Systems 
business business business 
Very strong competition Strong competition after Strong competition 
due to early deregulation relatively late due to early 
deregulation of the deregulation 
market 
Competitive-situation 
(external market) (from the very start of the (monopolist industry (from the very start of 
organisation, structure until the the organisation in 
mobile: 1993 liberalisation of the fixed 1994) 
online: 1996) network 
telecommunications 
market in 1998) 
Stage of Development 
of the Market 
Fast-growing Mature Growing 
Realises the following 
share of its sales within 20 % (mobile) DT group as % of total 51 % (online) 32 % 74 % turnover 
Overall evaluation of 
Early and very strong Relatively late (after Early, but relatively 
the need for learning* 
learning need deregulation) but low learning need strong learning need 
Effectiveness of top- 
level organisational 
learning was evaluated Mobile: Very good Good Very poor compared to other Online: Satisfactory 
parts of DT's top 
management group* 
(Prepared by author based on DT-internal presentation: "Regeln der Wertschöpfung" [The R ules of Creating Value] of 
23 January 2003; annotation: corporate case not considered here, as it has a purely strategic focus, without operational, 
market-related responsibility or competition) 
* self-evaluation of DT's top management. 
Table 24: Market Forces and Top-Level Organisational Learning 
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Furthermore, the overall findings also correspond to the top managers' estimates 
expressed in interviews on which parts of top management within individual cases learnt 
faster or better than others. In turn, all interviewed top managers unanimously agreed that 
within an individual case unit, there was faster or better learning amongst the parts of top 
management that had a direct interface to external clients or the market and with whom 
there was no obligation to contract such as with internal service or cross-divisional 
functions (e. g. human resources, finance, etc. ). 
This study also identified a correlation between market forces-caused in this case, for 
instance, by the deregulation of the corresponding market-and the frequency of the 
appearance of initiatives and methods for top-level organisational learning. This could be 
derived from an analysis of deployed methods for top-level organisational learning, such 
as organisation development projects, acquisitions or external recruiting activities133 
which, following Yeung et al. 's (1999) empirical study on organisational learning of middle 
managers or McGrath et al. 's research (1995) on the development of new competitive 
advantages, are fundamentally well-suited to developing the management capabilities 
required in fast-changing environments. At the same time, it was found that what applied 
to the top management of the business divisions and forces of customer markets, 
analogously applied to top management at headquarters and capital market forces. 
Due to the privatisation of DT group in the period under review and the relatively late 
liberalisation of the fixed network telecommunications market, this can best be illustrated 
by means of the top management of the fixed network business and DT's headquarters, 
which represented the majority of DT's top management for a long time 
134 Whereas, as 
shown in the figure below, very few major change initiatives were launched through the 
top management during the DT group's time as a state-owned monopolist, numerous 
133 This will be considered in greater detail in section 5.5. 
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projects were initiated after privatisation and DT's IPO135 in 1995 (annotation: above all 
numerous acquisitions) and the liberalisation of the fixed network telecommunications 
market in 1998 (see figure below; see also Chapter Four, section 4.4.3.2). 
Monopolist market position Keen Competition 
DT as a public authority DT as a private company 
Privati- Liberali- 
sation sation 
1990 1995 1998 2002 
h 
OD & Key Telekom 
c t& initiatives z °S KONTAKT Re-alignment Process 
headquarters Optimisation 
Fixed & branch IPO offices l t I Network mp emen s- 
Business & & 
tion Strategic Mergers Mgt. Holding 
Head- Acquisitions 
quarters « Four pillar » DT G oup 
-strategy 
t 
Prepared by author; 
annotation: the particularly highlighted initiatives were particularly complex and concerned the entire group 
Figure 8: OD & Key Initiatives Fixed Network Business & Headquarters DT Group 
As can be taken from the figure below, in the same period of time, the tenure of DT top 
management in the organisation significantly decreased due to acquisitions and steadily 
increasing external recruiting activities. 
134 In the other cases, there was greater market pressure from foundation on due to early deregulation and 
the development of the business. 
135 The IPO of DT group was finally imposed by the German federal government due to the enormous 
financial requirements (ca. 60 billion deutschmarks) for investments in the telecommunications 
infrastructure in former Eastern Germany (Buchner 1999, p. 13). 
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Dec. 1995: Jan. 1999: Aug. 2002: 
Tenure of DT's top managers in the group (in %) 
®>4 
years 
2-4 years 
- <2 years 
Prepared by author based upon corresponding top management HR department statistics. 136 
Figure 9: Development of the Top Management's Tenure in the Organisation 
Although it is known that top managers learn mainly from current practical experience in 
day-to-day business (Kammel 2000; Braddick 1988), from `learning-by-doing' (Schreyögg 
1984) and "... primarily through confrontations with novel situations and problems ... " 
(Davies and Easterby-Smith 1984, p. 180), it would be premature and too simple to draw 
the conclusion based upon these findings that market forces foster top-level 
organisational learning. This study showed rather that the frequency of the deployed 
initiatives and methods and thus potential options for top-level organisational learning 
increased as a result of increasing market forces. However, it would be tempting to 
concur that the deployment of such initiatives and methods is enough for top-level 
organisational learning to occur and that the deployment of such methods always leads to 
beneficial results. For a more in-depth consideration of that point it is referred to section 
5.3 on strategy. 
136 Note: No corresponding statistics were available until privatisation. According to the former head of the top 
management HR departments and some of his former colleagues, there were only very few external hires 
and no external acquisitions until privatisation, except in the then still relatively small spin-offs, Mobile and 
Systems. 
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In spite of that and due to the shown mediate connection between market forces and top- 
level organisational learning, this study confirms that customer as well as capital market 
forces matter for top-level organisational learning. However, the question remains why. 
Top management's explanations for this are looked at in the individual cases and in 
section 4.8. For example, the lacking "ballast of instructions and the civil service" was 
mentioned. That henceforth risks were taken and things done because they had to be 
done-without explicit instruction or authorisation. 
This suggests that top-level organisational learning might be related to an issue identified 
by Finkelstein and Hambrick (1996). Their research findings suggest that the mentioned 
forces in the top management's task environment, such as industry structure, regulation 
of the market, growth rate, capital intensity etc. greatly affect the level of managerial 
discretion and in turn how much influence managers have on organisational outcomes. 
They also found that in general far more discretion-and therefore more room for 
learning-is conferred to top managers when "there is a relative absence of clear means- 
ends linkages" and "an absence of direct and concentrated constraints" (Finkelstein and 
Hambrick 1996, p. 28). These aspects correspond precisely to what differentiated, for 
instance, the top management of the fixed network business before privatisation from the 
top management of the mobile communications business or the top management of the 
later (i. e. after privatisation) fixed network business. It suggests the conclusion that, by 
way of example, top level organisational learning in the mobile business was not only 
therefore perceived by top management as being overall faster and better because top 
management was subject to high pressure to succeed in the external market from the 
very start due to existing market developments and dependence from this market. 
Following Finkelstein and Hambrick's (1996) suggestion the top management of the 
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mobile business was also therefore more effective, irrespective of market pressure and 
pressure to succeed, as regards top level organisational learning because it had more 
options in terms of action and learning due to greater design and influence opportunities 
for organisational outcomes due to the lack of factors such as market regulation or public 
mandates. 
Against this background, the estimation of learning as better or more effective is qualified 
by the different starting conditions. A top manager from the mobile business made the 
following self-critical observation on learning success among top management in the 
various cases: 
"You have to qualify what you can affect against the background. It's doubtful 
that if you had put the then mobile top management in charge of the fixed 
network division that anything different would have resulted. " 
After it was possible to show that market forces benefit top-level organisational learning 
as well as determine the "room for learning" that top management has, legal constraints 
as a further identified exogenous factor of organisational learning at top management 
level will be subsequently explored. 
5.2.2 Legal Constraints 
It could be found in this study that organisational learning at DT group's top level was 
furthermore strongly influenced by restrictions of the civil service, i. e. the protection of civil 
servants by laws and regulations governing such state employees. The study showed 
that the presence or absence of public sector employment regulations above all affected 
the pace of unlearning as well as the pace and effectiveness of new top level 
organisational learning. Especially in fast changing environments like in this study, public 
sector employment regulations and "civil servant structures" on top level apparently delay 
adaptation processes or influence their efficiency in a negative way. 
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Apart from corresponding statements of interviewed top managers from all DT group 
businesses, this is supported by the significant decrease of the share of civil servants in 
DT group's top management in the course of time from 100% in 1990 to 14% in 2002, 
which cannot be explained by natural personnel turnover at top level only, but indicates 
intention and targeted actions137. It is also supported by the fact that in highly volatile 
environments (e. g. mobile business), separate subsidiaries were founded for this reason 
in order to-as is stated in the corresponding documentation (Blank 1996)-to bypass the 
constraints of public sector employment regulations (see sections 4.2.2 and 4.5.2), to 
increase the flexibility of the use of human resources and thus to achieve greater 
flexibility and quicker response to market requirements in this highly dynamic and 
competitive environment. This is also directly reflected in the composition of the different 
parts of DT's top management, where substantial differences could be found as regards 
the share of civil servants at the top level138 
In what follows, a closer look will be taken at why these legal constraints (i. e. public 
sector employment regulations) apparently had such an impact on the pace and 
effectiveness of top-level organisational learning. 
lt could be found in the cases of the fixed network business and DT's headquarters that 
until privatisation public sector employment regulations almost completely blocked access 
to the external labour market and thus to the adding of new skills from the external 
market. As acquisitions were not possible until privatisation due to legal restrictions, 
the 
possible spectrum of methods for top-level organisational learning was 
limited and had to 
137 As the then top management HR manager reported, most related changes 
happened first with the 
privatisation and the consequently altered legal framework as well as 
the gained access to the external 
labour market. 
138 e. g. nearly 100% civil servants in the top management of 
the fixed network business until privatisation of 
DT group whereas, with very few exceptions, 100% of 
the top management of the mobile business were 
externally appointed at that time. 
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be done on the basis of existing resources up to this time. As was shown in the relevant 
cases, top managers in the fixed network business as well as at headquarters themselves 
described learning on the exclusive basis of existing competencies, in particular with a 
view to the learning specialised competencies as less efficient (see sections 4.4.3.1 and 
4.7.2.3). This is supported by the fact that training measures started in the fixed network 
business with reference to this were halted due to the excessive amount of time required 
(see section 4.4.3.1). On-the-job learning was seen as inefficient by interviewed top 
management with these auspices. For example, they spoke of "very laborious project 
work" and substantiated this on the one hand with lacking expert knowledge (e. g. in 
sales, marketing), and on the other hand with fierce power struggles, micropolitical 
disagreements, lacking entrepreneurial spirit and great resistance to change that were 
reflected in endless discussions and long project durations. This evaluation by the 
interviewees is confirmed by Glotz139 who, for the same reason, described the constantly 
compromise-seeking and mediating first CEO of DT group (1989-1994), as a "strolling 
mediation committee" (Glotz 2001, p. 52). In fact, the Telekom KONTAKT project (see 
section 4.4.3.1) lasted 5 years (Telekom KONTAKT 1992-96), which is infeasible in a 
fast-changing and truly competitive environment. 
The above-mentioned fierce power struggles, lacking entrepreneurial spirit etc. are also 
signs that this could continue because of the lack of external recruiting and other addition 
of new competencies from outside; what Finger and Burgin-Brand (1999) called "more 
complex functioning and management', 140 or LaPalombara (2001) "normative idea" 
in the 
139 Peter Glotz 0 was a German politician, a social democrat, who sat on DT group's supervisory 
board for 
more than a decade. Afterwards he worked as a consultant 
for DT group. 
140Corresponding to Finger and Burgin Brand (1999) many public sector organisations are not qualitatively 
different from private sector organisations but due to the application of public 
law "... simultaneously under 
pressure from their own national governments, from the 
increasingly global market, and from their clients" 
(Finger and Burgin-Brand 1999, p. 133) so that "... they operate 
in a more difficult environment, which 
makes their functioning and their management more complex" 
(Finger and Burgin-Brand 1999, p. 130). 
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public sector, whose influence remained visible in many areas141. The "normative idea" 
expresses itself in additional dimensions that differentiate public from private sector 
organizations-among those orientation towards action and autonomy. Following 
LaPalombara's (2001) suggestion in public sector organisations action-up to the very 
top-tends to be reactive, and conservatism, not risk-taking becomes the modal 
orientation to action. As a result, organisational change in such organisations is 
extraordinarily difficult to carry off, given the magnitude of inertial forces and the informal 
influences and pressures that often limit the degrees of freedom open to persons in these 
organisations. 
This squares well with the clear estimation of top managers in this study, who-with the 
exception of three interviewed top managers, who were civil servants-all described 
every part of top management that had only a low proportion of civil servants and were 
put under private management earlier than other divisions as "fresher", more 
entrepreneurial and with a greater affinity to risk. In particular, this was the mobile 
business. 
Nevertheless, it would be dangerous to concur that civil servants are worse learners. 
Rather, it mirrors the idea of Sternberg and Lubart (1993, p. 9) according to which 
knowledge can be a double-edged sword and be beneficial and detrimental at the same 
time. 
141 Example: In 2002, the CEO Ron Sommer became more and more under attack in the wake of increasing 
financial debt incurred by the company as he invested billions in new technology (especially UMTS) and 
acquired the U. S. wireless group VoiceStream for over thirty billion euros. With the stock 
having lost 
almost 90% of its value during the past two years, the stockholders and some 
board members were 
attacking Sommer. Sommer vigorously defended himself, pointing out that he was transforming a century- 
old oversized government ministry into a global communications firm and that this 
involved taking sizeable 
risks. Sommer had support within the company ranks, but that became 
increasingly less important to the 
almost three million Germans who had decided to experiment 
in the stock market in the late nineties and 
were watching their investment melt away. During the 
German Government election campaign both 
chancellor Schröder and his opponent, Stoiber, saw these 
developments as a campaign issue that could 
be at once dangerous for Schröder and an opportunity to address voter concerns, especially 
in the face of 
rising unemployment and a continuing sluggish economy. 
Sommer had to step down. 
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A second important effect of public employment regulations on top-level organisational 
learning was that top civil servants could not be made redundant. Rather they had a 
guaranteed job for life. As a result, the fixed network and DT headquarters cases are a 
matter of a virtually entirely closed system up until privatisation. The reason for this is 
that, in both cases, there was no or only very limited access to external resources and top 
managers who were not ready or able to unlearn and/or learn new things142 could not be 
parted with. Corresponding to Hedberg (1981), Whittington (1993, p. 122) and likewise 
Bleicher (1991, p. 762) dismissals and the replacement of managers in key positions with 
people coming from outside the organisation represented an important, sometimes the 
only options when unlearning, as in the given example, e. g. among some presidents of 
the regional directorates, does obviously not occur and strategic change should be 
initiated. Only upon privatisation could the DT group-as the then head of top 
management HR reported and as arose from the corresponding documentation 143-make 
greater use of so-called consulting contracts with civil servants as top managers. 
Thereafter, the affected managers were available to the group as so-called "special 
consultants" until their retirement, maintaining at least their respective remuneration. In 
fact, they mostly no longer appeared (i. e. "they stayed at home"). Previously, there had 
been no possibility to sanction top managers who were civil servants whose undesirable 
learning behaviour and resistance could have been reacted to, due to legal public sector 
employment restrictions 144 
As mentioned before, the study showed that public sector employment regulations also 
had an important impact on the effectiveness of initiatives and methods for organisational 
142 A senior manager of the fixed network business put it this way: "In the fixed network business, there were 
and are many civil servants. The personnel structure and also the relatively high age structure up to the 
top level influence business. The change in spirit from monopolist to a price setter succeeded in part only 
through ageing and `dying off. " 
143 Precise figures cannot be given for confidentiality reasons. 
144 There was only the option of fostering desired behaviour by means of an additional incentive system, such 
as performance-related pay, which was introduced as part of Telekom KONTAKT 
(see section 4.4.3.1) 
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learning at top management level. Corresponding to Yeung et al. 's (1999) suggestion, 
management capabilities can best be developed in turbulent environments by direct 
experience and experimentation with new products, processes and structures. In this 
study, however, due to the aforementioned legal constraints, Yeung et al. 's approach 
could only partially be confirmed. Indeed, particularly top management learning in the 
mobile and online cases was seen as faster and better, which was primarily characterised 
by the building up work within the company. If, however, you follow Yeung et al. 's 
suggestion, the interviewed top managers would, for example, also have had to assess 
top-level organisational learning in connection with projects such as Telekom KONTAKT 
as efficient. That this was clearly not the case can be explained in different ways: Yeung 
et al. assumes an open system, i. e. that typically organisations mix-even if in different 
combinations and to varying degrees (Yeung et al. 1999, p. 38)-all learning styles, 
including competency acquisition from externally through e. g. recruitment or acquisitions. 
This was, however, nearly not the case in the fixed network and HQ cases until DT's 
privatisation. Yeung et al's research did also not take into account that for whatever 
reason, not only were no new managers recruited at the top level, but no existing 
managers could be made redundant. A further limitation of his study was his focus mainly 
on middle management and not the top management level, where specific influence 
factors such as power struggles and positional solitudes of top managers are much more 
important. And finally Yeung et al. 's study was carried out in private companies (Yeung et 
al. 1999, p. 39) so that his research did not take into consideration specific characteristics 
of public sector organisations as in this study. 
Consequently, the findings of this study suggest, as an extension of Yeung et al. 's (1999) 
approach, that top-level organisational learning in turbulent environments mandatorily 
requires the acquisition of external resources if the top management should get 
hold of 
specific competencies in time and overcome inertial forces and crusty structures. 
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5.2.3 Summary Component Exogeneous Factors 
In this section the external factors that generate or impede a pressing need for top-level 
organisational learning or that expand or narrow down options to respond to a learning 
need were analysed. 
As with Antonacopoulou (1999) in her study on management learning in the retailing 
banking sector, in this case a closer relationship between the arising of market forces and 
top level organisational learning could also be identified. 
It could thus be found that not only learning requirements are derived from market forces, 
but also the frequency of arising of initiatives and methods for top-level organisational 
learning is influenced by these. In addition, it could be shown that Finkelstein and 
Hambrick's study (1996) can be extended to top-level organisational learning. The top 
management's task environment such as industry structure, regulation of the market, 
growth rate, capital intensity etc. not only determines managerial discretion but greatly 
affects room for learning and in turn top management's influence opportunities on 
organisational outcomes. This became visible particularly based on the pace and 
effectiveness of top-level organisational learning. In the case-spanning and case-internal 
view, the parts of top management that were subject to greater market pressure and 
market dependence learned relatively earlier or faster. In the corporate case, the capital 
market took the place of the customer markets. 
As a second important exogenous factor that exerted an influence on organisational 
learning at top management level, public sector employment regulations could be 
identified. As was shown with the fixed network and DT headquarters cases, this meant 
top-level organisational learning up to privatisation was based solely on existing 
resources. New top managers and specific, new expert know-how could not 
be added to 
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top management through external recruiting, nor could civil servants be removed from top 
management by dismissals. This also meant that old thinking and acting patterns-here 
specific characteristics of the public sector (compare: Finger and Burgin-Brand 1999; 
LaPalombara 2001)-could outlive their usefulness at the top level. As a result, slow 
unlearning (see: Hedberg 1981; Whittington 1993; Bleicher 1991) and not effective top- 
level organisational learning could be identified as a weakness of these two case 
organisations. 
These research findings led also to a suggestion concerning the methods for 
organisational learning at top management level that should be applied in turbulent 
environments. Corresponding to Yeung et al. (1999), management capabilities can best 
be developed in turbulent environments by direct experience and the experimentation 
with new products, processes and structures. But the analysis of the exogenous factors in 
this study showed, that top-level organisational learning in turbulent environments 
additionally absolutely requires unlearning and the external acquisition of competencies 
(e. g. through external recruiting) in order to get hold of specific expert knowledge on time 
and to overcome inertial forces. 
5.3 Strategy 
Corresponding to a series of academics in the field of management and executive 
learning, there are from the perspective of a manager no "learning" problems per se. The 
manager's primary concern raised in the literature would rather be to respond to a 
performance requirement and manage a business problem with success (compare e. g. 
Antonacopoulou 1999; Richter 1999; Baldwin and Lawson 1995; Mumford 1988) 145 This 
is why this study, which seeks to contribute to a better understanding of organisational 
145 This might also be related to the problem identified by Baldwin and 
Lawson (1995) that once a manager 
made the decision to engage in a strategic process or project, 
learning would become a secondary 
purpose, and the manager even might not want to be perceived as a 
learner. 
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learning at top management level, has to have a look at the organisations' strategic 
objectives of which the top management's strategic approach to learning is consequently 
an integral part. 
Although agreement is largely predominant in the literature regarding the importance of 
learning processes for strategy development (see e. g. Mintzberg 1995; Quinn 1980) a 
more in-depth understanding of the relationship between strategy and top-level 
organisational learning is still lacking. Although we know that top managers have a 
preference for incremental learning approaches, i. e. for learning-by-doing (see e. g. 
Burgoyne and Stuart 1976; Burgoyne and Hodgson 1983; Stuart 1984; Davies and 
Easterby-Smith 1984; Mumford 1986; Braddick 1988; Kammel 2000; Antonacopoulou 
2002), and at any point in time have the power to influence the strategies, goals and 
design of the organisation (Duncan and Weiss 1979), precisely such incremental 
approaches are clearly only partly suitable, when substantial and fast change or 
adaptation respectively has to occur (see e. g. Schreyögg 1984; Ansoff 1991; Baldwin and 
Lawson 1995; Hamel and Prahalad 1996). Likewise the study by Yeung et al. (1999) 
suggests that in turbulent contexts only some of what he calls "learning styles" are 
effective. This raised the question under what circumstances the top management 
actually acquires the competencies to be successful (see also Storey 1989; Storey 1990) 
and refers to Baldwin and Lawson's call (1995) for a planned process or strategy. 
In what follows, a closer look will therefore be taken at the analysis of strategies as an 
outcome of strategy development and related learning processes of the top management 
(Mintzberg 1995; Quinn 1980). A particular emphasis will be put on the initiatives and 
methods for top-level organisational learning that derived from these strategies as well as 
on the interaction of corporate or business strategies respectively. Apart from potential 
conflicts of aims that could arise from the differing alignment of divisional top 
management groups to customer markets and the corporate top management group to 
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the capital market and its impact on top-level organisational learning, particular focus will 
be put on the implications for the development of business and corporate strategies. 
5.3.1 Strategy and Methods of Top-Level Organisational Learning 
As already illustrated, one corporate case (i. e. the top management of DT's 
headquarters) and three divisional cases were able to be identified in the case 
organisation DT group, where the top management of the fixed network, Mobile/Online 
and Systems business-as can be taken from the table below-had very different 
strategic challenges. As will be shown later in this section, this had corresponding effects 
and was reflected in the methods of top-level organisational learning deployed. 
Fixed network MobilelOnline Systems 
Business - Best quality strategy in the - Establishment and - Establishment and 
strategy premium segment 
development of the development of the 
- Minimise the loss of market business business 
share - Mobile: full range with - Best quality for individual 
comprehensive service for network and application 
mobile communication; concepts + bespoke 
- Online: Development of services for large national 
new business with strategic and international clients 
artnershi s 
Corresponding Corres Corres - Strategic re-alignment - 
New technologies and - Build a company of 
learning towards a 
financially-run standards, but most of all international reach 
challenges of 
company new marketing and sales - Refinement of group 
- Fundamental re- concepts products to a universal and the Top 
organisation towards - Establishment of high- uniform portfolio of high- Management 
customer-oriented appropriate organisation quality, customer-specific 
organisation products and services 
- Cultural change beyond national boundaries 
- Consistent optimisation of key financial indicators Corporate Co Co 
- Increase the value of the company Strategy 
- Higher company profile and a strong brand 
- Compensate for the loss of domestic market share through external growth and 
acquisitions at home and abroad 
Table 25: Strategic Requirements for Top-Level Organisational Learning 
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While it was a matter of setting up a large organisation and former monopolist in line with 
the saturated market in the fixed network division, the challenges facing top management 
in the mobile and online businesses were developing a market and the complete set-up of 
the business on the basis of new, modern products and services. 
The Systems division was also built from scratch, though they made great use of DT- 
internal products and services, which they then refined into bespoke solutions for national 
and international corporate clients. In contrast was the group viewpoint, according to 
which, there should be an overall improvement in key financial indicators and investments 
(e. g. in external growth) throughout the businesses. 
This resulted in very different challenges and learning requirements for the individual top 
management teams. The question that arises from that, however, is which concrete 
initiatives and methods of top-level organisational learning derived from the formulated 
corporate and individual business strategies in this turbulent environment, and which 
"learning styles", as Yeung et al. (1999) call them, were applied. 
The table below sums up those initiatives and methods for top-level organisational 
learning which were deployed either at corporate or divisional level and which the 
interviewed top managers themselves considered-irrelevant of how the learning results 
are to be evaluated-as having been important for top-level organisational learning. 
Played a role for TLOL? * 
Top Mgt. No No 
Trainin 
Regrouping 
around required No 
No 
competencies 
External 
recruiting 
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Dismissals/ 
deliberate 
turnover 
Restructuring ® No 
Approaches at 
corporate Played a role for TLOL? * 
Spin-Off in 
separate No 
subsidiaries 
Diversification No No 
(Merger with dSH) 
IPO & Joint 
b di ran ng 
Use of central 
functions and No No 
resources 
Acquisitions 
Four-pillar- 
strategy 
(business 
redefinitions) 
Top Mgt. 
Training 
legend: 
yes, but up to a very limited extent; 
= yes, to a moderate extent 
= yes, to a high extent 
= yes, to a very high extent 
No = was not deployed/ not relevant 
*annotation: Evaluation based upon self-assessment by interviewed top managers as well as the analysis of 
corresponding documentation; Those initiatives and methods for top-level organisational learning which 
were viewed as the most important ones are highlighted in grey. 
Table 26: Importance of Initiatives and Methods of TLOL 
It was very apparent that the significance that the top managers interviewed attached to 
an initiative or method for top-level organisational learning did not necessarily correlate 
with the frequency of its appearance, which suggests that certain initiatives and methods 
were more powerful than others. This applied particularly to measures that the top 
managers held for important structures for top-level organisational learning, such as 
"Regrouping around Required Competencies" (Telekom KONTAKT), "Spin-Offs", or 
"Diversification" (e. g., the merger with Debis Systemhaus (dSH) or the implementation of 
the "four-pillar strategy". Their particulars are looked at in more detail in section 5.4 on 
organisation. 
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Overall, it was found that DT's top management deployed principally on-the-job initiatives 
and methods for top-level organisational learning, which relate to what Yeung et al. 
(1999) called the learning styles "controlled experimentation" (with new products, 
processes, structures) and "competency acquisition" (e. g. through recruitment, 
acquisitions etc; ), and which according to his research findings, are the most effective 
learning styles in turbulent environments. The overall emphasis on changes of the 
structuring of the organisation confirms Kammel (2000) who-similar to Berends 
(Berends et al. 2003)-considers structures and executive learning as powerful, parallel, 
inseparable processes, which are strongly interrelated and which continuously influence 
and control each other. The strong focus on external recruiting of the divisional top 
management groups however relates to Simon's (1991) suggestion according to which 
organisational learning can also take place by `ingesting' holders of knowledge, the 
organisation and/or top management did not previously have. 
If you compare the divisional approaches with one another, it is clear that these are quite 
different. Whereas the top management of the fixed network business put a stronger 
emphasis on what Hedberg (1981) called "unlearning" and related personnel and 
structural measures to adapt and align existing resources within a large organisation to 
required competencies, the focus in the other, initially small, but fast-growing, divisions 
was on rapidly sourcing on the external labour market the competencies needed for the 
establishment of these new businesses. In this respect, compared to the new businesses, 
the fixed network business put a stronger emphasis on Yeung et al. 's (1999) learning 
style, `controlled experimentation', whereas Mobile/Online and Systems mainly applied 
the learning style `competency acquisition'. In both cases, off-the-job training by means of 
top management training played (see e. g. Antonacopoulou 2002) a subordinate role in 
the organisational learning of DT's top management. Despite a long "tradition of training" 
in the former state utility, with comprehensive, time-intensive training courses even at the 
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top level, off-the-job training was seen as unsuitable for rapidly gaining the required 
competencies (see section 4.4.3.1)146 Instead, after the privatisation and the subsequent 
derestriction of access to the external labour market, appropriate hires were made. This 
brought in a series of people for key positions with the required specialised knowledge, 
and according to a member of the fixed network division board, "the right attitude". This 
confirms the point identified by Kammel (2000, p. 659), and Beer et al. (1990) that training 
programs can only increase the probability and efficiency of strategic change and 
learning, but do not change organisational behaviour as they do not affect enough 
elements in the system. 
The analysis of the corresponding documentation established that, in addition to the 
projects and methods for TLOL named by the top managers in interviews, there had also 
been initiatives that match the learning styles "benchmarking and "continuous 
improvement' (compare (Yeung et al. 1999)). However, these clearly only played a 
subordinate role, as can be seen in the number, scope and duration of such activities and 
projects, and also in the comments by top managers. (see section 4.4.2.3). 
This leads to the conclusion that Yeung et al. 's (1999) model of learning styles, which 
was based upon a study with middle managers, can also be applied to top managers. 
These findings indicate further that also at top level the choice of the `right' initiatives and 
methods for top-level organisational learning depends on contextual considerations. 
146 It could be found that after previous measures had been stopped due to a lack of success, the 
later 
restarted attempt by DT headquarters at a top management training initiative failed 
due to a lack of 
interest on the part of the group board in the content of the training. (A member of the corporate 
board: : "I 
don't think much of training and coaching. "; see also section 4.7.3). This in turn caused 
frustration and 
raised transfer-problems for those top managers who did not perceive the 
training as an incentive 
(compare Salaman and Butler 1994). 
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5.3.2 Business versus Corporate Strategies 
However, it would be too tempting to similarly judge the target group top management 
analogous to Yeung et al. that "Experimenters Are High Performers" (Yeung et al. 1999, 
p. 61). This would namely suggest drawing the conclusion that in that fast changing 
environment, these learning styles were not only effective, but always led to beneficial 
results. As can be taken from table below, this was not always the case. The evaluation 
by the top management is further supported by the evolution of the financial performance 
indicators of DT group (compare section 4.2.4), which ended up in a record loss for DT 
group of the extremely large sum of 24.6 billion Euro in 2002. Further evidence for the not 
exclusively positive results could likewise be found in some DT internal auditing reports 
(e. g. DT internal audit report, Nov. 27,2002 on restructurings in the fixed network 
business). 
Important 
approaches to 
Fixed network Mobile/ online Systems 
" 
Approaches at 
divisional level: Evaluation of the impact of Divisional Approaches to TLOL* 
Top Mgt. ( J. J. 
Training 
Regrouping J. J. 
around required 
competencies 
External 
recruiting 
Dismissals/ 
deliberate 
turnover 
Restructuring 147 
J. 
App roaches at 
t l l Evaluation of the impact of Corporate Approaches on 
TLOL* 
pora e cor eve : 
Spin-Off in 
/ ' separate . . 
subsidiaries 
/Ilk 
Diversification J. 
/. (here into the IT business throught 
the merger with debis S stemhaus 
IPO & Joint 
branding 
147 These measures were viewed by the top management as a means to 
lower costs and improve operational 
efficiency or to eliminate organisational slack (see e. g. Dutton and 
Freedman 1985). Yeung (Yeung et al. 
1999, p. 32) notes in that connection, that organisations are more 
likely to learn from direct experience if they 
have sufficient slack resources. 
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U f se o central 
functions and 
resources ** 
® ý. 
(due to Spin-off) . 
/. 
(due to Spin-off) 
Acquisitions 
Four-pillar- 
strategy 
(business 
redefinitions) 
Top Mgt. 
Training 
legend: 
= rather negative 
= rather neutral 
= rather positive 
/. = not affected by that initiative/ method 
*annotation: Evaluation based upon self-assessment by interviewed top managers as well as the analysis of corresponding documentation especially DT internal auditing reports; Those initiatives and methods for top-level organisational learning 
which produced rather negative/detrimental results are additionally highlighted in grey. mainly so-called "Personalserviceagentur" where staff was allocated that could not be made redundant for legal reasons (e. g. civil servants, ... etc. ) 
Table 27: Divisional and Corporate Approaches to TLOL 
In contrast to the findings of Yeung et al. 's (1999) research on middle managers, the 
findings of this study on DT's top management suggest that the interaction of corporate 
and divisional strategies and resulting deployed initiatives and methods is rather crucial 
for effective top management learning to occur. As can be taken from the table above, 
corporate approaches such as mergers & acquisitions or the implementation of the four- 
pillar-strategy often produced undesired, partly detrimental learning results. According to 
the affected top managers, they additionally often triggered detrimental dynamics at the 
divisional level. It could thus be found (see table above) that e. g. after some large 
investments in acquisitions by the group management, the scope and frequency of 
restructuring and cost-cutting measures in the fixed network segment increased so much 
that this was not just seen as "damaging" or "unacceptable" by the top managers. Even 
the group auditors carried out an audit into the negative consequences of the frequent 
restructuring (DT internal audit report, Nov. 27,2002) on the orders of the board. 
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Similar developments could also be observed in the Systems business after the merger 
with debis Systemhaus, where the fluctuation at the top level as well as the number of 
external hires and restructuring projects increased hugely after the "decreed" merger. It 
was so pronounced that the Systems top management were not only seen by colleagues 
as a "disorderly crew" with unclear direction and a lack of cohesion. As corresponding 
documentation showed-at times three organisational structures applied simultaneously: 
1. Those to be found in the formal procedures (i. e. job and organisation plans etc. ), 
2. Those that were lived but not yet shown in the formal procedures, 
3. and the new ones that the Systems management board had already decided upon as 
a new organisation and that were lined up for implementation. 
These symptoms, which might be caused by what Campbell et al. (1995) called wasteful 
investment or diversification into new businesses, presumably result from subtle 
differences between the businesses (here telecommunications and IT) and a lack of 
sufficient understanding of the critical success factors in the business on the part of 
headquarters. The latter aspect will be considered in more detail in section 5.5. 
Against that background, this "experimentation" with new services, processes, structures, 
... etc. cannot at all 
be viewed as effective, regardless of which criteria one could now 
apply to measure effectiveness. Particularly because the organisation increasingly 
concerned itself with itself. 
That Yeung et al. (1999) did not identify this critical aspect for effective top management 
learning, which forms the basis of the interaction between corporate and divisional 
strategies and resulting approaches to top management learning, might on the one 
hand 
be attributed to the fact that Yeung et al. 's research was concerned with studying mostly 
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middle managers who are per definition less concerned by potential conflicts of goals 
between corporate and business strategies. On the other hand it might be attributed to 
the fact that Yeung et al. 's study was carried out mainly in larger companies in mature 
businesses, whereas in this study on DT's top management, there was a mix of fast 
growing and mature businesses as well as of smaller and larger organisations within one 
large group. 
In practice, however, an increasing number of top managers in large companies may 
increasingly be confronted by this mix, with the advent and growth of diversified firms with 
a corresponding divisionalised structuring. These top managers increasingly have to 
consider the vested interests of both the units and the group, and have to think in terms 
of relationships and dependencies. Not without reason did Finkelstein and Hambrick 
(1996, p. 8) call for more attention to be paid to these managers in decentralised firms in 
studies of top executives in such firms. 
5.3.3 Strategy Development in Divisionalised Firms 
The described partly even detrimental effects of the deployed initiatives and methods for 
top level organisational learning raised the question why these effects occurred. 
The findings of this study suggest that the lack of coordination of the deployed initiatives 
and methods for top-level organisational learning is responsible. It could 
be found that 
corporate launched initiatives and methods primarily focussed on the capital market 
(e. g. 
IPO, mergers & acquisitions, four-pillar-strategy etc. ), whereas initiatives and methods 
at 
divisional level were more strongly aligned with the customer market and organic growth. 
This inevitably led to conflicts in goals, which were clearly not sufficiently solved 
by the 
formal, so-called "Integrated Planning and Management 
Process" in the case 
organisation, in the scope of which goals were 
formulated and cascaded. For want of 
another platform to develop and harmonise strategies, a group-wide, 
coordinated, 
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strategic approach with a view to both customer and capital markets could not be 
achieved. 
Evidence for the apparently lacking involvement of above all divisional top managers in 
the group's strategy development and corresponding decision-making could be found in 
that even central strategic questions were not clear in the businesses. This is clarified in 
the table below with statements by divisional top managers on the acquisition strategy: 
Typical statement of a top Interview statement concerning the group's acquisition 
manager from the following strategy: 
business.... 
Fixed network "As far as our acquisition strategy is concerned, we have to 
define clear fields of expansion,... " (section 4.4.3.2) 
Mobile/Online "... as it was the group's CEO who decided to do it although it 
was a mistake, it was very easy for the divisions to deny 
responsibility. They didn't make the decision.... " 
"Internationalisation was not clearly defined.. " (section 4.5.3) 
Systems "The merger with debis? We knew nothing. We didn't even know 
what Dr. Sommer (annotation: CEO of DT group) wanted with 
debis. Then, suddenly they launched an integration project... ". 
"Here [in the matter of international acquisitions] the question of 
integration is still unclear. We don't have a competitive portfolio 
and the respective national companies are not really being led. " 
(see section 4.6.3) 
Table 28: Acquisition Strategy from Business Perspective 
These statements square well with the top management's overall assessment of 
the 
quality of the strategy development process, in which, according 
to Mintzberg (1995), 
learning processes play the crucial role. It could thus be found that according 
to more 
than 46% of all interviewed top managers, there was no satisfactorily shared common 
understanding of DT group's strategic alignment. 35% even spoke of a very 
poor shared 
understanding. A further 14% declined to comment. 
The reason for this overall bad 
assessment was given as the lacking link of corporate 
top management-starting with the 
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group board-to the divisional top management groups, which is why one inevitably 
concentrates on one's "own" goals and strateg ies'" . According to the criticism of 
numerous division managers, and also to self-critical representatives of headquarters, 
corporate level was badly grounded and lacked a feel for implementability. Above all, 
there was a lack of trust, of real interest in the assessments and experience of the top 
divisional managers, as well as a lack of communication and exchange on these 
topiCS149 
The latter is supported by a corresponding group auditing report (source: DT internal 
audit report, Nov. 27,2002, page 71) in which was additionally soberly noted: 
"... no analysis of previous measures was used as a basis for the further 
planning of measures. " (compare section 4.4.3.2) 
This suggests that the necessity of more intensively involving the top managers from the 
divisions and of learning from their experiences was clearly not seen at group level. This 
is supported by the fact that top management meetings at the group level during the 
tenure of CEO Dr. Sommer (1995-2002) actually only took place once a year as a rule15o 
and then in the highly-controversial format mentioned in section 4.3.2. 
148 This conclusion is suggested by the following quote from a former manager who headed the group's 
strategy department: "The best strategy is the one nobody knows. " 149 A divisional senior HR manager reported for instance of a top management meeting which took place 
shortly after some costly acquisitions: 
"The board of directors do nothing to involve the top management. The last top management meeting in 
December was a show-event - only appeals. Issues such as strategy, culture, the integration of new 
acquisitions or finance schemes were not discussed. These themes were simply presented. I was shaken. 
A member of the corporate board of management presented the latest cost-cutting programme. On the 
last chart, corresponding measures had been presented including `no more biscuits during meetings, 
reduction of subscriptions for newspapers', etc. Impertinent! I mean there were people from the business 
divisions 
... who were in charge of very important budgets, of billions! At the same time the board of 
management did not set an example. They kept their Lear jets, they had their plates with bite-sized fruit 
and biscuits during their meetings, etc. The highlight of that meeting followed later on. Somebody asked 
where the billions that would still be missing after the presented measures would come from? A board 
member answered to this question that we could not talk about that because otherwise we would find an 
article about this discussion in tomorrow's newspapers. So much concerning discussion about strategy, a 
shared understanding of strategy and trust at top management level.... " 
150 The only exception was the introduction of the T brand. One of the CEO's direct reports in DT's 
headquarters put the further course in a nutshell: "The dialogue culture [between the CEO and the top 
management] we had in the times of Ricke sen. became stunted in the era of Sommer. " 
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The lacking involvement and inadequate strategy development process-as emerges 
from the individual cases (see table on acquisition strategy above for an example)-led to 
concrete consequences for top-level organisational learning: 
  Firstly, it was unclear to many top managers what the goals were. 
  Secondly, the divisional top managers did not feel responsible for the quality of the 
implementation. 
Both surfaced in the case of the acquisition strategy as lacking integration or quality of 
integration projects, which was also referred to in corresponding DT internal 
documentation (e. g. Deutsche Telekom 2002) . 
This confirms the point made by Quinn (1980) that for effective learning to occur, above 
all those with most specific knowledge or who have to carry out the decisions have to be 
sufficiently and systematically involved in strategy development. It also mirrors the 
suggestion from numerous authors and researchers (e. g. Humble 1973; Stewart and 
Stewart 1981; Lloyd 1990; Hoeksema et al. 1997; Eisenhardt et al. 1998) that real and 
effective learning to take place at top level requires that based upon regular and/or 
frequent interaction the top managers themselves recognize a strong learning need, 
understand the meaning of the learning challenge and make the decision to engage in 
the learning process. This suggests in turn that in a divisionalised firm it is not enough for 
effective top-level organisational learning to occur to have a corresponding strategy 
development process for business strategies at divisional level. 
In fact, the findings of this study suggest that top managers in such companies urgently 
need inter-divisional platforms for strategy development, also with regard to the 
implementation of corporate strategies and to coordinate and harmonise corporate and 
business strategies. In the absence of corresponding platforms or processes for the 
concerned top managers, corporate strategies bear the risk to produce not effective top- 
level organisational learning. 
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5.3.4 Summary Component Strategy 
This section concentrated on the analysis of both business as well as corporate 
strategies. It could be found that different initiatives and methods for top-level 
organisational learning derived from different strategies. This corresponds with the 
learning styles "controlled experimentation" (with new products, processes, structures 
etc. ) and "competency acquisition" (e. g. through external recruiting, acquisitions etc. ), 
which Yeung et al. (1999) identified as the most effective ones in a turbulent environment 
in his study on organisational learning of middle managers, which suggests that Yeung et 
al. 's model can fundamentally be applied to top managers. It could be found that different 
focuses with regard to the deployed initiatives and methods for top-level organisational 
learning are not just attached to contextual considerations, but also result from the 
corresponding need for unlearning (Hedberg 1981). 
However, a noted limitation was that only an indirect connection between the frequency of 
the appearance of certain methods and initiatives and their significance for TLOL could 
be identified. Furthermore, the selected methods and initiatives, contrary to Yeung et al. 's 
(1999) suggestion, did not always lead to effective top-level organisational learning or 
beneficial results in an environment of turbulent change. Instead, partially undesired 
learning results occurred due to the insufficient interaction between corporate and 
divisional strategies and corresponding methods and initiatives for top-level 
organisational learning. To make Yeung et al. 's (1999) model applicable for top managers 
in diversified firms, it therefore needs to be complemented correspondingly. One can 
additionally derive particular demands on strategy development in diversified firms from 
the findings. From a learning perspective, platforms for the development and 
harmonisation of both corporate and divisional strategies are mandatorily required if 
effective top-level organisational learning should occur. 
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5.4 Organisation 
According to Klimecki (1997), the top management and the organisation form an 
inevitable learning community. This suggests that top-level organisational learning cannot 
be understood without consideration of the interactions with the organisational context, or 
to put it another way, when the top management and the organisation are considered as 
separate subjects of learning. For that reason Berends (Berends et al. 2003) claims to 
differentiate between agents of learning who undertake actions and interact and 
organisational references (e. g. resources and capabilities of the organisation) for analytic 
reasons only. 
In this section the specific characteristics of the component "organisation" and their 
impact on top-level organisational learning will be analysed in greater detail. This will 
contribute to the understanding of which organisational factors foster or hinder top-level 
organisational learning. A particular emphasis will be put on inertial forces such as the 
size, age and culture of the organization, on the firm's resources as well as on which 
influence they exerted on top-level organisational learning. Furthermore, a special focus 
will lie on the frequency of organisational change as well as on the structuring and 
restructuring of the organisation which is following Kammel (2000, pp. 382) not only a 
fundamental object of executive work but simultaneously result of managerial learning. 
Against the background of the above-mentioned potential shortcoming of an isolated 
consideration of the "organisation" component, reference is made to section 5.7 on the 
dynamic interrelationships between the components of the conceptual framework of this 
study. 
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5.4.1 Complexity of the Organisation and Top-Level Organisational Learning 
The corresponding case organisations did not only differ concerning the learning 
challenges they had to face (see section 5.3.1) but also as regards the main 
characteristics of the organisation. As will now be shown the organisational context 
influenced top-level organisational learning in many ways. 
The findings of this study suggest that a crucial point is what the interviewed top 
managers called "complexity of the organisation". More than 3/4 of the interviewed top 
managers-and here above all top managers with a short tenure in the organisation- 
identified Telekom's complexity as the strongest barrier to top-level organisational 
learning. This barrier was recognized by the interviewed managers as strongest at the 
corporate level, in the Systems business as well as in fixed network business151. 
However, what precisely was meant by "organisational complexity", what its sources were 
and exact effects on top-level organisational learning, and what the top management did 
in order to overcome that barrier will be analysed in greater detail in the following 
sections. 
5.4.1.1 The Impact of Size and Age of the Organisation 
It could be found that the main problems with organisational complexity for top-level 
organisational learning occurred in the fixed network business and at group level. 
According to the interviewed top managers themselves-and here above all external 
hires-these problems consisted to a large extent in the difficulty of understanding "how 
Telekom ticks" (quote of an interviewed top manager in the fixed network business). 
This was on the one hand attributed by the interviewed top managers to the 
large size of 
the organisation which became evident e. g in the volume of business activity and 
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number of employees (see table below), the resulting large number of levels of the 
organisation and high division of labour. On the other hand it was attributed to DT's age 
and heavy bureaucratic organisation 152 (see Darbishire 1997), which was often caused by 
what Drucker (1994) called the "theory of the business" of a public authority with a public 
mandate, 
153 
Case Case Case Case 
"Fixed Network" "Mobile / Online" "Systems" "Headquarters" 
Mature Young Young Young Mature 
Age and origin of Formally arose 1990 Spin-Off of a Spin-Off of Spin-Off of a Formally arose 1990 the organisation from the previous mobile an online Systems from the previous `Authority for Posts and subsidiary in subsidiary in subsidiary in 'Authority for Posts and Telecommunications' 1993 1996 1994 Telecommunications' 
Size of the 
business Very large Medium Small Medium Very large** 
(compared to other 
parts of DT in 
2002) 
Sales 25.4 19.7 1.8 11.3 53.7 
(in billion ¬) 
2002 
No. of employees 148,900 41,597 2,814 43,292 255,969 
2002 
Impact of size and 
age on top-level Very high Low Low Low Very high 
organisational 
learning* 
Source: annual reports DT group 1998 and 2002 
* Evaluation by interviewed top managers in comparison with other parts of DT's top management 
"" corresponds to DT group 
Table 29: Age and Size of the Case Organisations 
In the assessment of the top managers interviews, the direct consequences of the size 
and age of the organisation on top-level organisational learning were that top managers 
had to oversee and design very large organisations with a large body of partly 
151 This estimate squares well with the top management's own estimate of the `learning performance' of the 
various parts of the top management (compare section 4.9), where the top management of the 
headquarters and of Systems business came out with the lowest results. 
152 Annotation: According to the assessment of the top managers from the technical and field organisation of 
the fixed network business, this was due to the huge experience and knowledge of organisational trade 
in 
mass telephony (see section 4.4.2.2). Even if "what was offered worked" (quote of a top manager who 
headed a technical department in the fixed network business), there was clearly a lack of the necessary 
flexibility, procedural speed and efficiency. 
153 Annotation: As a public authority and provider of infrastructural service structures, routines, employment 
conditions etc. had been set and defined in detail by public regulations and parliamentary 
legislation. 
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idiosyncratic and tacit knowledge of how to run the business (Grant 1996). To do this 
required specific knowledge of the organisation, the coordination process and, with 
respect to longer action-response times, patience. For, on the corporate level as well as 
in the area of fixed networks, it often took a lot of time until initiatives for top-level 
organisational learning, such as organisational measures (compare section 5.3.2), were 
implemented and demonstrated any results. The analysis of the time periods of 
corresponding projects confirmed that such initiatives on the corporate level and in the 
area of fixed networks took on average 2-3 years; in some cases, even 5 years (e. g. 
Telekom KONTAKT (1992-1996)). Such long project periods, or to say it in the words of 
March- the "... distance in time and space between the locus of learning and the locus 
for the realization of returns... " (March 1991, p. 85), however, made it impossible for the 
corresponding top management groups to react quickly and spontaneously to changes in 
the market. Furthermore, given that top managers learn, according to Kammel's (2000) 
suggestion, mainly through the design of structures and what he called `structural 
leadership', the top management's opportunities to learn were limited by these inertial 
forces. 
Other than that, it was evidently difficult to predict the right timing and which measures 
would have which effect on the organisation, especially for newcomers. 154 An externally- 
hired senior manager of the fixed network business put it in a nutshell: 
"How could we know that is was the right moment for a certain development? And if we 
thought it was the right moment-how could we know afterwards what would really be the 
outcome of the planned initiative? " 
154 Annotation: Without exception, the interviewed external hires from headquarters and the fixed network 
business expressed experiencing difficulty with the complexity of Telekom's organisation. 
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The described phenomenon confirms the point made by Hannan and Freeman (1984), 
who found that co-ordination processes in large, mature organisations such as DT group 
or the fixed network business require more time and effort due to the sluggishness of the 
organisation. The findings also mirror the suggestion of Finkelstein and Hambrick (1996), 
according to which, `inertial forces' limit executive latitude, which means that top 
managers in large, mature organisations not only operate, but also learn under severe 
constraints. 
This raised the question of what the top management did to overcome or deal with these 
constraints. Two different approaches could be identified in this study. 
It could thus be found in this study that the top management created subsidiaries in new 
emerging, fast growing markets to "follow changes much more easily" (quote from an 
interview) and break with the ballast of the past. Starting with the mobile business, the 
creation of these companies in new business areas served, according to interviews with 
senior managers and documentation (see Blank 1996), explicitly to minimise inertial 
forces, to increase flexibility and to bypass the highly centralised, bureaucratic, and 
cumbersome formal organisation of Deutsche Telekom (see annual report DT group, 
1995). In addition, the subsidiaries, which emerged from corresponding projects, were run 
exclusively according to financial goals in the first years after their founding. 
The creation of such subsidiaries had an important impact on top-level organisational 
learning, as it enhanced, in line with Finkelstein and Hambrick's suggestion (1996), 
executive latitude and thus expanded the top management's repertory of learning 
options. It could thus be found that the top management of these initially very small and 
flexible subsidiaries could develop from the start relatively untouched from the rest of 
the 
organisation. As everything was built up from the scratch, they could concentrate on 
learning new things and on the development of these new businesses. 
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The success of this approach can, apart from corresponding statements of interviewed 
top managers, be derived from the fact that the decision on the spin-off of the online 
business was also officially justified with the positive experiences of the earlier spin-offs of 
Mobile (1993) and Systems (1994) (see annual report DT group, 1995). 
As inertial forces resulting from size and age cannot be avoided in large, mature 
organisations (Hannan and Freeman 1984), the top management of such organisations in 
turbulent periods is particularly challenged. The study indicates that mixed top 
management groups consisting of company veterans and new, external hires can deal 
best with these constraints. 
This is supported by the fact that in the fixed network division, according to the former 
head of the top management HR department, neither the "old" Telekom top managers, 
who rejected cooperation with and the ideas of the new top managers, nor the external 
hires, who tried to implement changes alone without the cooperation of the "old" Telekom 
managers, could gain lasting purchase. This could only be achieved by externals at 
headquarters due to the lack of operational responsibility. The external hires in the fixed 
network division had left the company once more after 1-2 years' service, according to 
some of the interviewed top managers from the fixed network division. The corresponding 
old "Telekomers" had received consultant contracts or taken early retirement. Directly 
after the company's privatisation in 1995 and the release of legal restrictions, there was 
indeed great personnel movement at the top level. As can be taken from a DT internal 
paper from the top management HR department-of the 340 top managers employed by 
Deutsche Telekom as of 31 December, 1995,125 left the company within the following 
three years (i. e. by 31 December, 1998), of which 13 from the fixed network division and 
headquarters became so-called "special advisors" and a further 18 took early retirement. 
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A further 90 from other parts of Telekom left the company for other reasons, whereby the 
document detailed the reason for leaving (e. g. resignation, dismissal) no further. 
Further evidence could be found in the interviews. To repeat (see section 4.4.3.2) the 
words of an interviewed externally-hired top manager, holding a position in DT's 
headquarters: 
"The mixture of external people means `push ahead' and civil servants means `slow 
down' is a great, yes perfect mixture. " 
In total 5, interviewed top managers from the fixed network business and DT's 
headquarters justified this assessment by saying that experience had shown that 
managing complex change processes required top managers who were very familiar with 
the organisation and the "Telekom" business. They would have calculated the effects of 
organisational measures more realistically, and would have been able to make a 
significant contribution to adapting the organisation to new needs. For this reason, 
explained the responsible manager from the group organisation, there had been 
moderate external recruiting in the fixed network division in comparison to other top 
management groups. In addition, new, externally recruited top managers contributed 
completely new know-how that was absolutely necessary for the future direction of the 
organisation. 
This statement is additionally supported by the significantly better assessment by the 
interviewed top managers of the learning performance of the fixed network business's top 
management as well as the deployed methods of TLOL compared to the top 
management at headquarters. It was found that in 2002, the top management at 
DT's 
headquarters only had 3 top managers with longer tenures due to heavy external 
recruiting and personnel turnover. 
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As mentioned before, a large, mature organisation will however touch limits. Even if there 
are a great number of managers available who "know how things are done", a large, 
mature organisation seems to have no possibility to develop new, fast-growing markets 
with the "old" organisation (see "fixed network case") due to the inertia of the 
organisation. The example of Mobile showed that the top management learnt to avoid 
organisational inertia by forming smaller organisational units, and to thereby create 
greater room for action (and therefore for learning). 
5.4.1.2 Cultural Constraints 
However, there would be a danger to concur that top-level organisational learning in new 
created subsidiaries cannot be constrained by inertial forces. This was largely the case in 
the Mobile and Online divisions, in the estimation of the interviewees. How, then, should 
their simultaneous assessment that the high complexity of the Systems organisation was 
detrimental for top-level organisational learning be interpreted? And this although the 
Systems organisation was, like the Mobile and Online organisations, a newly-created 
subsidiary and, compared to the Mobile business, of comparable size and age? 
In line with expectations, the interviewed top managers associated the top management 
of the fixed network business and pre-privatisation headquarters, where the bulk of the 
civil servants originated, with cultural constraints and old-fashioned behavioural patterns 
that were regarded as no longer conducive to attaining targets in the new, private sector 
environment characterised by intense competition. The "softer dimension" of the legacy of 
the public authority that refers to culture manifested, as suggested by Yanow 
(2000), in 
these parts of the top management in many ways155 The interviewed top managers 
155 Annotation: E. g. in language, status symbols or artefacts or in actions and processes. 
It was, for instance, 
found that business planning at Telekom in its beginnings was oriented to personnel 
instead of results and 
costs, and was simply delegated to a clerk. 
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themselves-and here mainly the externally-hired top manager-mentioned above all 
lacking performance and customer orientation, a lacking willingness to take risks and a 
large hierarchical and physical distance to the workforce. The "old Telekommers" in top 
management, in contrast, all emphasised the great cohesion with reference to the 
"Telekom family" (quote from several interviewed top managers of the fixed network 
business and the headquarters). 
However, as could be found in this study, the main impact of these cultural aspects on the 
learning of these parts of the top management became evident in the readiness to 
unlearn or learn as well as the cohesion of the top management and not mainly on 
organisational level. Therefore, these latter aspects will be considered in greater detail in 
section 5.5 on the top management (especially subsections 5.5.1 and 5.5.2.3). 
The Systems case, however, illustrated, that DT's culture is no monoculture and that 
cultural constraints can massively hinder top-level organisational learning. In this case, in 
contrast to Finkelstein and Hambrick's (1996) suggestion, inertial forces are not limited to 
large, mature organisations with an entrenched company culture. This is supported by the 
bad evaluation of the learning results of the top management of the Systems business. 
With the exception of only two top managers from the Systems business, all interviewed 
top managers unanimously considered the top management of the Systems business as 
that part of DT's top management with by far the worst learning performance in the group. 
They justified this assessment with the large cultural problems at Systems. This confirms 
Van den Bosch et al. 's point (1999) that strong cultures in general represent a severe 
inertial constraint, slow down attempts at change and leave "... little room for absorbing 
outside sources of knowledge in ways that contradict shared beliefs" 
(Van den Bosch et 
al. 1999, p. 557). 
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It was found that the merger of the Systems subsidiary with the similar-sized subsidiary of 
an equally traditional company, Daimler-Chrysler, (i. e. debis Systemhaus), which was 
based on a decision by the group management, did in fact lead to this development. 
Following Yeung et al. 's (1999) suggestion competency acquisition-e. g. by means of a 
merger or acquisitions-counts among the most effective learning styles in a turbulent 
environment. However, in the Systems case, the merger with debis Systemhaus led to 
very detrimental results. What was meant at corporate level as an attempt to, as Yeung et 
al. (1999, p. 37) call it, `buy competencies' ended 6 years after the creation of the 
Systems subsidiary (see section 4.6), and in the absence of a clear integration strategy, 
in a poorly managed integration project (see also section 5.3), in which two strong 
corporate structures (i. e. Telekom and Daimler-Chrysler) collided. The result was, as 
Systems' top managers in particular reported in interview, huge conflicts between the two 
camps. As could be taken from corresponding documentation (see HR strategy DT group, 
2001), this led to numerous personnel changes and the exit of key people up to the top 
level. Outwardly, the "struggle between the cultures" became visible in a very complex, 
three dimensional156 matrix organisation, that was in permanent flux due to hindersome 
and exhaustive power struggles between influential top managers implementing their 
changes. In so doing, they altered themselves in part so quickly, that the top executive 
managers of the Systems business often, in accordance to their own specifications, 
worked in parallel to several organisation structures (see also section 5.3.2)157. While the 
organisation's structure sometimes changes several times a year in this way, the duties 
and responsibility of the affected top executive managers also changed. The top 
managers of the Systems business reported in the interviews that the complex reviewing 
processes and the constant changes in the organisation overtaxed Systems' top 
management evidently to such an extent that it was increasingly involved more with itself, 
156 The matrix organisation of the Systems business was arranged around 
businesses, services and regions. 
157 According to statements made by managers of the Systems 
business, current organisational structures 
were often not completely implemented organisationally when a new 
restructuring had been decided 
upon and was pending implementation. 
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survival in the organisation and maintaining the ability to function for their own department 
than with sustainable development of the business (see section 4.6.3). At the same time, 
the top executive managers of the Systems business made the self-criticism in the 
interviews, that the numerous organisation changes had developed an "undesired self- 
dynamic" (annotation: quote of a senior manager of the Systems business), that even if 
the results of the restructurings seemed partly questionable, one was too intimidated by 
the organisational or personal consequences that would result from contradiction. 
The statements by the top executive managers in mobile and online business, who 
described their colleagues as the "disorderly crew" and even a "headless chicken of an 
organisation" (quote by a senior manager of the mobile business), also lend weight to the 
conclusion that Systems' organisation's form and fate increasingly eluded active 
monitoring and control. 
And if one assumes, ".. that the bulk of managers' learning takes place in the workplace, 
as a result of their work and role activities" (Antonacopoulou 2002, p. 5), such an 
organisational environment, in which work and role activities are permanently changing at 
short intervals as in the example at hand, consequently detrimentally affects TLOL. This 
is, for instance, confirmed by a former Systems senior manager who explained: 
"The creation of experience was not possible. If somebody established 
strategic planning... After I up to a maximum of 2 years... the people were 
all gone and the know-how got lost again. This short-term orientation was 
especially difficult with regard to issues such as IT-strategy or innovations. In 
order to ensure a real development in these fields we have to find a way to 
ensure continuity-at least in these areas. " 
The Systems example makes clear that the approach of Finkelstein and Hambrick (1996) 
must be extended. The findings suggest that cultural constraints, even among younger 
and substantially smaller organisations (in comparison to the fixed 
line network), can 
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significantly limit executive latitude and so make the top management operate and learn 
under severe constraints. 
These findings furthermore show that, in elaboration of Finkelstein and Hambrick's 
suggestion (1996), top managers not only play a passive role as regards inertial forces. 
Inertial forces such as size, age or cultural constraints, which determine the room to act 
and "learn" that top executive managers have, and thereby the influence they can have 
on learning outcomes, are not only a date, but can moreover also be systematically 
influenced through corresponding executive actions (e. g. through a merger or spin-off) or 
be caused by top management decisions. 
5.4.2 Formal Organisation and Top Level Organisational Learning 
Organisational structures are attributed, as shown in the literature review (see e. g. March 
and Olsen 1976; Senge 1990; Berends et al. 2003), a central role for organisational 
learning. Organisational structures and structural configurations are seen on the one 
hand as a subject of design by the top management, whereby the design of organisation 
structures are attended by learning processes (e. g. Senge 1990; Kammel 2000). On the 
other hand, organisational structures are viewed as the primary driver of change since 
they provide "... the skeletal structure for all organisational decisions and processes" 
(Wang and Ahmed 2002, p. 5) and thus define the framework for "structural leadership" 
(Kammel 2000, p. 382), similar: (Klimecki 1997; Berends et al. 2003). 
Against that background and as shown in the previous section, structural interventions 
such as the spinning-off of subsidiaries (see section 5.4.1.1) can also serve as a means 
to overcome inertial forces by which top-level organisational learning is constrained. Just 
as the example of the implementation of the `four-pillar-strategy' clarified, structures even 
have such a strong determining effect on top-level organisational learning that these 
structures themselves in contradiction to the agenda of the CEO triggered or 
benefited 
specific behaviour on the part of the top managers. This confirms the point made 
by 
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Kammel (2000) and Berends et al. (2003), that just as structures enable managers to 
plan, direct, organise and control the activities in the organisations (compare: Mabey et 
al. 2001), due to the specification of tasks, role expectations, etc., structures also specify 
a learning corridor in which the individual behaviour spectrum of the top managers 
moves. Hence structures channel learning processes. 
Corresponding to the suggestion from e. g. Kammel (2000) and Senge (1990), working in 
formal organisational structures and their form and change are therefore of great 
significance for top-level organisational learning. It could, however, be found in this study 
that this does not apply to every change in organisational structure, but only under certain 
conditions. This can best be illustrated by the numerous OD-projects and restructurings of 
DT group. In spite of the great number of these projects within the period under review of 
this study-including the spinning-off of the subsidiaries and 18 major restructurings 
between 1990 and the beginning of 2003 alone-the interviewed top managers 
themselves considered only two restructurings, Telekom KONTAKT (1992) and the `four- 
pillar-strategy' (2000), as having been important for the learning of DT group's top 
management158. A top manager and former civil servant heading the technical division of 
the Mobile business gave the following reason: 
"All other projects and initiatives are a logical consequence of these projects 
and can be derived from that. " 
A further analysis of the interviews with top managers and documentation on DT's OD- 
initiatives revealed that both of these projects differ in three main points from all other 
initiatives (see table below): 
158 36 out of 37 interviewed top executive managers regarded the four-pillar-strategy (launched in 2000) as 
very significant for top-level organisational learning . 
32 out of 37 described Telekom KONTAKT 
(launched in 1992) as an additional key project for to-level organisational learning (annotation: multiple 
responses were possible), even though many of the interviewed top executive management 
did not 
belong to the corporation at the time of the KONTAKT-project. All other projects received 2 to 
3 mentions 
as a rule, although, as said before, multiple responses were possible. 10 top executive managers 
responded, within this context, that acquisitions theoretically would have also been very 
important for top 
management learning. Due to a lack of a clear integration strategy, the international acquisitions were, 
however, initially to resume in their existing form as financial investments. For this reason, there were no 
changes in either the decision structures or in the collaboration at top level. 
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They led to a fundamentally different allocation of power and resources. 
A basic change in the decision-making processes was involved. 
A new DT-internal definition of the group's top management happened as a 
consequence, which is confirmed by the projects' schedules and the implementation 
of new management structures at group level (see figure below). 
Shift from Shift to 
Decision- public Holding 
Making authority to Structure 
private with q 
management divisional 
(DT AG) boards 
1992 1996 2000 2001 
t 
Key- Telekom « Four pil ar » Initiatives KONTAKT -strateýy 
TOP TOP TOP B'asines 
DT Group's 60 300 100 
Top f.. . 
Management 
7 
.. ime 
Figure 10 : Key Initiatives and the Definition of DT Group's Top Management 
The three above named aspects are reflected in the observable organisational changes 
(see table below), in a varying size of the top management and as will be considered in 
greater detail in section 5.5 on the top management, in a principle skill-shift at 
top level. 
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Shift from technology to customer 
Completely new allocation of i segments 
power and resources 
(before: 
4 technology &1 customer division; 
after: 
2 technology &3 customer divisions 
+ spin-offs mobile, Systems, online) 
II Decision-making processes 
Formal definition of 
DT's top management 
(group level) 
Shift from centralised organisation 
to a divisionalised organisation 
consisting of 4 self-contained 
pillars: fixed network, Systems, 
mobile & online 
z: in tt 01 power trom the minister to Decision-making in corporate 
the management of the board management board as well as in 
(- team decisions) new implemented divisional 
boards 
Increase of number of top managers Decrease of number of top 
at group level managers at group level 
(TO'P 60 - TOP 300) (TOP 300 -* TOP 100) 
Simultaneously implementation of 
divisional top management 
nrnuns159 
Table 30: What made the `Case-Key-I nitatives' Important for TLOL 
Thus in the course of Telekom KONTAKT, market and customer orientation with first-time 
decentralised responsibility was primarily emphasised (source: (Deutsche Telekom 
1992)); customer divisions and thus market-similar functions received an especially 
greater weight altogether on the top level in comparison to technology divisions and their 
corresponding technical functions. Thus several top managers explained in similar ways 
to the following senior manager, who held a management position in the fixed network 
business during the time of Telekom KONTAKT: 
"Telekom KONTAKT created pressure, obliged top managers to overcome 
old thinking and confront themselves with new questions. Otherwise, they 
were quick to leave and disappeared either into insignificance or were 
banished from the organisation completely. " 
Within the framework of the "four-pillar strategy, " an even broader focus, and consequent 
orientation, towards selected market segments (i. e. fixed network, 
Mobile, Online and 
Systems) resulted in even more decentralized responsibility and 
delegation of the 
159 Fixed network business: Top Leadership Forum/ 
Leadership Forum; corresponds to ca. 100 or 
300 top managers respectively; Systems business: 
Top Executives (TEC); corresponds to ca. 70 top 
managers; Online business: TOP 
30; corresponds to ca. 30 top managers); 
Mobile business: Definition still in progress at the end of this study. 
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international activities of the respective pillars (see Telekom 2001). The fixed network 
business, that even followed the motto, "We are Telekom, " (quote by a senior manager 
fixed network business) suffered, due to the juxtaposition of very diverse, large and 
independent business units against Systems, Mobile and above all, Online. A great 
reduction in its own influence had become evident in that the fixed line network in 2002 
only provided 20% of the group's top management (see section 4.2.5). This, although 
47% of the corporate profit had been gained there in 2002,58% of the total personnel 
were involved and in 2002, the fixed line network was the sole business division that 
produced positive results. 
This corresponds to a significant change of what Mintzberg (1992) called hierarchy of 
authority, through which flows the formal power to control decisions and actions. For, as 
shown, with the simultaneously changed allocation of power and resources decisions 
were made on a broader 'basis. However, in changing the balance of power and the 
decision-making structures towards a direction of more decentralisation and 
divisionalisation, this had, following the suggestion from Van den Bosch et al. (1999), 
effects on knowledge absorption and thereby the direction of organisational learning at 
top management level. Following Van den Bosch et al. (1999) a division form namely 
facilitates divisional knowledge absorption, and consequently learning with the 
development of their own businesses in view, but suppresses integration and thinking and 
acting in higher, group terms. From an organisational point of view, decentralisation 
allows-although perhaps at the cost of efficiency-higher flexibility and faster responses 
to local conditions in many different places. It presents, however, the danger of internal 
competition within the corporation, which is disadvantageous in converging markets. 
In 
the situation of the case organisation, this has also again had a negative effect on 
the 
quality of the collaboration at the top levels across the board; this will be 
further examined 
in section 5.5. 
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Following the suggestion of Finkelstein and Hambrick (1996), a changed allocation of 
power and resources also fundamentally leads to the (newly) powerful top managers 
receiving a greater amount of leeway. That naturally provides them great possibilities to 
influence strategies, in the development of which learning processes play a key role (see 
Mintzberg 1995). In that connection, it has to be borne in mind that following the 
suggestion from Quinn (1980), with regard to the quality of the learning process, the 
formal strategy development process is less important than the right compilation of the 
group of top managers who are charged with the development of the strategy. The latter, 
in turn, is reflected in the formal definition and composition of the top management (see 
also section 5.5). 
To sum up, this study could show, that structures and changes therein are significant to 
top-level organisational learning under certain conditions. These requirements are 
specifically the principle change of the allocation of power and resources and changes in 
the decision-making processes, such as in the formal definition of Top Management. 
Someone who wants to provide significant impulses for top management learning in the 
face of turbulent change must consider these three basic conditions; otherwise learning 
success will remain limited. 
5.4.3 Frequency of Organisational Change 
As already shown in the previous section, the number and frequency of OD-initiatives 
tells us little about their relevance for organisational learning at top management level. On 
the contrary, there would be a danger to concur that many and frequent measures were 
tantamount to a high quantity and quality of learning at top level. This also became clear 
on the basis of the Systems case, during which numerous restructurings and cultural 
conflicts resulted from the merger (compare section 5.4.1.2). Additionally 
in the previous 
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section, it was shown that the interviewed top managers placed no or very little 
importance for top-level organisational learning on the majority of OD-initiatives. 
However, this research was concerned with studying organisational learning at top 
management level and corresponding drivers and barriers, not as the espoused theory of 
top managers. The large number of OD-initiatives launched by the top management 
raised questions; particularly following the suggestion from Sennet (1998) and Lounamaa 
and March (1987) that too much organisational change even inhibits learning, or may 
produce chaos and instability. 
It could be found that the bulk of the numerous restructuring projects-some of which 
were quite drastic-actually only affected the classical and the larger business division: 
the fixed network business (annotation: the restructurings in the Systems business were 
merger-related, see section 5.4.1.2). Between 1995 and 2003 alone, there were 13 major 
restructurings"" initiated by the top management in the fixed network business (source: 
DT internal paper, Konzernforum Personal July 22nd, 2004). The majority of these 
measures (for Telekom KONTAKT and `four-pillar-strategy', see 5.4.2.1) were explained 
by 4 interviewed top managers with the reasoning that it was important to keep this large 
organization in permanent motion. Only in this way could the requisite process 
adjustments resulting from constantly increasing cost pressure be achieved in this large 
organisation, the "excess" personnel levered out of the processes and successively 
released. In fact, it could be derived from DT's annual reports that ca. 16,700 people were 
made redundant between 1995 and 1998 and another ca. 60,000 people were made 
redundant between 1998 and 2002 in the fixed network business. The growing Mobile 
Aso No less than 13 large restructuring projects could be identified in the fixed network business 
in the period 
from 1995 to 2003. In detail, these involved the following projects: Telekom KONTAKT, 1995: 
KNL; 
1996/97: ZAT, 1999: PK/GK KNL; 2000: WENN, ZNI; 2001/02: T-Com classic, T-Networks, 
SLIM, T-Com 
Plus; 2002/03: NICE, PRISMA, Ergo. 
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and Online businesses evidently caught little wind of this 161. The above-mentioned 
downsizing matches up well with the fact that 10 of the named 13 restructurings-so the 
large majority of them-were launched between 1998 and 2002-right after the 
liberalisation of the telecommunications market and in a phase of increasing competition 
and cost pressure. However, it means as well that the fixed network business underwent 
on average 2 restructurings per year. This suggests, following Sennet (1998) and 
Lounamaa and March (1987), that the individual and the organisation were no longer able 
to stand still and reflect on the past, which is detrimental for learning. 
In point of fact, detailed discussion of the projects with top executive managers 
demonstrated-as shown in the fixed network case (see section 4.4.3.2)-that even the 
long-standing top executive managers themselves, put a lot of effort into interpreting the 
meaning, objectives, and results of the individual projects (in spite of the fact that large 
parts of the organisation underwent organisational change and that every time, 
thousands of employees were affected by these measures). Three interviewed top 
executive managers admitted that some individual top managers have even tried to 
promote "their baby" on their own to "mark their territory' or somehow distinguish 
themselves from the others for professional gain. To these ends, they had often brought 
in support in the shape of consultants who had also conducted similar projects in other 
companies. 
This suggests that with some managers, it is obvious that their personal motives were of 
first priority. The majority of the interviewed top managers came, however, to the 
161 On top of that, people were already used to frequent changes and 
these were generally regarded 
positively from the point of view of the employees on account of 
the strong growth. A top manager of the 
mobile business explained in the interviews: 
"T-Mobile didn't need many of these things [restructuring projects] on account of 
its much shorter history 
and its greater adaptability. The fixed network business 
has always faced the problem-and indeed still 
does-of extracting people out of the processes. That's 
inflexible. But perhaps that's also a slightly 
arrogant opinion. " 
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assessment that the situation here is rather more about changing for the sake of 
change162. Further evidence for this interpretation could be found in a comprehensive 
auditing report on restructurings in the fixed network business (DT internal audit report, 
Nov. 27,2002, page 71). The report concludes that during the numerous OD measures, 
the top management neither had previous measures analyses, nor did they have 
sufficient key indicators and possibilities to control the measures, nor did they even 
commission retrospective investigations into the measures. Instead, the report analysed 
the significant detrimental effects for the wider organisation that resulted from the high 
frequency of change, and that an organisational change simply resulted in another. 
This leads to the conclusion and confirms the point made by Culley (1989) and Senge 
(1990) that executives are action-oriented and lack self-reflective competence. At the 
same time, the time distribution of the projects (annotation: the frequency of change 
increased dramatically after liberalisation) suggests that the danger of certain activities 
developing a certain momentum of their own and eluding the active control of top 
management is particularly high in fast-changing environments. Especially' in such 
contexts, there is therefore a strong need for a planned learning process and reflection on 
action (Baldwin and Lawson 1995). 
The orientation towards action was evidently strengthened evidently through the 
reduction in personnel (annotation: it emerges from group organisation documentation 
that the introduction of the four-pillar strategy, for example, brought along with it a 
significant reduction in the number of possible management positions. There remained 
only ca. 6 to 8 positions in management). In the end, given the very significant number of 
people that had to leave, also managers up to the top were affected by staff reduction. 
162 E. g. a representative of DT's organisation development department: 
"Telekom never gave itself and its 
managers and employees the necessary time to let something sink 
in. Nobody knew if something would 
have really yielded results. It had immediately been changed again. 
" (see also section 4.4.3.2). 
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Thus, the areas of responsibility were also reduced; in the worst cases, top positions 
were completely eliminated. Against that background, the little importance that was 
attributed to those initiatives for top-level organisational learning could also be accounted 
for in the competition among managers for internal resources and hierarchical promotion, 
which March identified as a barrier to learning (March 1991). Competition additionally 
increased, as did the initiation of corresponding change projects, with the increasing scale 
of the external recruitment of managers (see section 4.6.3). For, according to Gabarro 
(1987) or Kesner and Sebora (1994, p. 357), a robust conclusion can be made with 
regard to the appearance of change after the take-over of a position by a new top 
manager. However, no simple conclusions can be made concerning the effectiveness of 
that change, as this is context-dependent. 
Thus, the study demonstrates that, in a context of turbulent change, a planned learning 
process is most necessarily required. Furthermore, it demonstrates that top managers in 
such an environment control little of what they learn, and rather due to their action- 
orientation tending to "uncontrolled actionism", which complements the corresponding 
literature. 
5.4.4 Availability of Financial and Relational Resources 
Important differences between the individual case organisations were also found as 
regards firm resources. As shown in the literature review these resources can be 
considered as an input and simultaneously outcome of learning processes. Resources 
play an important role for top-level organisational learning as they describe the boundary 
conditions for the realization of measures for adjusting the organization and so determine 
the top management's spectrum of action options. As will be shown later, in this section 
played above all two resources an important role for top-level organisational 
learning: 
financial resources and the brand. These will now be analysed in greater detail. 
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5.4.4.1 Financial Resources and Top-Level Organisational Learning 
The table below reminds some financial key figures which illustrate the significant 
differences with regard to the scope but also the profitability of the corresponding 
businesses. 
Case Case 
"Head- "Fixed Case Case "DT Group" 
quarters" Network" 
"Mobile i Online" "Systems" in total 
Key figures 
Sales 2002 
(in billion ¬ 
. 
1. 25.4 19.7 1.8 11.3 53.7 
Annual result 
before tax 
(in billion ¬) 
2001: J. 4.6 -6.4 -0.2 -0.4 -3.5 
2002: J. 3.5 -23.7 0.0 -2.0 -24.6 
Table 31: What Financial Key Figures of the Case Organisation 
The very negative results of the new businesses (i. e. all business except "fixed network") 
demonstrate that investments and strategic decisions were directly reflected in burdens 
on the results of the business activities163. In its most extreme manifestation, this was 
expressed in the record loss year of the group in the year 2002. The extremely high 
losses, especially in the mobile communication segment, were attributable to investments 
in licenses (UMTS) and acquisitions (in this instance, Voicestream). According to the 
group's assets analysis (see 2002 DT Group annual report), EUR 43.1 billion were 
invested in 2000 and EUR 37.7 billion in 2001 (for comparison: EUR 7.5 billion were 
invested in 1998). 
The intense investments in infrastructure, licences and acquisitions can be seen as an 
indicator for the high capital intensity of the business, but also illustrate that very 
substantial funds could be invested-also incidentally for restructurings. 
Thus, more than 
50% of the interviewed top managers considered the financial power of 
the company and 
163 As shown in the case of the fixed network business 
high investments in connection with the reunification in 
Germany were still able to be financed through the successful 
IPO. 
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the personnel to be fundamentally beneficial basic conditions for top management 
learning. Following Finkelstein and Hambrick (1996), this would speak for large 
managerial discretion and leeway for learning for top management. The extent of 
investments questions, however, if the new businesses Mobile, Online and Systems- 
despite their fast growth-would have been in a position under their own steam to realise 
such extensive investments. This interpretation was also confirmed in the interviews by a 
number of top managers from the headquarters and the fixed network business who-like 
the following top manager in DT's finance department-stated: 
Many here-especially those in T-Mobile-literally tell themselves just how 
fantastic they are. They forget that they have been subsidised by the rest of 
the group. " 
It was furthermore found in this study that the preparation and the making of important 
investment decisions were limited to the person of the group's CEO himself, who was 
granted the corresponding decision-making authority. This can be derived from the fact 
that decisions on merger and acquisitions of the group's CEO were frequently criticised in 
the interviews as unilateral, isolated decisions. A directly affected top manager stated, for 
instance: "... We didn't have a clue what our CEO wanted with debis Systemhaus... ". 
These findings confirm the point made by Finkelstein and Hambrick (1996) that high 
capital intensity and the concentration of ownership on one or a few owners (Finkelstein 
and Hambrick 1996, p. 31) exerts an important restricting influence on managerial 
discretion, and by that, on options to learn. The top managers were neither involved in the 
development of corresponding acquisition strategies (compare also section 5.3.3) for 
which learning processes play a key role (see Mintzberg 1995), nor in the investment 
decisions themselves but had to take the consequences. Among other things, this led to 
the top executive manager's partial refusal-as shown e. g. in the case of the mobile 
business (see section 4.5.3) or Systems business (see section 4.6.3)-of accountability 
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for these decisions 164 and commitment to their implementation. This however is, 
according to numerous authors and researchers (compare e. g. Antonacopoulou 2002; 
Hoeksema et al. 1997; Rosenstiel 1995; Lloyd 1990; Sutcliffe 1988; Honey and Mumford 
1982; Stewart and Stewart 1981; Humble 1973; Mumford 1971) an imperative 
requirement in order for top level organisational learning to occur. 
Moreover, further consequences have resulted from the dramatic financial situation165 of 
the corporation for top-level organisational learning. The top management thus ushered in 
a whole range of cost-cutting programmes-especially in the fixed-network business- 
and de-investments as a response to the rapid increase of the group's indebtedness. 
Even a company-wide training programme for top management that had been developed 
in partnership with a renowned business school was put on ice due to a lack of funds. 
The introduction of the 4-pillar structure presented in the cases which, as illustrated, was 
primarily characterised and triggered by capital market considerations, is probably to be 
understood against this background. As can be taken from the following statements, even 
more important effects on top-level organisational learning arose out of the tense financial 
situation at the same time: 
"We have a short-term problem on account of debt reduction. This is 
currently making the implementation of medium and long-term ideas difficult. 
/ don't believe that we can survive in this way if we wish to remain 
competitive in the long-term. " [a technical senior manager in the fixed 
network business] 
'64 This can for instance be derived from the fact that the overwhelming majority of DT's top management 
evaluated the DT's overall adaptation to the new environment and market conditions as at least 
satisfactorily or better. Confronted with terrible financial ratios, the suggestion from Klimecki (1997), where 
(financial) resources not only represent an important input and prerequisite for learning processes, but can 
simultaneously be seen as an outcome of organisational learning, most of them referred to decisions on 
acquisitions, etc. in which they were not involved. In doing so they confirmed partly Murray's 
(1989) 
suggestion, according to which a variety of factors such as the length of time assumed to be necessary 
for 
effects to appear, the performance measures used and the definition of the top management team, 
i. e. 
that group of persons allowed to make certain decisions, have an impact on 
financial performance 
indicators. In any case it suggests that their evaluation was based not solely on financial results, 
but rather 
on different conceptions or models of an organisation's goals and criteria of 
its effectiveness (compare 
Bryman 1995). 
165 It has to be mentioned in that connection that in the period from 2000-2002, the share price of 
Deutsche 
Telekom plummeted from its all-time high of EUR 103.50 to its all-time 
low of EUR 8.32 per share. 
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"As far as product launches are concerned, we currently have another 
problem when it comes to the cost saving discussion. Many business cases 
are sometimes simply no longer pursued on account of the capital 
investments required. There is clear competition in this respect regarding the 
investment budget, usually at the cost of long-term projects. This is 
particularly difficult in view of the four-pillar strategy, and will continue to be 
so in the future. Take ISDN for example... if there had already been 4 pillars 
back then, ISDN would never have taken off... How should we approach 
long-term innovations in the future? I don't know. Trial and Error? " 
[the responsible top manager for technology platforms] 
These findings confirm that financial constraints exerted an influence on what Weber 
and Berthoin Antal (2001) called "orientation to time". However, it seems that- 
supplementary to Weber and Berthoin Antal (2001) and Bleicher (1985)-this does not 
only concern the dominant orientation to time166, but also the term within which results 
should be achieved (i. e. short-term versus long-term). In this present case, it could be 
seen that more long-term oriented topics and functional areas that were important to 
the overall group lost significance in favour of more short-term, divisional interests 
(annotation: with regard to the effects on, e. g. innovation, reference is made to 
Bungartz, 2007). What Senge (1990) called `orientation on short-term results' is 
reflected in the shut down or downsizing of certain central departments and 
discontinuation of top management positions even at the board level, and mainly in the 
technical field (see section 5.5) as well as an increasing competition for investment 
budgets. 
166 i. e. if an organisation is generally more oriented to the past, present or 
future. 
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5.4.4.2 Learning Implications of the'T'-Brand 
What is viewed in the resource-based view of the firm as an intangible and relational 
resource (compare Wernerfelt 1984) obviously had an important impact on top-level 
organisational learning in the case organisation: the brand-in the case organisation, the 
`T'-brand. External media and a former member of the supervisory board confirmed (see 
Glotz 2001) that the resounding success of the implementation of the T-brand would not 
have been possible without some external key recruitments at top level167, and thereby 
the integration of new competencies at top level from externally. 
If one ignores the importance of the brand for the market and concentrates solely on an 
appraisal of the significance of the brand for the learning of the top management, two 
developments could be observed in principle: 
From an internal perspective the T-brand had not only an integrative effect for what de 
Chernatony and Mc Donald (1996) called `marketing process'. Corresponding to the 
group's brand policy all products and services, all units and activities had mandatorily to 
be subsumed under the umbrella brand "T". Resulting from the strict implementation of 
the `T'-brand, which coincided with the new organisation of the Telekom as joint-stock 
company, and in spite of their often non-voluntary implementation of the T-brand 
(compare e. g. the Mobile or Online business), the interviewed top management declared 
in the interviews that on the top-level, with the implementation of the T-brand, the 
identification with the group had increased. Prior to the implementation of the "T"-brand, 
one identified oneself more strongly with their respective business. This change became 
possible when the T-brand began being connected by all with a positive image as a 
modern and attractive company. This learning was achieved in that, following 
Friedman's 
suggestion, the structural element (here: the conversion of DT to a stock corporation) was 
167 Above all the CEO and the responsible manager for the group's external and 
internal communication. 
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complemented by the elements of an organisations' culture that facilitate learning 
(Friedman et al. 2001, p. 760). This suggests that the T-brand as a cultic symbol was, 
above all from a cultural perspective, important for organisational learning at top 
management level and helped to bridge the trenches that existed before between the old 
and the new businesses. As Yanow states: "... it makes `organisation' as a collective 
`seeable' as an entity" (Yanow 2000, p. 250). 
From an external perspective, the "T"-brand contributed to a better image of DT as an 
employer for those in top management, and thus facilitated the access to crucial 
resources in the labour market. A newly hired senior manager reported: 
"Brand creation, branding, an upbeat external image. All of these factors 
were important, especially in view of the private customers. The (German) 
Post Office was also good in this respect, but not as good as Telekom. The 
new image was also good both for the image of Telekom as a modern 
enterprise and employer. Particularly with regards to the managers and 
experts, it was very important to detach from the old 'civil service' image. " 
Five further externally hired senior managers as well as the representative of the Top 
Management HR department emphasised the improvement of DT's external image as an 
employer by means of the T-brand. This suggests that a second important impact of the 
brand on top-level organisational learning consisted in further possibilities of the external 
recruitment of top executive managers, who, according to Kammel (2000) and Yeung et 
a!. (1999) provided an important option towards the advancement of organisational 
learning at top management level. Because... 
`... newcomers bring with them a new frame of reference for problem-solving 
and a new impulse for modification in the established... ", they contribute 
greatly to top-level organisational learning (Karamel 2000, p. 337). 
In summary, the study thus demonstrates, that a "Brand" influences external recruiting for 
the acquisition of new competencies at the top level. Furthermore, it had a positive 
influence on cooperation within the case organisation and thereby confirms Friedman's 
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suggestion (Friedman et al. 2001, p. 760), in that for organisational learning to occur, the 
structural element must be complemented by a cultural component. 
5.4.5 Summary Component Organisation 
This section concentrated on the organisation with which the top management forms an 
inevitable learning community (Klimecki 1997). Through the analysis of the organisational 
context of the top management a series of drivers and barriers as well as deployed 
initiatives and methods for top-level organisational learning could be identified. 
It could thus be found that top-level organisational learning is constrained by the 
complexity of the organisation and inertial forces. As could be shown, such constraints 
are, in elaboration of Finkelstein and Hambrick (1996), not limited to large, mature 
organisations. In addition, the findings show that top managers not only play a passive 
role as regards inertial forces. Inertial forces such as size, age or cultural constraints, 
which determine the action and learning room for top mangers, are not only a date but 
could rather also be influenced directly through corresponding executive actions (e. g. 
through a merger or spin-off) or could be caused through decisions made by top 
management themselves. 
This is contrasted by a further finding of this study. It could be shown, in accordance with 
Culley (1989), Senge (1990) and Baldwin and Lawson (1995), that executives are action- 
oriented and lack self-reflective competence. In fast-changing environments, this bears 
the risk that top managers control little what they do and learn (actionism) and that 
particular developments lead to a specific individual dynamic. Against that background, 
especially in such contexts, a planned learning process is imperatively required. 
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A series of further factors influencing top level organisational learning could be identified 
at organisational level such as capital intensity, the availability and decision-making on 
financial resources as well as the implementation of a brand. 
The analysis of the organisational context finally showed that structures for TLOL could 
be of great importance and have a behaviour-guiding effect. However, the findings of this 
study suggest that this, in correlation to existing literature, is connected to particular 
conditions. These are specifically: the principle change in the allocation of power and 
resources and changes in the decision making process; such as in the formal definition of 
top management. 
5.5 Top Management 
Before having a closer look at the dynamic interrelationships between the different parts 
of the conceptual framework, the component `top management' will be considered in 
greater detail in the following section. In that connection, it must be reiterated that in this 
available study, in contrast to a series of classic studies in the field, an extended section 
was seen as belonging to top management, not just the CEO and the group's board of 
management (see section 3.8.4). 
The starting point for the analysis of the top management is then initially, based upon the 
suggestion of numerous authors and researchers (e. g. Humble 1973; Stewart and 
Stewart 1981; Lloyd 1990; Hoeksema et al. 1997), an examination of the preconditions 
for learning at top level. This is followed by a closer look at what Hambrick (1994) called 
`elements of the top management', in order to assess the extent to which organisational 
learning at top level can be assumed and is reflected in observable changes of 
the top 
management's patterns of behaviour. This serves as a basis for the 
discussion of 
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selected executive actions as well as drivers of and barriers to top-level organisational 
learning which will be made in the final part of this section. 
5.5.1 Preconditions for Top-Level Organisational Learning 
As shown in the literature review executive learning---even if its day-to-day dimensions 
are not yet well understood (see Richter 1998, p. 300)-is marked by some distinctive 
features. A large number of authors and researchers, (e. g. Humble 1973; Stewart and 
Stewart 1981; Lloyd 1990; Hoeksema et al. 1997), identified that for real and effective 
learning to take place, it is required that the top managers themselves recognize a strong 
learning need, understand the meaning of the learning challenge and make the decision 
to engage in the learning process. It was found in this study that many interviewed top 
managers liked to talk neither about concrete past or future personal learning needs nor 
the learning needs of DT's top management. This was independent of the purpose of 
holding the interview168. This confirms the point made by Baldwin and Lawson (1995) that 
managers do not necessarily want to be seen as learners. It also mirrors Richter's (1999) 
suggestion that people at the high end of the hierarchy try to avoid the impression that 
they are possibly not knowledgeable enough. Instead, and based upon similar findings 
that could be observed in other studies with senior managers (compare e. g. Richter 1999; 
Antonacopoulou 1999), the respondents preferred to talk about challenges resulting from 
the group's strategy, concrete business problems or initiatives which squared well with 
formulated strategic challenges of the group (see: Blank 1996). 
In that connection, the large majority of them mentioned, that by far the strongest 
challenges of the top management would have consisted in the management of 
that 
change and teamwork at top level. Additionally-according to approximately a 
third of the 
interviewed top managers, and therefore a significantly smaller number-the 
"old" DT top 
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management for a long time lacked specialised knowledge and pertinent know-how-also 
in international business-with respect to market deregulation, privatisation and the 1PO. 
If this assessment is however compared to the assessment by the same top managers of 
which know-how at the top level got lost in the considered period of time and which was 
added, it was conspicuous that knowledge on the functioning of the group (see also 
section 5.4.1.1) that was important to the majority of respondents for change processes in 
large organisations within the group (i. e. the whole group or fixed-network business) had 
been lost to a large extent. This know-how was primarily seen among older top managers 
and former civil servants from the fixed-network division and headquarters with very long 
tenures, who furthermore-due to their training and shared working relationships-mostly 
had strong informal networks and worked closely together. That these top managers held 
that specific knowledge about `how Telekom ticks' might be attributed to some 
peculiarities of public service organisations. Finger and Burgin-Brand (1999) found in their 
case study on the Swiss Postal Service that the functioning and management of public 
sector organisations is not qualitatively different from private sector organisations, but 
more complex. This can be attributed to specific environmental constraints"', a tendency 
towards bureaucratisation, which is reinforced by specific administrative rules and 
regulations, and the fact that unions just as in DT's case-hold a very strong position in 
public sector organisations and so exert an important influence on change processes. 
The actual loss of this know-how is supported by corresponding data from the Top 
Management HR department, which say that the number of top managers over the age of 
45 at the group level between 1995 and 2002 fell by 22%; in 2002,47% of the group's top 
managers had a tenure below 4 years, and in DT's headquarters, there were only 3 top 
managers remaining with longer tenures (annotation: all of them left in 2003). 
168 lt should be remembered that, in that connection, a first series of 35 interviews was carried out 
for 
professional reasons within the scope of a top management development project. 
A second series of 37 
interviews was carried out for research purposes only (see methodology chapter, section 
3.8.3). 
169 Finger and Burgin-Brand (1999) argue that public sector organisations operate 
in a political and public 
context. Public sector organisations operate in an environment with political actors on 
one side and 
citizens and society on the other. Both sides are more than stakeholders to public sector organisations. 
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This would however mean that exactly the know-how that was important for achieving the 
strategic goals of a "fundamental reorganisation" and "strategic realignment of the group" 
(see: Blank 1996) had been lost at the top level-particularly at headquarters. Indeed, 
executive turnover is necessary in turbulent environments if, as stated by Carley (1996) 
and Pettigrew (1 985a), the organisation may not slow the rate of adaptation 11. However, 
this does not apply to such comprehensive replacement of experienced top managers. 
Having been confronted with that interpretation of the findings, the top managers 
themselves explained that there had been a series of "old" top managers who were either 
not willing or not able to cross things off the list and to concentrate on new challenges. 
These managers corresponded largely to what Antonacopoulou (1999) called 
`mathophobic managers'. Admittedly, it was not just about learning in DT's case, but 
above all about what Hedberg (Hedberg 1981, p. 3) described as `unlearning' or 
`discarding of obsolete and misleading knowledge' and which is, following his suggestion, 
a basic precondition for managerial learning to take place. Personal readiness for change 
was above all difficult for former civil servants, according to several of the top managers 
interviewed (see quote of an externally-recruited top manager from the fixed-network 
business's legal department in section 4.7.3). They had assumed their life-long 
employment under entirely different circumstances and rules, to which the company no 
longer wished to stick after the change from a state-owned utility to a private company. 
This corresponds to what Cavanaugh and Noe (1999) or Morrison and Robinson (1997) 
called `break of the psychological contract' and is similar to the findings that can be 
observed in Antonacopoulou's (2002), or Storey et al. 's (1997) study in the 
banking 
sector. 
170 Old executives would often have no training on the new task so 
that hiring new executives trained in that 
task would be preferable. 
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It could be found in this study that risk-aversion, poor performance or large hierarchical 
distance were often associated with those top managers who were not ready or able to 
learn. For the most important identified cultural barriers see following table 31: 
Cultural Empirical Evidence from the interviews (Examples): Constraint 
Lacking Some people here have a `9 to 5 mentality', which is often equated with a performance and public authority attitude. " (responsible manager of the OD-department DT customer , headquarters and former civil servant) 
orientation 
"Cost-oriented thinking-we didn't understand that at all back then. For instance, I passed my driving test here. I was given three weeks leave to do 
so. And we had managers who built their houses during working hours. Thankfully, we've departed from that old world. " (a top manager in sales in the fixed network business and former civil servant) 
"I find the vocabulary that was still used here sometimes when f started in the mid-90s interesting. Customers were still sometimes called applicants or 
residents. The term itself is one thing. Of far greater decisiveness, however, 
is the underlying mindset as fulfiller of a provisioning order. The effects of 
such a mindset can be easily seen in the service orientation and issues of 
economic efficiency, for example. " (an externally hired senior manager in 
sales in the fixed network business) 
Lacking "There are still people who nurture a `provider mindset, meaning they see 
willingness to themselves as working for a company which provides for them, so that's how 
undertake risks they conduct themselves. " (a top manager in HR of the fixed network 
business) 
"Accepting responsibility and not having the security net in place at all times. 
This was the major change for our former top civil servants. " (one member of 
the board of the fixed network business) 
Large I went to the people and to our branch "When I came to Deutsche Telekom 
hierarchical and 
, 
offices. I talked to everybody to learn about their ideas and views of the 
physical distance situation. This was a real cultural shock. Especially for the presidents of the 
to the workforce branch offices and regional directorates. But just about everyone in a 
leadership position communicated with his heads of staff or doorkeepers 
only. They all considered status to be incredibly important. The habit of 
communicating with people on lower levels was very underdeveloped here. 
They considered themselves to be above it. For me, this signified the 
absence of entrepreneurial thinking. A true entrepreneur would rather 
approach people at all levels, would look for new ideas and perspectives and 
would make it clear to each and every one of them just how important they 
are for the company as a whole. " (one of the first external hires of the top 
level; held different positions in the fixed network business and in DT's 
headquarters. ) 
"This hierarchical mindset and the distance to authority is evident 
everywhere. Our members of the board are not available, they are shielded. 
There is simply no place, no opportunity for contact and meeting. By the 
way, the architect of this building would have to be arrested. Our directors 
are as distant as possible from each other and every member of the board 
sits in his own tower. This building is a certain symbol. It is strange but 
obviously normal here that the manager of a unit has his office here and his 
team is situated somewhere else. It is this distance with regard to the 
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management which causes that nobody asks questions. It is not because 
you are afraid-it is simply because you feel the distance. " (a senior 
manager in DT's headquarters after his first months of service) 
Table 32: Cultural Constraints and Top-Level Organisational Learning 
The consequences of a lack of willingness or ability to learn were particularly clear in the 
fixed-network business, where hardly any external hires could be made, and there were 
no possibilities to sanction civil servants, both for legal reasons, until privatisation. In the 
course of the Telekom KONTAKT project, this lack of willingness or ability to learn 
became particularly clear in the lack of know-how, the power struggles, in demarcation of 
territory and distrust towards new colleagues, in toilsome project work, and, as the results 
of Carley's (1996) and Pettigrew's (1985a) work indicate, long project run times (compare 
section 4.4.3.1). This suggests that the principle key competencies among the top 
managers discussed above (here: knowledge about the functioning of the group and 
teamwork) could actually not be made available at the top level, and the envisaged 
"fundamental cultural change" (Blank 1996) could not be achieved. 
This confirms the point made by Hedberg (1981) that dismissals can be necessary when 
unlearning does not occur. It provides, also due to the distinctiveness of the research 
settings ", empirical evidence for Whittington's (1993, p. 122) and Bleicher's (1991, p. 
762) suggestion, which emphasises that in such situations only the replacement of 
managers in key positions by people coming from outside the organisation permit the 
initiation of strategic change or the achievement of a turnaround after a crisis. This study 
thus showed that learning processes are indeed possible, for which reason Telekom 
KONTAKT was even seen as one of the two key projects with respect to TLOL. The 
findings of this study suggest, however, that learning processes take too long, due to 
171 Annotation: until privatisation in 1995, the fixed network business and DT's headquarters were an almost 
closed system, i. e. there was almost no adding of external hires and no departures at the top level. 
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management (compare section 5.4.2) to their behavioural integration-significantly 
changed within the scope of substantial changes of the formal organisation (here: 
Telekom KONTAKT and the `Four-pillar-Strategy'). 
Characteristics of 
DT Group's 1990 After Telekom After "4-pillar- 
Top Management "KONTAKT" (1996) strategy" (2001) 
Locus/Structure Largely technical and Largely functional heads General and functional 
functional heads of a of a single organisation managers of partly 
single organisation plus selected general unrelated businesses/ 
managers of spin-offs organisations (- partly 
double membership, 
i. e. member of the 
group's top 
management and 
simultaneously head of 
own sub-organisation) 
Incl. decision-making Decisions were made by Decisions were made by Decisions were made 
the minister the management of the by the corporate board 
board. Spin-offs were as well as divisional 
managed like financial boards. 
participations. 
Corresponds to DT group's TOP 60 TOP 300 TOP 100 
internal definition of the ... 
(corresponds to 60-70 top (corresponds to 200-250 (corresponds to ca. 120- 
managers managers) top managers) 140 top managers plus 
decentralised top 
management groUPS 13 
Tasks Generalist approach Specialised in functional Specialised in the 
(frequent inter-unit areas (e. g. technology, market segments 
moves in a top marketing, sales) 
manager's career) 
Cognitive diversity of Low Moderate High 
the top management 
(as indicated by age, formal (strong influence of civil 
(first external hires) (due to numerous 
education, professional servants) external hires and 
experience in other acquisitions) 
industries/companies, 
origin/culture) 
Behavioural Very High High Low 
Integration 
Due to common formal Loose coupling of old New businesses 
education and training and new created dominate the top 
and shared work businesses. Top management, but 
experience management still largely develop own corporate 
("Telekom Family") dominated by traditional governance; limited 
parts of the group cohesion at group level 
Table 33: Development of Selected Top Management Characteristics 
173 Fixed network business: Top Leadership Forum/ Leadership Forum; corresponds to ca. 100 or 
300 top managers respectively; Systems business: Top Executives (TEC); corresponds to ca. 70 top 
managers; Online business: TOP 30; corresponds to ca. 30 top managers); Mobile business: Definition 
still in progress at the end of this study. 
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learning resistance and lacking new, specialised know-how, and are therefore not 
effective in an environment where fast change is required. 
However, the study-and here especially the case of DT's headquarters--showed that a 
lacking readiness or capacity to learn was not limited to civil servants and their particular 
(cultural) influences. The study rather suggests that this problem can arise even and 
especially among experts and consultants, if these have a very different understanding of 
roles, in accordance with Berthoin Antal and Krebsbach-Gnath's (2001) suggestion12. 
5.5.2 Top Management Resources 
Following the suggestion from Hambrick (1994), to be described accurately, the top 
management requires multiple constructs (e. g. structure, composition, social processes 
etc. ), which influence each other and potentially give rise to distinct patterns or 
consistencies. These constructs collectively compose the resources for learning of the 
`unit' top management and so for "... the process of changing the range of an entity's 
(potential) behaviour based on the development of its knowledge" (Berends et al. 2003, p. 
12). 
It could be found in this study that certain of these characteristics associated with 
constructs (see table below)-starting with the definition and the locus of the top 
172 As shown, in the headquarters case, shortly after privatisation an attempt was made "... to buy stars with a 
lot of money" but without taking care how these people would work together (statements were made by a 
top manager from DT headquarters with a long tenure). As could be found, many of these "stars" turned 
out to be lone warriors incapable of throwing off their "consultant role" and taking line responsibility. They 
were viewed as "... decoupled and disconnected from Telekom" and without "the faintest idea... " of what 
works and what does not work... and , not the men of action who translate these slides into practice" [source: a middle-aged externally hired top manager in the fixed network business coming from the 
industry. ] They had, as they themselves related in interview, only little contact with colleagues at 
headquarters and in other parts of the company. At the same time, headquarters was the only part where 
no attempt was made to set up a communications platform for top managers. As some of these top 
managers were not prepared to or capable of improving their teamwork, and to change their behaviour in 
terms of the development and implementation of projects, they had to leave DT after 1 or 2 years of 
service, as corresponding documentation and statements of the responsible former head of the top 
management HR department confirmed. 
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This mirrors again the suggestion by Kammel (2000) that managers learn through the 
design of structures and are even the subject of what he called "structural management". 
It could furthermore be found that the aforementioned characteristics fostered or hindered 
top-level organisational learning in many ways. In what follows these characteristics will 
therefore now-starting with the locus and structure of the top management-be 
analysed in greater detail. 
5.5.2.1 Locus and Structure of the Top Management 
As the table above shows, it could be found that the structure1', size15 and Iocus16 
varied significantly in the considered period of time. In this respect, the changed 
assignment of top managers (e. g. single organisation versus headquarters plus sub- 
organisations) led to an increasingly decentralised structure of the top management, 
resulting changed top management tasks and relationships among top managers' roles, 
and the steadily increasing number of top managers, due to organisational changes. This 
suggests that the top management could take advantage of the strong points of 
decentralised organisations for top management learning. According to Grant (1996) and 
Mintzberg (1992), these particularly come into effect in fast changing environments. 
Following the suggestion by Mintzberg (1992) and Grant (1996), who considers the firm 
as a knowledge-integration system, decentralised structures make tacit or idiosyncratic 
knowledge available and enable fast responses to local conditions in many different 
places. This can be attributed to the fact that decentralisation has implications for the 
internal structure of the firm, i. e. for the role of hierarchy, for the location and process of 
decision-making (Grant 1996) and strategy development (Mintzberg 1992) for which 
again learning processes play a key role. 
174 Means following Hambrick (1994): the roles of members and the relationships among those roles 
175 Means: number of managers classified as top management. 
176 Means following Hambrick (1994): the place of the top managers in their organisation. 
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Based upon that, one could assume that the observed changes of the structure, locus 
and size of the top management were intended. It could furthermore be assumed that the 
top management learned to deal with the steadily increasing pace of change in DT's 
environment as well as the fact that an important part of DT's processes were apparently 
based upon experience. 
Whereas this could be confirmed by means of corresponding documentation for the 
implementation of Telekom KONTAKT (Deutsche Telekom 1992; Deutsche Telekom 
1995), it could be found in the interviews, that this had no applicability to the 
implementation of the "four-pillar strategy" and with that, the strongest form of 
decentralisation. The top managers themselves saw the introduction of the "four-pillar 
strategy" as an isolated decision of the CEO, which was triggered by the capital market 
and made in the absence of intention to change the internal structure of the firm"'. It 
could furthermore be found in the interviews that the implementation of the four-pillar 
strategy led to great tensions between different parts of the top management, and to 
consequent large problems in handling converging markets, as shown in section 4.7.3. 
This even reached so far that the individual divisions were in competition on the external 
market 178 . According to the interviewed top managers, these conflicts, which were 
primarily about supply and service relations and the corresponding pricing between the 
divisions, clearly always flared up over the same points. As a result, vast trenches formed 
between two "camps" in DT's top management. On the one hand, there was the `old 
world' represented by the fixed network business; on the other hand, there was the `new 
world' represented by `new' businesses and here especially the mobile and the Systems 
177 For example, one top manager from Systems reported: "At the very beginning, the reasoning of the four- 
pillar strategy was the capital market. I remember when the four-pillar strategy was presented by our CEO. 
He said in the top management meeting: Who makes use of this structure for his own good... I will slay 
this person and then kick him out. The intention, however, was very different from real-life. " 
178 "Networked products are our strength, but all our departmental thinking gets squarely in the way of it. " 
[source: interview with a top manager in charge of a business line of the Systems business] 
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business. This evaluation of the interviewed top managers squares well with the analysis 
of group-internal preliminary work (see table 33 below). 
Head- "Head- 
quarters" 
Fixed "Fixed 
Network" 
Case 
"Mobile / Online" 
Case 
"Systems" 
Proportion of . 
1. 15% 13.4% 46.8% 37.2% 
internal 
preliminary work of 
total revenue 
Thereof: 
Fixed network 
1 9.4% 44.4% 37.1% 
Systems 9.6% 3.9% 2.3% . 1. 
Mobil 5.2% J. 0% 0.1% 
Online 0.2% 0.1% J. 0% 
(by author based upon DT internal documents) 
Table 34: Proportion of Internal Preliminary Work of Total Revenues 
The conflicts were clearly actually the strongest where there were the largest overlaps. 
These findings confirm the suggestion made by Hambrick (1994) that, depending on the 
degree of task interdependence of group members, the structure of the top management 
creates a tension regarding group identities. Following his suggestion, these tensions 
result from the fact that "... other group members think of themselves primarily as subunit 
group leaders, and not as top group members" (Hambrick 1994, p. 176). These overlaps 
and resulting role ambiguities or conflicts were respectively seen by the interviewed top 
managers-right after the complexity of the organisation (see section 5.4.1)-as the 
strongest barrier to top-level organisational learning179. As has been show, they led to 
TLOL being sometimes steered in undesirable directions (e. g. optimising the goals of the 
individual business divisions to the detriment of the group). Even in 2008, a well-known 
German business magazine wrote: "No Telekom boss has to date managed to get the 
employees to pull in the same direction and to identify with the group's goals ... 
" The then 
179 A top manager of DT's headquarters (annotation: no further details given 
for confidentiality reasons) came 
to the conclusion: "We are not capable of working together in a cross-divisional way-and 
/ include the 
management bodies in my judgement. " 
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CEO "... gave the business units more autonomy and promoted internal competition. 
Thus, everyone is fighting against everyone else, thinks firstly of his own benefit and does 
not allow others to be successful. That brakes elan exactly where it is desperately 
needed: in the development of innovative products or better service. " (Wirtschaftswoche, 
2008, p. 87). 
With the advent and growth of diversified firms, this underlines the need to intensify 
research into the structure of top groups and its impact on organisational learning at top 
management level. Even more so, as according to Hambrick (1994) despite the great 
significance of the structure of top groups to any complete theory on top managers, it has 
gone almost totally without attention in research to date. 
5.5.2.2 Composition of the Top Management 
Corresponding documentation in the Top Management HR department confirmed that 
strong use was made of external recruiting, even if there were considerable differences 
between the individual business units and between headquarters and the business units, 
as will be shown below. Likewise, the interviewed top managers themselves as well as 
representatives of the top management HR department highlighted that mainly specific 
expert knowledge in the field of marketing, sales or finance that DT's top management did 
not previously have was brought in via external recruitment. External recruited top 
managers were additionally meant "to bring a breath of fresh air into the place" (quote 
from an interviewed top manager of the fixed network business) by asking questions and 
bringing in new ideas. In the face of turbulent change, external recruiting was seen by all 
interviewed top managers-in the case of two top managers from the fixed-network 
division, also with reference to training measures attempted in the early 90's (see also 
section 4.4.3.1)-as the only way to get hold of the necessary competencies at top-level 
on time. Furthermore, very many new top managers-primarily international top 
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managers-had been added due to mergers and acquisitions, whose integration was at 
most only partly successful due to a lack of integration strategy, as was shown before in 
section 5.3.2 and 5.3.3 (strategy). 
A look at the composition of DT's top management (see below), which refers to the 
collective characteristics of top team members (Hambrick 1994), provides further 
empirical evidence for the actual, significant external additions and changes in the 
knowledge base at top level. The great changes in the composition of DT's top 
management observed in this study confirm that, following the suggestion from Simon, 
organisational learning at top level was also achieved by "ingesting new members who 
have knowledge the organization didn't previously have" (Simon 1991, p. 125). The 
findings likewise support the point made by Yeung et al. (1999), who identified in his 
empirical study the acquisition of new competencies through recruitment or acquisitions, 
etc. as a means to build up new management capabilities in turbulent environments. 
The more in-depth analysis of the composition of DT's top management180 and how it 
changed over time provides empirical insights into why external recruiting and mergers 
and acquisitions were applied as methods for top-level organisational learning in this 
study and especially on which characteristics are crucial for a top management group in 
an environment of turbulent change. Six large, overall trends as regards the evolution of 
what Hambrick called "quantity of a compositional characteristic" (Hambrick 1994, p. 177) 
of DT group's top management could be identified in the period under review181. These 
were as follows: 
180 To reiterate, in the connection that the size of DT's top management changed in the course of time, this 
was caused by changes in the group structure. All following statistics are relative values. 
181 In this connection, there was only little data for the time between 1990 and 1995, as the administration 
and support of top management was only assumed by DT upon privatisation in 1995. The evaluations 
shown therefore primarily relate to the time between 1995 and 2002. 
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i. A very clear drop in the average age of top management: 
The average age in 2002 was 47.3 years. In 1990, the top managers (at that time still 
civil servants) were at least, but often significantly more than, 50 years old. Overall, 
significant drop in the number of over-45s (see figure below). The youngest top 
managers could be found in the Online and Mobile businesses182. 
100% 
90% 
80% 
70% 
60% 
50% 
40% 
30% 
20% 
10% 
0% 
Ono specification 
Q >55 years 
Q45 - 50 years 
Q40-45 years 
® 35 - 40 years 
 < 35 years 
Note: based upon CV-analysis of DT's top management and following DT's formal definition 
of the top management: 1995: 340 CV's; 1998: 245 CV's; 2002: 121 CV's 
Figure 11 : Age Structure of DT's Top Management 
II. A very clear reduction in tenure in the organisation (see figure below): 
In 2002, the average tenure was 7.5 years. In 1990, all top managers were civil 
servants "for life". 
100% 
90% 
80% 
70% 
60% 
50% 
40% 
30% 
20% 
10% 
0% 
no specification 
Q> 20 years 
Q 12 - 20 years 
Q9-12years 
Q4-9years 
02-4 years 
 <2 years 
Note: based upon CV-analysis of DT's top management and following DT's formal 
definition 
of the top management: 1995: 340 CV's; 1998: 245 CV's; 2002: 
121 CV's) 
Figure 12 : Development of Tenure in the Organisation of DT's Top Management 
182 This squares well with DT's age structure of all employees. For example, 
2000 of the on average youngest 
employees were to be found in Online (average employee age: 
32.8), followed by Mobile (average 
employee age: 35). 
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1995 1998 2002 
III. A strong increase in the addition of top international managers: 
In 2002, they represented 24% of the top group (see figure below). 
In 1990, Telekom was still solely focussed on the domestic market. 
100% 
80% 
60% 
40% 
20% 
0% 
National 
International 
Note: based upon CV-analysis of DT's top management and following DT's formal definition 
of the top management: 1995: 340 CV's; 1998: 245 CV's; 2002: 121 CV's 
Figure 13 : Development of Top International Managers at DT 
The distribution of activity of all group employees supports that development and shows 
clear parallels to the development at the top level. 
2002 Activity distri bution in % 
Group Fixed Systems Mobile Online 
network 
National 74 76 76 45 71 
International 26 24 24 55 29 
Number of 
countries 
where 27 4 23 4 6 
present 
(depicted by author, based upon DT internal documentation [Konzernpersonalstrategie 2003]) 
Table 35: Geographical Allocation of Employees in Case Organisation 
IV. A strong movement in the formal education of top managers from technical to 
commercial and economic studies. From the second half of the 90s, an increase in 
non-academics (mostly from the "new economy") became apparent - see figure: 
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1995 1998 2002 
13 No specification 
100% 
80% 
60% 
40% 
20% 
0% 
O Natural & Engineering sciences 
0 Industrial engineering 
0 No academic graduation 
13 Classical studies 
M Business administration 
Note: based upon CV-analysis of DT's top management and following 
DT's formal definition of the top management: 1995: 340 CV's; 1998: 245 CV's; 2002: 121 CV's 
Figure 14: Development of the Formal Education of DT's Top Management 
This development was also reflected at all employee levels in the group: 
Skills Development of employees, in 
80 
70 
60 
50 
40 
30 
1994 2007 
Technology Skills   Service Skills 
(networks, installation etc. ) (Service, marketing, products etc. ) 
(Source: Deutsche Telekom, Personalbericht 2007) 
Figure 15: Skill Development in Case Organisation Over Time 
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V. Among the external additions to the top level, there was a clearly growing proportion 
of top managers with pertinent industry experience in IT and telecommunications as 
well as in consulting (see figure below). 
100% 
80% 
60% 
40% 
20% 
0% 
Others 
0 FMCG 
Consulting 
o Manufacturing 
MIT/TK 
Note: based upon CV-analysis of external hires of DT's top management and following DT's 
formal definition of the top management: 1995: 92 CV's; 1998: 88 CV's; 2002: 104 CV's 
Figure 16 : Industry Experience of External Hires of DT's Top Management 
"Industry Experience": A classification as specified in the "Statistical Classification of Economic Activities in 
the European Community" (commonly referred to as NACE), as a European industry standard classification 
system, is not appropriate due to its large amount of different clusters (consisting of a6 digit code and 996 
cluster and sub-cluster in total). This analysis therefore concentrates on FMCG (Fast Moving Consumer 
Goods), Consulting, Manufacturing and IT/Telecommunications. All other industries are summed up in 
'Others'. 
VI. External additions to the top level increasingly had experience from previous 
employment in large or very large companies (see figure below). 
100% 
90% 
80% 
70% 
60% 
50% 
40% 
30% 
20% 
10% 
0% 
D Small (< 50 headcounts) 
0 Medium (< 250 headcounts) 
D Large (< 2500 headcounts) 
0 Very Large (> 2500 headcounts) 
Annotation: 
* Based upon CV-analysis of external hires of DT's top management and following DT's formal 
definition of 
the top management: 1995: 92 CV's; 1998: 88 CV's; 2002: 104 CV's) 
* Enterprise categories spezified in Anlehnung an die European Commission 
Source: http: //ec europa eu/enterprise/enterprise policy/sme definition/index en. htm 
Figure 17: Previous Experience of New Hires by Company Size 
314 
1995 1998 2002 
1995 1998 2002 
Following Hambrick's (1994, p. 182) suggestion according to which the `top management 
group shaped context' and the `context shaped the top management', the dynamic 
interrelationships between exogenous factors, strategy, organisation and top 
management are considered later (see section 5.7). The following analysis concentrates 
on some special aspects affecting top management. Above all, this is to learn more about 
why external recruiting as a method for top-level organisational learning is used and why 
it is so important for top management groups that are confronted with massive change. 
As was found (see above), the age of DT's top executive managers-especially in the 
mobile and online business-decreased overall continuously in the period under review. It 
could be found in the interviews that the top managers themselves associated a stronger 
willingness to take risks with lower ages, and saw the "Mobilers" as the most willing to 
take a risk. Analogously, a former member of the Deutsche Telekom supervisory board 
attested the following of the youngest CEO that Telekom ever had, and quoted him as 
follows: "... some think rather something safe without future, but with past than something 
with risk, but with the chance of a special future. This is what differentiates the notion of 
entrepreneurship. " (Glotz 2001, p. 165). This confirms the findings of Wiersema and 
Bantel's (1992) empirical study, which suggests a proximate connection between certain 
demographic traits, such as low age and the receptivity to change, and willingness to take 
risk. Following Hambrick and Mason (1984), a lower age is for that reason also 
associated with growth and volatility of sales and earnings. And this, too, is confirmed by 
this study. Thus, the overall sinking age of top managers within the Telekom group 
generally and the lowest age of top managers within the group at Mobile squares 
particularly well with the corresponding key financial figures183. The intense tensions that 
could be observed mainly between top executive managers of the "old and new 
183 DT's sales grew from 30.5 billion euros in 1995 to 53.7 billion euros in 2002. Net profit fluctuated during 
this time between a high of 5.9 billion euros in 2000 and a record loss of 24.6 billion euros in 2002, 
whereby -23.7 bn fell upon the Mobile business, which had more than tripled 
its losses in comparison to 
the previous year. (source: annual reports DT group; for further details, please refer to section 4.2.4). 
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generations" or between the traditional and the new parts of the group's top management 
(see previous section 5.5.2.1), as well as the partly very large age spreads of up to 23 
years on the corporate as well as divisional boards 184 suggest that sourcing of younger 
top managers was important, also with a view to the debate over the direction of the 
company as well as decision-making. This confirms the point identified by Eisenhardt et 
a/. (1998), who creates a link between performance and conflict and considers age 
differences as particularly powerful as regards conflicts (similar: Wagner et al. 1984). 
Corresponding to Eisenhardt et al. (1998) high conflict top management teams which 
include large age spreads (> 20 years) outperform other teams as they "... lead to more 
thorough and creative discussion of decisions and avoidance of premature closure" 
(Eisenhardt et al. 1998, p. 8). This strongly indicates that large age spreads drive top- 
level organisational learning particularly in fast developing markets and environments. In 
the absence of internal options, as in DT's case, this can only be achieved by getting hold 
of external resources through recruiting. 
As far as the top management's tenure is concerned, the study demonstrated (see figure 
above) a steadily decreasing tenure of the top executive managers in the organisation in 
the period under review. As the table above shows, top executive managers from the 
fixed-network business usually had the longest tenure, which might also be attributed to 
its legacy as a public authority. 
Corresponding to Hambrick and Mason (1984), executive tenure is highly positively 
related to strategic persistence or the absence of strategic change185. The good learning 
184 In 1995, DT had the youngest CEO in its history, in a 45-year-old, and also in 2000, when the four-pillar- 
strategy and a new corporate board of management was implemented, the age difference between the 
oldest and youngest members of the corporate board of management was 18 years. On the Mobile board, 
which achieved the highest ratings from all interviewed top managers in terms of their learning, the age 
difference was even greater. There was a difference of 23 years between the oldest board member, the 
CTO184, and the youngest member, the head of sales and later Mobile CEO. 
185 In addition a further positive association was found between executive tenure and performance conformity 
to industry averages. 
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performance that the interviewed fixed-network managers, like other top executives from 
the group, attested to, and which also had an effect on the positive key financial figures 
and their external image as the "backbone of the group", strongly indicate, that this is not 
necessarily linked to a lack of capacity to learn186. At the same time, the former head of 
the group organisation and one of his direct reports, among others, stated in a joint 
interview on the subject that-as already shown in section 5.4.1.1-many external hires 
in change projects failed and "... cleared off again after a short time" (quote of an 
interviewed, external hired top executive manager in the fixed network business who 
joined DT in January 1999). This was because they had not understood "how Telekom 
works", and had therefore overlooked important hurdles in change processes. Due to the 
lack of direct operational responsibility for the implementation of change projects, this 
mostly did not lead to personal consequences for the external hires at headquarters, 
however. Here, one increasingly withdrew into a consultant role, which was also 
reinforced by the CEO and his direct reports increasingly hiring consultants. It could be 
confirmed in fact, that 2/3 of the top managers were in consulting prior to their arrival at 
DT headquarters' 87. At the end of 1999/the start of 2000, all three key positions, the 
strategic development of the group and policy, group strategy and group organisation 
were occupied by former consultants. 
The study thus confirms Becker's (1970) suggestion, which pointed out that top 
management groups with extensive tenure in a firm or industry build specific firm and 
industry knowledge which might be less valuable in times of high uncertainty and when 
innovations are required, but which is critical and useful when the firm requires efficiency, 
or past experiences have to be used to predict future events. As shown, quality 
leadership with simultaneous improvement of efficiency and economy exactly matches 
186 As already shown in section 5.5.1 on the preconditions for top-level organisational learning-the majority 
of top managers who were not ready or able to learn were located in the fixed network business or in 
DT's 
headquarters. 
187 Annotation: A further focus was due to the IT business in Systems 
317 
the strategic goals of the fixed-network division (see section 5.3.1). And as shown, the 
headquarters was increasingly perceived as "disconnected" and bad in terms of its 
learning performance, which primarily became clear with the acquisition policy and the 
introduction of the four-pillar strategy, which had partly led to detrimental results. 
The study thus demonstrates that the assessment of whether longer organisational 
tenures drive or hinder top-level organisational-learning depends significantly on the 
context and strategic intentions, and therefore on which know-how is required. 
Apart from the most extensively-investigated top management group composition 
research emphasising demography (e. g. age, tenure etc. ), which often has not produced 
consistent support for relationships between demographic traits on organisational 
outcomes (see Jackson 1992; Miller et al. 1998), there is very sparse existing research 
on the implications of the experiences in an international environment named in the case, 
formal education (but also professional experience in companies in various industries and 
of differing sizes) of the top management group, as well as their connection with TLOL. 
Although research has not produced a consistent empirical foundation, there is at least 
widespread agreement (see e. g. Wiersema and Bantel 1992; Glick et al. 1993; O'Reilly et 
al. 1993; Murray 1989), that diversity as a result of different professional backgrounds, 
origins etc. -similar to age-tends to directly or indirectly create disagreements when 
strategic issues are being considered, and thus has an impact on cohesiveness. Beyond 
that point, which will be considered in greater detail in the following section on the 
behavioural integration of the top management, the study showed that pertinent 
competencies that were necessary to achieve the formulated strategic goals did settle at 
the top level in increasing amounts. This includes, as can be taken from the figures 
above, alongside competencies in dealing with international markets and increasing 
formal education in commercial fields (especially marketing, sales and service), 
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increasing specialisation, which is clear from the increasing focus on the 
telecommunications industry and increasing recruitment of external top managers from 
both large and very large companies. 
The overall findings provide empirical evidence for Miles and Snow's (1978) suggestion, 
according to which, strategies are self-reinforcing over time. This means that strategies 
call for competencies, structures and processes that support the firm's strategic 
alignment. Therefore, as can be taken from the corresponding statistics above, top 
executive managers in these development areas will come to be more present in the 
organisation. 
In a reverse conclusion, the findings also however suggest that, at the top level, 
previously held know-how was lost, which corresponds to what Hedberg (1981) called 
"unlearning" or Blackler (Blackler et al. 1999) "organisational forgetting". In 2002, for 
example, the last technical director left the company's corporate board of management 
that had had 4 technical directors in 1990. With this, many technical topics or, e. g. mid- to 
long-term innovations and the resulting projects, lost their promoters and sponsors, as 
suggested by Hambrick and Mason (1984), who considered strategies and effectiveness 
as "... reflections of the values and cognitive bases of powerful actors in the 
organisation". For the effects, please refer to Bungartz (2007). 
To sum up, the analysis of the composition of DT's top management group showed that 
external recruiting is an important method for top-level organisational learning in an 
environment of turbulent change. In fast growing, developing markets it enables enlisting 
at short notice those competencies at top management level that support the firm's 
strategic alignment. The study showed that in turbulent environments, external recruiting 
can help to overcome risk-aversion, and that large age differences at top level drive top- 
level organisational learning, particularly in fast developing markets and environments. It 
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could be found that extensive external recruiting is no option-or just to a limited extent- 
when specific firm knowledge is required, which is critical when the firm requires 
efficiency or has to make use of past experiences to predict future events. Furthermore, it 
could be found that external recruiting helps to get hold of new expert knowledge at top 
management level at short notice. Over time, it helps to identify the most specific 
knowledge and competencies that are required by strategy, and contributes to making 
those executives more present in the organisation. 
5.5.2.3 Behavioural Integration of the Top Management 
Although it was shown in the previous sections that due to changes of locus, structure 
and composition of the top management, a new or a broader base of knowledge was 
allocated at top management level, it could be found in this study that the different top 
management groups of DT's top management apparently were only able to make use of 
these (new) competencies for TLOL in very different amounts and quality. The following 
reasons could be identified for that in this study. 
As shown in the table below and could be taken from a more in-depth analysis of the 
dispersion (Hambrick 1994) of the different top management group characteristics (see 
previous section), as well as corresponding statements of the interviewed top managers 
(incl. representatives of the Top Management HR department, as well as the group 
organisation), external recruiting and mergers and acquisitions in the individual parts of 
DT's top management were used to differing extents. They only became possible on a 
group-wide scale with the privatisation in 1995, and reached their peak at the end of the 
90s, which explains why cohesiveness was still strong after the completion of the 
Telekom KONTAKT initiative (see section 5.5.2). Beyond quality, also the diversity of the 
additions to the top level varied greatly. While the new additions to Mobile showed what 
Wagner et al. (1984) called similarity, and came almost exclusively from large and very 
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large companies in the IT and telecommunications industry, the new hires among 
headquarters' top management, with the exception of a group of consultants, had hardly 
anything in common. The new managers came from small to very large companies, 
different industries (e. g. foodstuffs, chemicals, aviation, construction, banking and 
insurance), sometimes even from research institutes or associations, and had the most 
varied qualifications. Against the background of the different starting points of DT's 
business divisions188 and the differing numbers of additions, this meant that DT's top 
management groups dealt with different levels of what Eisenhardt et al. (1998), Jackson 
(1992), or Miller et a1. (1998) called "heterogeneity" or (cognitive) "diversity". 
At the same time, the comparison of the quantity and characteristics of new entrants (see 
table 35 below) shows, with the assessment of the cohesiveness and effectiveness of 
top-level organisational learning in the corresponding top management group by the 
interviewed top managers, that diversity in some cases fostered, in other cases impeded 
top-level-organisational learning. This might be related to the problem identified by Miller 
et a/. (1998) that cognitive diversity can be very problematic when like in most 
organisations, it is not dealt with effectively, which is why he recommended avoiding high 
levels of cognitive diversity in executive groups. 
As the table below illustrates, it was apparently dealt with more effectively with diversity in 
those top management groups that continually grew, in contrast to Systems18', and where 
there were greater similarities, e. g. with regard to age, tenure or previous experience, 
between the existing top management group and the new additions, as was not the case 
at headquarters. High levels of diversity, however, clearly led to lacking cohesion and 
personnel turnover. 
188 Annotation: Whereas the top management groups of the fixed network business and headquarters had to 
deal with the legacy of DT's past as a public authority, 100% subsidiaries were created for the mobile, 
online and Systems business which were built up from the scratch. 
189 Annotation: There was a very large spurt in growth here due to the merger with a company of about the 
same size. 
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Top Management DT Group 
Fixed network Mobile/ Online Systems business Headquarters 
business business 
Quanti of new entrants due to... 
External 
recruitment' 
Low-Moderate High High-Very high Very high 
Mergers Not relevant Not relevant Very high Not relevant 
(merger with equally- 
sized company) 
Acquisitions Medium Medium-High Medium None 
Characteristics of new entrants 
Age Medium age young Medium age, Young 
(compared to existing (somewhat (about the same (about the same (significantly top mgt. group) younger) age) age) younger) 
Share of Low High, but from High, from most Low 
international top selected countries diverse countries 
managers 
Formal education Mainly Strong focus on Mainly Most diverse 
marketing/service marketing, sales, marketing/service formal 
(in contrast to service as existing education 
technology of top mgt. group 
existing top mgt. 
group) 
New entrants ga ined previous job ex perience in ... 
the following Diverse industries Mainly in IT and Mainly in IT and Most diverse 
branch: telecommunications telecommunications industries 
in a company of Mainly large Mainly large and Mainly large and Most diverse 
the following very large very large size of 
size:: companies 
Cohesiveness of the corresponding top ma nagement group... 
... was evaluated Good 
Mobile: Very good Very poor Very poor 
by interviewed 
B Online: Good top managers 
High identification High identification Lacking common Lacking 
with the "Telekom with "We are identification common 
Family" c different to identification 
("We are Telekom" C 
Telekom"c) 
Effectiveness of top-level organisational learning 
... was evaluated 
Good Mobile: Very good Very poor Very poor 
by interviewed Online: Satisfactory 
top managers 
(depicted by author based upon corresponding DT internal documentation) 
A according to the evaluation of representatives of the top management human resources department 
B compared to existing top management group 
Table 36: Diversity and Cohesiveness of DT's Top Management 
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This is supported by the interviewed manager responsible for the Top Management HR 
department, who explained that there had been similarly high fluctuations in new 
additions to the top level precisely at headquarters at the end of the 90s, and in Systems 
after the merger. The main reason at headquarters was usually lacking performance on 
the part of the relevant top manager, which mirrors the suggestion from Jackson (1992) 
that the performance of top management groups depends on the right balance between 
cohesion that is based upon confidence and a `common language' on the one hand, and 
conflicts arising from diversity and resulting multiple possible courses of action on the 
other hand. 
In contrast to that-the responsible manager of top management HR department 
continues-the affected top managers in the culturally difficult environment at Systems 
had "... lacked acceptance by their own people. " The latter confirms the point made by 
Forbes and Wertheim (1995) that mental maps, values and opinions of the managers on 
the lower hierarchical levels can turn out to be as incompatible with the ideas and 
proceeding of the newcomer at the very top and cause important resistance and barriers 
to change (Forbes and Wertheim 1995). Similar findings could be observed in Miller et 
al. 's study on the relationship between cognitive diversity among upper-echelon 
executives and strategic decision processes (Miller et al. 1998). He found that high levels 
of cognitive diversity cause problems with respect to communication, integration and 
political behaviour and appear to overwhelm any positive decisional effects of high 
diversity in top management groups. In extreme cases, this can lead to the inability to 
reach decisions and master strategic change (Miller et al. 1998). This was without doubt 
the case in the Systems business following the merger (see sections 4.6 and 5.3.2), as 
the constantly changing, complex matrix organisation shows.. 
It could furthermore be found in this study that, starting with the liberalisation of certain 
markets and the company's privatisation, the CEOs played an increasingly important role 
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with regard to the behavioural integration of the top management groups 190 Thus, the 
top management group of the Mobile business was not only overall more 
homogeneous 19' 
. As the top Mobile managers, and also the head of group 
communication and HR development, reported, there were regular team-building events 
and meetings during which strategic topics were worked on, on the initiative of the Mobile 
CEO. This apparently led, in the case of Mobile, to what a top manager from the fixed- 
network business's financial department called "a committed crew". Following Richter's 
(1999) suggestion, this is an important condition for top-level organisational learning to 
occur, as top managers have a strong preference for working and learning with people 
with whom they have trustful relationships, and which are based upon shared past 
working experience. There was similar behaviour at Online. And there were also-even if 
only twice a year-so-called Leadership and Top-Leadership Forums in the fixed-network 
business. In contrast, only in 2002 was a similar communications platform created at 
Systems. 
In contrast to the business divisions, headquarters was the only area of the company that 
had no meetings of the top management group, which can partly be traced back to the 
CEO's choice of candidates for the top positions, which placed greatest emphasis on 
individual performance and not on teamwork192. 
So strong was Dr Sommer's image as "Mister Telekom" externally and in public (see 
Glotz 2001), that his effect was seen that much more critically from within by top 
managers and even individual members of the supervisory board (see table below). 
190 Annotation: Due to the training and promotion system in the civil service, this problem had never before 
been seen in the same dimensions. 
191 According to the results of a CV-analysis, more than 2/3 of the top managers in Mobile came from the 
telecommunications industry, as well as 3 of top managers from large and very large companies. A large 
majority of the mostly between 35 and 40-year-old managers had studied commercial or economic 
subjects. 
192 In the interviews, CEO Sommer was accused of a preference for working with consultants and candidates 
who were starkly different to the old state-institution image, far beyond the measure propagated by Richter 
(1999) and Berthoin Antal and Krebsbach-Gnath (2001). 
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Assessment of the role of the CEO for the behavioural integration of DT's top management (Examples): 
Composition of "The CEO selected those top executives who showed individual high 
the top performance. Everything else-such as keeping good, respectful company 
management with colleagues, ... etc. -was viewed as needless stuff. " group (A top manager of the fixed network business) 
"The notion of quality and service came into the company ... Communication was extremely important which also had an important impact on the top 
management. The appearance had to be better than that that was behind it. 
These were the times where numerous young managers and above all 
consultants were recruited who produced all these nice consultant concepts 
with the Deutsche Telekom Logo on it. " 
(A top manager of the fixed network business) 
Lacking culture "There are not a lot of leaders who can accept criticism. We do not have a 
of debate company culture of debate, i. e. of expressing one's personal opinion. Nor is 
it common practice at our company to act consistently. " 
(A top manager in the Mobile business) 
"The dialogue culture [between the CEO and his top management team] we 
had before became stunted in the era of Sommer" 
(A top mana er at DT's headquarters) 
Lack of trust "There are scarcely open discussions between these different groups of top 
managers. There is no trust. Something is missing here. There is always the 
question or doubt, whether what you say will have repercussions. So in 
general what is said is not more than empty words. " 
(A top manager from the Systems business) 
"There is only a marginal amount of discourse-even during fire-side talks. 
There is no trust. Something is amiss. There is the question of whether what 
one says ends up being spread beyond those intended to hear. On the other 
hand, we tend to restrict conversations to meaningless talk. " 
(A top manager from the Mobile business) 
"Here, the newspapers are the only source of information. Everything is 
written earlier in the newspapers even than decided in the management 
board. These kind of things do not confirm an appropriate management 
culture. " 
A top manager from DT's headquarters) 
Impact of the "He was not the kind of guy you'd have a beer with. " 
Personality of (A member of the supervisory board, (Glotz 2001), p. 37 if. or Business Week, Oct. 
the CEO 1995) 
"Our CEO had an aura about him that made it difficult to get close. I have 
worked for long years with him, but / never knew what he took me for... if he 
liked me or not. He was so devious. " 
(A top manager of DT's headquarters) 
Internal "No team spirit, own interests and laying blame. That is our management 
competition culture, to which our company leadership has contributed greatly. 
It does 
nothing to change this. The competitive situation has deepened the rifts even 
more. " 
(A top manager of the online business 
Table 37: The Role of the CEO for Behavioural Integration 
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Even in the press, one could read this on the subject: 
"'There is no corporate culture', said a member of the Top 50 management 
group, who has worked at other large companies. `Everyone does their thing, 
likes to trip up colleagues in other divisions, and thereby sabotages the 
overall group goals. "' (Wirtschaftswoche, 2.6.2008, No. 23, p. 86). 
And further: 
"'Telekom has neither an emergent or lived corporate culture, nor a string, 
culture-influencing management culture. ' In principle, this shows that at core, 
Telekom is still the old telephone utility that it came from. `Team spirit, as it 
bonds together worker and manager over years in a growing undertaking, 
that has worn off at Telekom-and that is taking its revenge. "' 
(Wirtschaftswoche, 2.6.2008, No. 23, p. 87). 
This squares well with the assessment given in interviews of the main cultural 
characteristics of DT group's top management group and its sub-groups (see table 
below). It likewise squares well with the poor assessment of the cohesion of the 
headquarters as well as the poor evaluation of the quality of cooperation of DT group's 
top management, which was rated by 50% of all interviewed top managers as worse than 
satisfactory. This also led to an inability to replace the different component cultures of the 
top management groups of the individual businesses with a common management and 
leadership culture, and the cooperation of group-level top managers remained influenced 
by cultural conflicts between the "old" and the "new". This was particularly pronounced 
where there was close intermeshing due to internal supply and service relationships. (see 
also section 5.. 4.1.2 on cultural constraints). 
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Top Management DT Group 
Fixed network Mobile/ Online Systems Headquarters 
business business business 
Main cultural characteristics of the resulting top management group 
Metaphor c 
, 
The 
The young "The disorderly The dinosaurs" savages" crew" Consultants" 
Main cultural Large Start-up Micropolitics Lone warrior- 
characteristics hierarchical culture, and power syndrome, described by distance; risk Informal struggles, high interviewed top averse; able associations Cultural hierarchical managers of 
other parts of 
but bad 
external image 
with one melting pot of distance; decoupled 
DT group .... 
another, very different 
from the rest of Take a risk, , have an 
company 
cultures the group, 
appreciation for Strong 
new ventures, external image 
entrepreneurial 
Cohesiveness of the corresponding top management group... 
... was Good Mobile: Very Very poor Very poor 
evaluated by good 
interviewed top Online: Good 
managers 
High High Lack of Lack of 
identification identification common common 
with the with "we are identification identification 
"Telekom different to 
Family" c Telekom "c 
("We are 
Telekom" c) 
Main cultural characteristics of DT group's top management group 
As described 
by interviewed No common management culture and identity, top managers 
and external Strong internal competition, cooperation 
influenced by distrust. 
press .... 
Cohesiveness of DT group's top management group 
... was 
evaluated by Rather poor interviewed top 
managers 
: quote of interviewed top managers 
Table 38: Cultural Characteristics and Cohesion of DT's Top Management 
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The findings of this study illustrate the CEO's crucial role for dealing effectively with 
diversity. The study provides empirical evidence that it is not enough for top-level 
organisational learning to take place to allocate corresponding knowledge at top 
management level. The study rather confirms Hambrick (1994) and Finkelstein and 
Hambrick (1996), who attributed a major role as regards the composition and functioning 
of the top management group to the CEO. They show that the CEO can foster top-level 
organisational learning by avoiding high levels of diversity and through the continuous 
motivation and encouragement of the top management group. By authorising top 
managers, as suggested by Antonacopoulou (2002), to throw institutionalised norms, 
practices and policies within the organisation into question, the CEO can have a 
disproportionate impact on top-level organisational learning. 
5.5.3 Summary Component Top Management 
In this section the top management itself was analysed in greater detail. 
First of all, the preconditions for top-level organisational learning were considered. It 
could be found that the break of the psychological contract between the former public 
authority Deutsche Telekom and the civil servants limited the top management's 
readiness for learning and so represented an important barrier to top-level organisational 
learning. Before DT's privatisation, unlearning (Hedberg 1981)-which is a basic 
precondition for new 'learning was furthermore slowed down or inhibited due to the 
absence of any options to make civil servants redundant or otherwise sanction them. 
In a second step, a particular emphasis was put on the analysis of the top management's 
resources consisting of the locus, structure, composition and the behavioural integration 
of the top management. It was shown that the locus and structure of the top management 
varied significantly in the course of time. It could be found that, following Hambrick's 
suggestion (1994), a changed organisation of the firm and corresponding allocation of top 
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managers in the organisation creates role ambiguities and tensions regarding group 
identities, which can impede top-level organisational learning. This becomes evident, e. g. 
in conflicts that arise from group internal supply and service relationships, and suggests 
that the importance of the locus and structure of the top management for top-level 
organisational learning has to be particularly taken into consideration in diversified firms 
with a decentralised organisation. 
Based upon the analysis of the composition of the top management, external recruiting 
and acquisitions could be identified as methods for top-level organisational learning in 
fast-changing environments. In extension of Hambrick and Mason's (1984) and 
Eisenhardt et al's (1998) research, it was shown that the large age spreads that can be 
achieved e. g. through external recruiting, drive top-level organisational learning, 
particularly in fast-changing and developing environments. As far as organisational tenure 
is concerned, the study demonstrated, however, that whether longer organisational 
tenures drive or hinder top-level organisational learning depends on the organisation, the 
strategic intent and whether idiosyncratic knowledge about the firm and its functioning is 
required. Apart from that the study showed, in accordance with Miles and Snow (1978), 
that over time strategies are self-reinforcing and led to the allocation of competencies at 
top level that support the company's strategic alignment. Overall, it could be seen that 
diversity as regards formal education, industry knowledge and professional experience 
increased at top level. It could thereby be seen that too high levels of diversity-either 
due to the quantity or quality of new entrants or a mix of both-hindered top-level 
organisational learning and so should be avoided at top management level. Finally, the 
study highlighted the CEO's crucial role for dealing effectively with diversity. Hambrick 
(1994) and Finkelstein and Hambrick (1996) indeed already attributed a major role to the 
CEO as regards the composition and functioning of the top management group. In 
extension of this aspect, this study however emphasises the significance of continuous 
encouragements for top-level organisational learning (similar: Antonacopoulou 2002) by 
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the CEO. Only through corresponding learning platforms and a matching management 
culture that allows the top management to build "trustful relationships" (compare Richter 
1999), can the status quo be questioned, openness to the new and cooperation with 
other top managers be achieved, and with that the basis for top-level organisational 
learning be laid. 
5.6 Summary of Key Findings 
Now that the cases have been analysed in greater detail, the key findings and their 
sources of empirical evidence are summarised in the following table. Whether the 
following findings confirm, contradict or open new aspects of existing literature and 
research will be discussed more closely in chapter six: 
Research Method /Source of Data 
Key-Finding* 
Interview Documen Observa Others** 
tation tion 
Exogeneous Factors: 
" Market forces trigger TLOL and determine the top 
management's latitude of learning and their effect on X X X 
organisational outcomes. 
" In corporate functions (i. e. headquarters), capital 
market forces take the place of forces that originate in X X X 
customer markets in other divisions. 
" Legal constraints especially public sector employment X X X 
regulations hinder TLOL. 
Strategy: 
" The frequency of the use of certain initiatives/methods X X 
" Secondary 
ew data for TLOL says little about their importance for TLOL. 
+ 
+ Audit reports 
" "Controlled experimentation" and "competency 
acquisition" as main methods for TLOL in turbulent 
environments identified: 
¢ In large, mature organisations (i. e. group or large X X X divisions of case organisation): emphasis on 
unlearning and "controlled experimentation" 
¢ in new/young organisations: a stronger emphasis on 
"competency-acquisition" 
" Harmonised Corporate /divisional strategies in . Secondary 
diversified firms as a basic precondition for effective X X X interview data 
. TLOL. 
Audit reports 
Organisation: 
" Inertial forces as a barrier to TLOL not only in large, X X X 
" Secondary 
interview data 
mature organizations-cultural constraints can affect + Audit reports 
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i LUL in smaller, young organisations. 
" Action-orientation of top managers, internal competition 
and increasing external recruiting at top level, leads to " Secondary 
high frequency of organisational change and hinders X X interview data TLOL. + Audit reports 
" High capital intensity and the concentration of 
ownership limits the top managements latitude of action X X 
and learning. 
" Financial constraints foster `orientation to short-term 
results' and leads to a loss of knowledge related to X X X 
long-term oriented topics. 
"A means to reduce inertial forces: 
¢ In fast growing, new markets in turbulent 
environments (where no idiosyncratic knowledge is 
required): creation of new subsidiaries. X X X 
¢ In large, mature organisations: 
a mix of top managers with in-depth knowledge 
about the organisation ('insiders') and holders of 
specific new knowledge ('external hires'). 
" Changes in the formal organisation that matter for TLOL 
have to go along with a change of : 
- principle allocation of power and resources X X X 
- decision-making processes 
- formal definition of the top management 
"A strong Brand fostered TLOL through the X X 
strengthening of the identification with the group. 
Top Management: 
" In fast changing environments, replacement of top 
managers is required to overcome slow or lacking X X 
unlearning. 
" Structure of the top management can lead, particularly   Secondary 
in diversified firms, to role ambiguities and conflicts X X X interview data 
which influence TLOL. + 
Audit reports 
" Large age spreads in the top management group drive X X X TLOL in fast developing environments. 
" Organisational tenures have no uniform effect on TLOL. X X X 
" Over time, those competencies were allocated at top X X 
level that support the company's strategic alignment. 
" Too high levels of diversity hindered TLOL. X X X 
" CEO plays a major role as regards the encouragement X X 
for TLOL. 
Table 39: Key Findings and their Sources of Empirical Evidence 
* arranged around the components of the conceptual framework 
*ý` secondary data (see methodology chapter, section 3.8.5.1) 
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The table shows that, as described in the methodology chapter (see section 3.7.5), 
systematic use was made of triangulation of methods and data. Before moving on to 
chapter six, where the theoretical, methodological and practical contributions and 
implications as well as the limitations of this study are considered in greater detail, the 
next section summarises the interrelationships between the constituent parts of the 
conceptual framework. 
5.7 Dynamic Interrelationships 
The analysis of the findings of this study has shown the parts each of these four core 
components played for top-level organisational learning. These findings confirm 
Hambrick's suggestion, according to which the ".., characteristics of a top group-its 
composition, processes and so on-do not occur by happenstance" (Hambrick 1994, p. 
181) but are rather "... the result of contextual forces, some direct and others indirect and 
subtle... " (Hambrick 1994, p. 181). It has been illustrated that these four components of 
the conceptual framework could be separated from each other for analytical reasons, but 
in fact are highly interconnected. The derived interactions are presented in graphic form 
below: 
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" Market Forces 
" Legal Constraints Exogeneous 
Factors 
" Strategy and Methods for TLOL 
" Business vs. Corporate strategies 
" Strategy Development 
------------------ 
Str 
ý« Ac 
Organisation 
ET'Drs 
» i 
Top Management i 
ONwh* I 
- ---------------- 
v------------------ 
ý\ 
" Complexity of the organisation 
(size, age, cultural constraints) 
" Formal Organisation 
" Frequency of Organisational 
Change 
" Availability of Resources 
(financial resources, brand) 
((The Top Management in 
its Learning Environment» 
" Preconditions for Learning 
" Locus/ structure of the top 
management 
" Composition of the top 
management 
" Behavioural integration of 
the top management 
Figure 18: Conceptual Framework: "The Top Management in its Learning Environment" 
The four constituent parts of the conceptual framework thus influence each other by 
interacting and establishing a dynamic interrelationship, i. e. changes in one component 
have an effect on the other components. The previous discussions already contributed to 
the understanding how these components are interwoven with each other and what it 
meant for top-level organisational learning. 
The analysis has shown that exogenous factors, which, however, did not manifest 
themselves in the same quality and strength at the same time in all cases, greatly 
affected top-level organisational learning. Therefore, the necessity to adjust the strategy 
of "how to run the business" derives directly from the exogenous factors. Strategy defined 
the strategic choices made by the top management to adapt the organisation and the top 
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management accordingly, thus co-determining the initiatives and methods of top-level 
organisational learning. 
In terms of relationships between the four components of the framework, it is evident that 
strategy was not only influenced by exogenous factors but also the organisation and the 
top management. The following example helps to understand how these components are 
interwoven with each other. 
The case of the Mobile business, which was deregulated at an early stage, thus showed 
that in order to develop that fast-growing business and become a full-range provider with 
comprehensive service in mobile communications, a 100%-owned subsidiary company 
was created. This served to achieve quick responses to market requirements in this 
competitive environment by bypassing the highly-centralised, bureaucratic and formal 
organisation of the case organisation, DT, which was geared towards the completion of 
"sovereign tasks" rather than customer service, and which was constrained by public 
sector employment regulations. The mobile case thus demonstrated that greater flexibility 
and better access to knowledge that the top management did not previously have could 
be achieved, but that this was required to foster top-level organisational learning and to 
develop the new business. 
The example likewise illustrates the mutually-reinforcing and interdependent relationship 
between the components `organisation' and `top management'. As `actors' and by making 
use of their knowledge and management capabilities, the top management designs and 
shapes an organization. As `resources' the organisation marks the framework for top-level 
organisational learning by shaping top managerial roles and by defining the capacity, 
willingness, opportunities or necessities to learn. 
In the following chapter, a detailed account of the theoretical, methodological and 
managerial contributions of this study will be given. Furthermore, limitations of this study 
will be indicated as well as some possible directions for further research. 
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Chapter Six - Conclusions and Implications 
6.1 Introduction 
The debates in this study are based upon critical examination of the current literature and 
research in the areas of organisational learning-, and related areas of organisational 
research such as top management learning and strategic management and - leadership. 
What ties all of these together is the idea of the need for top-level organisational learning 
as a response to strategic change. 
Little empirical work in these fields has concentrated on top management as the target 
group and few have tried, so far, to bridge the gap between individual learning of top 
managers and top-level organisational learning (see Richter 1998). As a result and due to 
the partly isolated or fragmented streams of literature, there is a more generic description 
of elitarian approaches in the organisational learning literature. This longitudinal study, 
which covers younger as well as more established divisions and businesses of a large 
telecommunications group, provides in-depth insights into the practice of TLOL. It has 
also explored the methods and outcomes of top-level organisational learning and extends 
the theory and understanding of organisational learning of that influential group of people 
at the apex of the organisation. To fill this gap, comparative cases in different 
organisational settings and business contexts, at corporate and at divisional level, in a 
fast-changing environment were used to empirically investigate the deployed initiatives 
and methods as well as the drivers and barriers of top-level organisational learning. 
These led to a number of findings, culminating in the conclusion that the interplay 
between exogeneous factors, strategy, the characteristics of the organisation and the top 
management group, determines the deployed methods for top-level organisational 
learning. Similar factors explain whether this learning is reflected ultimately in 
organisational outcomes. 
335 
The study likewise contributes to the current discussion of the constructs of `dynamic 
capabilities' (Teece et al. 1997) and related discussions on `absorptive capacity' (Cohen 
and Levinthal 1989,1990,1994)193. Although these contributions were not the original 
intention of the thesis, this is in part due to the different understandings in the literature of 
precisely what dynamic capabilities are (see Easterby-Smith et al. 2009). 
This study has explored the two constructs in an organisation that underwent a shift from 
public- to private-sector status and extends the understanding of how TLOL links to "the 
firm's ability to integrate, build and reconfigure internal and external competences to 
address rapidly changing environments" (Teece et al. 1997, p. 516) which is a 
prerequisite for organisations to compete in such fast-moving contexts. The study also 
adds specific insights to the role and impact of the top management cadre on what 
Cohen and Levinthal (1989, p. 569) calla firm's `learning' or `absorptive capacity'. 
This additional contribution might on the one hand be attributed to the detailed 
descriptions of methods and outcomes of TLOL, which provide a co-evolutionary view 
linking the top management to the corresponding organisation in change and which 
highlight the recursive relationship between organisational learning and absorptive 
capacity identified by Lane et al. (2002,2006). Recursive in this connection means that 
learning and absorptive capacity co-evolve with each influencing the other (see e. g. 
Rosenkopf and Nerkar 2001, Vermeulen and Barkema 2001). On the other hand, this 
might result from the significant role that is attached in the relevant literature to managers 
(Zahra et al. 2006, Easterby-Smith et al. 2009, Ambrosini et al. 2009) and learning for the 
creation and development of dynamic capabilities (e. g. Eisenhardt and Martin 2000, Zollo 
and Winter 2002). 
193 E. g. Zahra and George (2002) propose that absorptive capacity should be defined as a dynamic 
capability. 
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In this chapter, the overall research findings are discussed by integrating them into a 
coherent theory. First, the theoretical contributions and implications will be outlined. Then, 
various managerial and practical implications are taken into account, followed by a 
discussion on the methodological contributions and implications. Finally, the limitations of 
the research, with suggested future research directions, are outlined. 
6.2 Theoretical Contributions and Implications 
In seeking to explore one of the currently underdeveloped areas of organisational 
learning, this section summarises the theoretical contributions and implications of this 
study. So, building on a critical analysis of the chosen phenomena, the research 
questions of this study, which were derived from the literature, will be answered in 
summary form. 
By placing emphasis primarily on the identified methods and factors that foster or hinder 
top-level organisational learning instead of purely on the outcomes, insights generated by 
this study enhance the understanding of top-level organisational learning and how it 
differs at corporate and divisional level by providing a more comprehensive picture of the 
chosen area. 
To this end, and derived from the notion of the `duality of structures' (compare Berends et 
al. 2003; Kammel 2000) two different perspectives will be captured to examine top-level 
organisational learning: 
Firstly, in the following section, the perspective that considers the top management and 
its organisational environment rather as "resources" that mark the framework for top-level 
organisational learning by defining the capacity, willingness, opportunities or necessities 
to learn. These "resources" are simultaneously the input and output of the top-level 
learning process and of the developments triggered by them on the top management 
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level as well as that of the entire organisation. This resource-perspective allows to identify 
the potential range of methods for TLOL. 
Secondly (see section 6.2.2), a perspective that gives greater emphasis to individual 
agency and which considers the top management as composed of "actors" who hold 
managerial roles, undertake actions and interact. 
As already indicated in the introduction to this chapter, the constructs of dynamic 
capabilities and absorptive capacity are integral components of this dual approach. By 
giving greater emphasis to individual agency-especially the influence exercised by top 
managers-in understanding the way organisations adapt to their environment, the study 
contributes to the discussion on dynamic capabilities (Eisenhardt and Martin 2000, Zollo 
and Winter 2002) and absorptive capacity and the work that develops from that (e. g. the 
work of Adner and Helfat (2003) on dynamic managerial capabilities194, Zahra et al. 
(2006) on entrepreneurship and dynamic capabilities and Zahra and George (2002) on 
absorptive capacity). 
By the employment of such a dual perspective, this thesis not only enhances the overall 
understanding of the concept of top-level organisational learning but also contributes to 
the understanding of the interrelationships between the top management and the 
organisation which form, corresponding to Klimecki`s suggestion (1997), an inseparable 
`learning community'. This dual approach, however, serves analytic reasons only and 
finds its limitation in that individual agency and resources and the corresponding learning 
processes are very tightly, sometimes inseparably, interwoven. 
A closer consideration of potential differences between corporate and divisional top 
management groups in this respect is-as far as is necessary-an integrative component 
of this view. 
194 Dynamic managerial capabilities are, following Adner and Helfat (2003, p. 1012), the capabilities with 
which managers build, integrate, and reconfigure organisational resources and competences. 
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Both of the named perspectives will be combined in section 6.2.3 into a new integrated 
approach to TLOL. In extension of existing theory, this makes possible a new, holistic 
view of methods and outcomes of TLOL which ties together the deployed methods for 
TLOL in the case organisation, the explanation for their use from a literature-perspective, 
the rationale for their use in the case organisation and indicators of `impact'/ outcomes. 
6.2.1 A Resources-Perspective on TLOL 
In what now follows, the theoretical contributions and implications of this study are 
considered and summed-up in a first step from a resources-perspective. As already 
elaborated earlier, this is based upon Berend's et al. (2003) and Kammel's (2000) 
suggestion to replace the dichotomy between individual learning and organisational 
learning and the consideration of individuals and organisations as separated subjects of 
learning, by simply two different ways of considering this social phenomenon. 
According to Berends et al. (2003), the resources perspective views top-level 
organisational learning and the deployment of corresponding methods as fostered or 
constrained by what Berends called `structural elements' (Berends et al. 2003) in the top 
management's context. Although Berends does not specify what is meant by `structural 
elements', he suggests that the top management groups have the power to decide which 
elements in their environment to take seriously195 and when to `act otherwise' (similar: 
Giddens 1984 or Antonacopoulou 2002). 
Existing literature and research have identified various methods and styles of TLOL (see 
section 2.6 of the literature review) that ascribe great importance to structures, the 
strategy development process and the knowledge present at the top level. These factors 
195 Annotation: This is similar to what Finkelstein & Hambrick (1996) called `filtering process'. 
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(i. e. structures, strategy development process and top-level knowledge) can be regarded 
as what Berends et al. (2003) calls "structural elements". They thereby show clear 
parallels to corresponding discussions in the dynamic capabilities literature-for instance 
regarding the significance of routines (cf. e. g. Teece et al. 1997, Zollo and Winter 2002, 
Winter 2003) as well as what Van den Bosch et al. (1999) identified as the organisational 
determinants of absorptive capacity196. Many other factors that influence organisational 
learning in one or the other way have been identified in the literature (see section 2.7). 
However, these are often isolated, i. e. observed independently of the relevant context 
and/or do not apply to the particular target group of top management. Based upon 
evidence from the cases, this study was able to extend existing literature and research by 
identifying and exploring the following `structural elements', i. e. contextual and 
organisational factors that influenced the range and use of the deployed methods for 
TLOL as well as their outcomes. 
6.2.1.1 Factors in the Top Management's External Learning Context 
It was found that market forces and the liberalisation of the corresponding markets 
generated a pressing need for-and so triggered-top-level organisational learning. This 
is indeed similar to what Antonacopoulou (1999) and Richter (1999) identified as triggers 
for management or executive learning and corresponds to the suggestion of authors in 
the organisational learning literature 197 who consider organisational learning as a way to 
adapt to environmental demands. The evidence from the cases suggests, however, that 
the different effects of market forces on TLOL cannot be understood without further 
differentiation and firm establishment of the market forces. It was thus found that market 
forces differ, due to regulatory forces (i. e. early versus late deregulation), differing market 
196 Following Van den Bosch et aL (1999) absorptive capacity is determined by the level of prior related 
knowledge, organisation forms and combinative capabilities. 
197 e. g. Cyert and March 1963; Lawrence and Lorsch 1967; Argyris and Schoen 1978; Duncan and Weiss 
1979; Shrivastava 1983; Fiol and Lyles 1985; Levitt and March 1988. 
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growth dynamics (i. e. growing versus mature markets) or market division (e. g. fixed 
network business as a former monopolist), which results in different pressures to change 
and also, following Finkelstein and Hambrick's (1996) suggestion, new possibilities for the 
relevant top management group198. While the identified market-related criteria of the top 
management's task environment clearly overlap with Finkelstein and Hambrick's concept 
of managerial discretion (1996), wherein the aforementioned forces affect the top 
management's latitude of action and therefore how much effect top managers have on 
organisational outcomes, there are also some important gaps. This study therefore not 
only extends Finkelstein and Hambrick's (1996) concept by expanding his application to 
top-level organisational learning but also further elaborates the exogenous factors that 
matter for TLOL. Findings generated by this study suggest to further differentiate market 
forces with regard to their intensity and content direction. It could thus be found that the 
differing independence from the external market affected top management groups. For 
instance, in the case organisation, this led to organisational learning of top management 
groups or parts of the top management that had high internal sales or a support function 
(e. g. purchasing, HR etc. ) being less effective199 than in other areas that were highly 
dependent on competitive markets or had functions that were close to the customer, e. g. 
marketing or sales. 
The discussion of the content direction of the market forces (i. e. whether the focus is on 
the capital markets or customer markets) showed that these aspects - as in the dynamic 
capability discussion (see Adner and Helfat 2003) - have often been neglected or 
underestimated in previous studies on organisational learning or TLOL. Whereas in the 
diversified case organisation, the top management groups at divisional level put a 
stronger emphasis on the relevant customer market, the capital market and shareholders 
were more in the foreground for top management at corporate level. This exerted an 
198 Annotation: It could, for example, be thus shown that since the deregulation of the market, the top 
management of the mobile business has had a greater level of freedom and, in contrast to other parts of 
top management, was managed only according to financial goals. 
199 e. g. due to the later appearance and lower frequency of different methods for TLOL. 
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important influence on TLOL because it can, as was able to be shown in this study, lead 
to conflicting corporate and business strategies200. Because, according to Mintzberg's 
suggestion (1995), learning processes play a key role for strategy development it could 
be found in this case study (e. g. the numerous merger and acquisition projects, the 
implementation of the four-pilllar-strategy) that the deployed methods for TLOL did not 
lead to-to say it with March (1990, p. 40)-a better fit with the environment and only 
desired outcomes of learning but `inexorably somewhere'. Or as Ambrosini et al. (2009, p. 
S20) state, the renewal of the resource base was "not in line with the environment". 
The study has further demonstrated that in (former) public sector organisations, legal 
constraints such as the applicability of public law or public sector employment regulations 
can require a framework that, especially in a phase of turbulent change, narrows potential 
options as regards initiatives and methods for top-level organisational learning. Large 
parts of the case organisation were thus segregated from the external labour market until 
privatisation. The findings of this study thus again mirror and further clarify the work of 
Finkelstein and Hambrick (1996) who identified that powerful outside forces contribute to 
low managerial discretion and thus limit the possible courses of action. The findings 
suggest that the presence of such legal constraints, as shown by the example of the case 
of the top management of the fixed network business, slows down or impedes unlearning 
(e. g. due to lacking possibilities to sanction or to dismiss) which represents, 
... as important a part of understanding as 
is corresponding to Hedberg's suggestion, 41 
adding new knowledge" (Hedberg 1981, p. 3). It could be demonstrated that such legal 
constraints furthermore hinder new top-level organisational learning due to the lacking 
influx of new competencies through external recruiting or acquisitions. This forced 
learning in a closed system thus led to the continuance of what Finger and Burgin-Brand 
(1999) called "more complex functioning and management" or LaPalombara (2001) 
200 For a definition of business strategy and corporate strategy it is refered to Andrews (1998). 
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"normative idea" in the public sector and which goes along with the persistence of 
conservatism, reaction and risk-aversion. The findings of this study suggest that TLOL on 
the basis of existing resources alone in rapidly-changing environments is therefore not 
effective. It has rather to be complemented by new knowledge at top management level 
(e. g. by means of external recruiting or acquisitions) in order to overcome slow learning 
and to foster the top management's awareness of multiple possible courses of action. 
Despite the initial absence of the idea to make a contribution in this area, the findings of 
this study create a link and contribute to the dynamic capabilities debate and when taking 
a process-perspective like Zahra and George (2002, p. 186)-also to the absorptive 
capacity discussion. It shows in further elaboration of Zollo and Winter (2002, p. 350) that 
environmental factors not only serve as stimuli, but can also be directly reflected in the 
constitution of what they call dynamic capabilities. This might become even clearer when 
adopting Zahra et al. 's (2006) definition of dynamic capabilities as "the abilities to 
reconfigure a firm's resources and routines in a manner envisioned and deemed 
appropriate by its principal decision-maker(s)" (Zahra et al. 2006, p. 918). 
Zahra et al's (2006) definition puts the top management's perception of change 
opportunities, their ability to implement these changes and their willingness to undertake 
these changes at the centre of observation. This in turn suggests a direct connection 
between TLOL, Finkelstein and Hambrick's (1996) concept of managerial discretion and 
the creation and development of dynamic capabilities: the greater the degree of freedom 
and room for manoeuvre resulting from market forces (including regulatory forces, market 
growth dynamics and market division) and other outside forces (e. g. public versus private 
labour regulations), the greater the "room to learn" is at the top level, and the broader the 
spectrum of abilities envisioned and deemed appropriate by the top management to 
create and develop dynamic capabilities. 
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Furthermore, the findings of this research highlight the necessity of a clear differentiation 
between capital market and customer market forces for the observation and evaluation 
(incl. the criteria on which it is based) of TLOL, managerial discretion20' and dynamic 
capabilities and so clearly serve as a contribution to the very sparse literature and 
research in that specific area (see Adner and Helfat 2003, p. 1013). This also derives 
from the different alignments towards customer or capital markets and the division of 
labour among the top management of multi-business groups in business managers and 
corporate managers who hold specific resource governance functions (e. g. allocation of 
resources at group level and between businesses). The study has shown that the division 
of labour among the top management in the diversified, complex case organisation not 
only led to a differentiated latitude of action of individual top managers. It rather has been 
shown that in the diversified, complex case organisation TLOL was largely determined by 
the co-ordination of the interplay of these individual top managers and their actions. This 
was important as all top managers oversaw large organisations but were not able - up to 
the very top - to capture the complexity of the whole organisation. They were more likely 
focused on their own what Finkelstein and Hambrick (1996, p. 41) called "limited field of 
vision" (e. g. capital versus customer orientation). 
6.2.1.2 Factors in the Top Management's Organisational Learning Context 
As can be derived from the discussion in the literature on the resource-based view 
(Wernerfelt 1984; Barney 1991, Barney et al. 2001) and as addressed in the methodology 
chapter, resources in general are difficult to research as they can be unique, 
idiosyncratic, or even intangible. But also tangible resources such as financial resources 
are scarcely addressed in the literature and research in connection with executive or top- 
level organisational learning. However, the evidence from the cases (e. g. limitation of 
201 Due to their main focus on CEO's no corresponding differentiation is made in Finkelstein and Hambrick's 
(1996) model. 
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decisions on M&A to the CEO or increasing short-termism as a response to financial 
problems) suggest that the availability of financial resources exerted an important 
influence on the selection and effects of the deployed methods for TLOL. This supports 
the work of Yeung et al. (1999) who identified a link between short-term cost and risk and 
the use of organisational learning styles at management level202. However, this study has 
extended Yeung et al. 's work by further elaborating the consequences of capital-intense 
businesses and of high investments, which lead to financial constraints. 
This study thus unveiled that capital intensity has a particular effect on decision-making 
processes. The high capital intensity of the business led to strategically important 
investment decisions, such as the purchase of new licences or acquisitions, became 
solely "a matter for the boss", in which the divisional top management was not at all or 
only slightly involved, although they had to carry out the decisions. The findings of this 
study thus again overlap with Finkelstein and Hambrick's (1996) model on managerial 
discretion, according to which high capital intensity and the concentration of ownership on 
one or a few owners (Finkelstein and Hambrick 1996, p. 31) limits the top management's 
latitude of action. 
This study extends their work by further elaborating the interplay between managerial 
discretion and TLOL. The findings generated by this study suggest that decision 
structures resulting from the high capital intensity led, among other things203, to the 
corresponding divisional top management group's partial refusal of accountability for 
these decisions. According to the suggestion of numerous authors and researchers 2041 
this is an imperative requirement in order for top level organisational learning to occur 
202 Yeung et al. (1999) thus identified that the organisational learning style `experimentation' was the least 
popular learning style among the sample companies although it had the strongest effect on long-term 
performance. He identified that experimentation also implied significant short-term costs and risk and so 
can temporarily even detract from competitiveness. (Yeung et al. 1999, p. 65). 203 
compare e. g. the cases of the top management of the mobile or systems business. 
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which explains why mergers or acquisitions in the case organisation often ended up in 
poorly managed integration projects. 
Apart from its effects on the deployment of mergers and acquisitions as a method for 
TLOL, the study was able to identify further consequences of the high capital intensity 
and financial constraints for TLOL. Indeed, the poor firm performance did not 
immediately 205 
, as suggested by Wagner et al. (1984), cause the replacement of 
executives associated with that poor performance. But the study was able to demonstrate 
that the poor financial results and the substantial indebtedness of the case company put 
the top management obviously in a state of stress and made the top management pursue 
activities or initiatives that promised short-term results. When again applying a dynamic 
capabilities perspective as it is defined by Zahra et al. (2006), the findings illustrate that 
financial constraints can substantially limit the abilities to reconfigure a firm's resources 
and routines deemed appropriate by the top management. As could be shown, short-term 
orientation (cost-cutting) and the neglect of long-term oriented topics (e. g. innovation) 
were, e. g. reflected in numerous restructurings, generally strong reductions in personnel, 
as well as the closing or scaling down of certain central departments. This brought about 
the reduction of corresponding top management positions, which led to what March 
(1991) called `competition among managers for internal resources and hierarchical 
promotion', and to little scope for experimentation (Antonacopoulou 2002) and which 
contributed to a deterioration in cooperation at the top level. The findings generated from 
this study thus reflect that high indebtedness exerts a restricting influence on top-level 
organisational learning as it leads to what Weber and Berthoin Antal (2001) called 
`orientation to time' or Senge (1990) `orientation on short-term results'. As a complement 
to the current literature and research, this study unveiled through the example of case 
204 compare e. g. Antonacopoulou 2002; Hoeksema et al. 1997; Rosenstiel 1995; Lloyd 1990; Sutcliffe 1988; 
Honey and Mumford 1982; Stewart and Stewart 1981; Humble 1973; Mumford 1971. 
205 In 2002 the CEO became more and more under the gun in the wake of increasing financial debt incurred 
by the company as he invested billions in new technology (especially UMTS) and made an acquisition for 
over thirty billion Euros. With the stock having lost almost 90 % of its value during the past two years, the 
stockholders and some board members were attacking the CEO. Finally the CEO had to step down. 
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organisation that short-term orientation is reflected long-term in a loss of knowledge at the 
top level with relation to long-term-oriented topics (annotation: in the case organisation 
knowledge on technology). 
A further contribution of this study is the creation of a link between the brand as a 
relational resource of the firm (Wernerfelt 1984) and TLOL. This study was able to show 
that the `T-brand' influenced identification with the group at top level in a positive way. 
The evidence from the cases does not merely confirm Friedman et al's (2001, p. 760) 
suggestion, which states that for organisational learning to occur, the structural element 
must be complemented by a cultural component. It was found that the attractive `T'-brand 
had not only a positive effect on the firm's reputation and the external labour market, but 
internally fostered the readiness in all parts of DT's top management for shared working 
experiences and common learning at top level-also through fostering of readiness to 
assume another top function in another part of the group. 
Another vital contribution of this study is to elaborate the significance of the relationship 
between the top management and its organisational context for TLOL. The review of the 
literature showed that this was indeed often emphasised, but had often been neglected in 
previous studies (see Hedberg 1981; Klimecki 1997; Kammel 2000). In comparison with 
the current literature and research, which is often limited to the observation of the 
interrelationships of top management and organisational performance or effectiveness 
(see also methodology chapter, section 3.7.4.2), it is clear that a stronger emphasis has 
also to be placed on other organisational factors that influence selection and effects of 
methods for TLOL. 
The evidence from the cases particularly highlights the need to take into account the 
interplay between the top management and inertial forces resulting from the size, age and 
culture of the organisation. Findings generated by this study suggest-and here mainly 
regarding the fixed network business and DT group-that organisational approaches to 
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TLOL in the large, mature organisations of the case company required more time and 
effort. 
The described phenomenon confirms the point made by Hannan and Freeman (1984) 
who identified the sluggishness of the organisation resulting from cumbersome routines, a 
high number of hierarchical levels, high specialisation and division of labour as causes for 
the pervasive effects of organisational size on co-ordination processes. The findings also 
clearly overlap with Finkelstein and Hambrick's concept of managerial discretion (1996), 
as a result of which large, mature organisations are not easily changed due to `inertial 
forces' resulting from size, age and entrenched company cultures which suggests that the 
top management in the large, mature case organisation not only operates, but also learns 
under severe constraints. This study enhances the understanding of the impact of inertial 
forces on TLOL by demonstrating that one difficulty for TLOL in the large organisations 
(here e. g. fixed network business and DT group) can consist in the large differences in 
time and space between a learning activity or executive action respectively and the 
corresponding returns. In contrast to Adner and Helfat (2003) it could be found that this is 
not only an issue for corporate managers but also for other managers who oversee 
complex organisations. In the case of this study the creation of a link between cause and 
effect required, at least against the background of the duration of change projects, long 
years of experience and knowledge about "how the organisation ticks". On top of that it 
could be found that top management groups of these very large organisations had to 
oversee a large organisation with a large body of partly what Grant (1996) called 
idiosyncratic and tacit knowledge, whose coordination requires involved coordination 
processes due to the division of labour. As could be shown in this study, both aspects led 
to externally hired top managers who did not make use of holders of that company- 
specific, implicit knowledge in change processes having a high risk of failing. 
348 
However, this study conflicts with Finkelstein and Hambrick's (1996) work by 
demonstrating that inertial forces with cultural causes are not limited to large, mature 
organisations, but can also occur in smaller, young organisations as a result of an attempt 
to extend existing competencies (see the case of the systems business). Owing to a 
merger in this business area, it was shown that top-level organisational learning was 
impeded by cultural conflicts and the resulting power struggles between influential top 
managers of both parties. The latter led to a complex, permanently changing organisation 
where roles and responsibilities of top managers were permanently changed, where key 
people left, where the creation of experience was not possible and where change gained 
a certain momentum on its own. As a result, top managers busied themselves with 
securing their own survival in the organisation and the organisation increasingly with 
itself. 
These findings highlight the meaning of organisational power and politics which have 
according to Lawrence et al. (2005) largely been ignored by organisational learning 
theorists especially regarding the organisational learning of the most powerful people at 
the top of the organisation. Following Easterby-Smith et al. (2008b), the study shows that 
TLOL does not occur and knowledge is not absorbed at top level without effort and the 
deliberate will of the individual top managers to do so. Resulting inertial forces can 
possibly be reinforced. Following Eisenhardt and Martin's (2000) suggestion, dynamic 
capabilities-such as learning (Ambrosini et al. 2009)- in high-velocity markets take on a 
different character and are characterised by "simple, experiential, unstable processes that 
rely on quickly created new knowledge and iterative execution to produce adaptive, but 
unpredictable outcomes" (Eisenhardt and Martin 2000, p. 1106). 
By identifying and exploring the factors outside the top management that influenced 
TLOL, this study has been able to enhance the overall understanding of which and why 
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organisational and contextual factors fostered or hindered organisational learning of that 
influential group of people. Clearly, a resources-perspective on TLOL alone remains 
incomplete and is unable to capture the nature of TLOL. It is therefore complemented by 
an actors' perspective which now follows in the next section. 
6.2.2 An Actors-Perspective on TLOL 
The second perspective derived from the suggestion from Berends (Berends et al. 2003) 
and Kammel (2000) is, that the top management as agents or actors of learning learns 
through the design of structures. Or to put it in a different way: the design of structural 
elements 206 and the existing resources (compare section 6.2.2 on the resources- 
perspective on TLOL) make the corresponding actions and interactions that lead to 
learning possible. From a process-perspective, learning plays an important role in the 
creation and development of dynamic capabilities and is also considered as a dynamic 
capability itself (Ambrosini et at. 2009, S11). Individual agency, and here especially the 
role of the top management, is viewed to be key for the development of dynamic 
capabilities (Easterby-Smith et al. (2009) or Narayanan et al. (2009)). 
The evidence from the cases shows that two types of `structures' were of particular 
relevance for TLOL from an actor's perspective: the design of the `structural elements', 
especially the formal structuring of the organisation, as well as the structure, locus and 
composition of the company's top management group. 
On the one hand, the findings of this study mirror the work of Richter (1999) which 
empirically explored individual and organisational learning at the executive-level with a 
particular focus on communities-of-practice and which questions the role of any other 
206 However, as mentioned earlier, Berends et al. (2003) and Kammet (2000), do not specify more precisely 
what is meant by "structures". 
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than the most formal or legitimised forms of communities-of-practice such as committees 
or task forces207 for top-level organisational learning208 
. 
On the other hand, the findings generated by this study reflect the suggestions from a 
series of scholars in organisational learning literature who attribute an important role to 
structures and the structuring of the organisation for organisational learning (e. g. 
Dodgson 1993; DiBella et al. 1996; Friedman et al. 2001) but who remain saliently short 
in empirical evidence. The kinds of structural features which were found in this study to 
be the most important were changes of the principle allocation of power and resources, 
the decision-making processes and the formal definition and structure of the top 
management. 
The evidence from the cases also agrees with Yeung et al. (1999), who identified what he 
called `experimentation' and `competency acquisition' as the main and most effective 
styles of organisational learning at management level in rapid-changing environments. 
These learning styles particularly emphasise the role of top management as agents of 
learning, as they provide great organisational freedom to the top management in 
comparison to other learning styles such as benchmarking or continuous improvement. 
The findings of this study suggest that Yeung et al. 's (1999) model of learning styles, 
which was based upon a study with mainly middle management, can essentially also be 
adopted for the top management. However, as will be shown in the following sections, 
this study has extended Yeung et al. 's (1999) work by further elaborating the 
interrelationships between the top management, the deployed methods for TLOL and the 
top management's learning environment. 
207 Wenger (1998) and Brown and Duguid (1991) consider communities-of-practice as informal and in terms 
of day-to-day working life as largely interstitial. 
208 Instead the crucial role of trust and shared history which is gained through shared common working 
experience is emphasised. 
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The findings generated by this study show that reference to a turbulent environment 
alone209 is not enough to understand the top management's differentiated approach to 
learning. Different parts of the case organisation's top management made different 
choices. By exploring the deployed methods and outcomes of TLOL, this study was able 
to demonstrate that even in one single, albeit very large organisation, very different 
methods can lead to very different results, which highlights the need to take specific 
managerial as well as organisational characteristics into account. It could thus be 
identified that the deployed methods for TLOL and resulting outcomes at group level or in 
the mature part of the organisation differed substantially from those used in the young, 
fast-growing part of the organisation. Whereas at group level or in the large, mature part 
of the organisation an emphasis was put on what Yeung et al. (1999) called 
`experimentation', the top management of the young, fast-growing part of the organisation 
placed a stronger emphasis on the learning style `competency acquisition'. This was 
evidenced by the analysis of the importance and effects of the different approaches to 
TLOL on corporate and divisional level (see tables 26 and 27). 
This study was able to identify a possible answer from a top management perspective to 
the question raised by Ambrosini et at. (2009) of whether regenerative dynamic 
capabilities210 that allow the firm to move towards new dynamic capabilities can be 
sourced from outside the firm, when there is no time for organisational learning to take 
place to develop and deploy them. The evidence from this study suggests that this is 
possible to a large extent in young, fast-growing organisations, whereas in large, mature 
organisations where dynamic capabilities have been developed and embedded in the 
organisation over time through learning processes and repetition, managers may find it 
209 Yeung et al. (1999) differentiated the following five contextual characteristics: speed of environmental 
change (Bourgeois 1988), competitive strategy, slack resources (Dutton and Freedman 1985), current 
success of organisation, ambiguity of technology. 
210 It is reminded in this connection that from a process-perspective learning is in itself a dynamic capabily 
(Ambrosini et al. 2009). 
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not only harder not to rely on their existing mindset (need for unlearning, Hedberg 1981) 
but are at risk of irreversibly destroying valuable resources by radically breaking the path 
and culture within the firm where it is not warranted. This not only confirms that dynamic 
capabilities are path-dependent (see Cohen and Levinthal 1990, Teece et al. 1997). It 
also makes a contribution to theory by showing that it depends on the dynamic top 
managerial capabilities (Adner and Helfat 2003) and the ability of top management to 
assess with regard to required changes how much learning effort can and should be 
made to absorb new knowledge from outside the firm and to build, integrate, and 
reconfigure organisational resources and competences correspondingly. As this study 
has shown, this is a tricky undertaking, as following the suggestions made by Teece et al. 
(1997) and Eisenhardt and Martin (2000), the evolution of new dynamic capabilities 
involves a combination of idiosyncratic and path-dependent elements that are partially 
unique to the firm and mainly held by the incumbent management and partially industry- 
specific elements (Narayanan et al. 2009). However, the study provided evidence that the 
latter cannot be exclusively sourced from inside the firm in fast-changing environments. 
This study has furthermore illustrated, using the example of the loss of knowledge of the 
functioning of the organisation in the case organisation (here especially in DT's 
headquarters), that a strong focus on new knowledge at top level bears important risks 
with regard to change processes. Thus the findings of this study suggest that it is neither 
efficient to source regenerative dynamic capabilities at top level exclusively based upon 
existing knowledge and capabilities (Telekom KONTAKT, fixed network business) nor 
based upon completely new knowledge and capabilities (four pillar strategy, DT 
headquarters). 
The contributions to each of the above identified two learning styles ('experimentation' 
and `competency-acquisition') will now be summed up in the following sections. 
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6.2.2.1 TLOL through Experimentation 
This study has confirmed that in general, experiential, iterative approaches are common 
in high-velocity markets such as the telecommunications industry (Eisenhardt and Martin, 
2000). As mentioned earlier, the evidence from the cases suggests that particularly 
experimentation with those ideas, processes etc. was powerful, which modified the formal 
structuring of the organisation as well as the top management. 
Despite having been widely adopted by the organisational learning and related literatures 
that `structural elements' represent a central parameter to establishing an organisation 
which is good at organisational learning (see Tsang 1997), empirical research on the 
type, usage and effect of structural elements for TLOL-with few exceptions, (e. g. Richter 
1999; Hambrick 1994)-has often been neglected in previous studies. This study extends 
existing theory by demonstrating that not every change in the formal organisation 
mattered for TLOL, or had an effect that corresponded to the intention expressed, e. g. by 
the CEO (for example the four-pillar strategy). Furthermore, it could be shown that the 
frequency of the use of certain initiatives or methods says little about their real importance 
for-or the effectiveness of TLOL (compare section 5.3.1). The findings generated by this 
study thus confirm that TLOL does not automatically lead to advantage (similar Helfat et 
al. 2007, Ambrosini et al. 2009) and conflict with Yeung et al. (1999), who claims that 
"Experimenters Are High Performers" (Yeung et at. 1999, p. 61). 
Given that very few studies have so far examined the role of organisational structures as 
a driver for knowledge creation, sharing, integration and transfer (see e. g. Zollo and 
Winter 2002, p. 37, Lane et al. 2006, p. 857) a vital contribution of this study is the 
identification of common patterns or commonality of those deployed methods for TLOL 
that led to changes of the formal structuring of the organisation and which evidently had 
an important impact on TLOL. It was thus found that the deployed methods that played 
an important role for TLOL went along with the simultaneous change of the allocation of 
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power and resources as well as of decision-making processes (annotation: in the case 
company in the direction of stronger decentralisation) and the company's formal definition 
of the top management, which was derived from the structure of the top management. 
This not only supports Easterby-Smith et al. 's (2008b) general call for more attention in 
organisational learning literature and research to the political nature of organisations. 
Specifically, it points out the importance of formal structures in defining the interaction of 
senior managers "as actors performing organisational roles" (Lane and Lubatkin 1998, p. 
465) and in defining those holders of knowledge who are more likely able to impose their 
will, or exercise an influence on strategy development (Mintzberg 1992) and resulting 
strategic decisions. A change of the formal structure thus helps to overcome barriers that 
result from the top manager's held norms about power and influence (Richter 1999) and 
so contributes to making new knowledge available and exploitable (Jones 2006). 
The study mirrors Van den Bosch et al. 's suggestion (Van den Bosch et at. 1999, Van 
den Bosch et al. 2003), according to whom a change in organisational form brings about 
changed knowledge absorption 21. A change of the formal organisation can be seen as a 
learning mechanism to create and develop new processes and routines which enable the 
organisation to cope with turbulent change (Zollo and Winter 2002). Although this study 
has shown (e. g. the implementation of the four-pillar-strategy) that purpose is not 
necessary for learning to occur, this study has confirmed the importance of corresponding 
deliberate learning mechanisms (Zollo and Winter 2002) and of reflection on action of the 
top management. 
This research thus provides empirical evidence for the important meaning of structures 
for TLOL as suggested by Klimecki (1997), Kammel (2000) and Berends et al. (2003). 
211 So could be shown in accordance with van den Bosch's suggestion, that the four-pillar-division form 
facilitated divisional knowledge absorption and so TLOL at the level of the corresponding businesses; it 
suppressed integration and TLOL at group level which was detrimental in converging markets. 
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Furthermore, it could be demonstrated that changes in the formal organisation can either 
help to overcome or worsen inertial forces (e. g. structural barriers in multi-divisional firms, 
Zolfo and Winter 2002) that impede TLOL. Whereas the case of the top management of 
the mobile business demonstrated that newly-created subsidiaries were better suited to 
the development of fast growing markets which require a fast adaptation to change, 
showed the case of the top management of the systems business that inertial forces 
increased resulting from the decision to merge with an equally-sized other company. 
This evidence from the cases clearly overlaps again with Finkelstein and Hambrick's 
concept (1996) of managerial discretion, according to which a changed allocation of 
power and resources exerts an influence on the top management's latitude of action and 
therefore their possibilities to influence organisational outcomes. In that connection, one 
of the major contributions of this study is to show, that it is not only crucial for TLOL to 
occur to make use or bring in new knowledge at top level . The findings generated by this 
study rather suggest that it is indispensable to simultaneously reduce the forces that limit 
managerial discretion or to strengthen the forces that increase the top management's 
latitude of action. Following Finkelstein and Hambrick's (1996) suggestion, learning 
results are only then reflected in organisational outcomes. 
6.2.2.2 TLOL through Competency-Acquisition 
It has been shown that another set of methods for TLOL used in this study (e. g. the 
deployed principally on-the-job initiatives and methods for TLOL, section 5.3.1) 
corresponds to Yeung et al. 's (1999) learning style competency acquisition. This study 
specifies the corresponding methods for TLOL, which are concerned with using the 
experience of others for one's own learning processes. It was thus found in this study that 
mergers and acquisitions, and above all, external recruiting were used. In accordance 
with Hedberg (1981), it could be demonstrated that the acquisition of new resources from 
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without was also necessary to overcome slow unlearning and to replace top managers 
who were not ready to learn in that fast changing environment. 
Contrary to Yeung et al. 's (1999) suggestion, and despite the case company's long 
tradition in training, off-the-job training for TLOL played no role in any of the multiple 
cases within the Group. This reflects the top managers' general preference for on-the-job 
learning (Antonacopoulou 2002; Richter 1999; Davies and Easterby-Smith 1984) and 
confirms the point identified by Kammel (2000, p. 659) and Beer et al. (1990) that training 
programs can only increase the probability and efficiency of strategic change and learning 
but do not change organisational behavior as they do not affect enough elements in the 
system. 
In contrast to that, the findings generated by this study showed that external recruitment 
and acquisitions led in the course of time to the allocation of new competencies at top 
level that the organisation did not previously have. This mirrors not only the work of 
Simon (1991, p. 125) who suggests that organisational learning can also be achieved by 
ingesting new members who hold new knowledge. By identifying a direct link between the 
recruitment of key personnel (e. g. a new CEO) and the implementation of new 
operational routines or initiatives (e. g. the implementation of the "T"-brand in the case 
organisation), the study also provides empirical evidence for Ambrosini et al. 's (2009, p. 
S19) suggestion that dynamic capabilities can be sourced from outside the firm. Finally, 
this study confirms Hambrick and Mason (1984) and Hambrick (1994) who indicate that 
just as the organisational context shapes the top management group, the "top group 
makeup has significant bearing on the fates of the organizations" (Hambrick 1994, p. 
186). However, this study has extended their work and the overall very sparse and partly 
virtually non-existent or inconsistent empirical research in the field (compare e. g. Miller et 
al. 1998; Jackson 1992) by identifying compositional characteristics of top management 
groups of the rapidly changing case organisation and its business divisions. It further 
357 
contributes to theory by exploring the linkages between these characteristics of the top 
management group and its learning environment. 
Furthermore, the study extends as will be shown below the understanding of the 
relationships between top management characteristics and the outcomes of TLOL. There 
is thus wide agreement in the dynamic capabilities and absorptive capacity literature and 
research (e. g. Jones 2006, Easterby-Smith et al. 2009, Ambrosini et al. 2009, Narayanan 
et al. 2009) that managerial perceptions, beliefs and competences matter for the creation 
and development of these constructs and will trigger change in a defined way. However, 
little is known so far about the interrelationships (Easterby-Smith et al. 2009, p. S5). 
This study was able to elucidate some of them. A series of overall trends as regards the 
evolution of what Hambrick called "quantity of a compositional characteristic as well as 
the dispersion of that characteristic within the group" (Hambrick 1994, p. 177) could be 
identified that resulted from external recruiting and acquisitions-and thus the use of the 
learning style competency-acquisition. 
Firstly, a clear drop in the average age of top management. This research thus confirms 
the findings of Wiersema and Bantel's (1992) empirical study, which creates a proximate 
connection between certain demographic traits such as low age and the receptivity to 
change and willingness to take risk. It likewise mirrors the findings of Hambrick and 
Mason (1984), according to which a lower age is associated with growth and volatility of 
sales and earnings. Above all, however, this study supports Eisenhardt et al's (1998) 
suggestion and extends this to TLOL, whereby top management groups with large age 
spreads outperform other teams. So this research indicates that large age-spreads drive 
TLOL in fast-changing environments. 
Moreover, the findings generated by this study show a steadily decreasing organisational 
tenure of the top executive managers in the organisation. In contrast to Hambrick and 
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Mason's (1984) suggestion, no uniform effect of organisational tenure on TLOL could be 
established. Instead of drawing unjustified, simple conclusions on the linkages between 
organisational tenure and strategic persistence or the absence of strategic change 
(compare Hambrick and Mason 1984), this study was able to demonstrate that the 
assessment of whether longer organisational tenures drive or hinder TLOL depends far 
more significantly on organisational context and strategic intentions, and therefore on 
which know-how is required. In accordance with Becker (1970), and as was made 
particularly clear in this study through the example of the headquarters and fixed network 
top management group, extensive tenures and therefore a mix of top managers with firm- 
specific, idiosyncratic knowledge about the organisation ("insiders") and holders of 
specific new knowledge ("external hires") is then necessary and conducive when the firm 
or parts of it requires efficiency. 
The findings generated by this study thus also echo and further elaborate the suggestion 
from Prieto and Easterby-Smith (2006) and other academics (Zollo and Winter 2002, 
Gibson and Birkinshaw 2004, Newey and Zahra 2009) who take a dynamic capabilities 
perspective and who identified that the long term continuous renewal of the firm rests not 
only on the exploration of new knowledge-based competences but also on the 
exploitation of existing knowledge-based competences. In doing so the findings partly 
relativise Eisenhardt and Martin (2000, p. 1111), who differentiate between moderate and 
high-velocity markets and who consider the existing knowledge of managers in high- 
velocity markets rather as detrimental to the rapid situation-specific creation of new 
knowledge. However, the evidence generated from this study rather shows that in 
turbulent environments and complex organisations, existing knowledge on the 
functioning of the organisation at top management level combined with 
entrepreneurship-which was in the case organisation mainly brought in from without- 
leads to more efficient TLOL and the creation of dynamic capabilities. This is supported 
by Finkelstein and Hambrick (1996, p. 26), who suggest that managerial discretion, and 
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thus the top management's ability to control the form and fate of the organisation, not 
only stems from contextual factors but is also derived from the degree to which the 
individual top managers are able to envision or create multiple possible courses of action. 
Similarly Easterby-Smith et al. (2009) propose that dynamic capabilities-and learning is 
considered as a dynamic capability itself (Ambrosini et al. 2009, p. S11)-can be created 
because the top management provides a vision for processes aimed at shaping the 
dynamic capabilities (Easterby-Smith et al. 2009, p. S4). 
The evidence from the cases furthermore showed that the level of diversity of the top 
management group increased in the period under review as a result of external recruiting 
and acquisitions. This is reflected in a mix of national and international top executive 
managers with differing formal education as well as professional experience in companies 
from different industries and of different sizes. It could be additionally demonstrated, that 
increasing numbers of competencies settled at the top level that were necessary to reach 
the formulated aims, and that increasing specialisation took place. Previous empirical 
research has not produced consistent empirical foundation on the issue of diversity (see 
e. g. Wiersema and Bantel 1992; Glick et al. 1993; O'Reilly et al. 1993; Murray 1989). 
However, this study was able to confirm the suggestion of Ambrosini et a!. (2009, p. S6) 
and Miles and Snow (1978) that strategies are self-reinforcing over time, and was able to 
extend their work by further elaborating the link between strategy, diversity of the top 
management group and TLOL. It could thus be found that diversity, similar to age, tends 
to directly or indirectly create disagreements when strategic issues are being considered. 
At the same time, it could also be demonstrated that high levels of diversity were 
problematic and led to lacking cohesion and personnel turnover, and consequently 
hindered TLOL. This study thus supports Miller et al. (1998), who observes that high 
levels of cognitive diversity can lead to the inability to reach decisions and manage 
strategic change. The research extends his work as well as Hambrick's (1994) by further 
elaborating the crucial role of the CEO for dealing effectively with diversity and for the 
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encouragement of TLOL. This is important as the absence of shared mindsets of the 
management involved can lead to negative results (Ambrosini et a! l. 2009, p. S22). 
Finally, the study demonstrated that external recruiting had important side-effects. The 
findings generated by this study thus suggest that external recruiting at top level 
contributed to an increasing high frequency of organisational change that hindered TLOL. 
This was shown e. g. by the numerous organisation development projects which were 
initiated by the systems or the headquarters top management group. The study not only 
elucidated interrelationships between different methods for TLOL (e. g. recruiting and 
restructuring) but showed that, in turbulent environments, organisational change can 
develop a certain momentum on its own. The findings mirror the point made by Culley 
(1989), Baldwin and Lawson (1995) and Senge (1990) that executives are action- 
oriented, control relatively little what they learn and lack self-reflective competence. This 
clearly conflicts with the call of proponents from the dynamic capabilities stream for 
deliberate learning mechanism (Zolfo and Winter 2002) or a purpose to create, extend or 
modify its resource base (Helfat et al. 2007, p. 4). It does not question the importance of 
top managers for the creation and development of dynamic capabilities, but illustrates 
particular risks resulting from the specific characteristics of top managers and underlines 
why a planned process for TLOL as suggested by Baldwin and Lawson (1995) is 
particularly needed in such contexts. 
6.2.3 An Integrated Approach to TLOL in Fast-Changing Environments 
The previous discussion of TLOL from an actors as well as a resources perspective 
showed that any part of explanatory theory on TLOL requires different albeit integrated 
ways of considering the phenomenon. In this section both of the named perspectives 
discussed in the previous sections, are summarised and combined into a new integrated 
approach to TLOL. 
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The table below which is derived from the overview of the deployed methods for TLOL in 
the case organisation (see table 26), sums up the deployed methods for TLOL within the 
investigated case and contrasts indicators of impact and outcomes of TLOL. 
Deployed methods Main Explanation for these Rationale for the use of ` ' for TLOL in case 
organisation variations (from 
the Learning Method in Indicators of / impact Outcome at top level 
the literature) case organisation 
No access to external Identification of those who were 
Regrouping of 
resources (legal ready to learn and those 
constraints); unwilling to learn (who were 
existing resources dismissed in the next step) 
around required Create pressure to 
competencies )A Develop new overcome old 
thinking 
competencies and achieve cultural change based upon 
controlled 
Cost-cutting (incl. staff Reduction of top management 
experimentation reduction) and/ or positions (flatter hierarchies), 
Restructuring with many new 
improvement of efficiency Competition and rivalry, 
ideas, new Action-taking (one measure 
products and 
follows another; no reflection on 
previous action) 
Business 
processes; 
primary sources of 
Increasing the company's Increasing internal competition, 
7a redefinition learning are value on the capital worsening of cooperation and market increasing conflicts customers a 
employees yees (direct direct Bypass legacy of the past New top management groups 
Spin-off in separate experience), and gain flexibility in fast with new, needed 
subsidiaries (see, Yeung et al. growing and 
highly competencies and high 
19999 99) competitive markets degrees of managerial 
discretion 
Sourcing capital in the Strengthened identification with 
capital markets for the company; increasing group- 
IPO & joint branding investments in internal job rotation 
infrastructure and 
acquisitions 
Acquisition of new Compensate for the loss Rise in international top 
competencies and of monopoly in the managers, but no effect on 
International experience of domestic market; Shift TLOL as there is no 
acquisitions others (from from a national stand- personal/procedural integration 
external) to help alone company to a of staff. 
organisational global player 
members to Extension of competence Due to poor integration, 
Diversification)c acquire state-of- profile and portfolio on the acquired competencies could 
(national the-art market not become effective; cultural 
acquisitions) competencies and conflicts and high personnel 
accelerate their turnover 
own subsequent Shift from sovereign Limited effect on TLOL; as 
Top management 
development, behaviour and technical attitudes have not changed 
Training 
( see Yeung et al. orientation to customer- fundamentally; 
1999) oriented behaviour and time-consuming, 
entre eurship 
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Fast sourcing of needed Specialised competencies 
new specialist acquired; however a partial 
External recruiting competencies deterioration in cooperation 
(e. g. due to high levels of 
diversity or the recruitment of 
`stars' instead of team players) 
Foster readiness Replacement of those Minimisation of opponents to 
Dismissals/ to learn and who were unwilling or not changes already decided upon; 
deliberate turnover unlearning able to learn loss of knowledge on the (see (Hedberg functioning of the complex 
1981)) organisation 
1' - 1-1-1'"a n1 wOý ui Wal naauuI e. y. IV e. g. I eteKOm MUN I AK I 
)B corresponds in case organisation to e. g. 'four-pillar-strategy' 
)C corresponds in case of systems business e. g. to the merger with debis Systemhaus 
Table 40: Learning Methods and Indicators of Impact 
The table above demonstrates that the main learning methods which were deployed in 
the case organisation correspond-from an actors perspective-to organisational 
learning styles at management level which following Yeung et al. 's (1999) suggestion are 
the most effective ones to create new competitive advantages in the described turbulent 
environment 212. However, in contrast to Yeung et al. 's (1999) research, but in agreement 
with Hedberg (1981), this research highlights-based upon empirical evidence-the need 
to draw particular attention to the issue of unlearning. 
This study also enhanced the overall understanding of learning styles by elaborating the 
interrelationships between experimentation and competency-acquisition. The evidence 
from the cases (here: fixed-network business) showed that in contrast to Yeung et al. 's 
(1999) suggestion TLOL merely through experimentation with the organisation's own 
existing resources in rapid-changing environments was not effective (compare Telekom 
KONTAKT, section 4.4.3.1), but strongly needs to be complemented by unlearning (e. g. 
through dismissals) and the simultaneous external acquisition of new competencies (e. g. 
through external recruitment). Hence an appropriate balance between the exploration of 
new knowledge-based competences and the exploitation of existing knowledge-based 
212 These new competitive advantages, in whose creation and development great significance is attached to 
top management and managerial agency (Helfat et al. 2007, p. 20), mainly refer to what Ambrosini et al. 
(2009) calls `renewing' or `regenerative' dynamic capabilities. 
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competences is required (Zollo and Winter 2002, Gibson and Birkinshaw 2004, Prieto and 
Easterby-Smith 2006, Newey and Zahra 2009). 
A further important contribution of this study resulted from the examination of the role of 
organisational structures for TLOL. The findings generated from this study point out the 
importance of formal structures in defining the interaction of senior managers "as actors 
performing organisational roles" (Lane and Lubatkin 1998, p. 465). It could thus be found 
that the deployed methods that played an important role for TLOL went along with the 
simultaneous change of the allocation of power and resources as well as of decision- 
making processes and a changed structure of the top management. The study thus 
highlights the political nature of organisations (Easterby-Smith et al. 2008b) and the 
meaning of the top manager's held norms about power and influence (Richter 1999) for 
TLOL. 
On the basis of the application of the relevant learning methods as well as the indicators 
of "impact" (see table above), the study showed that the selection and results of the 
learning methods used are significantly derived from factors that, corresponding to 
Finkelstein and Hambrick's (1996) suggestion influence how much effect the top 
management has on organisational outcomes. As discussed in section 6.2, these include 
factors related to the exogenous environment, strategy, characteristics of the organisation 
and the top management. This stresses the importance of applying an integrated 
approach which reconciles managerial agency and resources. However, it was shown, 
that, so far, managerial discretion-to which this study has added specific insights in 
relation to TLOL-has largely been ignored by researchers and theorists on TLOL213 
213 The same is apparently valid for its impact on the creation and development of dynamic capabilities or 
absorptive capacity. Lane et al. (2006) claims, for instance, that "prior research has failed to recognize that 
absorptive capacity can be seen as a multilevel construct. A firm's absorptive capacity is not just a 
function of industry and corporate characteristics. It also is a function of the personal absorptive capacity 
of its members, as well as the structures and processes of the organizational subunits to which they 
belong" (Lane et al. 2006, p. 854). 
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In that connection there is a further contribution of this study in the necessity to 
differentiate between the different levels of actors and different levels of resources, which 
was of particular importance in the diversified case organisation. 
The findings generated by this study suggest that particular attention has to be paid to the 
interplay between the corporate top management group as actors who take a group 
perspective and divisional top management groups as actors who mainly concentrate on 
their own division. The study of this diversified case organisation has shown that the 
structure of the top management led, in accordance with Hambrick's suggestion (1994), 
to role ambiguities and conflicts. Based upon the findings generated by this study, this 
research has not only extended Hambrick's work by providing empirical evidence that 
these role ambiguities and conflicts also had an effect on the indicators of `impact' or 
outcomes of TLOL-for example on the quality of cooperation. It could be identified that 
the development of corporate as well as divisional strategies-a process which is 
associated with learning (see Mintzberg and Quinn 1991)-and their agreement between 
corporate and divisional top management played a crucial role for TLOL in order to 
ensure that the top executive managers themselves recognise a learning need, 
understand the meaning of the learning challenge and make the decision to engage in 
the learning process (see Humble 1973; Stewart and Stewart 1981; Lloyd 1990; 
Hoeksema et al. 1997; Eisenhardt et al. 1998). 
Furthermore, this thesis contributes to an enhanced understanding of the interplay 
between the top management group and its different parts and the case organisation. 
The findings generated by this study highlight the importance of the coherence between 
the knowledge of the actors and the extant resources. The study thus mirrors the 
suggestion from Klimecki (1997) that the top management and the organisation form an 
inevitable learning community. This study extends Klimecki's suggestion by showing that 
for effective TLOL to occur, the corporate top management group heading an 
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organisation that is mainly composed of a large, mature part requires firm specific 
knowledge to achieve efficiency or make use of past experiences to predict future events 
(compare Becker 1970). 
Overall, this mirrors the work of Antonacopoulou (2002) who found that top management 
learning is a complex product of contextual factors. The core contribution of this study is, 
however, that TLOL is circumscribed by the top management's latitude of action and 
learning (Finkelstein and Hambrick 1996), which in turn is a product of top managerial 
agency, the perception of entrepreneurial opportunities and extant contextual and 
organisational factors and resources. Hence, the contributions to each of these 
perspectives are not mutually exclusive, but reinforce each other, which indicates the 
need for an integrated approach to TLOL. 
Finally, as an important `by-product' of this research and given that, following Ambrosini 
et al. (2009), TLOL can in itself be seen as a dynamic capability, this study contributes to 
theory by creating a direct link between the constructs of dynamic capabilities and the 
process perspective of absorptive capacity-which Zahra and George (2002) define as a 
dynamic capability-and the construct of managerial discretion. It also further elaborates 
- as has been shown above - Zahra et al's (2006, p. 918) definition of dynamic 
capabilities214 and contributes to Ambrosini et al's (2009, p. S20) discussion on the 
deployment of regenerative dynamic capabilities. It furthermore provides empirical 
evidence that managerial agency and managerial roles and the top management's 
perception of the firm's resources and capabilities determines the decisions to develop 
and deploy different forms of underlying processes, which can create the flexibility that 
enables organisations to compete in fast-moving markets. 
214 They define dynamic capabilities as "the abilities to reconfigure a firm's resources and routines in a 
manner envisioned and deemed appropriate by its principal decision-maker(s)" (Zahra et al. 2006, p. 918). 
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6.3 Implications for Practice 
In addition to the theoretical and methodological significance, this study has its 
managerial contribution and implications. These are primarily significant for CEOs, top 
executive managers or for all of those who are engaged in top management development 
and/or organisational learning or development in the broadest sense. 
This study thus complies with the demand of Pfeffer and Sutton (2006) to gear practical 
approaches more closely towards scientific insights, instead of basing decisions and 
activities on supposedly patent solutions or untested management methods. The latter is 
a substantial problem of the literature on the `learning organisation' (see Chapter Two, 
section 2.3), which is primarily based on practical experience and knowledge of 
consultants. Due to lacking empirical evidence and the trend towards trivialisation and 
generalisation (compare Argyris and Schön 1996), the concept often only retains the role 
of a guiding idea and a practice-oriented, theoretical frame of reference, which depends 
on the discovery and further development of design possibilities (compare Kammel 2000, 
p. 388). 
In addition, top management learning and development in a corporate context was for a 
long time seen as an individual activity in isolated places of learning and not, or hardly, 
positioned in connection with organisational learning or strategic change. This is certainly 
because little is known about how managers learn in the special organisational context 
(Kammel 2000) and the readiness to share this knowledge is limited (see Baldwin and 
Padgett 1993). 
6.3.1 TLOL and Off-The-Job Learning 
As elaborated earlier, this study has empirically investigated the methods and outcomes 
of TLOL and was able to show that the learning of the group of people at the top of the 
organisation can only be understood as collective action that must be seen in close 
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connection with the specific context (i. e. the components of the conceptual framework of 
this study: exogeneous factors, strategy, organisation, top management). 
As a result, the findings generated by this empirical study mirror the suggestion from 
Kammel (2000, p. 659) and Beer et al. (1990) that the qualifying function of off-the-job 
learning for top managers in times of turbulent change where new expert knowledge is 
required at top level-regardless of whether off-the-job learning is culturally accepted or 
not (see Antonacopoulou 2002)-is only regarded as being of limited significance. 
This suggests that investments in collective training measures for top managers in such 
contexts should not serve pure relaying of knowledge. Instead, training courses for top 
management groups in a context of strategic change are rather seen before the 
background of other targets (e. g. incentive). As far as TLOL is concerned, measures that 
contribute to improving integration and cooperation at the top level can be useful. It could 
thus be shown, that following the suggestion from Jackson (1992) and Eisenhardt et al. 
(1998), the right balance between cohesion and conflict that is centred on alternative 
courses of action and interpretation of facts plays an important role in handling diversity 
and using knowledge at the top level. This practical contribution might be of particular 
importance for those, who (want to) initiate such measures or who are in charge of the 
design and implementation of corresponding measures. 
6.3.2 TLOL and On-The-Job Learning 
The study has shown that in turbulent environments top managers learn primarily outside 
of targeted training measures, i. e. primarily on-the-job. The fact that TLOL must be seen 
in close connection with the specific context also leads to practical starting points for 
shaping or influencing TLOL. The findings of this study recommend to align the top 
management as well as its organisational environment more closely with learning 
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processes. In this connection strategy development, structural issues and the 
composition of the top management group are of particular interest: 
Strategy Development 
This study reveals that the deployed learning methods in the diversified case 
organisation, due to insufficient agreement of corporate and business strategies from 
which the relevant methods for TLOL are derived, did not produce exclusively positive 
results. This highlights as suggested by Pedler et al. (1991)-a proponent of the learning 
organisation literature-that strategy development and implementation must be more 
consciously formulated. Beyond formal strategy development processes, the CEO may 
have an important role as someone who can establish corresponding management 
meetings, off-site retreats or sessions. These can provide the framework for complex 
decision-making or the discussion of super-divisional strategic topics. Equally, the CEO 
can contribute to a better understanding of corporate and business strategies by careful 
overlapping of job assignments, e. g. passing responsibility for a group-wide project. 
Structural Issues 
The study was able to demonstrate that TLOL is strongly influenced by the formal 
structure of the organisation (incl. of the top management) and its configuration, and work 
in formally-defined teams that derive from this for the top management (e. g. task forces, 
management committees, etc., see also Richter (1999)). The research also clearly 
showed-whereby it diverges from many proponents of learning organisation literature- 
that this does not apply to every structural change, and that an excessively high 
frequency of organisational change can even lead to undesired results. A high frequency 
of such measures often benefits from the often strong action-orientation and lacking self- 
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reflection of (particularly newly-recruited) top managers (compare Culley 1989; Baldwin 
and Lawson 1995; Senge 1990). 
Furthermore the findings generated from the cases suggest that in accordance with 
Shrivastava (1983), there is not `one best way', but there is never a defined path for 
organisational learning and achieving a "learning organisation" independent from the 
starting point or context of the organisation. 
This suggests that in corporate practice, a planned process for top-level organisational 
learning as suggested by Baldwin and Lawson (1995) is needed, whereby organisation 
development and TLOL cannot and should not be observed in isolation due to their close 
connections. The evidence from the cases indicated that structural changes have a 
strong effect if they involve fundamental changes in the allocation of power and 
resources, decision-making processes and formal definition of the top management. 
As these radical changes are associated with medium-term higher probabilities and also 
risks, and simultaneously following the suggestion from Yeung et al. (1999), with short- 
term higher costs, the option of such deep structural changes in organisational practices, 
particularly in large, efficiency-oriented organisations in saturated markets, is seldom 
available. This should therefore be evaluated more intensively with respect to its effect on 
TLOL on the basis of a corresponding analysis. 
The findings generated by this study have shown that against this background, also the 
creation of a new subsidiary in a new, fast growing and dynamic market can 
be an option 
to promote TLOL, to achieve greater flexibility and get hold of new knowledge at 
top level. 
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Composition of the Top Management Group 
The study was furthermore able to demonstrate that the composition of the top 
management group had a large influence on TLOL. The practical recommendation to 
keep a special eye on a clear recruiting strategy and policy for the top level is derived 
from this. It could thus be shown that, following the suggestion from Becker (1970), the 
necessary mix of managers with longer tenures, and thus with firm specific knowledge, 
and external hires with new specific knowledge derive from strategy and the 
characteristics of the relevant organisation. When the firm required efficiency or past 
experiences had to be used to predict future events like in the large, mature part of the 
case organisation, a stronger emphasis had to be put on top managers with higher 
tenures, whereas the same top managers were less valuable in times of high uncertainty 
and when new knowledge was required to develop new businesses (e. g. mobile, online 
etc. ). 
As a complement to that, the evidence from the cases suggests that the top management 
at headquarters should be composed corresponding to the relevant businesses and the 
mix of business strategies. This also corresponds to the view of dynamic capability 
perspective (e. g. Prieto and Easterby-Smith 2006; Zollo and Winter 2002), whereby the 
continous renewal of the firm depends on existing as well as new knowledge-based 
competencies. Influence on the composition of the top management therefore represents 
a large opportunity for organising TLOL, of which particularly CEOs should be aware and 
actively use. 
Drivers and Barriers of TLOL 
Although a single case study cannot provide a sound basis for the derivation of reliable `if- 
then' relationships, this study would suggest that the factors identified in the top 
management's learning environment that exert an influence on TLOL are of significance 
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for top management groups in a similar context. The evidence from the cases suggest 
that these factors not only determine the selection of learning methods for TLOL, but also 
influence how much the top management's learning is reflected in organisational 
outcomes. 
The conceptual framework (see section 5.7) of this thesis might, in that connection, serve 
top managers and practitioners to assess their concrete case and derive measures, 
which are suited to extend top management's room to act and learn. 
6.3.3 Summary of Implications for Practice 
In addition to the theoretical contributions, the following practical implications could be 
identified: 
  The qualification function of off-the-job learning only has limited significance for top 
managers in times of turbulent change where new expert knowledge is required at top 
level. The findings suggest that measures to improve the cohesion and cooperation at 
the top level contribute to the integration of new knowledge. 
  Stronger alignment of top management, as well as of its fundamental starting position 
which is aligned to performance processes, towards learning processes. Important 
starting points are: 
- Strategy Development: 
In this connection, the CEO may have the important role of establishing 
corresponding management meetings, off-site retreats or sessions, which can offer a 
framework for complex decision-making or the discussion of strategic themes at a 
super-divisional level. A further important contribution the 
CEO can make is the 
transfer of responsibility for a group-wide project. 
- Structural issues: 
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As TLOL is strongly influenced by the formal structure of the organisation (incl. top 
management) and their organisation, and the resulting top management work in 
formally-defined teams (e. g. task forces, management committees, etc. ), it is 
recommended to establish a planned process that does not observe organisation 
development and TLOL separately due to their close association. 
- Composition of the top management group: 
Influence on the composition of the top management represents a large field for 
composition of TLOL, which CEOs in particular should be aware of and actively use 
by means of a clear recruiting strategy and policy. 
- Drivers and barriers of TLOL: 
With the aid of the conceptual framework (see section 5.7), factors can be identified 
and assessed that determine the learning methods for TLOL and influence how much 
the top management's learning is reflected in organisational outcomes. 
6.4 Methodological Contribution and Implications 
Beyond the theory and practice, this study makes a methodological contribution. As 
indicated by the corresponding little-integrated literature, organisational learning in 
general and TLOL in particular are immature disciplines which are characterised following 
Ketchen Jr. et al. by "... uncertainty about what constitutes the important questions to be 
asked and disagreement about how those questions should be addressed" (Ketchen Jr. 
et al. 2008, p. 644). However, it has often been neglected in the past that research 
methods can substantially contribute to the advancement of a field's domain (ibid), as in- 
depth empirical analyses can provide a platform for others to begin developing theories 
and explain phenomena. In that connection above all very detailed and in-depth insights 
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and/or longitudinal designs and/or new methodological perspectives can provide unusual 
data that can lead to subsequent significant theory development. 
This study makes a methodological contribution and is an attempt to contribute to the 
further development of TLOL by providing a rich methodology which ties together a 
detailed single case-study on TLOL which applies an enlarged definition of the research 
cohort, a longitudinal design and a dual perspective (here: the actors and resources 
perspective) on the phenomenon under investigation. The empirical study on TLOL is 
furthermore carried out by an insider researcher, which contributes not only to a better 
understanding of a series of epistemological and ontological challenges that have to be 
overcome when doing research on organisational learning (similar see Antonacopoulou 
2002) but also elucidates the specific requirements and constraints of doing research as 
an internal. 
6.4.1 The Top Management as the Research Cohort 
As elaborated in the Methodology Chapter, most research on top managers concentrated 
on CEOs and top management groups of a very limited size, which is partly due to the 
problem of getting access (see Finkelstein and Hambrick 1996). 
A vital contribution of this study is that a more comprehensive definition of the research 
cohort has been applied. The single case-study entailed several embedded cases, so 
that the study on the top management of a diversified firm did not only comprise the case 
organisation's members of the board of management, but also holders of key positions at 
corporate level as well as business unit heads at divisional level. Although these top 
managers all formed part of the same group that sought to transform itself during a 
turbulent period from a former monopolist into an international, diverse business player, 
these top managers headed organisations with very different characteristics in terms of 
growth, size, culture etc.. 
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The top management of the traditional, large and mature part of the organisation thus 
belonged to the subjects of the research, as did the top management of an initially very 
fast growing small company in a dynamic market, the top management of a company that 
was affected by a merger, as well as the top management of the headquarters of the 
case organisation. 
In all cases, these were top managers with considerable responsibility for strategic 
questions and/or operational business. This study has thus extended the relatively sparse 
research on the organisational learning of that target group which might, with the advent 
and growth of diversified firms, be of increasing importance. 
6.4.2 Conceptual Framework of TLOL 
A conceptual framework, which was derived from the literature, was used to organise the 
case study and to define the approach to data analysis. Apart from the fact that other 
researchers might find this conceptual framework useful as an analysis tool and for their 
own research projects on TLOL, a further contribution made by this study is the 
employment of a dual perspective to study TLOL. 
Using an `actors' and a `resources' perspective to examine TLOL and the dynamic 
interrelationships between the top management and the organisation is limited and 
highlights the need to consider different viewpoints and perspectives on this social 
phenomenon, to enhance the overall understanding of this concept. 
6.4.3 Doing Academic Research on TLOL as an Insider 
Qualitative studies on TLOL that are shaped by the hermeneutic tradition (also referred to 
as phenomenological paradigm, see section 3.3) are mainly interested in particular 
knowledge, such as how top managers construct reality. As was shown in the 
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methodology chapter, this means that subjective interpretation is key to the research 
process and requires that the researcher gets close to the research subjects. In spite of 
that, following Brannick and Coghlan (2007, p. 59), little attention has been paid so far to 
insider academic research and when it does it takes a rather negative view on what they 
call `going native'. Conversely some argue that there is no inherent reason why insider 
academic research is an issue (Brannick and Coghlan, 2007). Meanwhile, it can be stated 
that very little traditional research in the field of TLOL has applied a critical theory 
approach to executives, their actions, decisions and statements, and so has contributed 
to a better understanding of what executives really do or learn and why (similar: Ketchen 
Jr. et al, 2007). This in turn is-as this study illustrates-a strong point of doing research 
as an internal. 
A vital methodological contribution of this study lies in the fact that it highlights that insider 
academic researchers can through a process of reflexive awareness make knowledge 
explicit that is somehow embedded in the organisation and the top management as a 
sub-system of the organisation. It was furthermore possible to tap into the top manager's 
construction of reality and elucidate the case organisation's top management's 
understanding and mental concepts of the methods, outcomes as well as drivers of and 
barriers to TLOL. This study thus reaffirms the value and potential of insider academic 
research, especially against the background that today's researchers in the field of 
organisational learning and neighbouring fields of research such as strategic 
management, strategic leadership or knowledge management are vexed by the problem 
that certain constructs such as absorptive capacity, managerial discretion, dynamic 
capabilities or learning are very appealing but difficult to operationalise, not to mention to 
observe or to measure or to derive causalities from215. Insider academic research might 
215 For that reason Ketchen et al. (2008) came to the conclusion that despite important frameworks (e. g. 
Wernerfelt's (1984) resource-based view) for considering centrally important questions, certain concepts 
had less impact on the literature than they should have and risk reaching an impasse. 
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be one potential answer to that problem and might contribute to reduce such construct 
validity problems21' (compare Ketchen Jr. et al. 2008). 
This study also substantially adds to a better understanding of the specific dynamics and 
demands that are placed on insider academic researchers who undertake studies 
involving top managers in fast-changing environments or longitudinal studies. It has been 
shown in this study that insider academic researchers have to face the challenge to 
balance disparate interests: academic interests, those of the sponsoring organisation and 
the individual research subjects. 
Academic Community Sponsoring Organisation 
expects the researcher to... expects the researcher to... 
............ 
" 
............................ . º........ 
" Do a solid piece of research ; ;'" Do a piece of research that on 
that will contribute to general "" 
h TL Doing 
the short/ medium-term will 
t eory on OL and serves provide some improvement and 
the public good Research on will be of benefit to the 
" Accurately, objectively TLOL as an 
organisation 
transmit the findings and new ": Internal '" 
Contribute to a positive image of 
knowledge the organisation (4 e. g. no 
" Produce research which 
publication of negative findings) 
conforms with the standards T ;"" Meet the performance of, high quality' research inthefieldof requirements that are placed on 
(4 validity, reliability, tension between, * the researcher in his/ her active 
generalisability) :" opposing ; work-role 
" Make research progress that 
i 
/ 
interests 
7 
rements corresponds to requ 
" Individual top managers of the research unit] ; 
university ý" expect the researcher to... 
Resulting issues 
" Ethical issues 
" Potential role conflicts 
" Dual burden of working and researching 
" Deal with organisational change and politics 
" Potential prejudices between academics and practitioners 
...... ....... 
" Be independent and hold a position in the organisation 
with a certain status and power. 
" Produce visible research output on the short-term that 
focuses on the welfare of the research participants 
" Limit the burdens of research for the research 
participants (e. g. time, energy, disclosure of personal 
information) 
" Make efforts to secure the well-being of the research 
participants; (4 confidentiality, no harm or negative 
impact on career promotion, voluntary research 
participation) 
Figure 19: Insider academic research on TLOL-triangle of opposing interests 
216 i . e. that researchers are not measuring what 
they believe they are measuring 
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As figure 19 above illustrates, doing research as an internal thus means dealing with 
partly conflicting and contradictory interests and requires the insider academic researcher 
to find a compromise in his/ her approach to the research that is acceptable for all parties 
involved. 
For that reason, in the case of this study the first series of interviews with top managers of 
the case organisation did not primarily serve academic interests. Based upon the 
interview results a new project in the area of top management development was initiated 
in DT group and finally implemented by the researcher in her active work-role in the case 
organisation. This was of benefit for both the research participants and the sponsoring 
organisation. These short-term, visible results formed the foundation for trust in the 
continuing research work, which with the agreement of all participants, should also serve 
scientific purposes. All this would most likely have been almost impossible for a 
researcher with the active work-role of a "normal" employee. As for example, became 
clear from the arrangement of the interview appointments, top managers obviously placed 
value on the researcher's appropriate, functional and hierarchical position. The latter, 
together with the top management development project sponsored by the group board, 
was also not insignificantly seen as a guarantee that actual, visible benefits for the top 
management would result from the research. 
In this connection, this study makes a further methodological contribution by showing that 
research on TLOL and especially longitudinal research on TLOL is not possible without a 
rigorous consideration of ethical issues. The experience of this study is that getting 
primary as well as secondary access over such a long period of time is only possible 
when the researcher is aware of his/ her ethical responsibilities towards the sponsoring 
organisation and the research participants and takes corresponding precautions and 
actions. Only when the three ethical core principles which are particularly relevant 
for the 
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ethic of insider research on TLOL, i. e. justice, beneficence and respect for persons 
(Lindorff 2007) are respected, is the researcher trusted and can himself/ herself be 
sustainable in the organisation. For that reason and in order to avoid running the risk of 
being exploitative, it is agreed with Lindorff (2007) that there is a strong need for 
researchers to reflect upon their values, attitudes and professional ambitions and that the 
consideration of ethical issues deserves a more prominent position in business and 
organisation research. 
In spite of the particular challenges of doing research as an internal, the advantages and 
strengths of insider research outweight these however, and lead to the recommendation 
to use this research approach to a larger extent in the future. 
6.4.4 Research of Organisational Learning 
As elaborated in the Methodology Chapter, there are a series of methodological 
challenges when doing research on organisational learning. On one hand, these are 
linked with the fact that learning is a conscious as well as unconscious process and leads 
to resources that are partly tangible and partly intangible, to knowledge that is partly 
explicit, partly specific to the industry or even the firm and following the suggestion from 
Spender (1989) not accessible from without (similar Hitt et al. 1998). 
On the other hand, there is no objective, but only a socially constructed measure for the 
effectiveness of learning 217 , which means 
that the evaluation of the quality and 
effectiveness of organisational learning depends on a series of general, industry-, firm- 
specific, team-specific and individual criteria. These reasons were the cause for the 
inconsistent results of organisational effectiveness studies identified, and led to Bryman's 
call (Bryman 1995; Bryman and Bell 2003) for the abandonement of OE studies. 
217 Yeung et al. (1999) thus attached effectiveness to business performance, which he described in more 
detail with a set of criteria such as competitiveness and innovativeness. 
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This study has contributed to the understanding of the concerns raised by Bryman, by 
showing that especially in large organisations there is a often a long distance in time and 
space between the use of learning methods and learning outcomes (compare March 
1991). This does not only highlight the need to pursue a longitudinal research approach 
as it was used in this research project, but also raises the problem of creating a 
connection between cause and effect of the measure, which in turn requires firm-specific 
knowledge that again is not accessible from without. 
This thesis furthermore contributed to methodology by demonstrating that, as stated by 
Finkelstein and Hambrick (1996), the influence that the top management had on 
measurable organisational outcomes depended on a series of factors in the top 
management's learning environment. The study suggests that TLOL was strongly 
affected by the learning context and only reflected in organisational outcomes when there 
was high managerial discretion. 
For example, acquisition decisions, which had massive implications for the financial 
figures of the relevant organisation, were thus taken exclusively by the group CEO. In an 
organisational effectiveness study, in which the variable to be investigated was usually 
reflected in the organisation's performance, this would probably have led to false results. 
Further methodological implications and design requirements for TLOL studies derive 
from this aspect. 
It was thus shown in the Methodology Chapter that most of the research on top managers 
did not only apply a restricted definition of the research subjects. Very often, those 
studies comprised individual top managers coming from different companies. Given that 
there are, according to Finkelstein and Hambrick (1996), low-level and high-level 
discretion industries and organisations, methodological problems as regards the 
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comparability of the research subjects derive immediately from this-independent of the 
problems of dealing with tacit knowledge and social constructivism. 
Against the background that studies that apply a more comprehensive definition of the 
top management are already sparse, this study contributes to methodology by providing a 
single case study in a diversified firm in which the researcher held different active work 
roles, and in which there was, on one hand, much in common between top managers 
(e. g. industry, same roots, one brand) and at the same time, on the other hand, great 
differences (e. g. size, culture). Despite all remaining limitations, there should be greater 
comparability of individual frames of reference to assess the quality and effectiveness of 
organisational learning-in contrast to the studies with individual top managers coming 
from the most diverse industries-with which also knowledge that is not accessible from 
without (see Spender 1989) can be taken into consideration. 
6.5 Limitations and Future Directions of Research 
Although this research has made significant theoretical and practical contributions, like 
any other study, it has limitations that call for further research. This section highlights 
these, alongside future opportunities for investigation. 
First, the vast, interdisciplinary literature on organisational learning extends across 
multiple theoretical boundaries. In terms of the way in which the current literature is 
reviewed, it is clear that this study primarily emphasised the literature that concentrates 
on methods, outcomes as well as drivers and barriers of organisational learning at top 
management level in fast-changing environments. Though other related literature-such 
as the literature on top management or executive learning or the strategic leadership 
literature etc. -has been discussed in this thesis, the review thereof was not the main 
thrust and was therefore less than extensive. The literature on the learning organisation 
which corresponds to the prescriptive branch of the organisational learning literature was 
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also not appraised in detail within the scope of this study, as simply referring to what 
should be done to foster organisational learning without providing empirical evidence 
does not produce veridical knowledge. Likewise the ample literature on learning, 
knowledge management, strategy, the resource-based view, dynamic capabilities or 
absorptive capacity or the literature on the (formal or informal) structuring of organisations 
was, with few exceptions, not incorporated into the study. This limitation can be explained 
by the focus of this study, which aims to make specific contributions to methods and 
outcomes of TLOL. 
Secondly, there are limitations that result from the research design. This study was 
carried out as a qualitative single case study in which the researcher held an active work 
role. Although a series of precautions were taken in order to minimise bias, potential 
ethical issues or potential conflicts of interest on the part of the researcher (see 
methodology chapter), a limitation of this study lies in the involvement of the researcher in 
the organisation in terms of an active work-role and the resulting proximity to the research 
subjects. Therefore, possible leak effects from the researcher's experiences in working 
with the top managers cannot be fully eliminated, just like blind spots resulting from many 
years' tenure in the organisation. 
As this study was limited to one single case-albeit with its own embedded cases-the 
findings, to a certain extent, may have limited general applicability. This is a further 
limitation of this study although a series of countermeasures were taken (see 
Methodology Chapter) in order to overcome the weaknesses of a single case study and 
limited generalisability. Whereas further qualitative research may attempt to replicate this 
study in different organisational settings, quantitative research is suggested in order to 
extend the value of the research findings. In an initial step, this might include studies in 
comparable organisational settings and the same industry before moving on to other 
dimensions. 
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The last recommendation is related to methodological limitations of this research. As 
elaborated in the previous section, the process of learning as such cannot be observed. 
Therefore, in agreement with Miles and Randolph (1981), Giddens (1984) and Kammel 
(2000), this study reached the supposition that organisational learning has taken place 
when actions by organisationally key individuals that are understood to entail learning are 
followed by observable changes in the organisation's patterns of behaviour. This 
supposition, by definition, excludes all not-observable changes as well as difficult-to- 
access infomal structures such as communities-of-practice (Brown and Duguid 1991; 
Wenger 1998), which however, can also play a role in TLOL. Such a limitation represents 
a major research opportunity for future research. This, both with a view to how the not 
directly observable can be researched, and with regard to their interactions with 
observable changes, as well as the effects on TLOL. 
A further limitation of this study, according to Finkelstein and Hambrick (1996), lies in the 
fact that TLOL is only reflected in organisational outcomes, and is therefore directly 
observable, if top management has the necessary room to manoeuvre. This does not 
mean, however, that managers with low discretion do not learn, but that one-even 
despite the researcher's active work-role in the organisation and the employment of a 
longitudinal study-cannot directly measure and, a greater difficulty, can partly not 
observe this. This can-although this phenomenon is less pronounced among internal or 
external experts/consultants according to Richter (1999)-be reinforced additionally by 
positional solitudes, which can lead to top managers remaining cautious in their 
meaningful conversations and interactions. 
Another limitation of this research also results from the fact that executives themselves 
often have the tendency to claim positive results for themselves, whereas they like to 
assign unfavourable outcomes to others or to attendant circumstances. This complicates 
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the researcher's ability to evaluate certain outcomes and is not always transparent, even 
for an internal researcher. This was countered in this study by triangulation of data and 
data sources. 
The need for further research in this field is derived from the fact that managerial 
discretion, after the suggestion of Finkelstein and Hambrick (1996), is also partly 
determined by the executives themselves, as well as their awareness of multiple courses 
of action. Although researchers have not so far empirically examined these individual- 
level bases of discretion, there is agreement with Finkelstein and Hambrick when they 
determine that this represents a critically important arena for further investigation (see 
Finkelstein and Hambrick 1996, p. 32). In addition to the recommendations arising from 
the limitations and research design of this study, further recommendations for future 
research derive from this study. 
Linking the aforementioned individual dimension with industry, corporate and 
organisational characteristics and putting a stronger emphasis on managerial agency 
could also further contribute to a better understanding of the process perspective on the 
development of dynamic capabilities (Narayanan et al. 2009) or absorptive capacity (Lane 
et al. 2006, p. 854). Overall, the relationship between TLOL and dynamic capabilities or 
absorptive capacity offers many further promising directions for future research. 
More longitudinal empirical studies, as suggested by Easterby-Smith et al. (2009) and 
many other authors (e. g. Lane et al. 2006), could help to fill this salient gap and to better 
understand the relationship between the top management, TLOL and the creation and 
development of the firm's abilities to create, maintain and renew its bases of competitive 
advantage (Easterby-Smith and Prieto 2008). 
Given a clear definition of the constructs of dynamic capabilities and how they can be 
measured (for a critical discussion on that see Easterby-Smith et al. (2009)), 
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corresponding research could also include e. g. empirical work on Eisenhardt and Martin's 
(2000, p. 1109) concept of `equifinality', which suggests that there are multiple paths 
which lead to the same or similar dynamic capabilities. 
As elaborated earlier, there is still-partly due to the access problem-very sparse 
research on TLOL and neighbouring research areas such as top management or 
executive 'learning which also explains the impressive presentation by Finkelstein and 
Hambrick (1996) of future research directions of research on top executive managers. 
Whereas existing research often concentrates on CEOs or individual, selected top 
management positions, future research efforts should go beyond that and apply an 
expanded and a more differentiated approach. Some further work on `whom to study' 
could provide deeper insights into the common points and differences that exist between 
CEOs and top executive managers in large and small companies, in diversified and non- 
diversified firms, between corporate and non-corporate managers and between top 
executive managers with differing functions (e. g. operational and/or strategic). This would 
also provide an important contribution to which functions are comparable and which are 
not and how these different groups of top managers contribute to the creation and 
development of dynamic capabilities (see e. g. for corporate managers Adner and Helfat 
2003). 
Indeed, it is known that top managers predominantly learn "on-the-job". However, very 
little is known about the process of organisational learning-especially at top 
management level. Likewise, empirical studies on organisational learning styles at 
management level or methods for and outcomes of TLOL are still sparse. Such limitations 
call for more studies in this area, which take into account the interplay between different 
levels of learning. 
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Furthermore, little is known about the interaction of the composition of the top 
management group (e. g. significance of executive background factors such as 
demographic traits, functional background etc. ), structure of the top management group 
(e. g. role interdependence) and behavioural integration (i. e. cohesion versus conflict) of 
the top management group and its impact on TLOL. The same applies to the effect of 
incentive and reward schemes as well as executive compensation or also the role of the 
CEO, for which reason these fields show promising directions for future research. 
Likewise, based upon the large literature in that field, further empirical research on drivers 
and barriers of TLOL is needed which specifies those factors that are of particular 
relevance for the top management. A deep understanding hereof would allow better 
active organisation of TLOL in different contexts. 
It becomes evident that large areas in the field of TLOL still remain unexplored. This 
clearly not only calls for more qualitative as well as quantitative research. The great 
practical and theoretical interest in organisational learning and the learning organisation 
also hides the opportunity to further integrate the fragmented literature and research in 
the field of TLOL. 
6.6 Final Summary 
In conclusion this thesis has explored the methods and outcomes of top-level 
organisational learning. The study did not only identify and analyse a large number of 
methods for TLOL, it so contributed to a better understanding of the phenomenon and 
was able to identify a series of factors that fostered or impeded TLOL. 
In a nutshell, the study finds that the interplay between exogeneous factors, strategy, the 
characteristics of the organisation and the top management shapes the methods used for 
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TLOL, for which reason the applied methods are clearly different from one another, also 
in the different parts of the case organisation (here: large, mature part versus young, fast 
growing part). As has been illustrated, an `actors' as well as `resources' perspective was 
used to examine the methods and outcomes of TLOL. This contributed to an enhanced 
understanding of the dynamic interrelationships between the top management and its 
learning environment and the links between the methods used and organisational 
outcomes. This study particularly highlights the need for realistic observation of TLOL, 
whereby there are no simple cause-effect relationships and whose outcomes are not 
exclusively positive and do not exclusively contribute to solving the organisation's 
problems. Finally and although this was not the initial intention of this thesis, the study 
has added specific insights to the role and impact of the top management on what Cohen 
and Levinthal (1989, p. 569) call a firm's `learning'. It thus contributed to an enhanced 
understanding of how TLOL links to the process perspective on the development of 
dynamic capabilities and absorptive capacity which is a prerequisite for organisations to 
compete in such fast-moving contexts. 
This study has also been able to offer some practical suggestions and provides a new 
conceptual framework that allows researchers and management to systematically 
examine and shape top-level organisational learning within their own organisations. 
Finally reflecting on the experience of conducting this research on TLOL as a longitudinal 
study and as an insider researcher, the study has been able to offer some methodological 
insights that can be useful for future research in the field of organisational learning. 
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